War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization

Studies of signaling in international relations reveal how punishing bluffing ex post through domestic audience costs or opposition groups facilitates credible ex ante communication among states and reduces the impetus toward war. Global integration of economic markets may also reduce uncertainty by making talk costly ex ante. Autonomous global capital can respond dramatically to political crises. To the degree that globalization forces leaders to choose between pursuing competitive political goals and maintaining economic stability, it reveals the intensity of leaders' preferences, reducing the need for military contests as a method of identifying mutually acceptable bargains. Asymmetric integration can dampen the pacific effects of globalization, but asymmetry does not in itself exacerbate dispute behavior. We present the theory and offer preliminary corroborative tests of implications of the argument on postwar militarized disputes.     

Gambling for Resurrection Versus Bleeding the Army: Explaining Risky Behavior in Failing Wars

This article examines the behaviors of political leaders who implement costly and risky measures during wars in which victory has become highly unlikely. It advances two related claims. First, counter to the prevailing logic, leaders with little to no culpability for starting a war remain susceptible to blame and domestic repercussions for how a war ends. Second, with these new leaders, the impetus to avoid blame can prompt risky behaviors that look like gambling for resurrection; but the underlying objectives differ. Through similar behaviors, new leaders do not necessarily hope to salvage victory but instead seek to simultaneously exhibit resolve and demonstrate the futility of further fighting, thus securing support for a less-than-favorable settlement while hedging against domestic punishment. To assess this “bleeding the army” logic as distinct from gambling for resurrection, the article looks at the case of the French Government of National Defense during the Franco-Prussian War.     

Democracy,Deception, and Entry into War

Realists propose that elected leaders that seek war but face a hesitant public may use deception to build public support for war. Leaders may secretly make provocative diplomatic or military moves to push the adversary to attack first, rallying the public behind a war effort seen as defensive, or publicly exaggerate the threat posed by the adversary. This paper develops a liberal institutionalist critique of this theory, positing that elected leaders are deterred from engaging in such deception because democratic political institutions such as political competition, a professionalized military, and the marketplace of ideas increase the likelihood that such moves will be exposed, and once exposed, deceptive politicians will suffer domestic political punishment. The paper examines the thesis that Franklin Roosevelt sought to provoke Germany and Japan to war in 1941, finding little support. It also finds that in general autocratic leaders are more likely than elected leaders to deceive.     

Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States

Traditional alignment theories, such as balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theories, suggest that states confronted by more powerful or threatening states are more likely to balance against those states than to bandwagon with them. Yet in the context of the newly independent states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis), this proposition has not held true. A refinement of Steven David's theory of omnibalancing sheds light on this empirical puzzle. Using in-depth case studies of Ukraine and Uzbekistan, the authors argue that the alignment calculations of cis leaders have been driven more by internal threats to those leaders' political survival than by external threats to the state. These internal threats include the more traditional variants, such as assassination attempts, coups, and civil war, but also include opposition leaders and parties that may be perceived as challenging a leader's political survival. The post–September 11 security environment and the u.s.-led war on terrorism has also fundamentally changed the strategic calculations of cis leaders, as the United States is now willing to assist leaders against Islamist extremism and terrorism, taking over a role formerly played by Russia. The theoretical nuances offered here provide a more robust and accurate understanding of alignment motivations in the cis, especially in light of recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.     

Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?

This paper will explore the ambivalence or conflict in the literature about the extent to which leaders matter in international politics, commonly linked to the level-of-analysis question. One the one hand, national leaders are often larger than life figures with strong preferences and distinctive personalities who seem to leave their stamp on events. On the other hand, most ir scholars place great stress on the incentives and constraints posed by the environment, be it domestic or international. I will proceed in four sections. The first discusses the essential claims at stake, the kinds of evidence that could be adduced to support one position or the other, and the pathways by which individual differences can make themselves felt. The second section examines the implications for morality, responsibility, and democratic theory. This discussion too will point to relevant methods, including ones that are contested. I will then turn to post-Cold War American foreign policy, skeptically examine the claim that individual presidents, even George W. Bush, mattered as much as is generally believed and close by discussing the implications for democratic accountability and control.     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.     

