The ideological nationalization of partisan subconstituencies in the American States

Since the mid-twentieth century, elite political behavior in the United States has become much more nationalized. In Congress, for example, within-party geographic cleavages have declined, roll-call voting has become more one-dimensional, and Democrats and Republicans have diverged along this main dimension of national partisan conflict. The existing literature finds that citizens have only weakly and belatedly mimicked elite trends. We show, however, that a different picture emerges if we focus not on individual citizens, but on the aggregate characteristics of geographic constituencies. Using biennial estimates of the economic, racial, and social policy liberalism of the average Democrat and Republican in each state over the past six decades, we demonstrate a surprisingly close correspondence between mass and elite trends. Specifically, we find that: (1) ideological divergence between Democrats and Republicans has widened dramatically within each domain, just as it has in Congress; (2) ideological variation across senators’ partisan subconstituencies is now explained almost completely by party rather than state, closely tracking trends in the Senate; and (3) economic, racial, and social liberalism have become highly correlated across partisan subconstituencies, just as they have across members of Congress. Overall, our findings contradict the reigning consensus that polarization in Congress has proceeded much more rapidly and extensively than polarization in the mass public.     

Reexamining the Effect of Racial Propositions on Latinos’ Partisanship in California

Many seasoned politicians and scholars have attributed the loss in support for the Republican Party in California to its push for three racially divisive propositions in the mid- 1990s, especially the anti-immigrant Proposition 187. Their costs are said to involve the partisan realignment of Latinos against the Republicans. Using three separate data sources, we find no evidence of a “tipping point” or abrupt realignment among Latino registered voters who made up the electorate. Latinos’ partisanship within California did not change significantly; it did not change much when compared to nearby states; nor did voter registration change materially. The loss of support for Republicans occurred primarily among unregistered Latino voters whom historically had never been strong supporters. Our findings question the conventional wisdom about the powerful political effects of the propositions, and reaffirm the long standing conclusion in the literature that realignment due to a “critical election” is rare.     

The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century

One of the most important developments affecting electoral competition in the United States has been the increasingly partisan behavior of the American electorate. Yet more voters than ever claim to be independents. We argue that the explanation for these seemingly contradictory trends is the rise of negative partisanship. Using data from the American National Election Studies, we show that as partisan identities have become more closely aligned with social, cultural and ideological divisions in American society, party supporters including leaning independents have developed increasingly negative feelings about the opposing party and its candidates. This has led to dramatic increases in party loyalty and straight-ticket voting, a steep decline in the advantage of incumbency and growing consistency between the results of presidential elections and the results of House, Senate and even state legislative elections. The rise of negative partisanship has had profound consequences for electoral competition, democratic representation and governance.     

The distorting effects of racial animus on proximity voting in the 2016 elections

While the use of racial appeals by the 2016 Trump campaign is indisputable, researchers are actively debating their precise role in influencing voter behavior in the election. We seek to expand upon existing research which finds that racial animus electorally benefited the Trump campaign. We examine to what extent those benefits also materialized for GOP candidates down-ballot and whether racial animus distorted ideological proximity voting in the 2016 election. We find that racial animus among voters helped Republicans at multiple ballot levels and that higher levels of racial animus distorted spatial voting among voters ideologically closest to the Democratic candidate.     

Pathways to trump: Republican voters in 2016

The 2016 candidacy of Donald Trump has drawn considerable interest among social scientists and it invites a broader investigation into analyzing the dynamics of primary elections. We identify four key popular accounts that supposedly explained Trump's support: authoritarianism, populism, ethnic prejudice, and trade and immigration attitudes, most of which are associated with an argument about support for Trump in the white working class. With a unique survey panel to explore changing support for Republican presidential candidates over the primary season, we test these competing theories and examine their fit to the pattern of support and opposition to Trump before and after the primaries. We find that populist attitudes and anti-Muslim bias were considerably more important than authoritarian dispositions, and immigration and trade policy attitudes in explaining support for Trump among Republicans during the 2016 primary season. We demonstrate how Trump's supporters became more diverse as they increased in numbers over the primary season, but new supporters were not a representative sample of Republicans who initially supported other candidates.     

