A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET

"Network neutrality" is the shorthand for a proposed regimeof economic regulation for the Internet. Because of the trendto deliver traditional telecommunications services, as wellas new forms of content and applications, by Internet protocol(IP), a regime of network neutrality regulation would displaceor subordinate a substantial portion of existing telecommunicationsregulation. If the United States adopts network neutrality regulation,other industrialized nations probably will soon follow. As aresult of their investment to create next-generation broadbandnetworks, network operators have the ability to innovate insidethe network by offering both senders and receivers of informationgreater bandwidth and prioritization of delivery. Network neutralityregulation would, among other things, prevent providers of broadbandInternet access service (such as digital subscriber line (DSL)or cable modem service) from offering a guaranteed, expediteddelivery speed in return for the payment of a fee. The practicaleffect of banning such differential pricing (called "accesstiering" by its critics) would be to prevent the pricing ofaccess to content or applications providers according to priorityof delivery. To the extent that an advertiser of a good or servicewould be willing to contract with a network operator for advertisingspace on the network operator's affiliated content, anotherpractical effect of network neutrality regulation would be toerect a barrier to vertical integration of network operatorsinto advertising-based business models that could supplementor replace revenues earned from their existing usage-based businessmodels. Moreover, by making end-users pay for the full costof broadband access, network neutrality regulation would denybroadband access to the large number of consumers who wouldnot be able to afford, or who would not have a willingness topay for, what would otherwise be less expensive access. Forexample, Google is planning to offer broadband access to end-usersfor free in San Francisco by charging other content providersfor advertising. This product offering is evidently predicatedon the belief that many end-users demand discounted or freebroadband access that is paid for by parties other than themselves.Proponents of network neutrality regulation argue that suchrestrictions on the pricing policies of network operators arenecessary to preserve innovation on the edges of the network,as opposed to innovation within the network. However, recognizingthat network congestion and real-time applications demand somedifferential pricing according to bandwidth or priority, proponentsof network neutrality regulation would allow broadband Internetaccess providers to charge higher prices to end-users (but notcontent or applications providers) who consume more bandwidthor who seek priority delivery of certain traffic. Thus, thedebate over network neutrality is essentially a debate overhow best to finance the construction and maintenance of a broadbandnetwork in a two-sided market in which senders and receivershave additive demand for the delivery of a given piece of information—andhence additive willingness to pay. Well-established tools ofRamsey pricing from regulatory economics can shed light on whethernetwork congestion and recovery of sunk investment in infrastructureare best addressed by charging providers of content and applications,broadband users, or both for expedited delivery. Apart fromthis pricing problem, an analytically simpler component of proposednetwork neutrality regulation would prohibit a network operatorfrom denying its users access to certain websites and Internetapplications, such as voice over Internet protocol (VoIP). Althoughsome instances of blocking of VoIP have been reported, suchconduct is not a serious risk to competition. To address thisconcern, I analyze whether market forces (that is, competitionamong access providers) and existing regulatory structures aresufficient to protect broadband users. I conclude that economicwelfare would be maximized by allowing access providers to differentiateservices vis-à-vis providers of content and applicationsin value-enhancing ways and by relying on existing legal regimesto protect consumers against the exercise of market power, shouldit exist.     

Who Develops a University Invention? The Impact of Tacit Knowledge and Licensing Policies

In this paper, I propose a theoretical model to illustrate how the inventor know-how affects whether the inventor starts a firm to develop her idea or licenses an invention to an established firm for development. Inventor start-ups are characterized as development organizations that serve a temporary role in the invention–innovation process, developing an invention until they can sell the developed invention to an established firm that owns requisite complementary assets for commercialization. This model is then used to analyze the role and impact of a university technology transfer office (TTO) on this process to understand how TTO’s may both positively and negatively impact the transaction. The model posits a general theory of inventor–entrepreneur behavior in university and corporate research labs based on two factors: the importance of know-how and the distribution of inventors’ personal costs to transfer that know-how.     

Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets: The Case of German Electricity

This paper applies the concept of regulatory threat to analyse the electricity supply industry in Germany, where in contrast to other European member states there is no ex-ante regulation of network access charges. Instead, network access relies on industrial self-regulation and ex-post control by the Cartel Office. The paper extends the concept of regulatory threat to vertically related markets, stressing an optimal balance between the level of the network access charges and discrimination against third parties. The conceptual framework appears to explain developments in the German electricity sector accurately and thus provides a useful tool for policy analysis.     