Threats,opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948–1982

This paper explores empirically how domestic political and economic challenges affect political leaders’ propensity to respond with the use of force at home and abroad. The foreign policy and world politics literatures are replete with references to leaders’ alleged use of external conflict when confronted with domestic challenges, but rarely consider domestic responses to dissent or the role of interstate threats. Comparative research on repression primarily focuses on linkages between domestic challenges and leaders’ resort to repressive policies, but ignores international alternatives. Neither literature considers the influence of external threats and opportunity structures on resort to use of force and coercion at home and abroad. Alternatively, we contend that foreign conflict and repression are complementary and potentially interchangeable policies that leaders may use to maintain political power in the face of domestic pressure. We hypothesize that the level of domestic political constraints conditions the opportunity and likelihood of selecting either repression or foreign conflict in response to domestic challenges. Since the ability to capitalize on external conflict involvement in all likelihood is not independent of international opportunity structures, we explicitly address differences in the availability of historical interstate animosity. We test our hypotheses on resort to repression and external dispute involvement on a global sample of political leaders for the period 1948–82. Our results indicate that repression and external conflict involvement appear to be largely independent and driven by different challenges: While there is some evidence that domestic conflict increases the likelihood of disputes and that external threat may promote repression, there is little support for the idea of direct substitution in kind since leaders frequently combine both dispute involvement and repression.     

Civil War Victory and the Onset of Genocide and Politicide

Why do some governments engage in genocide and/or politicide? A common explanation for such government-sponsored mass killing is that civil war provides governments both the incentive and opportunity to eradicate their enemies during the fighting. However, many episodes of genocide and politicide begin once the fighting has ended. I argue that when the civil war ends with a clear victor the winning party is more likely to engage in mass killing than if the conflict ends through negotiated settlement or other inconclusive manners, since the victorious party does not fear armed resistance while they eliminate dissidents throughout the country. Moreover, I posit that the government will be more likely to engage in politicide rather than genocide, as politicide eradicates the leader’s political enemies across cross-cutting segments of the population, whereas genocide only destroys certain communal groups. Statistical examination of all post-civil war periods between 1955 and 2009 supports my argument.     

India,Pakistan and the Legacy of September 11th

While the physical effects of the attacks on the United States and the corresponding 'war on terrorism' seem to be the most direct consequences of September 11th, the most noteworthy consequence is, in fact, the changing world order and the newly emerging concepts of security. India and Pakistan, based on their geography, politics, and domestic experiences, are two key participants to this war on terrorism. By reviewing the regional relationships, economic impacts, and the Kashmir situation since September 11th, it will be possible to see that the success of this new security order in South Asia is contingent on India and Pakistan's cooperation. The leaders of these two countries will have to balance their domestic challenges and the demands of the international community.     

Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games

Two‐level games models predict that domestic division within a state can alter the extent to which that state is able to reach agreements with other states, and also alter the content of any agreement that is reached. I extend the model by introducing internal side‐payments composed of unrelated domestic issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation most when the executive and median legislators are in relative agreement about other salient domestic political issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation least when the executive and median legislators are in relative disagreement about other salient domestic political issues. U.S. ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate that not all types of domestic division inhibit international cooperation—some can facilitate it     

The Intra-National Struggle to Define "US": External Involvement as a Two-Way Street

Three perspectives on the causes of communal conflict are visible in extant work: a focus on ancient hatreds, on leaders, or on the context that leaders "find" themselves in. Leaders therefore have all the power to mobilize people to fight (or not to) or leaders are driven by circumstantial opportunities or the primordial desires of the masses to resist peace or coexistence with historical enemies. Analysts who focus on leaders or context recognize that external actors affect internal conflicts, but little systematic research has explored the processes relating the domestic politics of nationalist mobilization to factors in the international arena. How does the international arena affect the competition among leaders? How do skillful leaders draw in external actors to lend credibility to their own views? This article asserts that leaders compete to frame identity and mission, and explores the degree to which international factors affect whose "definitions of the situation" are successful in precipitating mobilization shifts among potential followers. A unique finding of this longitudinal study of Northern Ireland is that the role played by international institutions and actors is affected by how domestic actors perceive, cultivate, and bring attention to the linkages between the two spheres.     

