‘I,the people’: a deflationary interpretation of populism,Trump and the United States constitution

This paper advances a deflationary interpretation of populism, Donald Trump and the United States Constitution. It accepts that Trump utilizes a populist pose but rejects populism as too reductive for understanding his ascension and constitutional challenge. First, it argues that, although he merits the designation, Trump reveals more about populism than populism does about him. Trump illustrates populism’s conceptual elasticity, but employing it as a frame to understand him imposes coherence upon a figure whose monetized politics are chaotic, shallow and unanchored by principle. Second, populism provides a necessary but insufficient condition for critically explaining Trump’s ascension, either in terms of electoral populism or populism in power. Third, while democratic deconsolidation under Trump’s presidency cannot be discounted, the Constitution remains resilient in most important respects. A dispassionate constitutional sociology counsels a deflationary understanding rather than an uncritical alarmism that too frequently reproduces and reinforces the darker aspects of Trump’s populist political logic.     

From partisan to pluralist ideology: the changing practices of democracy through Spain’s 20th-century constitutional moments

This article explores the practices of democracy in Spain through the lens of its 20th-century constitutional moments, namely, those around the 1931 and the 1978 constitutions, with the aim of elucidating its changing ideological significance. Whereas in 1931, supporting democracy had a strongly partisan meaning, as every endorsement of the democratic ideal entailed a conflicting understanding of the Republic’s democratic character, in 1978 it gave rise to an integrative form of pluralism. Even if the former has left a deep imprint on Spanish politics, anticipating a kind of seemingly irreconcilable opposition between left and right, the latter has proved instrumental in the consolidation of the new democratic regime. After the institutional distortion of democracy during the four-decade dictatorship’s ‘organic democracy’, since 1977 the ideal of democracy was thoroughly recast into a pluralist ideology. Unlike views describing it as a consensual regime, the article argues that the politics of consensus tested since the 1977 constitutional debates paved the way for the accommodation of democratic pluralism; furthermore, the culture of pacts it contributed to set up has continued to inspire a new form of adversarial, parliamentary politics well beyond the transition years.     

Podemos: the ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in contemporary Spain

The paper inquires critically into Podemos as an instance of left-wing populism in contemporary European politics, putting forward four claims and a major thesis. First, Podemos was started as an original endeavour to ally in a hybrid mix two divergent approaches to democratic politics: the horizontal, open and networked mobilizations of the multitude, and the vertical, hierarchical, formal and representative structures of party formations, on the other. Such an amalgam might serve to combine the virtues of different models of democracy. Second, Podemos’ populism exemplifies a creative version of a ‘politics of the common’, but the terms of the ‘common sense’ are inflected in the direction of social rights, inclusion and egalitarian democracy. Third, Podemos illustrates a unique ‘reflexivity’ in the pursuit of populism. The party leadership has taken its cues from E. Laclau’s hegemonic theory of populism and implements it in its political strategy. Fourth, since the autumn of 2014, Podemos has arguably seen the gradual preponderance of a vertical, ‘hegemonic’ logic, reflecting a particular reading of populist theory which is prevalent among the party’s leadership. The broader thesis is that a dualist politics, which welds together horizontalism and verticalism in a conflictual bind, is a prima facie plausible strategy for renewing democracy in the present critical context. But a political organization like Podemos will be able to redeem its democratic promises as long as it maintains a constructive balance between these two political logics, avoiding the reassertion of centralized leadership and the suppression of pluralism which are typical of the populist tradition.     

Populism and technocracy: opposites or complements?

Although populism and technocracy increasingly appear as the two organising poles of politics in contemporary Western democracies, the exact nature of their relationship has not been the focus of systematic attention. This article argues that whilst these two terms – and the political realities they refer to – are usually assumed to be irreducibly opposed to one another, there is also an important element of complementarity between them. This complementarity consists in the fact that both populism and technocracy are predicated upon an implicit critique of a specific political form, referred to in this article as ‘party democracy’. This is defined as a political regime based on two key features: the mediation of political conflicts through the institution of political parties and a procedural conception of political legitimacy according to which political outcomes are legitimate to the extent that they are the product of a set of democratic procedures revolving around the principles of parliamentary deliberation and electoral competition. This argument is made through a close analysis of works by Ernesto Laclau and Pierre Rosanvallon, chosen as exemplary manifestations of the contemporary cases for populism and technocracy, respectively.     

Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan

The literature on populism used to depict the phenomenon as an alternative to the standard path from traditional to modern society; as a way to enfranchise the underclass; or as an anomaly vis-à-vis class politics and liberal institutions. More recently, the debate has shifted into something of a terra incognita as a result of the growing interest in the connection between populism and democratic politics. One of the more intriguing contributions to this debate is an article by Margaret Canovan, if only because it makes this unknown territory less confusing. Her argument draws from Michael Oakeshott's claim that political modernity is characterised by the interplay of two distinct styles – the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism . She renames them the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy and suggests that populism arises in the gap between them. This establishes a relation of interiority between populism and democracy. The former will follow democracy like a shadow. At times, however, the theoretical status of the gap is somewhat uncertain, as it seems more appropriate for thinking politics (particularly radical politics) in general. The political valence of the shadow could also be specified further to show the undecidability between the democratic aspect of the phenomenon and its possible ominous tones. This paper looks into this in some detail to engage in a friendly interrogation of Canovan's claims.     

Populisms and liberal democracy – business as usual?

Populism is often thought to mark a sharp break with liberal democracy. But to what extent is this the case? In this contribution the connections between populism and liberal democracy are sketched in the context of several areas where discussions about populisms have stressed their discontinuity with the liberal democratic tradition and its practices. The discussion concentrates upon the notions of the people, their representation, elites, constitutional issues and economic policies. In each case it is suggested that continuities are as strong, and sometimes stronger, than discontinuities in these relationships. The contribution ends with a discussion of how it might be possible to defend liberal democracy from a non-liberal position in the face of the critique from populisms.     

Representing the People: Laclau as a Theorist of Representation

Going beyond conventional conceptions of political representation, Ernesto Laclau takes representation to be a general category and not just limited to formal political institutions, and he takes representation to be performative in that it also brings about what is represented. This article examines the implications of this conceptualization of representation for Laclau’s theory of populism. Laclau takes populism to be exemplary of his conception of representation because populism is a discourse that brings into being what it claims to represent: the people. This is important for current debates about populism and the crisis of democratic institutions, whether domestic or international. I show how our conceptions of representation inform how we think about populism and liberal democracy, and specifically about populism as a threat to liberal democracy at the domestic or global level. I show this in the context of a reading of Jan-Werner Müller’s influential critique of populism.     

In search of a leftist democratic imaginary: what can theories of populism tell us?

It might seem that Herbert Marcuse was right: leftist politics can no longer avoid the challenge of devising its own positive normative grounds. The neoliberal political rationality that is now hegemonic must be taken on by a new imaginary: radical, leftist and democratic. This article explores what major theories about new populism have to offer to a radical leftist attempt to reinvent itself. The regeneration of populist movements across the globe appears to offer signposts to guide a new radical politics. Yet I argue that populism is no ideologically empty mobilizing strategy able to be harnessed to all manner of political purposes. Embedded in its demagogic form are key presumptions about the character of democratic justification that collude with a neoliberal political project. Theories of new populism help us to shed light, instead, on the challenges that face the Left in its own self-reconstitution amidst liberal democratic crisis. Circumspection concerning the ideological load that is carried by a populist rendering of democratic politics needs to be united with an insight into how the rise of populism itself issues a warning about aspects of a social democratic past that cannot be reclaimed unchanged.     

The Dismissal of Prime Ministers in the Asian Commonwealth: Comparing Democratic Deconsolidation in Malaysia and Sri Lanka

This article comparatively analyses processes of democratic deconsolidation in the Asian Commonwealth states of Malaysia and Sri Lanka by examining two recent constitutional crises in which the head of state dismissed, or attempted to dismiss, the serving prime minister during a parliamentary term. These episodes brought to a close fledgling reform movements that had obtained historic electoral mandates in both countries. The article discusses the Westminster-derived constitutional provisions concerning government formation as well as the distinctive features of political culture that animate those formal frameworks in the two countries. It is argued that while Malaysia and Sri Lanka possess the formal institutions of liberal democracy that notionally enable both pluralistic democracy and greater democratisation, their political cultures still have sufficient potency to be a counteracting force against the deeper consolidation of constitutional democracy. Democratisation therefore remains a work in progress in both countries.     

