Suggested Capacities for Minister's Success: An Empirical Approach Based on Saaty's AHP

The roles of ministers are complicated, multiple, and demanding. They need to perform both as a leader of public organization and as a political actor in the Cabinet as appointed by the president or prime minister. This research empirically examines which capacities and types of ministers account for their success. It concludes that a policy capacity is the most desirable ministerial capacity. In addition, this study concludes that a political type minister is the most appropriate ministerial type for ministerial success. However, there is not one best ministerial model, or one required capacity for ministerial success. That is, this study intends to better understand the virtue and the responsibility of ministers.     

The Civil Servant as Legislator: Law Making in British Administration

How are government policy commitments converted into legislation and what happens in the conversion? The role of civil servants in preparing legislation is far more important than is generally assumed. By looking at the work of four recent bill  teams in Britain – teams of civil servants given the task of developing Acts of Parliament – their crucial roles in initiating policies, placing them on the political agenda (even helping secure their place in a party manifesto), developing them, making sure they pass through parliament and enacting them once they have reached the statute books are assessed. The article explores the composition and working methods of bill teams. These teams work with considerable autonomy in developing legislation, but it cannot be assumed that they operate outside ministerial control. Teams see themselves as reflecting the priorities of the government in general and their ministers in particular. Yet ministers typically know relatively little about the law they are bringing in until they receive the submissions and briefings from their officials. Perhaps the biggest danger for democracy is not a civil service putting forward proposals which a minister feels forced to accept, but rather that ministers do not notice or fully appreciate what is being proposed in their name despite having the political authority to change it and a civil service which bends over backwards to consult and accommodate them.     

‘…I TAKE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY!’: THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RELATION BETWEEN MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS IN GERMANY

How is the doctrine of ministerial responsibility applied in the decisions of German ministers (not) to resign? This question arises from an empirical puzzle as well as from a theoretical contradiction. Despite the prominent principle of ministerial responsibility, empirically, the ‘personal consequences' of ministerial scandals in their area of responsibility, display a large variance. Some ministers resign because of rather trifling affairs, others stay in office in spite of serious scandals. Taking into consideration the delegation relationship between the executive and the parliament, in view of the principal‐agent theory, a minister's resignation due to major political or personal misconduct is to be expected. On the other hand, the actual constitutional configuration of ministerial responsibility casts theoretical doubts on the ministerial loss of office. The quantitative analysis of 133 resignation issues in the years 1949 to 2009 reveals that ministerial responsibility bears no relevance to the decision whether to resign or not. Indeed, when the cause of the resignation issue is directly connected to ministerial responsibility, the probability of a resignation even decreases.     

Finding a party and losing some friends: Overcoming the weaknesses of the prime ministerial figure in Italy

Silvio Berlusconi poses a problem for the existing literature on prime ministers and their power. Though Italian prime ministers are traditionally seen as weak, Berlusconi has been able to achieve some remarkable policy gains during his current term as prime minister. This article uses veto player theory and combines it with existing institutional and political explanations for variation in prime ministerial power to look at this challenging case. By looking at the number of veto players in the Italian system, and their ability to credibly use their veto against Berlusconi, an explanation is posited which can accommodate the exceptionalism of his second term in office. Despite the emphasis on his control of the media, we conclude that Berlusconi's power stems from more traditional political factors. The authors argue that Berlusconi's coalition and party allies have no choice but to accept his will and his decisions, as any alternatives are less appealing.     

THE SCOTT REPORT

The Scott report shows that the two most serious allegations made against ministers - that they conspired to sell lethal arms to Iraq in violation of government guidelines, and that they conspired to send innocent men to prison - are unfounded.
The inquiry violated the Salmon guidelines for the conduct of tribunals and is further evidence that an informal tribunal of this type is less well-equipped to examine a matter causing nation-wide public concern and to secure justice to individuals, than a statutory tribunal appointed under the Act of 1921.
Nevertheless, the Scott report raises three issues of fundamental constitutional importance - ministerial accountability to which the final section of the report is devoted, freedom of information which Sir Richard regards as a corollary of ministerial accountability, and the proper relationships between ministers and civil servants.
Sir Richard believes that constitutionally improper things occurred during the period which his inquiry covers. The fact that no minister or civil servant paid any penalty casts doubt as to whether ministerial accountability is a genuine convention of the constitution or a convenient fiction enabling both ministers and officials to evade responsibility.     

