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1.
The policy ideals of responsive regulation have been developed on the basis of substantial empirical evidence. The overall formulation of responsive regulation theory itself, however, has rarely been empirically tested. This article sets out the theoretical concept of responsive regulation in the context of business regulation enforcement and discusses how we might operationalize and empirically measure it. We develop two alternative theoretical interpretations of responsive regulatory enforcement: “tit for tat” responsive regulation and “restorative justice” responsive regulation. We then measure business firms' perceptions of the reactions and counter‐reactions of a regulatory enforcement agency throughout the investigation and enforcement process. We find little evidence of tit for tat responsiveness actually occurring in practice. To the extent that tit for tat responsiveness does exist, we find a small amount of evidence that it has the hypothesized effects on behavior but not on attitudes. We find clearer evidence of restorative justice responsiveness having the hypothesized effects on attitudes but not on behavior. 相似文献
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John Mendeloff Wayne B. Gray Philip Armour Frank Neuhauser 《Regulation & Governance》2021,15(4):1454-1479
How well do firms in the United States maintain compliance with occupational safety and health administration (OSHA) standards after being cited for a violation? How and why does this vary among standards? This paper identifies serious violations of 91 frequently cited standards at manufacturing plants during 1992–2002 and tracks compliance with that standard in later inspections over 10 years. While formal measures of Repeat violations are quite low, we find considerably higher re-violation rates for some standards once we look separately at how often health standards are cited in later health inspections and safety standards cited in later safety inspections. Characteristics of the standards affect re-violation rates, but not always in the expected direction. Standards whose violations are rated as more hazardous or which received higher initial penalties tend to have more re-violations. These findings could reflect inspector behavior, with those standards getting more attention and thus being cited more frequently. When, as in the case of OSHA and other enforcement agencies, we know about violations only when inspectors cite them, we need to consider bureaucratic behavior as well as employers' incentives. 相似文献
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Xuehua Zhang 《Regulation & Governance》2016,10(1):29-43
This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short‐lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment. 相似文献
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Jodi L. Short 《Regulation & Governance》2021,15(3):653-685
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of “politics” has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement. 相似文献
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Christopher S. Decker 《Regulation & Governance》2007,1(4):312-328
This paper considers the level of, and changes in, optimal noncompliance penalties under the following conditions: (i) where the regulator responsible for setting policy parameters, such as a penalty, is different from (and thus may have a different objective from) the regulator responsible for enforcing existing regulations; and (ii) where enforcement behavior changes from one in which enforcers are unresponsive to overtures on the part of firms to increase compliance to one in which enforcers are responsive to such overtures. The model developed shows that when enforcers “switch” from unresponsive to responsive enforcement, the optimal penalties for noncompliance need to be reduced. The analysis also gives insights as to what variables dictate the degree of penalty reduction. 相似文献
7.
Judith van Erp 《Regulation & Governance》2011,5(3):287-308
Enforcement agencies increasingly disclose or “name and shame” corporate offenders. This article uses responsive regulation as a framework for an empirical study of the impact of non‐anonymous publication of sanctions in the Dutch financial market. These publications are characterized as “naming without shaming”, because they are used for technical guidance rather than with the intention to shame. The findings show that naming offenders functions as a general deterrent in the market for financial intermediaries, but considerably less so in the capital market. In both markets, the publication of sanctions weakened the impact of enforcement. In the capital market, the publications neutralized the seriousness of offenses and contributed to the image of the regulator as powerless. In the market for financial intermediaries, naming offenders was perceived as stigmatizing shaming and led to defiance, rather than compliance. The case study suggests, however, that the publication of sanctions may provide an opportunity for guidance, provided they contain a moral message, rather than technical instruction. 相似文献
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Responsive regulation usually boils down to the assumption that enforcers should not shift to coercing before it has become clear that persuading does not work. This presupposes that it is possible to determine what the correct enforcement style is, that enforcers can apply the most suitable style, and that enforcers control the negative unintended consequences of their conduct. We have studied the applicability of these presuppositions at the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority by way of observations, interviews, and a survey. The applicability of all three presuppositions has proven problematic; enforcement agents apply different styles in comparable cases; they are impeded in applying the most appropriate style; and they do not control the perverse consequences of their conduct because regulatees tend to perceive it as more coercive than intended by inspectors. Our findings are not unique to this inspectorate and hence raise questions about the applicability of the theory of responsive regulation. 相似文献