Banning political parties in a democratic constitutional state: the second NPD ban proceedings in a comparative perspective

ABSTRACT

Backes’s article discusses the judgement of the Second Senate of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) of 17 January 2017—not to ban the right-wing extremist party Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)—in light of recent lively international debates on the protection of democracy. It considers the logic of an examination of proportionality as established by German constitutional law, considering aspects of the legitimacy, suitability, necessity and appropriateness of the party ban. The article shows that the newly introduced criterion of ‘potentiality’ requires an examination of proportionality even if the court itself denies this. Thus the threshold for intervention has been raised, moderately, since a concrete or even immediate threat as defined in police law is not required. The Court links the definition of a free democratic basic order more closely to the established minimum definitions of comparative research and provides clarification that further refutes the (exaggerated) accusation of ‘vagueness’. In doing so it has sharpened the contours of the concept of militant democracy that is widely regarded in international comparative studies.     

A Response to Jeremy Waldron's Law and Disagreement

This article offers a critical response to arguments developed by Jeremy Waldron on the subject of democracy and constitutional rights. In particular it responds to three claims made by Waldron: first, he claims contemporary Western societies are characterised by deep and intractable disagreement; second, collectively binding decisions should be reached by democratic means alone; and third constitutional devices, such as bills of rights, should be rejected because they act as constraints on democracy. I argue that Waldron is unable to argue for the primacy of democracy from the baseline of intractable disagreement that he posit. He implicitly relies upon a position of moral consensus to confirm the priority of democracy over alternative decision-making procedures. Further, the moral stance that Waldron takes towards democracy is based upon a Kantian theory of justice which is shared by liberal-constitutional theorists, such as Rawls and Dworkin, who advocate bills of rights. Finally, Waldron does not provide the arguments necessary to justify the rejection of bills of rights. Good reasons exist for tempering democratic procedures with constitutional devices. However, this conclusion is qualified. It depends upon counterfactual claims that can be resolved only by taking into account the specific institutional and cultural practices of particular political systems.     

Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy

Populism, understood as an appeal to 'the people' against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values, should not be dismissed as a pathological form of politics of no interest to the political theorist, for its democratic pretensions raise important issues. Adapting Michael Oakeshott's distinction between 'the politics of faith' and 'the politics of scepticism', the paper offers an analysis of democracy in terms of two opposing faces, one 'pragmatic' and the other 'redemptive', and argues that it is the inescapable tension between them that makes populism a perennial possibility.     

From chasing populists to deconstructing populism: A new multidimensional approach to understanding and comparing populism

This paper challenges some widespread theoretical assumptions and practices in the study of populism and proposes a new multidimensional approach to generate and analyse data on this latent construct. Rather than focusing on categorising subjects as populists or not, it recommends reaching a better understanding of what populism is, the salience and relative weight of its attributes and how they interact creating an inner populist logic. Despite the increasing media and academic attention, historical discrepancies in how to conceptualise and operationalise populism have hindered cumulative progress in the literature. Initially most efforts were devoted to the study of specific movements, without a clear comparative angle, and the concept of populism was often conflated with that of nationalism. When the literature started to pay more attention to the analysis of the attributes associated with populism serious disagreements emerged concerning its true essence. Populism has been conceptualised as an ideology, a cynical strategy, a performative style and a discursive logic of articulation. The disputes between these competing interpretations have arguably slowed down the generation of comparative data. Although this article is meant to be a critique of the current state of the field and a call to make it pivot into a slightly different direction, it does not adopt an iconoclast stance and largely tries to reconcile the different existing research traditions – ideational, discursive, performative and strategic. It shows that their efforts are to a great extent complementary but mostly operating on different rungs of the ladder of abstraction. This paper argues that shifting from minimal definitions into a multidimensional approach may stimulate the generation of comparative data on a wider range of attributes and facilitate the identification of degrees and varieties within populism. This paper develops a new analytical framework which deconstructs populism into five dimensions: (1) depiction of the polity, (2) morality, (3) construction of society, (4) sovereignty and (5) leadership. These dimensions, that synthesise the most influential conceptualisations of populism, are empirically and theoretically interconnected and encompass ideational, discursive and performative attributes suggested in the literature. These dimensions are in turn composed of lower order attributes forming a multilayered network structure. This multidimensional framework provides a heuristic template that can be adapted and operationalised in diverse ways depending on the hypotheses, type of data and subjects of the analysis. Some examples of how to turn these dimensions into variables to capture supply- and demand-side populism are introduced. Future empirical research could help map and better understand the network of interactions and intersections among these dimensions and attributes. This could be the key to settle some of the current conceptual debates about populism and its varieties.     

