国际区域经济一体化进程与中国

21世纪以来,由于多边贸易谈判屡次受挫,世界各国开始热衷于推进区域经济一体化进程,积极开展区域贸易协定谈判。目前,全球及各主要地区的区域贸易协定在合作模式、运行机制以及运作领域等方面呈现出许多新特征。中国已于2001年起努力寻求与贸易伙伴缔结区域贸易协定。研究区域经济一体化进程及其特点,将有利于深化我国的区域经济一体化战略,应对新的国际区域经济合作进程。     

Can human rights conditionality reduce repression? Examining the European Union’s economic agreements

The insertion of human rights commitments into international economic agreements is now a widespread practice. We argue that the effect of such commitments depends on the degree of leverage held by one partner over the other. In a comprehensive analysis of the European Union’s (EU’s) relations with developing countries, we find that human rights clauses are conditionally effective; they are associated with improved political freedom and physical integrity rights only in countries that are more heavily dependent on EU aid. An in-depth look at the EU’s enforcement of its human rights clause in the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group reveals that the Union most often responds to violations of political rights—particularly coups and flawed elections—and that enforcement is indeed a more powerful catalyst for change in highly aid-dependent states. Alternative explanations—that the impact of the human rights clause depends on legalization, the country’s strategic importance, NGO activity, or domestic institutions—find little support.     

Recent developments on RTAs in North East Asia

This paper explores the recent developments for regional trade agreements (RTAs) in North East Asia since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. After having successfully achieved high growth rates since it became a WTO member, China’s stance towards RTAs has become more positive. In particular, an RTA in North East Asia will be facilitated if China, Japan and Korea fully acknowledge the positive spillover effect from launching such an RTA. This paper further argues that all three nations have to endeavor to resolve the prolonged confrontation in their collective defense systems if they want to expedite any real progress towards a federal RTA in North East Asia.     

Social Protection in India: A Welfare State Sans Public Goods?

Of the two principal components of social welfare policy—basic public services and social protection—India has focused disproportionately on the latter in the last two decades, expanding existing social protection programs and creating new ones. By contrast, the country’s basic public services, such as primary education, public health, and water and sanitation have languished. What explains this uneven focus? Why has India prioritized social protection over public services? This article considers explanations suggested by the existing literature on welfare states and concludes that they do not account adequately for the Indian case. Instead, it argues, the prioritization of social protection in India results from a combination of political, ideational, and institutional factors rooted in India’s political economy.     

The GATS and financial services: the role of regulatory transparency

The World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and its Annex on Financial Services provide the international legal framework for the regulation of cross-border trade in financial services. This paper analyses the main provisions of the GATS that relate to regulatory transparency of trade in financial services. The GATS generally provides a flexible framework for states to negotiate liberalisation commitments while providing WTO members with autonomy to promote their regulatory objectives. The extent to which states, however, must adhere to GATS disciplines regarding transparent regulatory practices has become a source of policy debate. Although the WTO has played no role in setting financial regulatory standards, the transparency obligations of the GATS have important implications for how financial regulators can achieve their objectives. Moreover, GATS transparency obligations can potentially create disproportionate administrative costs for developing countries and thus undermine their financial sector development. The paper argues that the principles of regulatory transparency in the GATS should be interpreted in a way that favours regulatory discretion to achieve financial stability and other prudential objectives. In the post-Doha era, WTO members should attempt to clarify GATS transparency obligations in a way that promotes financial development and regulatory autonomy.     

拉美民众意识形态极化趋势及其影响

拉美国家近年来政局不稳的一个重要原因在于民众的意识形态出现了极化的趋势。本文分析了2012—2019年间“美洲晴雨表”中18个拉美国家的数据,发现自2014年以来,持极端意识形态的民众尤其是持极左观点的民众比重出现了显著上升,这主要是受到经济发展形势和各国执政党意识形态两个因素的交互影响。宏观上,以极左民众比重上升为特征的极化趋势主要是受到整个区域经济持续低迷和右翼政府的紧缩性经济政策影响。微观上,本文通过回归分析发现,民众对国家经济形势的判断与其所在国执政党的意识形态共同影响着其极化方向。在右翼执政的国家,民众对国家经济形势的评价越负面,其持极左观点的概率越高,持极右观点的概率越低;在左翼执政的国家,民众对国家经济形势的评价越负面,其持极左观点的概率越低,持极右观点的概率越高。最后,本文讨论了民众意识形态极化对拉美国家政局稳定的影响。本文发现,拉美极端民众尤其是极左民众参加抗议游行的概率显著高于温和民众。这意味着一国的极端民众比重越高,其发生大规模示威游行的概率越高。     

