Autocracies,democracies, and the violation of civil liberties

Research on autocracies and their consequences has been a growth industry in the latest decade. Nonetheless, the relationship between the type of autocracy and the violation of civil liberties has largely been ignored. In this article, we employ a new dataset, which includes cross-temporal data on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly/association, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement, to shed light on this issue. Analysing 182 countries in the period 1979–2008, we show that democracies repress civil liberties less than autocracies do, whereas we find little evidence to the effect that different kinds of autocracies violate civil liberties to different degrees. However, we also show that the differences between democracies and autocracies have declined starkly since the Cold War. Finally, our results demonstrate that the difference in the extent to which democracies and autocracies repress civil liberties is larger for the freedom of speech and freedom of assembly/association than for the freedom of religion and freedom of movement. We take the general difference between the two categories of liberties as evidence that autocracies repress political liberties more than private liberties because the former presents levers for oppositional activity. We argue that the cross-temporal differences are a consequence of the spread of more minimalist democracies since the end of the Cold War.     

广东省对美、日贸易与经济增长关系的实证分析

广东省作为我国改革的前沿阵地，改革开放30年来，经济实力、市场环境得到了大幅提升和改善。目前广东省GDP总额已经占到全国的1／8，多年排名全国第一。在我国出口主导型的经济发展模式下，广东在对外贸易方面更是走在了全国的前列，进出口贸易额对外贸易顺差额均排名全国第一，2007年广东进出口贸易额占全国的30％，     

Buying National: Democracy,Public Procurement,and International Trade

Many studies show that democracy promotes freer trade. However, because they typically focus on “at-the-border” barriers such as tariffs, we know little about democracy’s effects on “behind-the-border” barriers such as discrimination in government procurement. We address this question by asking how democracy affects governments’ incentives to discriminate against foreigners when buying goods and services. We argue that “buy national” policies have unclear costs and are harder to attack than policies that visibly interfere with consumers’ ability to buy foreign goods. This makes such provisions more attractive than tariffs to democratic leaders seeking reelection. We thus hypothesize that democracy leads to lower tariffs but to greater discrimination in public procurement. We support this hypothesis with an analysis of procurement and imports in 138 countries from 1990 to 2008. Our results imply that a full understanding of the democracy–trade policy relationship requires attention to increasingly prominent behind-the-border barriers to trade.     

Unionization and Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment

Although inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has many benefits for a country as a whole, like trade, it is a source of competition for producers in the host country, with concomitant effects on labor markets. The entrance of foreign multinationals increases demand for skilled labor at the expense of unskilled labor, and also increases the elasticity of demand for labor because multinationals are able to shift production across borders. This raises the question of whether or not labor has an impact on policy toward inward FDI. I suggest that organized labor is a key determinant of the influence of labor on inward FDI restrictions. Not only do unions mitigate the collective action problem facing labor, but unionized workers, regardless of skill level, have incentives to support restrictions on inward FDI because rising elasticity of demand restricts bargaining power. I expect that higher levels of unionization will lead to greater restrictions on inward FDI. I find support for this hypothesis in an analysis of U.S. industry-level formal restrictions on inward FDI between 1981 and 2000. Industry skill intensity, a proxy for the distributional consequences of FDI for labor, does not explain variation in barriers to inward FDI, suggesting that the confluence of interests and influence is necessary for labor to influence policy.     

Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

This paper examines individual attitudes in six industrialized democracies to determine what factors condition citizens' support for trade liberalization. We argue that public support for trade liberalization is influenced by politically driven views and individual economic utilitarian considerations. To test our propositions, we develop and estimate a series of logistic regression models of public support for trade liberalization. That data are derived from The World Values Surveys (1995–1997). We find strong empirical support for the economic utilitarian factors—primarily education, but also gender and income—as the principal factors shaping individual attitudes toward trade liberalization. Conversely, while some empirical support is found for political factors such as one's geographic orientation and level of cognitive mobilization, we find that the political predictors of support are weaker overall than the economic interest predictors.     

Domestic politics and the WHO’s International Health Regulations: Explaining the use of trade and travel barriers during disease outbreaks

During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO), acting under the authority of the International Health Regulations (IHR), recommended against the imposition of trade or travel restrictions because, according to WHO, these barriers would not prevent disease spread. Why did 47 states impose barriers anyway? This article argues that states use barriers as political cover to prevent a loss of domestic political support. This logic suggests that governments anticipating high domestic political benefits for imposing barriers during an outbreak will be likely to do so. Logistic regression and duration analysis of an original dataset coding state behavior during H1N1 provide support for this argument: democracies with weak health infrastructure—those that stand to gain the most from imposing barriers during an outbreak because they are particularly vulnerable to a negative public reaction—are more likely than others to impose barriers and to do so quickly.     