Democratization and women’s representation in presidential cabinets: evidence from East and Southeast Asia

This article examines patterns of women’s cabinet representation across all presidential democracies in East and Southeast Asia since democratization. It demonstrates how the choice of female ministers differs across career backgrounds in presidential systems and further examines why young presidential systems in Asia are conducive to women’s access to ministerial power through professional career tracks. We argue that despite women’s successful performance in national legislative elections, women have been restricted to access the power resources necessary to target other political goals, such as cabinet positions, whereas democratic transition has provided broader avenues for women to emerge as professionals outside party politics. By analyzing original data on female ministers in East and Southeast Asia, the study finds that the share of women among professional ministers has increased over time, but women’s share among political ministers has not changed significantly. Additionally, the different qualifications of female politicians and professionals also make them eligible for appointment to different types of policy areas in terms of prestige and gender. Our analysis suggests that women’s cabinet representation has improved overall since democratic transition in Asia, but this improvement disguises contrasting outcomes in women’s cabinet status according to their career backgrounds.     

Navigating the dichotomy: The top public servant's craft

How in their day‐to‐day practices do top public servants straddle the politics–administration dichotomy (PAD), which tells them to serve and yet influence their ministers at the same time? To examine this, we discuss how three informal ‘rules of the game’ govern day‐to‐day political–administrative interactions in the Dutch core executive: mutual respect, discretionary space, and reciprocal loyalty. Drawing from 31 hours of elite‐interviews with one particular (authoritative) top public servant, who served multiple prime ministers, and supplementary interviews with his (former) ministers and co‐workers, we illustrate the top public servants’ craft of responsively and yet astutely straddling the ambiguous boundaries between ‘politics’ and ‘administration’. We argue that if PAD‐driven scholarship on elite administrative work is to remain relevant, it has to come to terms with the boundary‐blurring impacts of temporal interactions, the emergence of ‘hybrid’ ministerial advisers, and the ‘thickening’ of accountability regimes that affects both politicians and public servants.     

A DEFENCE OF FREQUENT MINISTERIAL TURNOVER

The frequency with which British ministers are transferred between departments incurs considerable adverse comment. It is generally held to have a prejudicial effect upon government. However, much of the criticism is misdirected and predicated upon questionable assumptions. There are cogent (if rarely voiced) arguments in favour of relatively rapid ministerial turnover. Within departments short-stay ministers are in a stronger position than conventional wisdom allows. At the cabinet level they are less likely to adopt a narrow, departmentally oriented approach at the expense of wider considerations. The party management function of ministerial reshuffles, though much disparaged, plays an essential part in effective government, promoting ministerial vitality and assisting in the achievement of the legislative programme. The preponderance of career politicians in the House of Commons accentuates the pressures for rapid ministerial turnover, the need for which is, paradoxically, further increased by the same party being in office for a prolonged period.     

UK Ministerial Responsibility in 2002: The Tale of Two Resignations

The resignations in 2002 of Stephen Byers and Estelle Morris (UK Secretaries of State for Transport and Education respectively) suggest the need to review the constitutional and political aspects of resignation. In both cases, ministers recognized that they had failed in the oversight or supervision of their departments and thus in the fulfilment of their ministerial role. Their resignations therefore provide evidence of a move away from 'causal responsibility', with its complication of the policy/operations and accountability/responsibility distinctions, towards 'role responsibility'. In so doing, they raise the possibility that what are commonly understood as 'departmental fault' resignations may be more appropriately subsumed within an expanded category of personal fault. The resignations also challenge Finer's thesis on the conditions that need to be meet for a resignation to be forthcoming. In neither instance was the political party out for blood or the prime minister unbending. In both cases the press was relentless, suggesting that the media has become a prime actor in determining resignation, and the minister yielding, a recognition, perhaps, of constitutional principle over political pragmatism.     