Transaction costs in electoral coordination: How turnout shapes changes in the number of parties*

This article examines the forces shaping changes in the number of parties between consecutive elections. We argue that the transaction costs in electoral coordination depend on the turnout level in the previous election. The greater the number of peripheral voters entering the electorate, the less likely a substantial change in the distribution of partisan support in the subsequent election. The argument is tested using data for 313 parliamentary elections in 63 countries from 1990 to 2011, and two cases studies of countries using compulsory voting (the Netherlands and Australia).     

Race,Class, and Values in Post-New Deal Presidential Politics: Inverted Class Loyalties as a Trend in Presidential Elections, 2000–2012

This article analyzes the role of race, class, and values as a determinant of voting behavior in recent presidential elections. Over the past decade the What's the Matter with Kansas? thesis has been cited to argue that the culture wars over social issues (civil rights, homosexual rights, feminism, gun control) have inverted the class determinant of partisan choice to the point where lower-income white voters favor the Republican Party while professionals have shifted toward the Democratic Party. The article concludes that there is significant evidence that the class loyalties as determinants of partisan identity established by the New Deal have been superseded by values-driven imperatives, which are themselves trumped by racial identities. As a result, traditionally Democratic pre-materialist white blue-collar constituencies have moved toward the Republican Party, while the opposite has occurred in traditionally Republican post-materialist suburban constituencies.     

A swing vote from the ethnic backstage: The role of German American isolationist tradition for Trump's 2016 victory

We question the growing consensus in the literature that European Americans behave as a homogenous pan-ethnic coalition of voters. Seemingly below the radar of scholarship on voting groups in American politics, we identify a group of white voters that behaves differently from others: German Americans, the largest ethnic group, regionally concentrated in the ‘Swinging Midwest’. Using county level voting returns, ancestry group information from the American Community Survey (ACS), current survey data and historical census data going back as early as 1910, we provide evidence for a partisan and a non-partisan pathway that motivated German Americans to vote for Trump in 2016: a historically grown association with the Republican Party and an acquired taste for isolationist attitudes that mobilizes non-partisan German Americans to support isolationist candidates. Our findings indicate that European American experiences of migration and integration still echo into the political arena of today.     

Earthquakes and Aftershocks: Race, Direct Democracy, and Partisan Change

Although dramatic partisan change among the electorate is infrequent, the issue agendas of parties may produce large shifts. A major cause of such change is the politics of race. In a political environment charged with racially oriented issues, racial groups often align themselves with different parties (as witnessed most recently in the American South). Yet, if racial appeals violate norms of equality, these appeals may rebound on the party using them. Consequently, members of the (white) racial majority and racially targeted minority may both move away from the offending party. Using data from the California Field Poll, we find that racially charged ballot propositions sponsored by the Republican party during the 1990s in California reversed the trend among Latinos and Anglos toward identifying as Republican, ceteris paribus, by shifting party attachments toward the Democratic party. Our results raise serious questions about the long-term efficacy of racially divisive strategies for electoral gain.     

Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries

We develop a model of intraparty candidate selection under partisan electoral competition and voter uncertainty. Candidates for office belong to parties, which are factions of ideologically similar candidates. Each party’s candidate for a general election can be selected either by a “centralized” mechanism that effectively randomizes over possible candidates or by voters in a primary election. The electorate cares about ideology and valence, and both primary and general elections may reveal candidate valences. Our main theoretical result is that while primaries raise the expected quality of a party’s candidates, they may hurt the ex ante preferred party in a competitive electorate by increasing the chances of revealing the opposing party’s candidates as superior. Thus, primaries are adopted in relatively extreme districts where a clear favorite party exists. An empirical analysis of the adoption of direct primaries and the competitiveness of primary elections across U.S. states supports these predictions.     