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Design‐Build‐Finance‐Maintain‐Operate (DBFMO) contracts are a particular type of public‐private partnership whereby governments transfer the responsibility for the design, construction, financing, maintenance, and operation of a public infrastructure or utility service building to a multi‐headed private consortium through a long‐term performance contract. These arrangements present a typical principal‐agent problem because they incorporate a “carrot and stick” approach in which the agent (consortium) has to fulfill the expectations of the principal (procurer). This article deals with a neglected aspect in the literature related to the actual use of “the sticks or sanctions” in DBFMOs and assesses to what extent and under which conditions contract managers adopt a deterrence‐based enforcement approach or switch to a persuasion‐based approach, specifically when the contract clauses require the use of (automatic) deterrence. An empirical analysis of four DBFMOs in the Netherlands shows that the continuation of service delivery, the need to build trust, and the lack of agreement on output specifications play a role in the willingness of the procurer to apply a more responsive behavior that uses persuasion, even when deterrence should be automatically applied. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 相似文献
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Nathan Coombs 《Economy and Society》2016,45(2):278-302
AbstractIn response to the flash crashes and market manipulations blamed on high-frequency trading (HFT), algorithms have been brought inside the regulatory perimeter. This paper focuses on the most ambitious regulation directed at the practice: the algorithm-tagging rule in the German High-Frequency Trading Act. Fifteen interviews with stakeholders in the Act’s implementation serve to reconstruct how regulators defined an algorithm and help pose the question of to what extent regulatory definitions and data need accurately to represent financial practices to be useful. Although tentative in its findings, the research suggests that the algorithm-tagging rule may be providing valuable signals in the noise to trade surveillance officers and having virtuous effects on the cultures of trading firms. The conclusion argues that sociologists of finance should adopt a more balanced approach when evaluating regulatory technologies and heed MacKenzie’s 2005 call to open up their black boxes. 相似文献
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Suzanne Kingston Edwin Alblas Mícheál Callaghan Julie Foulon 《Regulation & Governance》2021,15(Z1):S143-S162
The European Union has some of the world's most ambitious and highly developed environmental laws on its books, but their effectiveness is severely compromised by non-compliance. With the UNECE Aarhus Convention (1998), Europe launched an innovative legal experiment, democratizing environmental enforcement by conferring third party citizens and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) with legal rights of access to environmental information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters. Based on some 2000 surveys and over 150 interviews with stakeholders from three Member States – France, Ireland, and the Netherlands – we adopt a holistic, 360° perspective, capturing the views of regulated parties, NGOs, and the general public on this private governance experiment. Our data provide important new insights into the practical effectiveness of Europe's laws enabling private environmental enforcement, its (intended and unintended) effects on farmers' compliance decisions in the vital area of nature conservation, and how law might be used to stimulate pro-environmental predispositions. 相似文献
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金国坤 《北京行政学院学报》2007,(2):66-70
建设法治政府是构建和谐社会的前提和保障。在和谐社会构建中的诸多不和谐音符中,相当部分是由于政府不依法行政所致。构建和谐社会必须建设法治政府。政府坚持依法行政,切实保护公民权利,严格执法、公正执法、文明执法,才能实现人们相互之间特别是政府与民众之间的和谐。 相似文献
14.
执法权与行政权辨析 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
鄂振辉 《北京行政学院学报》2005,(6):58-62
执法权与行政权是国家权力体系中非常重要的两种权力,它们既有共性与部分的重合,又有各自的特点与运作范围,它们运作的科学性、公正性与否,与每个公民的切身利益密切相关.随着我国政治体制改革的逐渐深化,执法体制与行政体制的改革已势在必行,有必要首先在理论上廓清两者的界限,对两种权力的性质、特点及其概念的使用进行系统分析,为执法体制、行政体制的改革作好充分的理论铺垫. 相似文献
15.
We examined the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) inspections in the US to identify the effects of repeated inspections and the time between inspections on non-compliance. Our sample included 549,398 inspections conducted from 1972 through 2006 in manufacturing plants in the 29 states where federal OSHA enforces the law. We controlled for inspection type, industry, establishment size, and year. The number of total violations cited fell by 28%–48% from the first to the second inspection; after that, the numbers declined much more slowly. These effects were found in every one of the four sub-periods examined. The number of violations cited increased with each additional year since the prior inspection after controlling for other variables; however, the increases were small, totaling approximately 15% over five years. OSHA should probably give higher priority to first time inspections than to repeated inspections. The current requirement that at least two years elapse between planned inspections should probably be lengthened. 相似文献
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AbstractThis study aims to empirically test a widespread assumption that fiscal crises instigate administrative reforms. The empirical analysis relies upon an international comparative study of the responses of 14 European governments to the fiscal crisis of 2008–2013. It is found that fiscal crisis and public administration reforms are not necessarily closely connected. In the majority of cases, the fiscal crisis did not have an instant effect of triggering structural public administration reforms or substantial shifts in existing reform trajectories. The crisis intensified the pressure to reform public administration to some extent, but the European governments’ responses predominantly followed a combination of straightforward cutbacks and incremental change. More substantial reforms were carried out in countries most severely hit by the crisis and/or where administrative reforms were conditioned by international financial assistance. 相似文献
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不依法行政,危害巨大。从"进一步完善行政执法体制,夯实执政基础;进一步转变执法理念,加强执法队伍监管;进一步完善行政执法程序,保护公民的正当权利;进一步创新执法方式,保证执法效果"等方面,自觉堵塞制度漏洞,深化体制改革,全面落实依法治国基本方略。 相似文献
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武暾 《铁道警官高等专科学校学报》2014,(4):78-83
法律的经济分析理论自产生发展至今,已成为法学理论的一个重要分支,要想正确认识和运用这一理论,必须对其理论结构进行详细的研究。法律的经济分析理论结构包括四个方面,即法律的经济分析理论的内涵、法律的经济分析理论的哲学基础、法律的经济分析遵循的原则、法律的经济分析的方法和基本定理。 相似文献
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William Funk 《Regulation & Governance》2011,5(2):275-285
This is a review essay concerning the book Regulation by Litigation. Utilizing public choice theory as the basis of its analysis, the book presents three case studies designed to demonstrate that regulation by litigation does not serve the public interest. This review essay attempts to show that public choice theory does not explain the decision to use litigation in these cases, that the alleged failure of litigation in these cases might not be failures at all, and that regulation by litigation is not the unmitigated evil the authors of the book suggest. 相似文献
20.
汪全胜 《北京行政学院学报》2006,(2):63-66
法规批准制度是指有关主体制定的法规范性文件需经特定主体的批准才能生效的法律制度。现行法规批准制度存在批准范围小、批准程序缺少操作性等不足。完善法规批准制度需合理设置批准范围、完善批准程序等,并对经批准的法规性质进行了法理考察。 相似文献