Derrida,Semiotics and Justice

In this essay, one of Derrida’s early texts, Plato’s pharmacy, is analysed in detail, more specifically in relation to its reflections on writing and its relation to law. This analysis takes place with reference to a number of Derrida’s other texts, in particular those on Freud. It is especially Freud’s texts on dream interpretation and on the dream-work which are of assistance in understanding the background to Derrida’s analysis of writing in Plato’s pharmacy. The essay shows the close relation between Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s texts and Freud’s study of the dream-work. The forces at work in dreams, it appears, are at play in all texts, which in turn explains Derrida’s contentions in relation to the pharmakon as providing the condition of possibility of Plato’s texts. The essay furthermore points to the continuity between this ‘early’ text of Derrida and his ‘later’, seemingly more politico-legal texts of the 1990s. A close reading of Plato’s pharmacy, with its investigation via ‘writing’ of the foundations of metaphysics, and thus also of the Western concept of law, is obligatory should one wish to comprehend how Derrida attempts to exceed the restricted economy of metaphysics through his analysis of concepts such as justice and hospitality.     

Derrida’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Purveyor of Truth</Emphasis> and Constitutional Reading

In this article the author explores Jacques Derrida’s reading in The Purveyor of Truth of Edgar Allan Poe’s The Purloined Letter. In his essay, Derrida proposes a reading which differs markedly from the interpretation proposed by Lacan in his Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’. To appreciate Derrida’s reading, which is not hermeneutic-semantic in nature like that of Lacan, it is necessary to look at the relation of Derrida’s essay to his other texts on psychoanalysis, more specifically insofar as the Freudian death drive is concerned. The present article explores this ‘notion’ as elaborated on by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle as well as Derrida’s reading of this text. It also investigates the importance of the ‘notion’ of the death drive as well as the significance of Derrida’s reading of The Purloined Letter for constitutional interpretation. This is a modified version of a paper presented at the Critical Legal Conference, 14–16 September 2007 at Birkbeck Law School, University of London.

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Law,Genre and the Voice of the Friend

The article attempts to think friendship in its relation to law and justice and provides some arguments for the importance of this concept in Derrida’s ethical, legal and political philosophy. It draws on early texts such as Of grammatology and reads them in conjunction with later texts such as The animal that therefore I am. The relation of friendship to law and justice is explored by means of Derrida’s notion of “degenerescence” understood as the necessity or law of indeterminateness that cuts across, both limiting and de-limiting, all laws, types and generic partitions, for instance, juridical (natural and positive right), humanistic (human and animal), anthropological (sexual difference), philosophical (physis and nomos). Drawing on Derrida’s readings of “sexual difference” in Heidegger and the latter’s evocation of “the voice of the friend” in Being and time, the article addresses the theme of Geschlecht and articulates the exigency to think sexual difference beyond duality together with the exigency to rethink law and right otherwise than on the ground of nativity and “natural fact” and in terms of what Derrida calls “a friendship prior to friendships” at the origin of all law and socius.     

Rethinking the Notion of a ‘Higher Law’: Heidegger and Derrida on the Anaximander Fragment

The Anaximander fragment, in the readings of both Heidegger and Derrida, speaks of that which exceeds positive law. In this article, the author provides a detailed reading of Heidegger’s Der Spruch des Anaximander, showing how Heidegger relates this fragment to his thinking of Being, the latter having been ‘forgotten’ by metaphysics. Heidegger’s reading at the same time involves a contemplation of technology and of the ontological relation of beings to each other. Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s Der Spruch highlights specifically those parts of Heidegger’s text where that which precedes Being’s gathering, Being’s disjoining or dissemination, is pointed to. This disjoining, Derrida contends, speaks of the gift of a day more ancient than memory itself and ties in closely with certain aspects of the thinking of Marx. Derrida’s focus on that which precedes Being is in turn related to his contemplation of the law or condition of possibility of technology and also of that which makes possible a relation to the other as other. This condition of possibility, or the gift of Being, which Heidegger’s text also speaks of, involves a ‘higher law’ which can serve as a ‘measure’ for the evaluation, interpretation and transformation of positive law.

