Thirty Years of Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases*

The Supreme Court early took note of extralegal, “social science” materials in Muller v. Oregon (1908), and a half-century later made specific reference to social science authorities in the famous footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Since Brown, much has been written about the Supreme Court's use of social science research evidence, but there has been little systematic study of that use. Those writing on the subject commonly focus on areas of law such as jury size, where social science has been used, and have generally assumed that social science information has been utilized in Supreme Court decisions with increasing regularity. Surprisingly little is known, however, about either the justices' baseline use of social science authorities, or many other aspects of their uses of social science information. The focus here is on the citation of social science research evidence in a sample of 240 criminal cases decided during the 30 years between the Supreme Court's 1958 and 1987 Terms. The resulting portrait contributes to a fuller understanding of the justices' use of social science materials, and may ultimately help promote more effective utilization of social science research evidence in Supreme Court decisions.     

An Analysis of Policy‐Based Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions

While Congress can attempt to overrule constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court by initiating the constitutional amendment process, an amendment is rarely a practicable option. Instead, Congress regularly tries to modify the impact of constitutional decisions with ordinary legislation. I analyze policy‐based responses to the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions that were initiated in Congress between 1995 and 2010. For each responsive proposal, I consider the relationship between the proposed legislation and the Court's legal holding and the relationship between the proposal and the public policy associated with the Court's decision. I find that Congress enjoys considerable success in reversing the policy impacts of the Court's decisions but is limited in its ability to overcome the Court's legal rules.     

Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine

Recent scholarship has demonstrated that the Supreme Court of the United States has defined poorly and inconsistently applied two core First Amendment concepts-content and viewpoint discrimination. This article systematically explores the malleability of the Court's speech discrimination principles. Using data from The Supreme Court Compendium that categorize the ideological voting behavior of justices on the Court, the article studies decisions in three socially divisive areas of law in which content and viewpoint discrimination have been central issues of significant cases. Analysis shows that the Court's weak definitions and inconsistent applications leave the content and viewpoint concepts especially ripe for manipulation. The article concludes, therefore, by suggesting a new method of analysis that would offer more consistency.     

Seasonal Affective Disorder: Clerk Training and the Success of Supreme Court Certiorari Petitions

We investigate why the Supreme Court grants a smaller percentage of cases at the first conference of each term compared to other conferences. According to received wisdom, Supreme Court law clerks are overly cautious at the beginning of their tenure because they receive only a brief amount of training. Reputational concerns motivate clerks to provide fewer recommendations to grant review in cert. pool memos written over the summer months. Using a random sample of petitions from the Blackmun Archives, we code case characteristics, clerk recommendation, and the Court's decision on cert. Nearest neighbor matching suggests clerks are 36 percent less likely to recommend grants in their early cert. pool memos. Because of this temporal discrepancy, petitions arriving over the summer have a 16 percent worse chance of being granted by the Court. This seasonal variation in access to the Court's docket imposes a legally irrelevant burden on litigants who have little control over the timing of their appeal.     

Letters to the Editor

While many basked in the euphoric rays emanating from the New Jersey state court Mt. Laurel decision, commentators and litigators in the land use field were tempering their sentiments with the knowledge of the U.S. Supereme Court's impending consideration of a primary federal land use challenge in Warth v. Seldin. The Court's 5-4 decision, affirming a federal appeals court'ss affirmance of the dismissal of an exclusionary zoning challenge by various individuals and groups, was predicated on the elusive concept of “standing.” If a sufficient case or controversy existed, according to the Court, or if the various classes of plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of challenge, their right to challenge Penfield's zoning could be established. In Warth the majority took a restrictive view and, on a one by one basis, denied standing to each of the plaintiffs.     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Social science in supreme court death penalty cases: Citation practices and their implications

This study examines the use of evidence based on social science research in Supreme Court capital punishment cases decided between 1963 and 1985. These years mark the beginning of the Court's modern decisions regarding the death penalty and extend to the approximate midpoint in this body of jurisprudence. The frequency and the major correlates of social science research citations in the Supreme Court's death penalty cases are described, and these findings are contrasted with the justices' use of social science evidence in other types of criminal cases. The justices have used social science materials relatively often in capital punishment cases, although it does not necessarily follow that social science findings have been important to the decision of these cases. The results of this research are discussed, along with other issues relevant to the judicial use of research evidence based on social science.     

Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit Case

This note examines the UK Supreme Court's judgment in the Brexit case, Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. The case upheld the decision of the High Court, which rejected the claim that the foreign affairs prerogative provided a legal basis for giving notice to EU institutions of the UK's intention to withdraw from the EU. But the Supreme Court's preferred basis for dismissing that claim rested on the more general proposition that significant constitutional change can only be effected by statute. This position offers the germs of a jurisprudence of constitutional change and was substantiated by means of an analysis of Parliament's dual capacity as legislator and constituent agent. Miller also includes important and potentially innovative dicta on the relationship between international and domestic sources of law.     

Dolly and Alice

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In re Roslin Institute, rejecting patent claims to mammals cloned from somatic cells, was rendered about a month before the United States Supreme Court''s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Alice opinion explicitly sets out the standard for determining whether an invention falls within statutory patentable subject matter. Thus one is thus left to wonder what the Roslin opinion might have looked like had it been decided only a few weeks later, after the Alice decision was published, with the benefit of the Supreme Court''s further direction on patentable subject matter. In this essay I explore whether in hindsight the Alice standard might have dictated a different outcome in Roslin, suggesting how the two-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Alice might apply to a ‘products of nature’ analysis for cloned mammals. Drawing on that analysis, I then use the Roslin case as a vehicle to highlight certain issues with the Supreme Court''s current subject matter jurisprudence as applied to biotechnology. By juxtaposing Dolly with Alice, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court has revivified a number of dormant biotechnology patent problems in the guise of subject matter analysis.     

Justices,Political Actors,or Both: An Exploration of the Brandenburg Line Through the Regime Theory Lens

Regime theory seeks to explain decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States by noting that justices tend to decide cases in ways that align with the prevailing political ideology. The theory emerged from political science literature and has not been explored regarding communication law. This article tests regime theory against the progression of seven Supreme Court precedents that led to the threatening speech test established in Brandenburg v. Ohio. The test is traditionally viewed as the fruit of about a half-century of deliberate judicial evolution. The analysis found regime theory helped explain the Court's progression and decisions in this line of cases, but contained some notable weaknesses.     

The Supreme Court and the Social Conception of Abortion

Skeptics of Supreme Court power have pointed to abortion policy as an example of surprising limits on the justices' power to change society. I argue, however, that the Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade played a critical role in transforming how Americans think and talk about abortion. I develop an account of the development of the social conception of abortion from a critical reading of twentieth century American journalism and then test some predictions of that account through the use of quantitative content analyses. I conclude by discussing some implications for the study of judicial politics and public constitutionalism.     

Koushal v Naz: Judges Vote to Recriminalise Homosexuality

In Koushal v Naz the Indian Supreme Court overturned a High Court judgment which had declared unconstitutional section 377 of the Indian Penal Code criminalising ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’. In doing so, it has rebranded gay and transgendered Indians as criminals. This case note explores some of the structural problems that led to this judgment. The first problem is the transformation of the Indian Supreme Court into a populist, quasi‐legislative, institution that sees itself as a tool of governance. This has put significant pressure on its counter‐majoritarian role. The second relates to the sheer size of the Court's docket (given its wide jurisdiction and lax standing rules), coupled with the Indian legal academy's inability and unwillingness to continuously demand judicial fidelity to the law. These factors have led to the normalisation of unreasoned or poorly‐reasoned judgments and a breakdown of stare decisis.     

The Arendtian Dread: Courts with Power

Hannah Arendt was fearful not only of a populist President speaking in the name of the people and unbound by legality. She was also concerned that popular support could be harnessed by those responsible for limiting it. In other words, she was fearful of the American Supreme Court relying on popular support. This is the meaning of her obscure depiction of the American Supreme Court as “the true seat of authority in the American Republic” but unfit to power. I argue that Arendt's characterization of authority as requiring “neither coercion nor persuasion” means that the Court's source of legitimacy is expertise rather than public support. Yet the current dominant understanding among American Justices as well as scholars is that public support is the source of the Court's authority. In Arendt's mind, such an understanding means that the Court has become the seat of power. The corruption of the Court's authority and constitutional law as a language of expertise capable of resisting public opinion will inevitably follow.     