The Influence of News Media on Political Elites: Investigating Strategic Responsiveness in Congress

News media play a central role in democratic politics, yet we know little about how media affect the behavior of policy makers. To understand the conditions under which news media influence political elites, we advance a theory of strategic responsiveness, which contends that elected representatives are more likely to heed their constituents' preferences when voters are attentive. Accordingly, news media's influence on legislative behavior should be most apparent near elections and dependent on the partisan composition of the constituency. We capitalize on the incremental rollout of the conservative Fox News Channel in the late 1990s to evaluate our theoretical predictions. Fox News caused both Republicans and Democrats in Congress to increase support for the Republican Party position on divisive votes, but only in the waning months of the election cycle and among those members who represent districts with a sizable portion of Republican voters.     

Republicans in the South

This article explains the failure of the Republican party to reproduce their dominance of the South in presidential elections at lower electoral levels. First, the foreign policy and social issues that have benefitted Republican presidential candidates have lower salience in state and congressional elections. Second, sustained Republican control of the White House has exposed the party to recurrent mid-term setbacks at lower electoral levels. Third, deficiencies of local party organization and a paucity of identifiers deprives the Republicans of candidates in sufficient quantity and quality to be competitive with Democrats.     

Does Quality Matter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections

We assess whether quality challengers in state supreme court elections have a significant impact on the electoral successes of incumbents and whether the electorate seemingly makes candidate-based evaluations in these races. To address these questions, we examine 208 elections to the states' highest courts from 1990 through 2000 in the 21 states using partisan or nonpartisan elections to staff their benches. From a Heckman two-stage estimation procedure that takes into account factors influencing challengers' decisions to run as well as factors affecting the electorate's choices among candidates, we find that quality does matter. Experienced challengers significantly lessen the electoral security of incumbents, and the electorate appears to evaluate challengers' qualifications. These findings stand in stark relief to traditional notions that the electorate is incapable of responding to candidate stimuli beyond incumbency and that judicial elections inherently are an ineffective means for securing popular control over the bench.     

Explaining variation in concern about the outcome of presidential elections, 1960–1980

Since 1960 there has been a steady erosion in concern about the electoral outcome of presidential elections among the white electorate. An analysis of the six SRC-CPS presidential election surveys conducted between 1960 and 1980 shows that a substantial portion of the erosion of electoral concern can be accounted for by the weakening of partisan loyalties and the decline in feelings that the political system is responsive. More generally, the analysis suggests that extent of concern about the electoral outcome is primarily a long-term secular component and not a short-term, election-specific factor as is commonly assumed in the literature.     

European ruling parties’ electoral strategies and overseas enfranchisement policies

Emigrants’ ideologies and partisan attitudes may diverge from other voters’: overseas voters are ideologically self-selected, receive distinctive information about campaigns and have experiences abroad that are likely to shape their political views. Parties, anticipating these emigrant attitudes, can manipulate overseas voting availability to give the vote primarily to their own supporters. Alternatively, parties may expect newly enfranchised voters to provide electoral support in gratitude for the right to vote. To distinguish these separate processes, this project undertakes a case study of Turkey to trace a ruling party's strategic expectations as it makes overseas-enfranchisement decisions. To see how generalisable these results are, the study further extends to a statistical analysis of differences in vote choice between voters at home and abroad across all 23 European countries that report overseas votes separately, using an original dataset encompassing 121 elections. Both the case study and the statistical analysis suggest that emigrant-enfranchising parties tend to garner overseas voters’ support in a lasting way. This suggests that overseas enfranchisement most often appears to involve incumbent parties (correctly) expecting long-term ideological compatibility with their overseas nationals, not simply exchanging the franchise for short-term, transactional support.     