财政法的经济学根基——交易成本公共物品理论的提出

传统上,财政学和财政法均认为财政存在的必要性在于外部性理论以及在此基础上提出的传统公共物品理论。而交易成本公共物品理论则主张,财政法的经济学根基不在于外部性,而在于解决外部性的交易成本的高低。政府应以更低的交易费用来提供公共物品,提供公共物品的目的是为了降低整个社会的交易费用。财政和财政法的主要职能是降低整个社会的交易费用,而不是所谓的教务式的“提供公共物品”。借“私人不愿提供公共物品”之名而行垄断之实,其结果往往导致该物品的交易费用增加。因此,在决定一类物品由谁提供时,政府应该这样思考：该物品由私人提供和由国家提供,哪种方式交易费用较低？政府如何降低其交易费用？     

The WTO's First Antitrust Case - Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition

A World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute panel has decided theWTO’s first antitrust case. It resolved the matter infavour of the United States’ claim that Mexico had anticompetitivelyfacilitated exploitative prices and a cartel that raised theprice of terminating cross-border telephone calls in Mexicoand thereby harmed trade and competition. The case is Mexico– Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (April2004) (‘the Mexican telecom case’). This essay arguesthat if the WTO’s antitrust clause was in fact triggered(which is a point of contention), Mexico’s conduct violatedits obligations. Furthermore, it argues that the GATS antitrustobligation in the telecommunications sector should be acknowledgedas occupying an important place at the intersection of trade,competition and industrial policies. Antitrust law is the otherside of the coin of liberal trade law. Antitrust law opens marketsby prohibiting private and other commercial restraints, whiletrade law opens markets by prohibiting public restraints. BeforeMexican telecom, no legal discipline was regarded as copiousor flexible enough to address combined public and private restraints.In particular, nations were allowed free rein to privilege nationalchampions that harmed competition in and out of their country,imposing costs on outsiders as well as on their own people.A positive reading of the antitrust clause helps to fill thegap.     

Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO

The WTO is not explicitly concerned with the problem of regulatoryjurisdiction in connection with prudential regulation (as opposedto industrial policy regulation). However, as the WTO has addressedincreasingly complex regulatory barriers to trade, it has developedseveral devices that have the implicit effect of allocatingregulatory jurisdiction among states.This article reviews afew illustrative cases in WTO law, including Helms–Burton,Shrimp, and Gambling. This review suggests how these cases maybe understood as dealing with allocation of regulatory jurisdiction.Negative integration rules such as national treatment or proportionalitymay serve as devices applied by tribunals for allocation ofregulatory authority. The WTO has very limited rules of positiveintegration—whereby states either harmonize regulationor agree on more specific allocations of regulatory authority,such as mutual recognition. However, it has developed a modestdegree of capacity to engage in positive regulation, or to referto positive integration rules developed in other contexts, suchas Codex Alimentarius. Finally, this article examines theoreticalbases for allocating and reallocating regulatory jurisdictionin order to establish a framework by which to analyse the roleof the WTO in this context.     

Institutional law and economics

Behavioral economics provides one of the foundation for institutional law and economics (ILE). Improvement in predicting the performance of alternative laws will be built on ILE insights into how distribution affects productivity of labor and realization of joint gains. Our understanding of obedience to law as well as other categories of failure to be opportunistic (such as in high exclusion-cost situations) will be better understood from an ILE perspective that investigates learning to supplement specific sanctions.The boundaries of ILE inquiry encompass private property rights, regulation, and public spending and taxation since these are complements and substitutes. Public spending is not a good measure of the size of government, and regulation is not the opposite of freedom in the aggregate. This framework of ILE can usefully be seen as distinctive, even if all of its practitioners do not use the label and several of its propositions are shared with other paradigms. A better label might simply be institutional economics or political economy.     

Toward an asymmetric Coase theorem

Various reformulations of the Coase theorem have developed normative corollaries on the choice of optimal remedies in the presence of positive transaction costs. In this article, we consider the extent to which these propositions are affected by the presence of asymmetric transaction costs, and we offer a reformulation of the Coase theorem which takes into account asymmetrical transaction costs. Our analysis combines several insights from the existing literature on property-type vesus liability-type remedies, identifying the conditions for the superiority of each type of remedy. Further, we consider the possible use of mixed remedies and identify the optimal scope of such solution.     