Do Plaintiffs in CERCLA § 113 Contribution Actions Need to Prove Consistency with the National Contingency Plan?

This article discusses whether the claimant in a contribution action brought under section 113 of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act needs to prove that the costs were incurred in a manner that was consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP). This article examines the recent case law as well as the Supreme Court decisions that address the relationship between sections 107 and 113 and concludes that although the recent case law suggests that NCP is a requirement, the Supreme Court's analysis of the relationship between sections 107 and 113 in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. may undermine the basis for that conclusion.     

The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The Importance of Certainty in Language

How can legal decision makers increase the likelihood of a favorable response from other legal and social actors? To answer this, we propose a novel theory based on the certainty expressed in language that is applicable to many different legal contexts. The theory is grounded in psychology and legal advocacy and suggests that expressing certainty enhances the persuasiveness of a message. We apply this theory to the principal–agent framework to examine the treatment of Supreme Court precedent by the Federal Courts of Appeal. We find that as the level of certainty in the Supreme Court's opinion increases, the lower courts are more likely to positively treat the Court's decision. We then discuss the implications of our findings for using certainty in a broader context.     

Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co.

Since 1980, the Supreme Court has used a complex form of intermediate constitutional scrutiny-the Central Hudson analysis-when government regulations of commercial speech are challenged on First Amendment grounds. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court used this analysis for the first time to test the constitutionality of government restrictions on tobacco advertising. This article reviews the Court's commercial speech doctrine including previous treatment of governmental attempts to restrict harmful product advertising. The article then provides an overview of the national regulatory framework for tobacco advertising and analyzes the Supreme Court's 2001 opinion in Lorillard Tobacco. The article then explores the impact of the case on the Court's commercial speech doctrine and in subsequent lower court opinions.     

The Quest for a Satisfactory Definition of Terrorism: R v Gul

The UK Supreme Court judgment in R v Gul presented a unique opportunity for a judicial appraisal of the definition of terrorism contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. While the applicant was ultimately unsuccessful in his challenge, the Supreme Court's rejection of the state's argument that reliance on prosecutorial discretion could mitigate certain absurd applications of the section 1 definition of terrorism, eg the labelling of acts of UK or other military forces as terrorist, has potentially wide‐raging implications for the UK's counter‐terrorism measures. In addition, the powerful obiter dictum arguing in favour of a reform of this definition and a ‘root‐and‐branch’ review of counter‐terrorism legislation is a strong rebuke of recent high profile misapplications of such powers.     

Unfair Contract Terms,Unfair Prices and Bank Charges

This note considers how the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 1993 draws the line between the review of unfair contract terms and the review of unfair contracts (and, in particular, unfair prices) in the context of two cases concerning bank charges: Abbey Life plc v The Office of Fair Trading (2009) (the Bank Charges case) in the UK Supreme Court and Case 484/08 Caja de Madrid (2010) in the European Court of Justice. The note explains the proper question to be addressed by a court for this purpose under article 4(2) of the Directive and criticises the Supreme Court's approach to the interpretation of article 4(2) and its application of the UK regulation implementing this article to the circumstances in the Bank Charges case.     

Supreme Court Ruling Creates More Standing Room in the Already Heated Global Greenhouse Gas Movement

This article reviews the recent April 2, 2007 Supreme Court decision in the Massachusetts v. EPA, a highly important case regarding greenhouse gases. The case centered on the Court's review of EPA's denial of a petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. The Court required EPA to reconsider its denial. The Court found that. 1) the petitioners have standing to challenge EPA's denial of their petition; 2) the Court has the authority to review the denial of the petition; and 3) the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. This article looks specifically at the Court's analysis of standing and jurisdiction by Justice Stevens, who wrote the Court's majority opinion, and two dissenting opinions by Justices Roberts and Scalia. Most interesting is how the closely divided Justices (5 to 4 decision) viewed, very differently, the issues regarding standing, the evidence that emissions from new motor vehicles are causing global warming and harm to Massachusetts, and the agency's judgment in denying the petition. Lastly, the article speculates on the impact of the decision and the current activities taking place at the state and regulated community level involving future regulation, litigation, and opportunities by various companies and coalitions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The article then presents five broad areas where companies that emit greenhouse gases should need to maintain or increase awareness to better position themselves in the global greenhouse gas movement.