Reputations,Perceptions, and International Economic Agreements

How do countries’ actions on the international stage affect their reputations? We propose that, particularly when evaluating countries about whom individuals may have few prior beliefs, international agreements may hold particular sway in establishing countries’ reputations. Specifically, if a relatively unknown country joins an organization with a country that has a good reputation, individuals will judge that original state to be less risky; if the better-known countries are generally perceived to have a bad reputation, the less-known state will also look more risky. This article presents evidence from a survey experiment in which individuals are asked about the weight of various factors in their perceptions of countries’ reputations. Subjects would randomly receive a prompt about a country’s domestic policy reform or its ties to other countries via economic or cultural agreements. The results show that states’ international ties play a role in assessments about country reputations. We also examine possible mechanisms underlying this finding. Lower risk associated with agreements with good countries is largely a function of anticipated economic benefits. However, the higher risk associated with agreements with bad countries seems to be more a function of anticipated political closeness between countries.     

The Political Economy of Developing Country Antidumping Investigations against China

This article draws on industry-level data to analyze the political economy of the use of the antidumping statute by 10 less developed countries (LDCs) against China. Test results suggest that Chinese import competition is an important factor explaining the pattern of LDC antidumping initiation against China. Macroeconomic factors such as gross domestic product growth rate also play some role in influencing the pattern of LDC antidumping determination against China. Importantly, statistical analyses did not yield any evidence suggesting that China's membership in the World Trade Organization has disciplined developing countries' use of the antidumping policy. The paper conjectures that China's Most-Favored-Nation status under the World Trade Organization, the designation of China as a nonmarket economy in antidumping investigations until 2016, and the retaliatory incentives generated by the growing deflection of Chinese exports to developing country markets may have overwhelmed the institutional effect of the trade organization in shaping the pattern of LDC antidumping decision making toward China.     

GATS Article XVI and national regulatory sovereignty: what lessons to draw from US—Gambling?

The article examines the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body's ruling in US—Gambling that United States (US) prohibitions on the foreign supply of gambling and betting services via the internet to consumers in the US violated US market access commitments under Article XVI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The article reviews the main arguments criticising the decision and suggests that these views are (i) misguided because they rely excessively on a textual approach to interpreting Article XVI market access commitments, and (ii) lead to results that do not conform with the common intentions of the negotiating parties. The article argues for an approach that relies primarily on examining the facts of each case and the context in which WTO Members' commitments are negotiated. This approach also emphasises the importance of WTO Members making clear and precise market access commitments. In the author's view, the Appellate Body ruling adds more clarity to how GATS market access commitments will be interpreted in the future and, in doing so, facilitates market access negotiations and the making of additional commitments by WTO Members.     

Business engagement in violence prevention and peace-building: the case of Kenya

Kenyan business was important in mitigating episodes of election violence in 2007–2008 and 2013. This article finds that this role was motivated by the ethical and moral commitments of key business leaders to further peace in times of violence; and by interests in preventing future economic loss. However, by adopting a lens that situates business roles in violence prevention and peace-building within Kenya’s conflict systems and political economy, the article finds a paradox: this lens confirms the Kenyan ‘success story’ with respect to specific violent episodes; but it also reveals a much more limited role for business in transforming the underlying sources of conflict; especially when these are congruent with key business fundamentals connected to land ownership, property rights, export-oriented production or services, or a ‘limited’ access order. Overall, the article highlights that business should leverage its comparative advantages within broader multi-stakeholder coalitions, especially in terms of its ability to influence political leaders, entry-points for informal dialogue to diffuse crises and capital to support peace-building initiatives.     

The role of actors and institutions: The difficulties of democratic survival in Mali and Niger

Mali and Niger, two neighbouring countries in Francophone West Africa, offer a good opportunity for identifying key factors favouring the survival of a young democracy. While democracy has so far survived, just about, in Mali, it ended in Niger with a coup d'état in January 1996. Given comparable levels of poor economic development and similar troubled modern political histories, economic and societal preconditions do not provide clues to the different experiences of the two countries. Instead, the answer must be sought in the institutional choices made and in the interaction between key players during the democratic transition. An electoral system with proportional representation resulted in political instability in Niger, while a majoritarian system ensured a stable political majority in Mali. Political crisis in Niamey provided an opportunity for the army to retake power. While the military had been alienated from the Nigerien national conference, it had participated actively in and supervised the Malian conference. Mali and Niger provide tentative lessons for other ‘late democratizers’.     