STRATEGIC LINKS IN A CUT‐THROAT WORLD: RETHINKING THE ROLE AND RELATIONSHIPS OF AUSTRALIAN MINISTERIAL STAFF

Ministerial staff relationships form part of the networks within the core executive. This article uses data from a comprehensive empirical study of Australian ministerial staff to explore advisers' horizontal relationships with each other. It finds that the interactions between Australian ministerial advisers are a key part of their role, are highly valued by ministers and public servants, and are an important element of the cabinet system. The informal links and networks between partisan advisers are underpinned by commonly understood norms of behaviour and a clear power structure. This partisan arena of the core executive has become important to ministers and the collective functioning of government.     

REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCOTT REPORT FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

The immediate impact of the Scott report was slight because it had no conclusion and led to no ministerial or other resignations. Reasons for this inconclusiveness were examined, including conventions of the judicial process, the difficulty Scott had in defining the offences he was examining, the slipperiness of those offences as constitutional conventions and Scott's lack of grasp of administrative processes.
Yet his report is a mine of information on problems of accountability in the area of government defence sales. It was atypical in that three departments pursuing four policies between them and with another department as policeman had a locus in the process. Given the nearly 100,000 licences being processed at one time, it was a large, complex and fragmented administrative activity which might easily have resulted in more mishaps than it did.
Despite its special features the author argues that it does provide evidence of six areas of difficulty in government accountability which are also of (growing) relevance outside the area Scott surveyed: how one finds who is responsible for policy and policy change; how accountability is secured where confidentiality is justified for national security or other reasons; how one gets operational accountability for executive operations within departments; the accountability of junior to departmental ministers; of junior to more senior civil servants; and of civil servants to ministers.     

Re-assessing the Role of Departmental Cabinet Ministers

The study of the core executive has been dominated by discussion of the Prime Ministers and Cabinet with only limited serious treatment paid to ministers. However, ministers and departments are crucial actors in the core executive. This article examines the multiple roles and varying impacts of ministers. More particularly, we initially develop a classification of ministerial roles, which builds upon, but develops, work by Headey, James and Norton. Subsequently, we use this classification to pose two key questions. Which roles do particular ministers stress? In what ways has the balance between these roles changed in the last twenty‐five years?     

RAYNERISM IN PRACTICE: ANATOMY OF A RAYNER SCRUTINY

Rayner scrutinies have become a regular feature of life in government departments. It takes only a few months to conduct a scrutiny but implementation is a far longer process which can absorb much ministerial and official time. This paper describes one of the first Rayner scrutinies — on arrangements for paying social security benefits — from inception to implementation. It relates the scrutiny team's reports to the social security system it was in part reviewing and then traces the way that ministers and officials handled the controversy that the scrutiny team's proposals caused when leaked in an inaccurate form. It concludes by speculating about some wider lessons that might be drawn about the validity of the scrutiny technique; the value of the Rayner label on reviews; the need for independent reviews in bureaucratic organizations; civil service responsiveness to reviews: the political dimension to management issues: public debate and open government considerations, and the indirect consequences of scrutinies.     

Acquiring Political Craft: Training Grounds for Top Officials in the German Core Executive

Political craft is an essential qualification of senior officials in the German Federal ministerial administration. The emphasis on political craft as a vital complement to administrative-technical competence reflects a policy-making system that is characterized by multi-party government, an assertive Parliament, a strong opposition, influential Lander , and growing informalization. In fostering political craft, three institutions play a key role: (i) the Chancellery; (ii) the political support units to the executive leadership; and (iii) the parliamentary parties in the Bundestag, which employ Federal ministerial officials on temporary leave. The centrality of these institutions in Federal policy-making makes them into outstanding training grounds for future top officials.     

