An Attitudinal Response to Role Conflict in Local Government

Local government consists of elected community representatives, who serve on a part-time basis, hold office for a limited term and do not possess particular managerial skills. The chief executive officer (CEO) is appointed to manage the local government entity. Role conflict becomes an issue due to the competing values of the council and the CEO regarding resource allocation and the overall direction of the organisation. This paper looks at the underlying issues of the friction between the volunteer council and the paid staff and what strategies could be implemented to ensure the two functions are complementary and not conflicting.     

Strengthening Local Government Leadership and Performance: Reexamining and Updating the Winter Commission Goals

The Winter Commission report of 1993 stressed cities with the mayor‐council form of government and emphasized removing barriers to executive authority in large cities. In order to assess and update the report, it is important to recognize that a majority of cities with populations over 100,000 use the council‐manager form, in which restrictions on the executive and fragmented authority are unlikely to be present because of the constitutional principles on which the form is based. There has been progress toward improved leadership in both forms of government and substantial management change, including the incorporation of reinventing government and e‐government practices, and large counties are more likely to have an elected or appointed executive. An emerging issue not considered by the commission but in line with its purpose is the increasing challenge of governing expanding metropolitan and megapolitan regions.     

The ministerial system in Niue

A ministerial system of government has been developed in the tiny micro state of Niue, and in this article the pattern of ministerialization is compared with a typology derived from a study of the ministerial systems in other countries with ministries and ministerial departments. In Niue while the foundations of responsible government were being laid, and functions and powers transferred to an elected executive committee, no corresponding moves were made to reorganize established public service departments and there is, therefore, a mismatch between ministers and departments. Niue like New Zealand has a form of ministerialization that initially appears to conform to the least developed mode in the typology. Niue, however, has a unique arrangement in having a Secretary to Government who is the head of the public service and chief administrative officer with control over all departments, and with a right to attend Cabinet meetings and speak on any matter. Niue, as a consequence, has a ministerial system which overall does not conform with the typology and has interest as an attempt to develop a form appropriate to a micro state.     

Managing Competing Values: Leadership Styles of Mayors and CEOs

The mayor and CEO play an important complementary role in local economic and community development. As the head of the elected council the mayor has a close working relationship with the CEO of the council organisation. Each has the opportunity to influence the policy and administration functions of council. The quality of their working relationship influences the quality of local governance in their community. In this study 413 pairs of Australian mayors and CEOs responded to metaphors assessing the effectiveness of their working relationship with each other. They also completed Cameron's Management Skills Assessment Instrument. Effective working relationships are more likely to occur when their managerial style complements or is the same as the other, on Cameron and Quinn's Competing Values Framework. The implications for CEOs are discussed along with strategies for enhancing the working relationship with their mayor.     

Transforming the Administrative State: Reform in Hong Kong and the Future of the Developmental State

Hong Kong has been depicted as an administrative state where the civil service is insulated from political and societal forces and enjoys a stable pattern of growth in rewards and status. In these respects, it is similar to other Asian developmental states. In Asia, as in the West, traditions underlying the administrative state are being challenged. The Hong Kong civil service has recently come under serious criticism as a result of a major fiscal crisis and a series of administrative failures, while the unelected status of the chief executive is a focus of growing protest. What is the reform capacity of the Hong Kong bureaucracy in these circumstances? What is the likely trajectory of administrative reform, and can we expect Western models of the neo‐administrative state to be relevant and appropriate to Hong Kong and, by extension, to the rest of Asia?     

The impact of women above the political glass ceiling: Evidence from a Norwegian executive gender quota reform

Women have historically been underrepresented in democratic assemblies, particularly in top positions with executive powers. Most gender quota reforms address this by mandating a more equal gender representation on election lists. In contrast, a 1992 legislative reform in Norway required parties' candidate lists for the local executive board to comprise at least 40% politicians of each gender. This legal change was not only exogenously imposed by a higher-level government, but also generated distinct quota-induced constraints across Norwegian municipalities. We exploit the resulting variation in ‘quota shocks’ using a difference-in-differences design to identify the quota's effect on women's political representation as well as local public policies. We find that more women enter the executive board after the reform, though spill-overs on women's representation in the local council and on the probability of a female mayor or top administrator are weak. We also find no consistent evidence for shifts in public policies due to increased representation of women in positions with executive powers.     

Do Political Similarities Facilitate Interlocal Collaboration?

This research examines the extent to which political similarities—that is, homophily between political actors at the local level—affect patterns of interorganizational collaboration in an emergency response situation. While the field of emergency management has focused on implementation‐oriented arrangements among key stakeholders, few studies have systemically investigated the creation and development of interorganizational collaborations led by political actors, especially following catastrophic events. The analysis reveals that a dyadic tie with political homophily boosts local responders’ ties with other agencies during emergencies. Findings indicate that political solidarity, formulated by chief elected officials of municipalities and council members, can broaden the scope of interorganizational collaboration by mitigating institutional collective action problems at the local level. This research presents a critical recommendation for emergency managers that interlocal collaboration for timely response to a disaster is attributable to political similarities that facilitate frequent interlocal interactions through formal and/or informal agreements.     