Shaping factors of EU–East Asia relations

Six shaping factors will determine the short-to-medium term outlook for East Asia. Two of these are geo-political flashpoints, with implications beyond the region—North Korea and China–Taiwan cross-strait relations. For both of these at least some logic of a’ solution’ will need to be worked out. Intra-regional tensions between China, the fastest growing economy in the world, and Japan, the second largest economy in the world, will need accommodation and compromise. Fourthly, the relationship between the US and China remains ambivalent, veering between strategic partnership and strategic competition. Long term stability in the region will require that the US–China relationship becomes more predictable, which will only be possible if both players define their long-term interests innovatively and in different ways. Probably the most important shaping factor for the region is the domestic political economy of China. The nexus between Chinese economic growth and its domestic political stability needs to remain in tact—without economic growth no political stability, while stability is a precondition for continued growth. These five shaping factors together will determine the scope of multi-lateral problem-solving frameworks for the region. The Kuala Lumpur first East Asia Summit has shown the determination of leaders in the region to co-ordinate, share information and exchange views. However, the decision not to go beyond the current institutional set-up and to retain ASEAN’s centrality points to a continuation of the present ‘shallow’ integration for some time to come.     

Long-term outlook for China’s political reform

China’s post-1978 economic reform is generally acclaimed as success, for the Chinese economy has expanded nine-fold in a matter of 25 years and the country rose from the world’s 34th largest trading nation in 1978 to the third largest in 2004 ahead of Japan. Interestingly, the Chinese experiment is often described in the West as “economic reform without political reform”. This begets the question: how could a politically un-reformed system be able to deliver such an economic miracle? In reality, China has conducted, by its own standards, major political reforms since 1978. Though far short of the Western expectations, the Chinese experience since 1978 should better be described as “great economic reforms with lesser political reforms”, without which China’s economic success would be inconceivable. China’s “lesser political reforms” have reduced country’s opportunities for greater political change, thus alienating many reform-minded intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may also have helped China avert the possible economic and social upheavals which could have resulted from rushing too fast into a radically different economic and political system. There is a strongly held belief, especially among the more ‘ideological’ observers of Chinese affairs that unless there were a radical political reform, perhaps tantamount to a revolution, to rid China of its “oppressive” Communist Party, the Chinese system would inevitably collapse just like what had happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As the party has been in power, China had been predicted to face collapse in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the Soviet Union’s disintegration of 1990, the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2003 outbreak of SARS. Yet all these forecasts turned out to be wrong and the track record of the China doomsayers over the past 20 years is indeed poor. Will China become a democracy through its political reform in 20 years? Indeed, a full democracy could be the best scenario for China, the region and beyond, but it is difficult to give a definitive answer, which will, to a great extent, depend on how to achieve democracy in China, i.e. the costs/risks involved, as well as what kind of ultimate shape such a democracy will take. If full-fledged democratisation will take more time, the pressure for a more accountable government and more democratic society is growing, and this trend will continue with the rise of China’s middle class and civil society. Therefore, the most likely scenario for China in the coming two decades is that China will continue its own approach to political reform, and the relative successful experience of China’s economic reform may well set a pattern for China’s political reform in the years to come. As part of Europe’s general approach towards China’s political change, it is in Europe’s interest to assist, in line with the view of most Chinese, gradual reform rather than revolution or ‘regime change’, which could produce hugely negative consequences for China itself, Sino–European relations and European interests in China and even East Asia.     

Turkey's New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey–EU Relations

When European Muslim citizens are involved in social conflicts or when they contest the place that is given them in Europe, these political claims are often seen as radical and inspired by external influences. If an attempt is made to understand what part the influences of the so-called Muslim “countries of origin” play in the way Muslims contest European models of society and integration, it turns out that the roots of radicalisation are often purely European. The idea that it is the Islamic and communitarian nature of the European Muslim way of life which is at the base of their failing integration has to be challenged. Indeed, the initiatives of religious actors have failed to channel the radicalisation of European Muslims’ political demands. The role of the religious variable is of much less importance in political radicalisation than the lack of an institutional response to the demands for greater social and economic integration.     

Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are rebel groups successfully incorporated into democratic politics when civil war ends? Using an original cross-national, longitudinal dataset, we examine political party formation by armed opposition groups over a 20-year period, from 1990 to 2009. We find that former armed opposition groups form parties in more than half of our observations. A rebel group’s pre-war political experience, characteristics of the war and how it ended outweigh factors such as the country’s political and economic traits and history. We advance a theoretical framework based on rebel leaders’ expectations of success in post-war politics, and we argue that high rates of party formation by former armed opposition groups are likely a reflection of democratic weakness rather than democratic robustness in countries emerging from conflict.     

Brazil as ‘Southern donor’: beyond hierarchy and national interests in development cooperation?

This article analyses Brazil's growing role in external development assistance. During Lula da Silva's presidency, cooperation with developing countries grew dramatically. While the official position is that Brazilian development assistance is moved not by national economic or political interests, but by international ‘solidarity’, and does not reproduce the North–South traditional aid relations, we suggest that it is not completely divorced from national, sub-national or sectoral interests and cannot be viewed apart from Brazil's broader foreign policy objectives. Brazil does pursue political, economic and commercial interests and, concomitantly, has made a positive difference in the recipient countries. However, more empirical research and field investigation are needed to better gauge the impact of Brazil's assistance initiatives and their contributions to South–South cooperation more broadly. During Lula's terms (2003–2010), Brazil could be classified as a ‘Southern donor’, which expresses the country's own novelties, and tensions, of simultaneously being a donor and a developing country.     

金砖国家数字经济合作现状与前景北大核心

在全球政治与经济发展复杂多变的今天,金砖国家数字经济发展势头较好,大数据、云计算、物联网、人工智能等新兴技术领域持续保持发展活力,"新零售""新制造"等也在不断改变人们的生活日常,并逐渐影响着人类社会治理领域一系列的价值观念。金砖国家通过不断完善合作机制,促进数字经济创新发展,取得的进步有目共睹,数字金砖已成为带动世界经济增长、推动全球经济治理体系变革的重要力量。鉴于数字经济发展本身特有的规律特点,金砖国家在深度合作方面也面临现实挑战,特别是有必要重新认识技术突破国界带来的国家安全风险问题以及数字巨头权力过度扩张对国际格局带来的影响等。在今后合作路径方面,金砖国家间可通过开展功能性合作,不断磨合彼此的差异和分歧,共同探寻数字利益增长空间,携手开启和合共生、命运与共的数字经济新未来。     

美国重返亚洲战略下的中国与印度关系

印度因其特殊的地缘政治环境被美国视为抑制中国“崛起”的控制阀和其重返亚洲、构建遏制中国包围网的重要节点。但印度在政治经济上对美国借重的同时亦和中国在国际上有着诸多共同利益诉求,并为加速本国经济腾飞而不得不倚重中国高速增长的经济,其角色的特殊性决定了在中美新博弈中印度将左右倚重并制衡。因此,在经济利益为国家相互关系主导因素的背景下,中国应与印度构建共赢发展互动关系,推动两国经济持续快速发展。     

国家主权、思想自立与发展权利——试论当代非洲国家建构的障碍及前景

由松散分割的传统部族社会,向统一聚合的现代主权国家过渡,是当代非洲国家政治发展的核心主题与基本目标。在此发展阶段上,非洲国家需要形成有效能的中央政府,且致力于国家的经济发展、政治稳定和民族融合,以国家力量来集中资源,动员民众,培植国家情感,追求发展目标。迄今,国家成长与民族融合这两大任务在许多非洲国家都没有真正完成。为此,非洲需要一种新的思想变革运动,从自身的现实需要来追求理解政治的意义,从经济的角度来把握政治的本质,以经济发展为中心来建设国家,维护国家主权,追求思想自立,方能最终实现国泰民安,富强稳定。在维护非洲国家主权、推进非洲国家成长方面,中国可以发挥更多建设性的作用。     

Winners,Losers, and the Press: The Relationship Between Political Parallelism and the Legitimacy Gap

Recent work has explored how individual and institutional factors affect the gap in perceptions of political legitimacy between electoral winners and electoral losers, but has ignored the role that the political information environment, in general, and ideologically biased media, in particular, plays in exacerbating or diminishing this gap. By combining individual-level public opinion data in 28 countries, an expert survey on media systems, and a variety of country-level indicators, I find that higher levels of political parallelism in a country are associated with a larger winner-loser gap in institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy. The relationship is contingent on whether or not people are actually exposed to said media. This research, which links the study of political communication with the study of comparative political behavior, indicates that the increasing availability of partisan news around the world is a cause for concern.