THE NEXT STEPS AGENCIES, POLITICAL SALIENCE AND THE ARM'S-LENGTH PRINCIPLE: BARBARA CASTLE AT THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT 1965-68

The Next Steps agencies preserve a long tradition as the latest manifestation of the arm's-length principle of ministerial control. During the major part of this century, the now almost defunct public corporations offered one of the best examples of the arm's-length principle at work, and the recorded experiences of participants can provide valuable lessons for the Next Steps agencies. This article employs the diaries of Barbara Castle during her period as Transport Minister from 1965-68 in order to examine how she apportioned her time. From the evidence, a model is constructed which suggests that political salience is of greater importance than official structures in determining ministerial behaviour. Arising from the case study and the model, the final section of the article attempts to identify Next Steps agencies which have an inherently high potential for political salience, and concludes that, in this category, direct ministerial control would be preferable to the arm's-length principle.     

Ministerial Resignations 1945–97

This article reports on data collected on ministerial resignations and non-resignations 1945–1997. It analyses the reasons why ministers resign and patterns that emerge in terms of the types of issues that are more likely to lead to resignation, and variances between different Prime Ministers, parties and over time. It provides the first fully quantified analysis of ministerial resignations in Britain in the post-war period to enhance the impressionistic analyses which have been offered before.     

ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICIZATION OR CONTESTABILITY? HOW POLITICAL ADVISERS AFFECT NEUTRAL COMPETENCE IN POLICY PROCESSES

There is limited empirical research on the extent to which politicized recruitment of ministerial advisers affects the quality of the policy process. In this article we take a novel step by looking at two possible consequences of increased political recruitment for the policy process: administrative politicization and contestability. We deploy a Most Similar Systems comparison of Denmark and Sweden and include survey answers from 657 civil servants in managerial positions. We find that political recruitment of top civil servants, such as Swedish state secretaries, restricts the access of the civil service to the minister, but it does not substantially politicize the policy process. Danish civil servants perceive themselves as more contested by the relatively few Danish political advisers than their Swedish colleagues. Our results imply that the organization of political advice is a crucial factor for politicization and contestability     

CHANGES IN PUBLIC SERVICE BARGAINS: MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN DENMARK

The concept of public service bargain (PSB) has been reintroduced in recent times to the study of public administration to analyse the division of roles between ministers and the civil service in the context of public service reforms ( Hood 2000, 2001, 2002 ; Hood and Lodge 2006 ). The empirical investigation of the concept of PSB in general and changes in PSBs in particular is, however, limited. This article addresses this limitation by investigating what causes changes in public service bargains, particularly with respect to the provision of advice. As argued by Hood, we demonstrate how changes in PSBs can be explained by a combination of changes in the environments of ministries as well as the interests of the political actors. Furthermore, we point to the professional qualifications of civil servants as well as their interests as causes of change which, until now, have not received sufficient attention in the PSB literature. The article is based on a longitudinal case study of PSB between ministers and the permanent civil service in Denmark.     

The partisan–professional dichotomy revisited: Politicization and decision‐making of senior civil servants

Politicization has an ambivalent reputation among public administration scholars. While considered an effective instrument to safeguard political control over ministerial bureaucracy, partisanship of senior civil servants is likewise associated with patronage and is deemed detrimental to professionalism and meritocracy. To scrutinize this contradiction, the article examines how the party‐political background of senior civil servants influences their decision‐making behaviour. Two theoretically derived conceptions of loyalty are therefore put to the test: responsiveness and responsibility. Effects are captured by using the vignette technique in 40 in‐depth interviews with former senior civil servants from ministerial departments at federal and state level in Germany. The results are surprising in so far as they reveal that politicized senior civil servants act neither more responsively nor less responsibly than their non‐politicized peers. These findings challenge common assumptions and call for a more refined analysis of the conditions under which politicization leads to negative effects.     

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND POLITICS: SENIOR BUREAUCRATS IN FRANCE

Why is new public management reform so difficult to implement in France? In order to answer this question, this article examines the changes that have affected the higher civil service since the late 1970s. Decision‐making networks have been considerably politicized, and public policies are now largely devised by ministerial cabinets staffs. Simultaneously, the tasks of career senior civil servants are increasingly technical and specialized. The management reforms undertaken since 2002 by an economically liberal government might have offered senior bureaucrats the opportunity to regain a more active professional role, but the reforms run counter to their political culture, since the large majority of them still share a leftwing political ideology. Reformers seem to have no other choice than to change the institutional system in order to resolve this contradiction.