Political competition and foreign policy power sharing

In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. 1 develop a three‐actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an a priori value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states.     

Rationalist state,revolutionist EU and realist war: Austria in international society

This article examines Austria's position as a small, neutral state in the international society as framed by the English School. This examination is chiefly done in the face of the effects of great power conflicts and their impact on Western Europe's society of states. In doing so, the article provides insights to the fundamental puzzles concerning the ways power is managed between states, great and small alike. The article surveys how war (such as in South Ossetia in 2008) and war-like incidents affected Austria's position in the international society and the understanding of its place in great power conflicts between East and West. I argue that neutrality, despite European integration in the context of a peaceful international society, remains a political option for small states such as Austria. This option is especially lively if there is a domestic sentimental attachment to it and sticking to it does not undermine domestic or European and international foreign policy rationale and interests.     

Leopards Can Change Their Spots: When Leaders Take Out of Character Actions

According to audience cost theories, out of character actions by hawkish leaders are likely when such leaders can use their reputations to deflect criticism. This analysis examines the theory of out of character actions, focusing on shifting international conditions and the use of secrecy to allow leaders both to lead public opinion and avoid unwanted scrutiny. The plausibility of this theory is tested in the paradigmatic case for hawkish policy reversal: Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China in 1971–1972. Examination of four facets of Sino–American relations—the Soviet dimension, conservative opposition to rapprochement, growing domestic support for improved relations, and the secrecy of negotiations—reveal the significance of contextual factors and Nixon’s decisions in explaining improved relations. Leaders can effectively change their type with minimal political repercussions, as long as conditions are favourable and audience costs can be minimised.     

Military Dialogue in the Euro‐Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence

The summer 2006 war in Lebanon can be perceived through at least five different frames of reference. The US administration saw the war in Lebanon as a local manifestation of the global war on terror. According to this framework, Hezbollah is an Al Qaeda-type enemy, not a national group with a local agenda and constituency; bargaining with Hezbollah is not possible. This point of view makes fighting global terror more difficult and jeopardises the search for stability and peace in the region. Many Israeli and European politicians saw the war as a confrontation between radical Islam and a modern Israeli state, a clash of cultures between Islamic fundamentalists and Western civilisation. This frame of reference, however, fails to recognise the fault line within the Muslim world itself, between those who want to integrate their societies into a globalised world and those who do not. The conflict in Lebanon can also be interpreted as a consequence of the weakening of a state, a framework which underlines the need to strengthen Arab institutions, or as an asymmetrical war between an armed nation state and a guerrilla movement. Finally, the war in Lebanon can be seen as a conflict over power, land, resources and sovereignty–the classic realist perspective. If the international community fails to work toward a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, another framework will gain strength in the Arab world: one that interprets events according to a theory of non-negotiable conflicts between Western imperialism and radical Islamic resistance.     

The economic community of West African states,the defence of democracy in Sierra Leone and future prospects

The wave of democratization in the 1990s has brought considerable challenges and opportunities for post‐cold war Africa. One such challenge is the democratic intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) under the aegis of the multilateral intervention force, ECOMOG, to restore a democratic government and constitutional order. The ECOWAS democratic intervention in the West African state of Sierra Leone can be located in a wider debate about international dimensions of democratization. In several respects, it also reflects the changing nature of international politics in the post‐cold war period particularly with regards to certain traditional norms of international society, namely non‐intervention and state sovereignty. The ECOWAS democratic efforts in Sierra Leone demonstrate that it is increasingly becoming acceptable for regional and international organisations to ‘defend’ democracy, albeit under the auspices of forcible as well as non‐forcible humanitarian intervention. However, these kinds of external intervention on behalf of democracy have in most cases led to its retrenchment. This article therefore critically assesses how the nature of domestic politics led to the suspension of democracy in Sierra Leone, the domestic and international implications of the ECOWAS defence of democracy there and the country's post‐conflict democratic prospects.     

