On the Argument of Infinite Regress in Proving Self-awareness

In PV 3.440ab and 473cd–474ab, Dharmakīrti raises the argument of infinite regress (anavasthiti) twice. The argument originates from the same argument stated by Dignāga in his Pramā?asamuccaya 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress is called ani??hā. In Pramā?asamuccayav?tti 1.12b2, Dignāga presents another type of argument of infinite regress (anavasthā) driven by memory, which is elucidated by Dharmakīrtian commentators. The arguments were criticized by Kumārila Bha??a and Bha??a Jayanta and even more intensively so by two modern scholars, Jonardon Ganeri and Birgit Kellner. In this paper, I first examine the source of the arguments—Pramā?asamuccayav?tti 1.12 and its translation, based on which I provide my interpretation of the two models of arguments of infinite regress. I then offer my response, according to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, to Ganeri’s and Kellner’s critiques. By doing so, I attempt to identify the essence of these arguments is and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory.     

Laws that are Made to be Broken

Criminal laws are created to achieve various ends. These include (1) reducing the incidence of wrongdoing, and (2) holding wrongdoers responsible for their wrongs. Some criminal laws are created to further the first of these ends by means of compliance. The second end is to be furthered only if, regrettably, some fail to comply. These criminal laws are made to be followed. Other criminal laws are not created with compliance in mind. Conviction, in these cases, is no regrettable fallback. It is the primary means by which the law is to contribute to ends (1) and (2). Laws of this second kind are made to be broken. My concern in this paper is with the creation of such laws. Section 1 sharpens the contrast drawn above, and considers some arguments for enacting laws that are made to be broken. The following sections develop an argument against. Section 2 introduces what I call the identification principle. It argues that the principle is an implication of the ideal of the rule of law, and that it binds state officials who make, apply and enforce criminal laws. Section 3 argues that when laws are made to be broken, the identification principle is violated. Section 4 concludes.     

The Use of the Biblical Oath and Its Development

The use of the oath in Jewish law reflects the religious nature of this system of law: in case a litigant cannot receive justice from the human judges s/he is entitled to call on God by swearing an oath. I begin this survey of the use of oaths in Jewish law with a discussion of the nature of “swearing an oath” based on biblical stories and biblical rules that regulate the use of oaths outside court. I then focus on the use of the oath in court; I survey the domain of circumstances in which an oath is accepted by Jewish law as evidence according to the Bible, the Mishna, Gemara, and codifications. Finally, I exemplify how the oath is used in practice in the 20th century by one case from Rabbi Saul Ibn Dannan’s responsa book “Hagam Shaul”.     

Śrīharṣa on Knowledge and Justification

In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of ?rīhar?a can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in ?rīhar?a’s masterpiece, the Kha??anakha??a-khādya (KhKh). This argument grounds the position that the system of justification (pramā?a) that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting ?rīhar?a’s polemical style, I am neither proposing a thesis in this paper that ?rīhar?a is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing ?rīhar?a’s first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of ?rīhar?a’s position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants.     

How Democratic is Civil Disobedience?

In her book, Conscience and Conviction, Kimberley Brownlee argues that there is nothing undemocratic about the robust, primary right to civil disobedience that she devotes most of her argument to defending. To the contrary, she holds that there is nothing paternalistic about civil disobedients opposing the will of democratic majorities, because, inter alia, democratic majorities cannot claim particular epistemic superiority, and because there are flaws inherent to democratic procedures that civil disobedience addresses. I hold that Brownlee’s arguments fail. In particular, her argument fails because it does not properly construe the nature of the epistemic claim that can be made either by democratic procedures or by civil disobedients, and because it illegitimately conflates the concern about permanent minorities that has been a constant thorn in the side of democratic theorists, with a concern with all outvoted minorities, whether permanent minorities or not.     

A Monstrous Inference called Mahāvidyānumāna and Cantor’s Diagonal Argument

A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipak?a) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.     

