Political markets, property tax referenda, and local school spending

For better or worse, fiscal decisions made through property tax referenda allow local political markets to work. Demand, supply, and voting process components of such markets are estimated for those Oregon K-12 school districts that held referenda between 1981 and 1986. Various attributes of the median voter were related to school spending, but supply decisions by school boards and administrators were also important. Large districts used state aid to substitute for local property tax revenues on nearly a one-for-one basis, while relying on reversion budgets (inadequate property tax bases and implicit threats of school closures) to extract greater-than-desired spending levels from the median voter.     

Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan? New evidence from local property tax competition

This paper reexamines whether fiscal decentralization constrains Leviathan government. Using panel data for Pennsylvania, we compare actual property tax rates to the Leviathan revenue-maximizing rates for municipalities, school districts, and counties. Using spatial econometric methods we also estimate the degree of spatial dependence at the three levels of local government. We find that fiscal decentralization results in stronger intergovernmental competition and lower tax rates. We also find evidence of collusion among school districts that exhibit high interdependence but also high tax rates. This calls into question the current literature??s blind use of spatial dependence as a measure of intergovernmental competition.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.     

The sources of tactical voting in British parliamentary elections, 1983–1987

Using data from the UK General Election Surveys of 1983 and 1987, we present a critical test of different approaches to tactical voting. Specifically, we are concerned with how the competitive situation in each constituency affects voters' likelihood of voting tactically, as well as the role of voters' attitudes and personal characteristics. We find that voters are less sensitive to the actual marginality of a district than to whether or not their party has a chance of winning the seat. In addition, we find that party identification, and particularly intense loyalty, dampen the tendency to vote tactically, regardless of the type of district. We also consider differences in tactical voting between constituencies where Labour dominates vs. districts where the Conservatives are strongest. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of these findings for the study of voting behavior.A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1991 meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, March 1991.     

All Together Now? An Empirical Study of the Voting Behaviors of Homeowner Association Members in St. Louis County

Homeowner associations (HOAs), by design, collect homogenous members of a community into a residential development with defined boundaries and contain at least some very active individuals. This implies that HOAs may lower the transaction costs involved with voting resulting in HOA membership increasing voter participation. Further, as more HOAs provide goods and services to their members as substitutes for goods and services provided by the public sector, one would expect HOA members to vote more conservatively and in support of more privatization. Using a detailed population database constructed for Saint Louis County, Missouri, and results from the November 2004 general election, this article analyzes the effect that living in an HOA has on voter participation and on the results of several election issues. Following a similar study by the Public Policy Institute of California, the results show that, once population characteristics are controlled for, there is no HOA effect on the likelihood of HOA members to vote Republican. Unlike previous work, this study shows that if the vote reporting districts are broken into five mutually exclusive categories rather than using the 60% rule used in other studies, areas with more HOAs do show an increase in participation rates and an increased likelihood to vote against property tax increases. The results hold up even after the presence of spatial autocorrelation is confirmed and controlled for.     

Does Compulsory Voting Increase Support for Leftist Policy?

Citizens unequally participate in referendums, and this may systematically bias policy in favor of those who vote. Some view compulsory voting as an important tool to alleviate this problem, whereas others worry about its detrimental effects on the legitimacy and quality of democratic decision making. So far, however, we lack systematic knowledge about the causal effect of compulsory voting on public policy. We argue that sanctioned compulsory voting mobilizes citizens at the bottom of the income distribution and that this translates into an increase in support for leftist policies. We empirically explore the effects of a sanctioned compulsory voting law on direct‐democratic decision making in Switzerland. We find that compulsory voting significantly increases electoral support for leftist policy positions in referendums by up to 20 percentage points. We discuss the implications of these results for our understanding of the policy consequences of electoral institutions.     

Local Government Responses to Fiscal Stress: Evidence from the Public Education Sector

This article investigates local government responses to fiscal stress through the lens of the K–12 public education sector, examining two major policy options available to school districts for managing fiscal hardship: (1) cutting costs, especially through layoffs, and (2) raising revenues locally through voter referenda. The article employs district‐level administrative and survey data from California and Indiana to examine whether school districts exhibit features of a rational or natural system—in which their behaviors largely reflect fiscal pressures only—or whether they exhibit features of an open system in which nonfinancial factors also shape responses. In Indiana, district fiscal characteristics explain differences in cost‐cutting and revenue‐raising behaviors; there is little empirical evidence that school districts exhibit features of an open system. In California, both fiscal and environmental attributes, including poverty characteristics, average student achievement levels, and the enrollment of English learner students, explain school district behaviors.     

