浅析中苏政治体制改革——从结构功能主义的视角比较

中国和苏联的社会主义改革是20世纪80年代极具影响力的重大国际性事件,但是两国改革的结局却截然相反,苏联的改革没能挽救苏联解体的命运,中国的改革却使得国家走上了快速发展的道路。主要通过结构功能主义理论对中苏两国的改革进行比较,对两国的政治体制改革进行分析。     

王朝的覆灭——苏联解体时期的马克思主义

苏联解体从1985年戈尔巴乔夫登上苏共最高领导人的位置后拉开帷幕,随着苏联社会改革的深化,作为官方哲学的苏联哲学--苏联时期的马克思列宁主义哲学受到了严重的冲击.在苏联哲学界"寻找哲学本质"的道路上,马克思主义哲学却遭到批判、否定,随着苏联解体,苏联形态的马克思列宁主义哲学也彻底终结了.     

苏联政治改革与民主化的教训——苏共败亡20年祭

在苏联解体、苏共垮台20周年之际,重新回顾和总结苏联政治改革与民主化的教训,有以下几个方面应该引以为戒:一是改革是社会主义自我完善的手段,改革不能变成信仰放弃、方向背弃、主义抛弃;二是苏共是苏维埃政权和政治体系的根本和核心,失去了苏共也就没有了苏联。三是改革是社会主义制度的自我完善,必须坚持社会主义方向,必须在党的领导下进行。总之,政治改革必须有利于国家稳定和民族团结,必须有利于提升政治民主、政治稳定和政治效率。要树立正确的民主观,探索一条科学的政治发展道路。     

改革是社会主义国家的历史潮流

科学社会主义作为一种社会制度,在地球上已经存在和发展七十年了。苏联、中国和其他社会主义国家在建国后都发生了深刻的变化,初步显示出社会主义制度的优越性。社会主义各国由于受苏联模式的影响,也就程度不同地暴露出一些共同的弊端。近二、三十年来,各社会主义国家都在探索旨在自我完善和发展社会主义制度的改革,走自己的道路。即使是苏联,现在也开始了这种改革。不改革就没有出路。本文从科学社会主义在实践中这一角度,就改革已成为社会主义国家的历史潮流问题,谈谈自己一些粗浅的认识。     

“两个不走”:中国道路的方向性规定

"两个不走"是中国共产党人总结社会主义正反两方面经验对中国道路所做的方向性规定。固守苏联模式形成体制僵化的老路与改革走上制度西化的邪路是导致苏联剧变的前后两个根本原因。改革开放以来,中国共产党既不走制度体制单一化的封闭僵化的老路、又不走制度体制多元化的改旗易帜的邪路,成功地走出"一个主体与多样发展"相结合的新路。"老路"与"邪路"的总根源是制度与体制不分。中国改革之所以既没有固守体制僵化的老路也没有滑向制度西化的邪路,归功于邓小平提出了制度与体制划分的思想,在改革一开始就确立了破老路与防邪路的改革大方向。只有把制度与体制分开的"改革体制与完善制度"相结合的正路才是中国特色社会主义道路。传统社会主义老路是粗放式增长与阶级斗争扩大化之路,苏联剧变式邪路是全盘西化与社会动荡之路。只有"一个中心与全面发展"相结合的好路才是实现中国梦的中国道路。     

改革一年,每况愈下——1992年俄罗斯经济形势

苏联解体后,原苏联的各加盟共和国走上了独立发展的道路。为了让读者了解这些国家一年来的经济状况和经济改革的情况,特刊登以下来自俄罗斯、乌克兰和哈萨克斯坦的报道。     

毛泽东对中国特色社会主义道路的探索及启示

新中国成立后,毛泽东在借鉴苏联模式的基础上对我国的社会主义道路进行了艰辛探索,提出了许多重要思想,这些思想是马克思主义基本原理与我国国情相结合的重要理论成果,为以后的社会主义建设和改革提供了经验。     