Transgression and Standard Theories: Contributions Toward Penal Abolition

In this paper I propose a transgression theory and a standard theory toward penal abolition. I argue that given the ubiquity of “crime” in human relationships, to speak of “criminal behavior” as deviant nullifies the concept deviance (abnormal, out of the ordinary, etc.). After demonstrating that empirically the opposite is the case, I argue for a transgression theory (that most human beings regularly act in ways that transgress the norms and laws they establish) and propose a standard theory (that human beings are both maintainers and transgressors of the social orders they establish). My paper challenges the foundational language (constructions) of “criminal justice” logic that ignore the continuity of the past in the present (white supremacy, neocolonialism, racial capitalism, and gendering enslavement), and that fortify discourse and practice from recognizing, eliminating and standing accountable by rectifying centuries of white privilege, heteronormativity, and the oppression of nonwhite bodies.     

The Positionless Middle Way: Weak Philosophical Deflationism in Madhyamaka

In this paper, I explore the connections between meta-ontological and meta-philosophical issues in two of Nāgārjuna’s primary works, the Mūlamadhyamakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartanī. I argue for an interpretative framework that places Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as a meta- and ultimately non-philosophical evaluation of philosophy. The paper’s primary argument is that an interpretative framework which makes explicit the meta-ontological and meta-philosophical links in Nāgārjuna’s thought is both viable and informative. Following Nāgārjuna, I start my analysis by looking at the positions that exist within the ontological debate and show that the Mādhyamika should be understood as an ontological deflationist who aims to discredit ontological questions altogether. I argue, however, that the Mādhyamika does not wish to engage in meta-ontological debates either and that Nāgārjuna’s ontological deflationist arguments necessarily lead to a position of philosophical deflationism: the rejection of all philosophical and meta-philosophical debates. Further on, I provide a sketch of denegation, the language operator in Madhyamaka that allows Nāgārjuna to make seemingly philosophical claims while not having the commitments that traditional philosophical claims do. I conclude with a defense of my interpretation of Madhyamaka as weak philosophical deflationism compared to other deflationist construals, an explicit discussion of the ways in which my understanding differs from contemporary western interpretations that prima facie resemble weak philosophical deflationism, and an identification of weak philosophical deflationism with dequitism, a variant of quetism.     

Agency,Coercion, and Global Justice: A Reply to My Critics

Mathias Risse, Andrea Sangiovanni, and Kok-Chor Tan have offered some subtle and powerful criticisms of the ideas given in my Justice and Foreign Policy. Three themes in particular recur in their critiques. The first is that the arguments I make in that book rest upon unjustified, arbitrary, or contradictory premises. The second is that the use of coercion in the analysis of distributive justice is a mistake. The third is that the global institutional set represents, contrary to my arguments, an independent first-order site of justice. I address these criticisms, and try to vindicate the methodology of Justice and Foreign Policy in the face of these objections.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">The Lesser Evil Dilemma for</Emphasis> Sparing Civilians

The rule I call ‘Civilian Immunity’ – the rule that prohibits targeting civilians in war – is the heart of the accepted jus in bello code. It prohibits targeting (viz., intentionally killing) civilians in a wide variety of war circumstances. Seth Lazar's brilliant book, Sparing Civilians, attempts to defend Civilian Immunity. In this essay I show, first, that his ‘Risky-Killing based argument’ fails to provide civilians with the robust protection Sparing Civilians promises. I argue, secondly, that the moral framework that Sparing Civilians employs, a moral framework that centralizes the Deontological Clause (stating that one's intentional killing is worse than enabling others to kill), leaves the immunity of civilians against Leaders unexplained.     