THE ECONOMICS OF "WIRELESS NET NEUTRALITY"

Network neutrality issues have been vigorously debated worldwideover the past few years. One major aim of network neutralityproponents is to prevent high-speed Internet service providersfrom charging content providers for priority delivery. Recently,proponents have turned their attention to the regulation ofwireless networks, such as those for cellular phones, whichprovide increasing numbers of consumers with access to Internetservices. Some application providers have relied on a recentacademic paper to support greater regulation of wireless operators.Although the proposals to regulate these networks use the phrase"net neutrality," the regulations they seek to impose on wirelessoperators have little in common with those being sought forother Internet service providers. In this article, we providea framework for determining whether certain kinds of regulationsshould be imposed on the owners of wireless networks. We alsoconsider the benefits and costs of specific proposals for theregulation of these networks. Our principal conclusion is thatthe costs of most of these proposals are likely to exceed thebenefits.     

EXCLUSIONARY PRICING AND CONSUMERS HARM: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PRACTICE IN THE DSL MARKET

The assessment of exclusionary abuses by dominant firms is byno means an easy task. This is particularly true for pricingabuses, as there is no clear-cut way of distinguishing a pricecut that is abusive from one that instead is pro-competitive.We argue that there are several shortcomings in the way theEuropean Commission as assessed exclusionary pricing abusesin two important decisions concerning Internet access servicemarkets: Deutsche Telekom AG and Wanadoo Interactive. Firstof all, in computing downstream costs to apply the price squeezetest the incumbent's economies of scale and unavoidable costsshould be factored in, as the test is only meant to establishwhether an as-efficient competitor has been unlawfully foreclosed.Secondly, since the price squeeze test provides only for a necessarycondition for predation to occur, it is also necessary to provethat the recoupment of initial losses is a plausible scenarioso that the conduct under examination may indeed turn out tobe harmful to consumers. This is all but a trivial task, asthere are some sources of endogeneity that may cause a radicalchange in the underlying market structure. Particularly, inmarkets at early stage of development, entry barriers that mayfacilitate the recoupment of initial losses ex-ante may causea change such that market structure no longer supports recoupmentex-post.     

Innovative regulations,incomplete contracts and ownership structure in the water utilities

Using an incomplete contract framework, we analyse new forms of regulation and private participation in public services. This paper explains contractual efficiency in the absence of financially guaranteed investments in public private partnerships. The example of a number of African countries underlines how a series of national, normative law reforms can give rise to innovations in approaches to regulation. This new hybrid form of regulation, inspired by a French regulation approach combining commission regulation and franchise bidding, could be more effective than previous approaches to regulation, in the sense of being more stable and more closely aligned with stakeholder expectations. This approach to regulation would appear to be more efficient economically, while integrating the objectives of solidarity tariffs and social water access connections. Based on these analyses, our results show (1) the impact on the robustness of new lease contracts on financing constraints, and (2) the advantages of Asset Owner Companies that reconcile explicit commitments and special purposes. We demonstrate that this achieves optimum efficiency by encouraging parties to determine jointly the optimal level of costs and investment. In addition, the mechanism fosters discussion about the possibility of institutionalizing Asset Owner Companies by predetermining the distribution of risk in lease contracts.     

Fair use and copyright protection: a price theory explanation

Copyright scholars suggest that computer technology has reduced transaction costs associated with copyright transfer, allegedly eliminating the need for the fair-use doctrines that were developed to allow limited use of copyrighted material in situations where the transaction costs of securing authorized use would be prohibitive. According to this emerging view, in an ideal world with no contracting costs, third party use of copyrighted material could realistically only take place with the express consent of the copyright holder. This would give the author absolute power to dispose of his work, including the right to veto uses, without the possibility of a fair use “override” of any sort.This paper shows the limits of such transaction cost-based arguments. If transaction costs provide the dominant economic justification of “fair-use” doctrines, an exogenous reduction of such transaction costs would limit the scope and application of the defense of fair use. Nevertheless, in this paper we suggest that, when viewed in light of the anticommons theory, fair-use doctrines retain a valid efficiency justification even in a zero transaction-cost environment. Fair-use defenses are justifiable, and in fact instrumental, in minimizing the welfare losses prompted by the strategic behavior of the copyright holders. Even if copyright licenses can be transferred at no cost (for instance, in a “click and pay” frictionless computer world), the strategic behavior of the copyright holders would still create possible deadweight losses.In this context, we identify a number of critical variables that should guide and constrain the application of fair-use doctrines. These variables include (a) the number of copyright holders; (b) the degree of complementarity between the copyrighted inputs; (c) the degree of independence between the various copyright holders in the pricing of their licenses; and (d) ability to price discriminate.     