Jurisprudence: A Transfer Science

This article juxtaposes dogmatics and deconstruction to argue that the latter is no more than an inverted or decomposed species of the former. Taking the contemporary attraction of law to other disciplines as her starting point, Vismann traces the history of linguist interest in law. Focussing on Derrida’s exemplary and essentially glossatorial analyses of legal textuality, and of the paradoxes and aporias of legal language, she argues that deconstruction offers few surprises to lawyers long trained in the philological ironies of power. A more constructive understanding of the conjunction of dogmatics and deconstruction would thus look to the role of law as a science of transfer from the real to the symbolic and would in this vein focus on the hardware of legal acts of transfer, such as filing systems and thus propose a prehistory of cyber legality. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Allergologies Versus Homeopathies

This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his understanding of violence (of the enemy and the war). Combining Franz Rosenzweig’s reflections which concern the sick philosopher and Hegel’s state, as well as Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ texts beginning with ‘Liberté et commandement’ in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism—that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too—and the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ ‘ontology as allergy’ and in Derrida’s autoimmunology.     

Madness and the Law: The Derrida/Foucault Debate Revisited

In this article the Derrida/Foucault debate is scrutinised with two closely related aims in mind: (1) reconsidering the way in which Foucault’s texts, and especially the more recently published lectures, should be read; and (2) establishing the relation between law and madness. The article firstly calls for a reading of Foucault which exceeds metaphysics with the security it offers, by taking account of Derrida’s reading of Foucault as well as of the heterogeneity of Foucault’s texts. The article reflects in detail on a text of Derrida on Foucault (‘Cogito and the History of Madness’) as well as a text of Foucault on Blanchot (‘Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside’). The latter text shows that Foucault was at times acutely aware of the difficulty involved in exceeding metaphysics and that he realised the importance in this regard of a reflection on literature. These reflections tie in closely with Foucault’s History of Madness as well as with Derrida’s reflections on literature and on madness. Both Derrida and Foucault contend that law has much to learn from literature in understanding the relation between itself and madness. Literature more specifically points to law’s ‘origin’ in madness. The article contends that a failure to take seriously this origin, also in the reading of Foucault’s lectures, would amount to a denial by law of itself.     

Constitutionalism and imperialism Sub Specie Spinozae

This paper examines the public, private and political in the work of Adriana Cavarero by drawing upon the situations of two women whose lives feature in her work: Elizabeth I and Penelope. It includes an analysis of the way in which Cavarero is rethinking Hannah Arendt’s view of ‘the political.’ Cavarero’s exposition of the metaphor of the King’s two bodies in the common law is explored, along with her critique of hylomorphism. Finally, it extends her work in Stately Bodies by considering different images of the power of the body in later political discourses regarding the worker’s body and the effect of the advance of techno-science. This paper was presented at ‘The State He’s In – Political Philosophy and the Figural: A Conference with Adriana Cavarero on her book Stately Bodies: Literature, Philosophy and the Question of Gender’ at Warwick University, Department of Philosophy in May 2004. I would like to thank Adriana and all the conference participants for their comments. Thanks also to the referees of this paper. I have kept the informal style of presentation from the conference, along with the emphasis upon theoretical, rather than historical, analysis.     