Why Conceptual Models and "Big" Institutions Matter: A Response to David Altheide,Nina Eliasoph,William Gamson,and Todd Gitlin

The two cases analyzed here demonstrate a new journalistic practice of interviewing enemy leaders at times of war. We argue that whereas traditionally journalists had accepted the principle that when the nation is under threat, patriotism precedes professionalism, in the new media environment, with the domestic public exposed to international TV channels, this is no longer an option. As a result, journalists act more independently, even when this entails public resentment and government disapproval. We demonstrate how in interviewing enemy leaders, journalists play the part of politicians once diplomatic negotiations have ceased. Although such interviews provide high ratings and amplify the relevance of journalism at times of war, the irregular settings in which they are conducted undermine the journalists' endeavor. From the interviews we examined, it emerges that the cross pressures on the interviewers lead to a questioning style that deviates significantly from normative news interviews. Interviewers tend to be dragged to one of the extremes of hostility or deference. Finally, we show how the ways in which domestic governments respond to these interviews serve as additional evidence of their controversial character.     

Italian foreign policy in the post-cold war period: a neoclassical realist approach

Abstract

Drawing on a neoclassical realist approach, this article analyses the foreign policy conduct of different Italian governments from 1994 to 2008. Pressured by the post-cold war international system, these governments have been compelled to raise Italy's profile within the international system. However, the way in which successive governments have responded has differed markedly. By looking at variables located at the domestic level – elite perceptions of the distribution of power and government instability – it is possible to explain these differences. Neo-classical realism is seen as an advance on Waltzian neo-realism precisely because it allows room for domestic as well as international (or systemic) variables, and because it has a very specific focus on foreign policy as such.     

Human rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state

How does state obligation to international human rights treaties (HRTs) affect mobilized dissent? We argue that obligations to protect human rights affect not only state behavior but also the behavior of dissidents. We present a theory in which the effect of HRTs on dissent is conditional on expectations of when it will constrain government behavior. We assume that HRT obligation increases the likelihood that government agents face litigation costs for repression but argue that leaders are only constrained when they would be most likely to repress. The expectation of constraint creates opportunity: citizens are more likely to dissent in HRT-obligated states with secure leaders and weak domestic courts. We find empirical support for the implications of our theory using country-month data on HRT obligation and dissent events from 1990 to 2004.     

A Comment on the Comments

Private diplomacy and secret agreements among adversaries are major features of international relations. Sometimes secret reassurance has resulted in cooperation and even peace between longtime adversaries. Yet rationalist theories consider private diplomatic communication as cheap talk. How do we explain this gap between theoretical expectations and the empirical record? I offer a theory that explains how, why, and when a leader may convince an enemy that his private reassurances are credible even when they are not costly to undertake. I also account for the conditions under which recipients of such reassurance infer the leader's benign intentions from these secret interactions. I claim that leaders engage in secret reassurance with the enemy when they face significant domestic opposition. The adversary can leverage the initiator's domestic vulnerability by revealing the secret reassurance, thereby imposing domestic punishment on the initiator. Further, by entering into private or secret negotiations and offering their adversary such leverage, initiators generate “autonomous risk” that exists beyond their control. I evaluate this theory against two empirical cases. The first case looks at Richard Nixon's secret assurances to the Chinese leadership in 1972. The second examines the secret negotiations between Israeli officials and the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization that ended with the signing of the Oslo I Accord in 1993.