The meaning of regulatory costs

Regulatory costs are an essential aspect of the efficiency and quality of regulations. Moreover, they are a genuine loss of welfare which have a negative impact on national income. Surprisingly, regulatory costs are often neglected or misinterpreted in regulatory assessments, except—though only recently—for administrative compliance costs. One important reason is the lack of a clear and consistent definition as well as a practical and exhaustive typology of regulatory costs. This conceptual paper presents a cost taxonomy that takes into account all costs of regulation. We identify 16 direct and two indirect regulatory cost types. The former are costs borne by society in preparing and implementing regulations. For the government, they consist of information, decision-making, drawing-up, planning, administrative start-up, operational, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Citizens and businesses, on the other hand, incur rent-seeking, information, planning, three types of compliance, delay and enforcement costs. The indirect costs comprise the efficiency loss plus, in the event of poorly designed or market-based regulation, also transaction costs. The neglect of any of these costs may lead to the underestimation of costs in absolute or relative terms and thus to inefficient regulatory choices.     

Factors in Estimating Potential Response Costs of Spills and Releases

This article provides a discussion of the categories of response costs associated with releases of hazardous substances or petroleum into the environment and the factors to be considered in developing response cost estimates. To understand and estimate the costs of responding to sudden and accidental releases of hazardous materials or petroleum into the environment, a number of key factors must be considered. Detailed cost estimating approaches developed through the study of catastrophic marine oil spills are discussed for purposes of illustration, and then generalized for application to other types of spills. It is recognized that many practitioners will have access to detailed information on releases based on their own experience and it is anticipated that this article will provide additional insight, ideas, and a framework for estimating response costs.     

The unintended consequence of doorstep consumer protection: surprise,reciprocation, and consistency

Cooling-off periods are universally employed in doorstep selling regimes. Paired with a right for consumers to withdraw from the contract, this legal instrument seeks to protect consumers against superior skilled and knowledgeable sellers thus restoring the balance of interests. According to prior literature, cooling-off periods also serve an economic function by moderating the abuse of market power, by mitigating problems of hidden characteristics, and by promoting consumer choice. If their drawbacks—mainly the creation of consumer moral hazard and shifting of risk to the seller—can be contained, cooling-off periods are hence supposed to yield efficiency gains. By thinking out of this box, the present paper showcases that cooling-off periods also establish the perverse incentive for the seller to increase consumer compliance to a level which outlasts the cooling-off period. I argue that inevitably occurring psychological factors and transaction costs from the cooling-off regime amplify each other, thus creating a hard-lock status-quo bias. Based on behavioural insights and transaction cost theory, I predict that an inefficiently high number of consumers will enter into a doorstep contract and that, at the same time, the number of cancelled contracts will be inefficiently low. Consequently, I propose to change the default inherent in current cooling-off regimes from presumed consent to presumed withdrawal in order to debias consumers’ withdrawal decision.     

企业国际化过程中的法律问题研究

本文从企业国际化过程中的“国家”面向。追问了企业在进入某国市场时该国法律对企业国际化选择可能具有的作用：从合约的角度分析了如何运用交易成本及准备成本对企业国际化的约束、上头成本对企业国际化的保护及其限度问题。     

Eleven Years of GATS Case Law: What Have We Learned?