Give Me Shelter: Reexamining Military Intervention and the Monadic Democratic Peace

Increasing empirical evidence points to the existence of a monadic democratic peace. However, the quantitative literature on international conflict has yet to produce any compelling evidence that such a peace holds for one of the most prominent types of interstate force in use today, foreign military intervention. This study tests the hypotheses that democracies are less prone to intervene militarily and less likely to be the targets of such incursions. In doing so, it compares six overlapping theoretical perspectives on the monadic democratic peace. No empirical support is lent to the hypothesis that democracies intervene less often than nondemocracies, but considerable evidence indicates that democracies are rarely the targets of foreign military intervention. The latter result remains consistent across six different intervention populations from 1975 to 1996. Of the six theoretical perspectives analyzed, the institutional approach recently advanced by Bueno de Mesquita and his associates fares best. Its predictions match the empirical outcomes exactly. None of the other theoretical frameworks is even half right. In sum, it seems that democratic governance provides a barrier against foreign military intervention, but it does not limit intervention abroad.     

The Geography of the International System: The CShapes Dataset

Sceptics of globalization attribute the proliferation of light weapons to economic openness. Increasing globalization apparently weakens public authority, leading to social disarray, anomic violence, and general conditions that make handgun ownership and use more likely. Pro-globalists might argue contrarily that trade openness can raise the premium on peace as violence is bad for business. Moreover, greater interdependence allows the diffusion of anti-proliferation norms and facilitates cooperative behavior among trading partners for stemming the demand for and proliferation of small arms. Using a unique dataset on small arms imports, we find that greater openness to trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) lowers small arms imports per capita. A policy measure of economic freedom is associated with higher small arms imports, but this association seems to be explained entirely by the association between economic freedom and strong bureaucracies. States that are de facto more open to the global trading system are less likely to be inundated with these weapons, but richer, better-governed countries import more small arms. Global policy should pay closer attention to the seepage of these weapons from the relatively wealthy, who manufacture and buy them in larger quantities, to the poor, among whom the ‘problems’ associated with small arms are often manifested. Curbing those factors that encourage globalization, however, would be counterproductive to reducing the trade in small arms and light weapons.     

Perils of parliamentarism? Political systems and the stability of democracy revisited

Parliamentary systems are generally regarded as superior to presidential ones in democratic sustenance. This article contributes to the debate on the relationship between systems of government and the survival of democracy by bringing in a new perspective and analysing the experiences of 131 democracies during 1960–2006. We argue that systems of government do matter, but their effects are indirect; they exert their influence through societies' prior democratic records. Confirming the conventional argument, our data analysis shows that uninterrupted parliamentary democracies face significantly lower risks of a first breakdown than their presidential counterparts. Contrary to the common understanding, however, we find that the risk of a democratic breakdown can be higher for parliamentary regimes than for presidential regimes among the countries whose democracy has collapsed in the past. Furthermore, the risk of a previously failed democracy falling again grows as (the risk of) government crises increase(s). Hence our study questions the common belief that parliamentary systems are categorically more conducive to democratic stability than presidential ones.     

黑龙江省壮大对俄贸易主体研究简

黑龙江省在对俄经贸合作上一直走在全国前列,并致力于打造对俄经贸平台.该省对俄贸易经营主体特点为私营企业领跑出口、国有企业引领进口;对俄贸易方式主体特点为一般贸易和边境小额贸易是主要贸易方式、边境小额贸易方式不可或缺、一般贸易方式开始占据主导地位;贸易商品主体特点为传统商品和机电产品占据出口大部分份额而地产品份额小、机电产品出口创新高、自俄进口资源性产品仍占主流.     

Give them toys? Military allocations and regime stability in transitional democracies

In contrast to the conventional wisdom that democratization reduces coups, 46% of coups targeted democracies from 2000–2009, twice the rate seen in the prior half-century. Efforts to explain coups have arrived at wildly varied conclusions regarding the vulnerability of democracies. We argue that this is attributable to regime type acting as a conditional influence. We theorize that democratization incentivizes old elites to veto the process, and these vetoes are more likely to occur when the new regime cannot credibly commit to the military’s corporate interests. Using cross-national data for 172 states for the years 1952–2009, we find that though young democracies are more vulnerable to coups than either civilian authoritarian regimes or older democracies, this vulnerability is mitigated when military expenditures are near or above the sample mean. We also find that commonly argued determinants of coups appear to be driven by their influence in democracies, suggesting the need for scholars to revisit commonly held assumptions regarding autocratic survival.     

Institutions,the Illegal Drug Trade,and Participant Strategies: What Corrupt or Pariah States Have In Common with Liberal Democracy and the Rule of Law

Institutions generate incentives that guide behavior, but many analysts and policymakers underestimate the power of institutions to affect behavior by ignoring how distinct strategies work to generate similar outcomes in different institutional contexts. This article uses the illegal trade in psychoactive substances to illustrate how outcomes (the size of the illegal drug market) across very distinct political institutions can be the same because individuals adopt different strategies in their pursuit of the same behavior: to participate in the illegal drug trade. The illegal trade in psychoactive substances represents an understudied and poorly studied issue in international relations. Arguments that focus on the deviant characteristics of governments in the developing world and organized crime to explain the trade are misleading for empirical and methodological reasons. I propose a general argument about the proliferation of the illegal drug trade that accounts for its success in countries struggling with poverty, corruption, terrorism, and pariah leaders, as well as in rich, stable democracies in which the rule of law “reigns.” The article takes factors that are often seen as distinct in explaining the drug trade (e.g., civil rights in liberal democracies and corruption in developing countries) and demonstrates that their explanatory logic represents variations on the same causal variable: the ability to conceal oneself. My insight is that the strategies used to achieve concealment vary by the institutional context in which participants find themselves.     