On the Value of Constitutions and Judicial Review

In his thought-provoking book, Why Law Matters, Alon Harel defends two key claims: one ontological, the other axiological. First, he argues that constitutions and judicial review are necessary constituents of a just society. Second, he suggests that these institutions are not only means to the realization of worthy ends, but also non-instrumentally valuable. I agree with Harel that constitutions and judicial review have more than instrumental value, but I am not persuaded by his arguments in support of this conclusion. I argue that Harel’s ontological claim is unsustainable, and that his axiological claim needs revision. Regarding the former, I show that constitutions and judicial review are only contingent constituents of a just society. Regarding the latter, I contest Harel’s specific account of the value of constitutions and judicial review. Harel grounds the non-instrumental value of constitutions in freedom as non-domination but, upon scrutiny, it emerges that their non-instrumental value lies elsewhere. Further, Harel holds that the non-instrumental value of judicial review stems from its embodying a right to a fair hearing. I argue that this right has non-instrumental value only under a particular set of circumstances. I thus conclude, contrary to Harel, that the non-instrumental value of judicial review is contingent on those circumstances obtaining.     

On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology

This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness (svasa?vedana) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form (sākārajñānavāda). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form (grāhakākāra/svābhāsa) grasps the objective mental form, the position of the subjective mental form becomes problematic—it becomes superfluous, as can be demonstrated with reference to Dignāga’s explanation of the Sautrāntika’s pramā?a-pramā?aphala argument. As a result, self-awareness itself becomes precarious. In connection with this problem, an argument on the relationship between self-awareness and the yogic perception of other minds given by Dharmakīrti leads us to discover that self-awareness is important for establishing subjectivity, in order to avoid another person’s access to one’s own mental states. Through examining Pramā?avārttika 3.448–459, this paper tries to find a way to interpret the svābhāsa-factor without relating to its object-factor (grāhyākāra), and to shed new light on the problem of subjectivity in the Sautrāntika epistemology.     

Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Classification of Arguments by Consequence Based on the Type of the Logical Reason: Editorial Conundrum and Mathematics for Commentators

This paper examines a passage of the eleventh chapter of the Rigs gter of Sa skya Pa??ita (1182–1251) on the division of arguments by consequence (thal ?gyur) of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” with respect to the type of relation between P and Q. This passage appears in quite different versions in several available recensions of the Rigs gter, all of which are problematic to some extent. The different interpretations of the commentators can be shown to derive from their reliance on different versions of the text, which they strove to make sense of through two distinct strategies. Following up on the examination of a division of arguments by consequence along the same line in the works of Sa skya Pa??ita’s Tibetan predecessors, in particular Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210) (see Hugon, in J Indian Philos 44(5):883–938, 2016b), I evaluate the diverging versions of the Rigs gter against a coherent logical scenario founded on Sa skya Pa??ita’s discussion pertaining to the types of logical reasons in inference in the tenth chapter of his work and comparison with the classification by Phya pa. I offer a hypothesis regarding the genesis of the problematic versions of the passage on the classification of consequences in the Rigs gter based on the comparison with the classification found in mTshur ston’s epistemological work. I propose that the composition of this portion of the Rigs gter might have involved a textual reuse of mTshur ston’s classification, even though mTshur ston and Sa skya Pa??ita disagree on background issues. This very disagreement imposed changes to the reused text that led to problematic readings.     

Yogācāra Substrata? Precedent Frames for Yogācāra Thought Among Third-Century Yoga Practitioners in Greater Gandhāra

The connection between early yogācāras, or practitioners of yoga, and later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda philosophy has long preoccupied scholars. But these connections remain obscure. This article suggests that a text that has received little attention in modern scholarship, the Saddharmasm?tyupasthānasūtra, may shed light on aspects of early yogācāra contemplative cultures that gave rise to some of the formative dynamics of Yogācāra-vijñānavāda thought. I show how traditional Buddhist meditative practice and engagement with Abhidharma theoretics come together in the Saddharmasm?tyuasthānasūtra to produce a novel theory of mind that mirrors many of the philosophical problematics that early and late Yogācāra-vijñānavādins confronted and attempted to work out in ?āstric detail.     