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negotiatorsfaced a significant challenge when having to craft a comprehensiveset of disciplines governing multilateral trade in services,and the result is somewhat complex. Some obligations, in particularthe most favoured-nation treatment (MFN) obligation, apply acrossthe board. Others, like the market access and national treatmentobligations, apply only in respect of service sectors of a Member'schoosing. There is overlap between the market access and nationaltreatment obligations, and the relationship between these twodisciplines and those on domestic regulation is not clearlyestablished. Additional obligations have been adhered to ona voluntary basis, in particular in the areas of telecommunicationsand financial services. In general, the interpretation and understandingof Members’ Schedules of Specific Commitments proves tobe a laborious exercise. This provides fertile ground for difficultand often sensitive interpretive issues to arise. Although Membershave thus far not made extensive use of dispute settlement proceduresto resolve them, existing World Trade Organization (WTO) decisionsalready show the reach of GATS disciplines and their potentialimpact on Members’ policies and regulations. The Gamblingcase has, in particular, sparked a debate as to what shouldbe the right balance between trade constraints and the autonomyof Members’ service regulators. This article reviews theGATS case law with a view to offering a critical assessmentof the main systemic issues that have been addressed by WTOadjudicatory bodies. These issues are, respectively, the scopeof application of the GATS, the interpretation of specific commitmentsin Members’ Schedules, market access, non-discriminatorytreatment, and general exceptions.     

Conceptualizing The "Digital Divide": Closing The "Gap" By Creating A Postmodern Network That Distributes The Productive Power Of Speech

This article challenges the prosaic way of debating the solution of the "Digital Divide." Most solutions offer physical access for the consumer to the "network-of-networks." But the way in which the network undergoes its construction after the Telecommunications Act of 1996 leaves such consumer-oriented solutions wanting. The "end-user" is increasingly less capable of creating content to "push" onto the network. The power to produce speech is more and more the privilege of large scale producers of content who are also owners of the physical network. Because of this, even physical connectivity is no solution to bridge the gap between the "info-haves and have-nots." Without the power to produce speech, every end-user remains a mere consumer of speech. Both law and policy can address these problems. The aim of this article is to show how both are complicit in the creation of a network that disparages individual expression and yet still retain the power of precedent to demand the creation of a postmodern "network-of-networks" that seeks to distribute the means of producing speech.     

The Controlling Shareholder Enforcement Gap

The regulation of controlling shareholder related‐party transactions is one of corporate law's animating concerns. A recent Chancery Court decision extends the double approval framework endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court—independent director committees and a majority of the minority shareholders—to non‐freezeout transactions. This article explains why the Chancery Court's innovation does not decrease the risk faced by minority shareholders. Subjecting a transaction to the double approval framework is a voluntary decision. Transaction planners will willingly traverse this path if the benefits outweigh the loss in deal certainty and attendant costs. When almost every freezeout is challenged in court, the voluntary application of this framework is the logical outcome. The calculus in the non‐freezeout context leads to a different result. Non‐freezeouts must be challenged by a derivative lawsuit. The procedural hurdles inherent in the derivative mechanism affect both the demand for the ratification framework and the incentive to comply. Without a tangible threat of a lawsuit to coax voluntary compliance in the non‐freezeout setting, transaction planners have nothing to gain by subjecting the deal to the double approval gauntlet. This article's analysis reveals a large gap in the enforcement of self‐dealing transactions. Recent high‐profile litigation exposes questionable adherence to the double approval framework for obviously conflicted non‐freezeout transactions. The paucity of derivative lawsuits foretells a troubling fate for similar transactions at less enticing litigation targets. Worse yet, the superficial step toward improved minority shareholder protection stifles the discussion on additional reform.     

Means and Ends: A Theory Framework for Understanding Entrepreneurship in the US Arts and Culture Sector

This article provides a framework for the conceptualization of arts entrepreneurship in the US by first examining a range of perspectives on the boundaries of the “arts and culture sector” in the US and then exploring in some depth four theories of entrepreneurship and how such theories may be realized within the arts and culture sector. Theories of firm formation are considered both generally and as potentially applied to the arts and culture sector, with examples of firm formation drawn both from existing literature and the author's direct observation of entrepreneurial activity. Finally, the essay connects these theories in a means and ends framework to provide a context for understanding arts entrepreneurial activity, especially in the US arts and culture sector. The theory that emerges from the examples provided to illustrate the framework is a simple one: artists form firms or otherwise undertake entrepreneurial action toward the end of creating art sustainably and they do so by discovering or creating new connections between their means and that desirable end.