Labour's approach to planning: Economics v politics

Since 1964 the Labour Party has been closely associated with the development in government of a conception of planning which gives pride of place to economic rather than representative opinion. Although ofneo‐liberal inspiration, its adoption by Labour is by no means circumstantial but is historically embedded in social democratic ideology concerning economic organisation. This convergence with neo‐liberalism is especially notable for its tendency towards the denial and ultimate impoverishment of politics. Yet the theoretical basis exists for an approach to planning—ultimately more realistic politically—incorporating and developing rather than devaluing representative democracy.     

孙中山五权宪制中的国民大会

国民大会是孙中山后期五权宪制架构中的一个重要权力结构。从这一结构所承载的功能来看，它首先是一种“民主”的制度安排；同时，作为中央政制中针对政府权力的“结构性制约因素”，它又具有“宪政”的意义。章力图分析这一机构所折射出的政治理念的基本取向及其自身存在的问题。     

Is Liberal Democracy Sliding into ‘Democratic Despotism’?

Post‐democracy and cognate concepts suggest that the postwar period of democratisation has given way to a concentration of power in the hands of small groups that are unrepresentative and unaccountable, as exemplified by the rise of multinational corporations and their influence on democratic politics. This article goes further to argue that this does not fully capture the triple threat facing liberal democracy: first, the rise of a new oligarchy that strengthens executive power at the expense of parliament and people; second, the resurgence of populism and demagogy linked to a backlash against technocratic rule and procedural politics; third, the emergence of anarchy associated with the atomisation of society and a weakening of social ties and civic bonds. In consequence, liberal democracy risks sliding into a form of ‘democratic despotism’ that maintains the illusion of free choice while instilling a sense of ‘voluntary servitude’ as conceptualised by Tocqueville.     

Roadgrading Community Culture: Why the Internet is so Dangerous to Real Democracy

This article forwards an anarchist analysis of the internet as inherently degrading of local community and the possibility of real democracy emerging. The authors suggest that rampant virtuality, based on the eradication of time and space as functional communicative restraints, acts to separate individuals from their face-to-face relationships and localities. They forward that local community is the only forum in which genuine democracy and an ecological society can hope to thrive. The article argues that in asking the question Where do you want to go today?, the internet attempts to create a virtual everywhere, a universalising logic that is to communication what the WTO and globalisation are to economics. Further, the piece forwards a view of technology and society in dialectic relationship with one another, suggesting that democratic tools and a democratic society rely on one another for their emergence.     

‘No regionalism please,we are Leghisti !’ The transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini

Whilst the Lega Nord has traditionally been defined as a regionalist populist party, since Matteo Salvini became its leader in 2013 it has undergone a process of profound ideological transformation. This article assesses this momentous change and the impact it could have on the future of the Lega, drawing on a content analysis of Salvini’s and the party’s Facebook posts, as well as interviews with regional leaders. It argues that, under Salvini’s personal style of leadership: (a) regionalism has been replaced by an empty form of nativist nationalism, which fails to address socio-economic issues related to the North–South divide; (b) populism remains central to the party’s strategic communication, but the EU has taken Rome’s place as the people’s ‘enemy’; (c) this ideological shift has paid-off at the 2018 general election, but is underpinned by latent fractures between the leader and regional representatives which could have profound implications in the future.     

From McCarthyism to the Tea Party: Interpreting Anti-Leftist Forms of US Populism in Comparative Perspective

This article presents an analysis of McCarthyite and Tea Party political discourse and explores the possibilities of utilizing populism as an analytic construct for making comparisons between the political and economic projects envisaged by these two conservative movements. Relying on a definition of populism as a universal discursive formation, this article argues that there is a similar structure to the discourses of McCarthyism and the Tea Party, which relies on the construction of a “left-oriented enemy,” posed as a threat to the American values of freedom and independence historically tied to the nation's “founding moment.” With this comparative discursive structure established, the article then explores the ideological differences between the movements and attempts to interpret them within a historical framework. This article concludes by asserting that cases of populism in the immediate postwar period such as McCarthyism were short lived compared to new cases of populism such as the Tea Party, insofar as the universal discursive structure of populism, which once proved to be an exceptional phenomenon within modern forms of political rule, is now becoming part of the institutionalized structure of democratic politics, evidenced by a number of cases taken in comparative-historical perspective.