Explaining legislators’ positions on outside income limits: Voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983

This article examines roll-call voting by members of the U.S. Senate on three proposals to limit members’ outside income in the 1980s. I find that several factors influenced legislators’ votes on outside income limits legislation (OILL). First, financial self-interest was an important constraint on members’ willingness to support OILL. Members who earned more honoraria were less likely to vote yes, but this opposition was neutralized when limits were attached to the compensating mechanism of a pay raise. Senators from poorer states were generally more likely to support honoraria limits alone but less likely to support limits linked to a pay raise, suggesting a responsiveness to constituent interests in both cases. Finally, when OILL was linked to a pay raise, electoral considerations became prominent in legislators’ vote decisions, with electorally vulnerable members less likely to vote yes.     

Electoral Institutions and Distributive Policies in Parliamentary Systems: An Application to State Aid Measures in EU Countries

Electoral institutions should systematically affect the propensity of a country to rely and spend on distributive measures. Supporting evidence is however still rare because of the difficulty in finding comparable cross-national data, the employment of dummy variables to account for the electoral systems, and the failure to recognise the interacting effects of different electoral rules on policy outcomes. Employing national data on state aid expenditure and a number of measures across European Union countries, the article provides evidence that legislators elected in higher magnitude districts spend less. More interestingly, it shows the interlocking policy effects of electoral institutions. Where high district magnitude is combined with ballot control, party-based voting and pooling, these rules conjunctly dampen politicians’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote and lead to lower spending on, and use of, distributive measures. Where high district magnitude is not combined with these rules, results are inconclusive. With one exception though, if leaders do not have control over the ballot rank, higher magnitude increases reliance on distributive measures. Results are robust to several alternative political-economy explanations of fiscal policy outcomes.     

Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections

We develop a model of legislative policymaking in which individuallegislators are concerned with both policy and reelection. Legislators'preferences are private information, and they have two meansof communicating their preferences to voters. First, they eachhave a "party label" that credibly identifies an interval withinwhich their ideal points must lie. Second, their roll call votesmay convey additional information about their preferences. Eachlegislator must therefore tailor his or her votes to his orher district in order to forestall a reelection challenge fromthe opposing party. In equilibrium, nonsincere voting recordswill occur mostly in moderate districts, where extreme incumbentsare vulnerable to challenges from relatively centrist candidates.In those districts, the most extreme legislators may even chooseto vote sincerely and retire rather than compile a moderatevoting record. Thus, both roll call scores and candidate typeswill be responsive to district type. An empirical test of shiftsin roll call scores of retiring House members in moderate districtsconfirms these findings.     

Do School Report Cards Produce Accountability Through the Ballot Box?

Public education has been transformed by the widespread adoption of accountability systems that involve the dissemination of school district performance information. Using data from Ohio, we examine if elections serve as one channel through which these accountability systems might lead to improvements in educational quality. We find little evidence that poor performance on widely disseminated state and federal indicators has an impact on school board turnover, the vote share of sitting school board members, or superintendent tenure, suggesting that the dissemination of district performance information puts little (if any) electoral pressure on elected officials to improve student achievement.     

Patriotism, pigskins, and politics: an empirical examination of expressive behavior and voting

In this paper we use data collected from nearly 4,000 single-family residences in Auburn, Alabama to investigate empirically whether specific political expressiveness (displaying a candidate’s election sign in one’s yard), general socio-political expressiveness (flying an American flag on either Memorial Day or Independence Day), or non-political expressiveness (displaying support for Auburn University’s football team outside one’s home) is related to the likelihood that at least one resident voted in the national/state/local elections held November 7, 2006. Controlling for the assessed value of the property and length of residential ownership, we find strong evidence that all three measures of expressive behavior are statistically significant predictors of a greater likelihood of voting than occurred at residences showing no evidence of these expressive behaviors. These findings suggest that voting may be more completely understood not as politically-expressive behavior but, rather, as a generally expressive tendency that happens on occasion to be manifested in a political context. That is, an understanding of why some people vote and others do not may require an understanding of why some individuals are more expressive (generally speaking) than others.     

Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues

In the 1990s, the American executive organized financial rescues for Mexico and several Asian economies. These rescues were controversial in Congress, where members voted repeatedly to reduce or eliminate the executive's freedom to engage in them. I analyze these roll calls with an eye toward explaining who opposes and who supports international financial rescues. I argue that the interests of private actors (district constituencies and interest groups) have an important effect on member voting. Following Stolper-Samuelson reasoning, I find that a member is significantly more likely to favor (oppose) rescues as the proportion of high-skilled (low-skilled) workers in a district increases. In addition, I find that campaign contributions from international banks increase the probability that a member will vote in favor of rescues. Overall, the findings suggest that the distributional effects of rescues find expression in Congress and constrain U.S. international financial policymaking.     

Is referendum voting distinctive? Evidence from three UK cases

The study of referendum voting follows much the same format as for general election voting. Influences on vote, however, are likely to differ significantly. Referendums decide issues, while general elections determine which party or parties will form the government. Parties are often divided on referendum issues and these issues tend to be of low salience. General elections, however, are contested by long-established parties on highly salient issues. Using panel data from the British Election Study and the 2011 Alternative Vote Referendum Study, we find that voters place different weights on party identification, issue positions, government and leader evaluations when voting in general elections and referendums, but the evidence for differential campaign effects is limited.     

Turning Up the Heat: The Impact of Electric Utility Competition on K–12 Education Funding in Ohio

Ohio, like many states, is currently-considering deregulation of the retail electric power industry. This issue is made more complex in Ohio because structural change in the delivery of electric power is also likely to have a negative effect on state and local government revenues. This effect occurs because of three main forces: the elimination of differential property tax treatment of utilities relative to general businesses, the likely decrease in state electricity excise tax revenues as a result of falling power prices and administrative difficulty in taxing out of state providers, and the potential for stranded costs to diminish the taxable value of electric generating equipment. This article provides an overview of these issues and a brief analysis of the extent to which these problems will be shared by other states. The article then demonstrates the impact of deregulation-induced tax changes on both state and local school district revenues in Ohio and concludes with a discussion of how the state's ability to insulate local governments from these adverse fiscal effects is made both more imperative and more difficult by a recent Supreme Court Ruling on school funding Finally, the issues discussed in the article are placed in a more general context of the challenges of adjusting tax policy to changing circumstances     

A political economic analysis of congressional voting patterns on NAFTA

This paper delves into the question of the determinants of Congressional voting on NAFTA. It uses a logit model to examine both House and Senate votes and is able to use district specific estimates in the former. It finds only very limited support for the thesis that narrowly defined employment gainers and losers were important determinants of Congressional voting patterns, though some substantial support that districts that were highly agricultural or already possessed a substantial Hispanic population and skilled labor force and had the most to gain from the general effects of NAFTA lead to a positive effect on the probability that a member of the House would vote affirmatively. Contributions from labor unions lowered the likelihood of affirmative votes. Political partisanship and ideological positions apparently had little effect on the votes. A Representative's political capital had a marginally significant effect on the probability on an affirmative vote, but it performed positively in the Senate and negatively in the House.     

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament’s voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives’ incentives to adhere to citizens’ revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences.     

Marginal vote seeking in multi member districts

Differences in the number of seats that similar vote shares can deliver make some votes more marginal than others. In multi-member district systems, high-marginal-return votes are very volatile and research has assumed that parties do not go after them. This paper rejects this assumption, introducing a theory of marginal vote seeking across multi-member districts. By leveraging a novel mathematical algorithm and a cross sectional data set, we find evidence that parties seek marginal votes in these systems despite their volatility. In the case of the poverty alleviation programs used here, their use to attempt to secure marginal votes overwhelms the program’s poverty alleviation goals. Estimates suggest that a district’s share of a program’s budget can increase by as much as 8% simply because of this district’s likelihood of delivering marginal votes.     

“Robin Hood” and Texas School District Borrowing Costs

The “Robin Hood” system of school financing in Texas takes property tax funds from wealthy school districts and gives them to poorer districts. This paper examines Permanent School Fund‐insured, school district debt and discovers that under the “Robin Hood” system, Texas school districts with either Aa or A1 underlying credit ratings have higher borrowing costs than districts with lower ratings. Also, the borrowing costs of Texas school districts with underlying credit ratings of Aa and A1 are higher than those for non‐Texas, privately insured school districts with the same ratings, while the borrowing costs of A and Baa‐rated Texas school districts are lower.