Candidate Choice Without Party Labels:

In the absence of party labels, voters must use other information to determine whom to support. The institution of nonpartisan elections, therefore, may impact voter choice by increasing the weight that voters place on candidate dimensions other than partisanship. We hypothesize that in nonpartisan elections, voters will exhibit a stronger preference for candidates with greater career and political experience, as well as candidates who can successfully signal partisan or ideological affiliation without directly using labels. To test these hypotheses, we conducted conjoint survey experiments on both nationally representative and convenience samples that vary the presence or absence of partisan information. The primary result of these experiments indicates that when voters cannot rely on party labels, they give greater weight to candidate experience. We find that this process unfolds differently for respondents of different partisan affiliations: Republicans respond to the removal of partisan information by giving greater weight to job experience while Democrats respond by giving greater weight to political experience. Our results lend microfoundational support to the notion that partisan information can crowd out other kinds of candidate information.     

Hunting where the ducks are: activating support for Donald Trump in the 2016 Republican primary

ABSTRACT

Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 Republican primary defied the predictions of many politicians, pundits, and political scientists. Yet, while Trump’s nomination was hard to predict, it is not difficult to explain. We show that Trump’s campaign message succeeded by activating longstanding, but often unappreciated, sentiments among Republican voters about immigration and economic entitlements. In particular, his support was concentrated among Republican voters with hawkish views on immigration and relatively liberal views on economic policy. Moreover, these views preceded support for Trump, rather than the other way around. Drawing on an original panel survey, we show that attitudes about immigration and economic entitlements measured in 2011 strongly predicted support for Trump in 2016. Although Trump’s coalition struck many observers as odd, it was predicated on a set of attitudes that is not unusual among Republican voters. He simply hunted where the ducks are.     

Electorally unstable by supply or demand?—an examination of the causes of electoral volatility in advanced industrial democracies

The stability of voters’ partisan choices from election to election is a key feature of democratic politics, but why it varies across advanced industrial democracies and elections is not well understood. This study makes several key contributions to explaining electoral volatility. Firstly, it is argued and demonstrated that strategic voting plays an independent role in inducing vote switching. Secondly, the analysis shows that demand-side factors—such as socio-economic cleavages and organizations—do not predict voter stability, whereas supply-side factors—such as the party system, government performance, and strategic incentives—do. Thirdly, earlier contradictory findings with respect to the role of the electoral system are clarified, as its effects are shown to be indirect rather than direct. And finally, the importance of the temporal dimension to stability is demonstrated, as the time since the previous election is found to have a positive effect on volatility. The results are based on a comprehensive statistical analysis of 336 elections in 21 countries between 1950–2005, where the significance as well as the robustness of individual variables across different model specifications inform the conclusions.     

The 1992, 1994 and 1996 elections: A comment and a forecast

A model of the two-way relationship between elections and the economy, previously estimated on historical data for 1916–1988, is applied to the United States elections of 1992, 1994, and 1996. The 1992 result was a surprise to the model since the economy had performed reasonably well that election year. The midterm elections of 1994 were accurately forecast. The Republicans took control of Congress not because of unusual circumstances but because of a normal midterm cycle. President Clinton's chances in 1996 look dim given the current modest growth rate and an electoral bias favoring Republican presidential candidates. But an alternative model, keyed more to the voters choosing Clinton to balance the Republican Congress, gives him a reasonable chance of reelection.     

Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional gerrymandering: Using computer simulations to estimate the effect of gerrymandering in the U.S. House

What is the effect of gerrymandering on the partisan outcomes of United States Congressional elections? A major challenge to answering this question is in determining the outcomes that would have resulted in the absence of gerrymandering. Since we only observe Congressional elections where the districts have potentially been gerrymandered, we lack a non-gerrymandered counterfactual that would allow us to isolate its true effect. To overcome this challenge, we conduct computer simulations of the districting process to redraw the boundaries of Congressional districts without partisan intent. By estimating the outcomes of these non-gerrymandered districts, we are able to establish the non-gerrymandered counterfactual against which the actual outcomes can be compared. The analysis reveals that while Republican and Democratic gerrymandering affects the partisan outcomes of Congressional elections in some states, the net effect across the states is modest, creating no more than one new Republican seat in Congress. Therefore, the partisan composition of Congress can mostly be explained by non-partisan districting, suggesting that much of the electoral bias in Congressional elections is caused by factors other than partisan intent in the districting process.