以苏联为鉴走好中国道路

作为世界上第一个社会主义国家,苏联探索出了社会主义式的发展道路,苏联模式曾被当作唯一的社会主义发展模式引进到包括中国在内的其他社会主义国家中,随着苏联的衰退直至最终解体,其多方面弊端也慢慢展现出来。改革开放以后,中国走上了有中国特色的社会主义道路,用实践证明了照搬硬套不能实现发展,只有结合本国实际,真正把握社会主义实质,走上符合自身发展的道路才是正确的社会主义道路。     

激进改革路径的苦果——苏联改革失败二十年后的反思

正激进改革导向歧路苏联解体已经二十年了,苏联改革的教训问题一直令人深思。有人认为,戈尔巴乔夫改革失败,是抛弃了社会主义制度造成的恶果。然而,如果从苏联改革的历史过程来看,就会发现,苏联改革失败而中国改革成功,其关键原因     

斯大林工业化道路再认识

斯大林的超高速工业化道路,不仅是苏联经济体制模式形成与全面建立的重要因素,也是斯大林社会主义模式形成的三大社会支柱之一。正确认识斯大林工业化道路,对理解苏联经济体制模式存在的弊端有重要意义。     

Economic calculation in the Soviet Union

The article seeks to analyse the relationship between different forms of economic calculation in the Soviet Union, concentrating on monetary calculations used by the State Bank and on the use of ‘material balances’ and of input‐output analysis in planning the Soviet economy. It provides a critique of Bettelheim's analysis of the role of monetary calculation in the Soviet Union and, using the work of Lavigne, attempts to provide a foundation for a specific analysis of economic calculation (and hence, relations of production) in the Soviet Union. The article concludes by arguing that the variety of methods of calculating used in the Soviet Union, and the generation of ‘needs’ by organisational exigencies which may not be fully taken into account in the main methods of calculation, undermine the common conception of planning as the rational pursuit of certain ideal ends, a conception which is unfortunately still influential in many socialist conceptions of planning. Finally, in rejecting the view that one can conceive of socialism as a certain ideal state of affairs, the article argues that political critiques of the Soviet Union do not entail the rejection of the view that it is a socialist society.     

苏联时代特权现象的制度根源及其启示——基于利益机制的分析

苏联时代实行的"官职等级名录制",揭示了苏联时代特权现象的制度化特点。依据于权力道德化的干部作风建设,而不是着眼于建立权力客观化利益机制的政治制度,官僚特权现象不但不能得到有效遏制,反而会借助于道德化的利益机制而滋生和蔓延开来。因此,通过政治体制改革适度引入竞争机制,同时建立相对公平的利益机制,清除制度性和政策性特权,将成为遏制特权现象的重要制度化机制,这就是从苏联反特权教训中得到的重要启示。     

Collision in Manchuria: rescue,intelligence, and the Cold War in Asia,August–September 1945

The Japanese decision to surrender on 15 August 1945 created an extraordinary and unique situation in the Chinese province of Manchuria. Within hours of the Japanese surrender, a number of special American intelligence teams parachuted into Manchuria to gain information on the POW’s and Soviet intentions for postwar Asia. This paper will examine on what occurred when Soviet and American military personnel met in Manchuria. Both sides had very different goals and aims for the end of war. For the small American force assigned to locate and identify Allied POW’s, their mission exemplified the already strained relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. For nearly every instance of cordial and joyous meetings between the two sides there were equally difficult confrontations and misunderstandings. These encounters offered a preview into the coming Cold War in Asia.     

The memorial day statement: women's organizations in the ‘peace offensive’

This contribution examines the gendered aspect of the American response to the issue of peace in the Cold War. In 1949, the US government accused the Soviet Union of launching a ‘Peace Offensive’, designed to represent the Soviet Union as ‘peace-loving’ whilst painting the Americans as ‘warmongers.’ In recognition of the undeniable appeal of ‘peace’ as a rallying cry, the United States sought to re-define the term in such a way as to illustrate the difference between what East and West meant by their commitment to the cause of peace. American women's associations had a particularly active role in US efforts to counter the Soviet ‘Peace Offensive’. Leaders of US women's associations and policy-makers within the government were concerned that the ‘Peace Offensive’ specifically targeted women, on the basis of their special gendered interest in peace. They tried to convince women across the globe that Soviet-backed peace campaigns lacked sincerity and that women's special interest in peace was best represented by the United States.     