Elizabethan ‘Spinning’ and Penelope’s Weaving: The Political, the Common Law and Stately Bodies

This paper examines the public, private and political in the work of Adriana Cavarero by drawing upon the situations of two women whose lives feature in her work: Elizabeth I and Penelope. It includes an analysis of the way in which Cavarero is rethinking Hannah Arendt’s view of ‘the political.’ Cavarero’s exposition of the metaphor of the King’s two bodies in the common law is explored, along with her critique of hylomorphism. Finally, it extends her work in Stately Bodies by considering different images of the power of the body in later political discourses regarding the worker’s body and the effect of the advance of techno-science. This paper was presented at ‘The State He’s In – Political Philosophy and the Figural: A Conference with Adriana Cavarero on her book Stately Bodies: Literature, Philosophy and the Question of Gender’ at Warwick University, Department of Philosophy in May 2004. I would like to thank Adriana and all the conference participants for their comments. Thanks also to the referees of this paper. I have kept the informal style of presentation from the conference, along with the emphasis upon theoretical, rather than historical, analysis.     

Sovereignty Without Sovereignty: Derrida’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Declarations Of Independence</Emphasis>

This article questions the common assumptions in legal theory regarding Derrida’s well-known Declarations of Independence. Through a close reading of this text, well-known ground such as the relation between speech and writing, the notion of representation, speech act theory, the signature, and the proper name is covered. The contribution that this analysis makes in the present context lies in the additional ‘step’ that it takes. The article seeks to give an explanation of the laws at work in Derrida’s thinking in the above respects and to explain more specifically how they find expression in Declarations of Independence. The article in this regard also investigates the importance and role of the ‘notions’ of death, loss of meaning, loss of ownership, and loss of sovereignty in Derrida’s thinking. The contention is that if we take account of Derrida’s reading in Declarations of Independence, it is possible to view constitutions in a very different way, more specifically their ‘origins’, with inevitable implications for constitutional interpretation.

Interrupting the Myth of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Partage</Emphasis>: Reflections on Sovereignty and Sacrifice in the work of Nancy,Agamben and Derrida

Agamben traces the bio-political essence of modern politics to the non-sacrificial killing of Homo Sacer in Roman law. Nancy, on the other hand, links the history of Western politics to the fundamental logic of sacrifice in Western metaphysics. He nevertheless contemplates the possibility that Western societies may finally have arrived at the threshold of a non-sacrificial existence. Derrida seeks to resist the sacrificial logic of Western metaphysics and politics, but nevertheless appears to accept it as an irreducible fact of human co-existence. Unlike Nancy, he envisages no actual or actualised beyond beyond the realm of sacrificial metaphysics and politics. He thus can be said to interrupt Nancy’s ‘myth’ of a non-sacrificial partage. This article compares these three philosophical stances in the hope of throwing more light on the role of sacrifice in the law and politics of our time. Professor of Law, Rand Afrikaans University. Conversations with Ann van Sevenant, Carol Clarkson, Louise du Toit, Peter Fitzpatrick, Costas Douzinas and Adam Thurschwell gave impetus to many of the themes developed in this article. Concomitant shortcomings and inaccuracies, as always, are mine.     

Love and Communism: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Shattered Community

This paper takes as is its point of departure Jean-Luc Nancy’s argument that the occidental idea of community in the modern era has always meant a kind of project or work whose intention was to glorify death in order to redeem and make it meaningful. It does so in order to return the community to its self-identity; to inter or assimilate what intrudes. In so doing, it also produces us as beings who cast this glorious lost past retrospectively. Recalling a lost original communalism, then, is not only politically dangerous, it is a symptom: it operates as a kind of compensatory reinstatement of an imaginary lost unity. On this view, casting ‘back’ to a glorious communal past must not only be resisted on political grounds, it also provides, as a symptom, a way to undertake that resistance. In this paper, I investigate a narrow dimension of Nancy’s strategy for resisting this lure: Nancy’s notion of shattering reveals that the ‘lost object’ of community is a melancholically interred, narcissistically invested retroactive creation of the very work of mourning he resists and re-thinks. The work of mourning on this view, can itself only be resisted by a certain disouevrement or unworking.     

Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom

The rapid recent expansion of copyright law worldwide has sparked efforts to defend the ‘public domain’ of non-propertized information, often on the ground that an expansive public domain is a condition of a ‘free culture’. Yet questions remain about why the public domain is worth defending, what exactly a free culture is, and what role (if any) authors’ rights might play in relation to it. From the standard liberal perspective shared by many critics of copyright expansionism, the protection of individual expression by means of marketable property rights in authors’ works serves as an engine of progress towards a fully competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’ – though only if balanced by an extensive public domain from which users may draw in the exercise of their own expressivity. This article shows that a significantly different, and arguably richer, conception of what a free culture is and how authors’ rights underpin it emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, progress towards a fully emancipated (i.e. a ‘mature’ or ‘enlightened’) culture can only be achieved through the critical intellectual activity that public communication demands: individual expressive freedom is only a condition, not constitutive, of this ‘freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters’. The main thesis defended in this article is that when Kant’s writings on publicity (critical public debate) are read in relation to his writings on the legal organization of publishing, a necessary connection emerges between authors’ rights – as distinct from copyrights – and what Jürgen Habermas and others have named the public sphere. I conclude that it is the public sphere, and not the public domain as such, that should serve as the key reference point in any evaluation of copyright law’s role in relation to the possibility of a free culture.     

Leiter on the Legal Realists

In this essay reviewing Brian Leiter’s recent book Naturalizing Jurisprudence, I focus on two positions that distinguish Leiter’s reading of the American legal realists from those offered in the past. The first is his claim that the realists thought the law is only locally indeterminate – primarily in cases that are appealed. The second is his claim that they did not offer a prediction theory of law, but were instead committed to a standard positivist theory. Leiter’s reading is vulnerable, because he fails to discuss in detail those passages from the realists that inspired past interpretations. My goal is to see how Leiter’s reading fares when these passages are considered. I argue that Leiter is right that the realists’ indeterminacy thesis has only a local scope. Those passages that appear to claim that the law is globally indeterminate actually address three other topics: judicial supremacy, judges’ roles as finders of fact, and the moral obligation to adjudicate as the law commands. With respect to the prediction theory, however, I conclude that Leiter’s position cannot be defended. Indeed the realists offered two ‘prediction’ theories of law. According to the first, which is best described as a decision theory, the law concerning an event is whatever concrete judgment a court will issue when the event is litigated. According to the second, the law is reduced, not to concrete judgments, but to regularities of judicial (and other official) behavior in a jurisdiction. I end this essay with the suggestion that the realists’ advocacy of the second prediction theory indirectly vindicates Leiter’s reading of the realists as prescient jurisprudential naturalists.     

Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy

There is no question Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is an engaging and powerful book which will inform legal philosophy, particularly Kantian theories, for years to come. The text explores with care Kant’s legal and political philosophy, distinguishing it from his better known moral theory. Nor is Ripstein’s book simply a recounting of Kant’s legal and political theory. Ripstein develops Kant’s views in his own unique vision illustrating fresh ways of viewing the entire Kantian project. But the same strength and coherence which ties the book to Kant’s important values of independence blinds the work to our shared moral ties grounded in other political values. Ripstein’s thoughts on punishment are novel in that he embeds criminal law, both in its retributivist and consequentialist facets, into Kant’s overarching political philosophy to show how criminal law can be seen as one aspect of the supremacy of public law. But a criminal law solely focused on the preservation of freedom takes little notice of the ways criminal law need expand its view to account for how a polity can restore the victim of a crime back to civic equality, reincorporate offenders after they have been punished and cannot leave past offenders isolated and likely to reoffend, resulting in the rotating door prison system and communities of innocents who remain preyed upon by career criminals. Lastly, a political theory that does not prize our civic bonds will ignore the startling balkanization of our criminal punishment practices, where policing, arresting and imprisonment become tools of racial and social oppression. In illustrating the benefits in viewing criminal law as a coherent part of Kant’s political theory of freedom, Ripstein also highlights what is absent. It then becomes clear that though Kant presents one important facet of punishment, only a republican political theory can meet the most pressing moral demands of punishment by reminding us that criminal law must be used to preserve and strengthen civic society.     