Understanding Shared Roles in Policy and Administration: An Empirical Study of Council‐Manager Relations

Recent literature in public administration emphasizes enhanced collaboration between elected and administrative officials. The complementarity view is presented as an alternative to the traditional politics–administration dichotomy. At the center of this new perspective lies the concept of shared roles between elected officials and public administrators with respect to policy making and administration. This article expands the emerging literature on role sharing by proposing and testing new variables to understand what enhances the policy‐making role of city managers and the administrative role of elected officials. Employing data collected from a nationwide survey of city managers and utilizing structural equation modeling methodology, this research finds that the council’s expectations and the city manager’s role conception significantly influence the city manager’s involvement in policy making, while the context of policy making, the city manager’s support, and the council’s access to resources affect elected officials’ involvement in administration. This article aims to make a cumulative contribution to the literature on role sharing.     

THE GOVERNMENT AND HOSPITAL COMMITTEES OF MANAGEMENT IN VICTORIA

Abstract: A new method has recently been introduced for selecting members of Victorian hospital committees of management: they are to be appointed by the Minister of Health, instead of being nominally elected by "contributors" to the hospitals. The 1977 Health Commission Act, which contains these new appointment provisions, gives the state government additional powers over the hospitals, and the power to appoint committees of management could contribute to this augmented control. The new method of selection, however, is expected to make little difference in practice to the committees. Neither the former Liberal state government, in framing the Health Commission Act, nor recent official inquiries have considered seriously the capacity of these committees as they are now constituted to maintain a high degree of hospital autonomy, despite the hospitals' heavy reliance on public funds. By leaving undisturbed these inheritors of the voluntary hospital tradition, the former Liberal government, though it has left its Labor successor with some new powers, has left it also with a potential obstacle to implementing the kinds of reforming measures recommended for the state's health services.     

Ethics by Design: The Impact of Form of Government on Municipal Corruption

While trust in government at all levels is at an all‐time low, actual corruption at the municipal level has been declining. One factor often credited with this decline is the introduction of the council‐manager form of government. One of the key reasons the council‐manager form was created in the early 1900s was to act as an antidote to the corruption prevalent in the big‐city machine politics of the era. Despite this, no one has tested whether the council‐manager form has in fact influenced the decline in corruption rates. This article uses a rare events logit model to analyze corruption convictions in municipalities between 1990 and 2010 to determine which factors, including form of government, affect the probability that a corrupt act will occur. The findings indicate that municipalities with the council‐manager form are 57 percent less likely to have corruption convictions than municipalities with the mayor‐council form.     

The congressional veto: Shifting the balance of administrative control

During the past decade, hundreds of provisions have been enacted by Congress giving that body some form of control over the projects and regulations of federal agencies. Pressures for more far-reaching measures of this sort, including a proposal to vest Congress with a veto of all regulations promulagated by federal agencies, have intensified debate on both the constitutional merits and administrative wisdom of the congressional veto process. These measures are exerting considerable effect, delaying the decisions of the agencies, reshaping the regulatory process, and increasing the direct congressional role in setting administrative agendas and substantive policies. The result is a transfer of administrative power to the more than 200 standing committees and subcommittees of the Congress-and, significantly, to their staffs. This transfer has served to impede the executive chain of command, to diminish the role of independent regulatory agencies as experts in their respective fields, to devalue judicial review of agency action, and to reduce the accountability of the affected agencies.     

Do constitutions matter? Evidence from a natural experiment at the municipality level

This paper asks if it does matter for taxes and government spending whether the mayor is elected (and recalled) by direct election or by the municipal council. It thus contributes to the economic literature on the impact of constitutions on economic outcomes. The effects are identified based on reforms of the municipal constitutions that were exogenous from the point of view of the municipalities in content and timing: each year, quasi-randomly selected groups of municipalities introduced the new constitution. This setup helps overcome endogeneity and identification issues that are common to many studies in the field using country level data. Using a new panel dataset of the 686 municipalities in three German states, this paper shows that direct mayoral election and recall through referendum only (as opposed to election and recall through the municipal council) reduce tax rates and increases spending on government employees.     