Puruṣavāda: A Pre-Śaṅkara Monistic Philosophy as Critiqued by Mallavādin

The Advaita literature prior to the time of Gau?apāda and ?a?kara is scarce. Relying on the citations of proponents and their opponents, the picture we glean of this early monism differs in many aspects from that of ?a?kara. While Bhavya’s criticism of this monistic thought has received scholarly attention, the chapter Puru?avāda in Dvāda?āranayacakra (DNC) has rarely been studied. Broadly, this conversation will help ground classical Advaita in light of the contemporary discourse on naturalism. In particular, this examination will help contextualize the early Advaita that lacks clear imprint of Mahayana Buddhism. The doctrine of Puru?a, central to this paper, sidelines the role of avidyā or ignorance, and provides a realistic picture of the world. I have relied on the commentary V?tti upon the Vākyapadīya as has been substantially cited in DNC in order to advance the arguments. As a consequence, the examination on Puru?a also paves the path for advancing arguments on linguistic monism.     

The Scope of Application of Analogical Reasoning in Precedential Law

This article describes the scope of application of an analogical argument in the province of precedential law. Inter alia, it revolves around such issues of the doctrine of precedent as: distinguishing, ascertaining and crystallizing the meaning of ratio decidendi or expanding its coverage onto the cases of first impression. Allowance has also been made for the presence of analogy in searching for the law-maker’s intention, the determining of the obsolescence of precedents and quoting precedents out-of-jurisdiction. The place analogical reasoning has in legal education has also been touched upon. On top of that, the article highlights the usage of analogy in precedential law which enables the replacement of the conception of rationes decidendi for the proposition of applying judicial precedents directly upon the relationship of similarity that obtains between cases decided previously and the instant case.     

How Can the Word “Cow” Exclude Non-cows? Description of Meaning in Dignāga’s Theory of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Apoha</Emphasis>

Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenaga?i. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.     

Proof of a Sentient Knower: Utpaladeva’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi</Emphasis> with the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vṛtti</Emphasis> of Harabhatta Shastri

Utpaladeva (c. 900–950 C.E.) was the chief originator of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of monistic Kashmiri ?aivism, which was further developed by Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020 C.E.) and other successors. The Aja?apramāt?siddhi, “Proof of a Sentient Knower,” is one component of Utpaladeva’s trio of specialized studies called the Siddhitrayī, “Three Proofs.” This article provides an introduction to and translation of the Aja?apramāt?siddhi along with the V?tti commentary on it by the nineteenth–twentieth century pa??it, Harabhatta Shastri. Utpaladeva in this work presents “transcendental” arguments that a universal knower (pramāt?), the God ?iva, necessarily exists and that this knower is sentient (aja?a). He defends the Pratyabhijñā understanding of sentience against alternative views of both Hindu and Buddhist schools. As elsewhere in his corpus, Utpaladeva also endeavors through his arguments to lead students to the recognition (pratyabhijñā) of identity with ?iva, properly understood as the sentient knower.     

Does Early Yogācāra Have a Theory of Meaning? Sthiramati’s Arguments on Metaphor in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Triṃśikā-bhāṣya</Emphasis>

Can the early Yogācāra be said to present a systematic theory of meaning? The paper argues that Sthiramati’s bhā?ya on Vasubandhu’s Tri??ikā (Treatise in Thirty Verses), in which he argues that all language-use is metaphorical, indeed amounts to such a theory, both because of the text’s engagement with the wider Indian philosophical conversation about reference and meaning and by virtue of the questions it addresses and its motivations. Through a translation and analysis of key sections of Sthiramati’s commentary I present the main features of this theory of meaning and discuss the ways in which it is distinct from Vasubandhu’s ideas. I demonstrate how this theory of meaning enabled Sthiramati to present a unique understanding of discourse that distinguishes between varying levels of truth within the conventional realm. This understanding sat well with the Yogācāra soteriological and theoretical needs, and most importantly, enabled him to establish the meaningfulness of the school’s own metaphysical discourse. Securing this meaningfulness was especially important to Sthiramati in meeting the challenge posed by the radical conventionalism of the Madhyamaka, and his response as I interpret it suggests that one of the main disputes between the early Yogācāra with the Mādhyamika, at least as reflected in the Tri??ikā-bhā?ya, in fact turns on linguistic rather than ontological issues.