朝韩经济合作现状与前景分析

随着朝韩政治关系的缓和 ,双方的经贸合作发展十分迅速。目前 ,双方间贸易形式有3种 ,即商业贸易、委托加工贸易和非交易型贸易。 2 0 0 2年朝韩间的贸易额达 6 4亿美元 ,占朝鲜对外贸易总额的 1/4以上 ,在朝鲜吸引的外资中韩国更是首屈一指 ,在朝鲜 4个经济开发区及特区中有 2个是由韩国单独投资建立的。但双方在经贸合作中也存在一些亟待解决的问题 ,如商品进出口结构不合理、进出口能力差距悬殊等。从长远看 ,双方在共同发展与共同繁荣的原则下 ,将会继续扩大经贸方面的合作。     

Globalization and Domestic Trade Policy Preferences: Foreign Frames and Mass Support for Agriculture Subsidies

Reforming agriculture trade policy is key to breaking the deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations. While existing studies have focused on institutions and interest group barriers to agriculture trade reform in developed countries, most have failed to recognize the broad support for agriculture protection among developed countries. In this article we examine one of the drivers of this support: the ability of politicians to frame their own agriculture policies as less generous relative to those of other countries. Drawing on existing literature on heuristics, we argue that voters are malleable to politicians’ comparative framing of agriculture policies. Using an original survey experiment in the United States, we find that framing US agriculture as less generous than other countries generates an additional 12% of respondents supporting increased farm payments to US farmers. These results speak to the difficulty in reforming agriculture and more broadly about the lack of public support for unilateral trade liberalization.     

Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment

The industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature.     

Finding peace in a world of hegemony and terrorism

Although acknowledging the importance of power, Immanuel Kantsuggested that republican constitutions, economic interdependence,and international law and organizations can form the basis fora dramatically more peaceful world. Statistical analyses ofthe behavior of pairs of states, 1885–1992, confirm thisliberal vision. Using methods common to medical epidemiology,we find that the Kantian elements substantially reduce the likelihoodthat states will become involved in a fatal militarized dispute.Indeed, two democracies linked by extensive trade and a densenetwork of international organizations are 95% less likely tofight than states that do not share these characteristics. Ouranalyses have important implications for the United States andChina, two countries destined to shape the twenty-first century.Engaging China in trade and integrating it into the major internationalorganizations over the last three decades has, with some liberalizationof its government, substantially reduced the risk of militaryconflict.     

菲中贸易对菲律宾经济的影响评估

2005年以来，中国成为菲律宾的第三大贸易伙伴，菲中贸易对两国都产生了重要影响。本文主要分析菲律宾与中国之间的进出口商品结构、机械及运输设备和农产品贸易数据，评估菲中贸易对菲律宾经济、就业和民生的影响程度。     

Ideological radicalism and democratic experience in new democracies

In comparing publics’ ideological self-placements between established and new democracies, it has been observed that there is a higher proportion of citizens who express radical views in the latter countries. This is likely due to sharp differences with regard to evaluations of past authoritarian rule, the legitimacy of the new regime, or new institutional arrangements governing the distribution of power when countries embark on democratic transition. Studies on the attitudinal aspect of democratic consolidation lead one to expect a decrease in extreme views in new democracies with the passage of time, as questions of regime principles and institutions are settled, and citizens come to accept democracy as the “only game in town”. The present article investigates whether this proposition is applicable to “Third Wave” new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia by examining longitudinal public opinion data from 23 countries. In addition to the length of democratic regimes, We also analyse the impact of economic performance, quality of governance, and electoral systems on the proportion of radical citizens. Results show that while longer democratic experience does contribute to reducing extremist leanings, factors such as the level of corruption, rule of law, and plurality electoral rules play a more substantive role.     

What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System

This paper assesses the relative importance of force employment as a cause of military victory. It focuses on the adoption of the modern system in interstate wars since 1917. Using cases, contingency tables, and regression analysis, we find that war participants who use the modern system are significantly more likely to succeed in decisive battlefield engagements. However, the modern system does not predict victory at a higher rate than more traditional unit-level explanations for combat effectiveness, suggesting that it might function as a causal mechanism linking factors like regime type and material endowments with martial capabilities. Exploring the possible links between unit-level explanations of military power and the organizational-level force employment indicators, we find that more materially powerful states and democracies tend to implement the modern system at a higher rate than other types of actors, but more extreme autocracies also frequently adopt. Combined, these findings suggest the relevance of continuing to explore how organizational-level variables impact military effectiveness.