The Sense of Freedom. The Surprise of Being-in-Common

‘Globalization’ implies, among other things, the radical crisis of the metaphysical and theologico-political conceptions of sense. The crisis of the device built upon the concepts of the abstract individual, the nation and the State is at the same time the crisis of the subject as a master and an owner of sense (each time, the sense). But, if human beings are subtracted by the national, historical and metaphysical identities, by the system of the meanings-image, they are exposed to the possibility itself of sense as what precedes and exceeds every constituted identity or reality. This article aims at exploring in Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought the strict relationship between the ‘non-appropriable’ nature of sense and the being-in-common of human beings considered not as abstract individuals, but as multiple-singularities. A community that is the opening itself of sense, is not sacrificed to an originary or future Unity, but it is offered to the event of the present; to the existences as events and to an ‘immediate mediation’ as surprise. The experience of this offer as surprise is what Nancy calls ‘freedom’. Graduate student at the University of Venice, Italy; conducting a study of ‘the centres of temporary detention’ for migrants in Italy. The translations of all extracts are mine unless otherwise provided. These pages are dedicated to the migrants of the Association Solidariedade Imigrante of Lisbon, Portugal (to each one and to all of them, their friendship is for me such a great gift). I would like to thank Vania Trento Miotto and Thanos Zartaloudis with all my heart for the precious help in the revision of this article. Obviously, the responsibility for these pages rests entirely with me.     

Spectres of Coke: Judicial Supervision as a Revolutionary Inheritance

Sir Edward Coke is known for having played a central role in establishing the power of the common law courts to exercise a supervisory jurisdiction over the executive/administration. Coke is usually praised in the literature for his boldness in doing this, whilst he is at the same time censured for having dared to suggest that this jurisdiction should be a very wide one. This essay questions the inheritance of judicial supervision and enquires whether there may be a secret to uncover in Coke’s texts. Referring to Coke’s Institutes, it is suggested that the wide jurisdiction of the common law courts that Coke advanced, is linked to and should be understood in light of Coke’s pronouncements in the epigrams on law and justice. Judicial supervision, according to this reading of Coke, involves not only a necessarily limited jurisdiction in accordance with law, but also the desire for an unlimited jurisdiction, which corresponds with Derrida’s analysis of justice and law. This reading of Coke, it is suggested, calls on us to view judicial supervision as revolutionary in nature, which requires of the courts to rethink fundamentally the way in which they exercise their supervisory function.

Indigenous rights discourse in Australia

The ability of Australia's indigenous people to create their own cultural identity and social reality is shaped profoundly by the Australian legal system in various ways. The 1992Mabo decision of the Australian High Court ‘created’ a right to land tenure for Australia's indigenous people. This ‘right’ has been further explicated by federal legislation in the post-Mabo era, in and around law. This essay analyzes the 1992Mabo decision in the context of governmental, judicial and wider social responses to indigenous issues. At several sites, it examines ‘indigenous rights’ discourse to illustrate the shifting meaning of ‘rights’ in legal currency in the indigenous debate. The essay suggests that the ‘rights’ discourse of legal liberalism has not yet provided meaningful plurality in the recognition of indigenous rights.     

Politics of Law and the Lacanian Real

The paper explores the role of Jacques Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis in debates in law and legal philosophy. It proceeds by considering a debate between Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler over Lacan’s concept of the real, which forms part of a larger discussion over the future of democracy and the rule of law (Butler et al. 2000). Through reference to discussions of the relationship between law and ethics based on the Antigone tragedy, I argue that the difference between Žižek and Butler’s positions should not be understood in terms of the correctness of their reading of Lacan, but in terms of the political commitments that inform their respective interpretations. I explain the implications of this debate over one of Lacan’s most enigmatic concepts, thereby showing how Lacan’s theory can be used to rethink the politics of law in light of the increased emphasis on ethics in contemporary legal debates.