Soviet Bloc and Western Bugging of Opponents’ Diplomatic Premises During the Early Cold War

This article examines Soviet Bloc and Western bugging of their opponents’ diplomatic premises in the early Cold War, from 1945 to the late 1960s. It explains the process of audio surveillance, identifies significant cases of bugging and describes the countermeasures taken by Western states. The paper concludes that the Soviet Union was able to gather a considerable amount of intelligence from bugging Western embassies in Moscow during the early Cold War. In particular, bugging enabled the Soviets to break the diplomatic ciphers of the United States, Britain and West Germany.     

Soviet jews in the glasnost era

Semyon E. Reznik is a writer, historian, and journalist He is a staff editor-writer for American Illustrated Magazine,a U. S. Information Service publication. He is also a freelance writer for several Russian emigré newspapers and magazines. He has closely monitored the situation of Soviet Jewry and has published articles about the subject in prominent magazines in the United States. Before emigrating to the United States in 1982, he was expelled from both the Soviet Writers’ and the Soviet Journalists Union. He was written widely on politics, literature, history, and science in the Soviet Union.     

The logic of anti-Zionism: Soviet elites in the aftermath of the Six-Day War

Despite the opening of Soviet archives, and the surge in scholarly interest in anti-Zionism, scholars have not used declassified archive documents to shed new light on Soviet anti-Zionism in the wake of the Six-Day War. Based on such documents, Gjerde’s article challenges a view of post-1967 Soviet anti-Zionism that has been prevalent since it emerged during the Cold War: that it represented a ‘disguised’ form of antisemitism that Soviet leaders used as a political tool. To the contrary, Gjerde argues, the archive documents suggest Soviet anti-Zionism was more than a propaganda invention. Within higher Soviet echelons, a particular logic existed that fostered a view of ‘Zionism’ as an immense, conspiratorial threat to the Soviet Union. In one sense, this logic grew out of a more general tendency to view nonconformity as conspiracy: the Soviets had established extremely narrow boundaries for what constituted acceptable Jewish identity; and, when some Soviet Jews began to voice nationalist sentiments after the Six-Day War, Soviet leaders saw this expression of nonconformity as essentially a hostile act, warranting severe counter-measures. This is not to say Soviet anti-Zionism was not antisemitic but rather that to explain it merely as a propaganda tool is to ignore much of the complexity of its emergence.     

正确对待农民:东方国家政权建设的基本经验——读列宁《十月革命两周年》的几点思考

1919年11月,十月革命胜利两周年之际,列宁发表演讲,总结了苏维埃政权建设的经验,提出了"要正确地对待农民"的论断。但是,这条用流血换来的教训并没有为后来苏联领导层所认真贯彻,以至于在农民问题上失误一再出现。这是今天东方社会主义国家政党在农村和农民工作中应当认真思考的问题。     

‘It takes a Russian to beat a Russian’: the National Union of Labor Solidarists,nationalism, and human intelligence operations in the Cold War

This article reconstructs the CIA’s exploitation of the Natsional’no Trudovoi Soyuz, a right-wing Russian nationalist organization, as a part of ‘rollback’ and ‘stay-behind’ covert operations against the Soviet Union during the 1950s. Operations such as these relied on the notion that far-right nationalism presented a potent counter to international communism. The article explores postwar ties between American intelligence and the NTS in a shared effort to ‘roll back’ the borders of communism. It likewise discusses the ability of Soviet counterintelligence to intercept, penetrate, and sabotage nationalist networks and their operations backed by Western governments.     

The Soviet reaction to ‘Eurocommunism’

Assertion of independence from Moscow by some West European Communist parties, inaccurately known as ‘Eurocommunism’ has caused angry reaction by Soviet Russia, especially when those parties have criticised the internal policies of the Soviet government in the matter of civil rights. The Soviet Union is also apprehensive about the possible effects of ‘Eurocommunism’ on the cohesion of the Communist bloc. But this apprehension should not be exaggerated. The USSR can still rely on the Western Communist parties for support for its foreign policy, and can exercise control over them in various ways. There is no probability of a break between the USSR and any Western Communist party in the foreseeable future.