The decentralization of health care in developing countries: organizational options

The complex ways in which decentralization is practised in the field of government health services are examined. Organizationally, decentralization means a choice between different types of public institution, which vary in terms of: the areas over which they have jurisdiction, the functions delegated to local institutions; and the way decision-makers are recruited, so producing institutions. There is little agreement about the optimum size of areas, either in terms of population or territory. Areas cannot be delimited without consideration being given to the powers to be exercised at each level. The specification of functions always assumes certain things about who will exercise the delegated powers. The two issues cannot be separated. Five structures of decentralization are distinguished, each of which could in principle be created at regional, district and village/community level: the multi-purpose local authority, the single-purpose council, the hybrid council, the single purpose executive agency, the management board, field administration, health teams, and interdepartmental committees. Whatever the institutions used for decentralization, the choice of structures and the ensuing process of decision-making will be highly charged politically. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

State-Local (Chicago) Relations in Illinois: The Harold Washington Era, 1984

Since Harold Washington became mayor of Chicago in 1983, relationsbetween the city and the state have changed significantly. Forone, the mayor is no longer the power-broker in state politics.The perception that Richard J. Daley controlled state governmentmay have been a myth, but today—after the mayoraltiesof Bilandic and Byrne, and with Washington now in office—eventhe myth no longer prevails. The continuing conflict in thecity council, with Washington's forces being in the minority,has also contributed to the change in state-local relations.The city council divisions carry over to a divided legislativedelegation in Springfield. Underlying the present situationare maneuvers by the various potential candidates for the 1987mayoral election. Some clues as to the outcome can be seen inthe election returns for U.S. Senator in the 1984 contest betweenincumbent Charles Percy and Congressman Paul Simon. Black votersdeserted Charles Percy in 1984; in the past, they had stronglysupported him.     

Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption

We conducted an experimental analysis of the causes of corruption, varying the ease of hiding corrupt gains, officials’ wages, and the method of choosing the law enforcement officer. Voters rarely re-elect chief executives found to be corrupt and tend to choose presidents who had good luck. Directly elected law enforcement officers work more vigilantly at exposing corruption than those who are appointed. Increasing government wages and increasing the difficulty of hiding corrupt gains both reduce corruption.     

A Tale of One City: The Devo Manc Deal and Its Implications for English Devolution

On 2 November 2014 George Osborne stood in the impressive great council chamber of Manchester town hall and, flanked by the ten leaders of Greater Manchester's local authorities, announced a devolution deal for the city‐region. Greater Manchester would receive a significant package of powers over transport, housing, planning, skills, business support and welfare in exchange for creating new governance structures, including a directly elected mayor for the city‐region. This article explores the background to the Devo Manc deal, arguing that it is the product of both a long history of local government collaboration in Greater Manchester and George Osborne's desire for a sweeping restructure of English governance. It traces how the key decisions were taken quickly and by a small number of key officials. The article also identifies some flaws in Devo Manc and considers whether it is an appropriate model for other city‐regions in the UK.     

What Have We Learned about the Performance of Council‐Manager Government? A Review and Synthesis of the Research

The 100th anniversary of the International City/County Management Association provides an excellent point to review and assess research on the performance of the council‐manager form of government. The development of the council‐manager form arguably has been the most important innovation in American local government over the last century, yet its impact on the performance of municipal governments is not well understood. This article reviews and assesses the empirical evidence for 10 propositions that council‐manager governments perform better than mayor‐council governments. This evidence indicates that although progress has been made on demonstrating differences in representation and functionality, the proposition that council‐manager governments are better managed than mayor‐council governments has yet to be seriously engaged in this literature. Filling this critical gap requires progress in two areas: the development of theory to explain why council‐manager governments are better‐managed organizations and the production of evidence assessing the major propositions of this theory.     

Targeting the lobbying effort: The importance of local government lobbying

Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.     

Police Budgeting: Winning Strategies

Based on a national survey of police chiefs with a follow-up focus group, this article discusses budgetary strategies that police departments used to be successful in budgeting. The strategies include: using crime and workload data judiciously; capitalizing on sensational crime incidents; effectively getting the message out; carefully mobilizing interest groups; strategic planning; playing the federal grants game; working closely with the chief executive and elected officials; and involving all departmental staff levels in budgeting.     

Gaining new insights by going local: determinants of coalition formation in mixed democratic polities

We develop a simple spatial model suggesting that Members of Parliament strive for the inclusion of the head of state’s party in coalitions formed in mixed democratic polities, and that parliamentary parties try to assemble coalitions that minimize the ideological distance to the head of state. We identify the German local level of government as functionally equivalent to a parliamentary setting, such that the directly elected mayor has competencies similar to a president in a mixed national polity. Our findings show that the party affiliation of the head of state is a key factor considered by party members in the legislature when forming coalitions: coalitions in the legislature are more likely to form if they include the party of the head of the executive branch. Furthermore, the policy preferences of the head of the executive branch matter for the legislators’ behavior in the coalition formation process: the smaller the ideological distance between the position of a coalition and the position of the head of state, the more likely a coalition is to be formed.