CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PERFORMANCE INFORMATION

Abstract: This paper outlines the current state of play in relation to performance information in the Australian Public Service. It highlights the findings of the evaluation of the past decade of management reform in The Australian Public Service Reformed and the Management Advisory Board's Building a Better Public Service in relation to performance information. It outlines some of the recent initiatives at commonwealth level to improve the quality of performance information. It touches briefly on benchmarking (noting that this topic is covered by other papers at the same session and at the conference). It sets out the rationale behind the recent changes to annual reporting requirements for commonwealth departments: to provide parliamentarians with more focused information and reduce unnecessary duplication and paper overload. Reports so far have tended to confirm the success of this strategy, with some modifications required to provide more detail in agencies' documentation provided at budget time. It sets out the findings of the recent Department of Finance paper on the use of evaluation in the 1994–95 Budget—in summary, some 75% of proposals for new spending or savings in the budget were influenced by the results of evaluation. Finally, it makes some observations about the success of the Australian system of making public servants responsible for outcomes as well as outputs, and suggests that this is in part the reason why we have been able to make our evaluation strategy stick.     

The colour purple: perceptions of accountability across the Tasman

This article explores the changing rhetoric and substance of accountability in the relationships between parliamentarians and public servants in what Alex Matheson terms the ‘purple zone’—where the ‘blue’ of political strategy and ‘red’ of public administration merge in ‘strategic conversation’. The primary focus is on current developments in Australia. As the Westminster system of governance, and the role of public administration within it, undergo profound transformation, the prerogatives of elected parliamentarians (in the blue corner) and the responsibilities of career public servants (in the red corner) are changing fundamentally. In Australia and New Zealand the increasingly complex relationships that exist between government, parliament, public service and the wider community challenge the traditional notions of accountability. Both the lines of accountability, and its standards, are under challenge. The acceleration of Australia's move to contract out the delivery of government services is creating new arenas of creative tension between administrative review and management for results. Public service agencies are increasingly perceived to be themselves in a contractual relationship with government. There is a risk that the public good may become subverted by private interest. How will we ensure that agencies will ‘not contract out responsibility at the citizen's expense’? © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. Vol. 17 , 293–306 (1997). No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 0. No. of Refs: 33.     

Does school accountability lead to improved student performance?

The leading school reform policy in the United States revolves around strong accountability of schools with consequences for performance. The federal government's involvement through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 reinforces the prior movement of many states toward policies based on measured student achievement. Analysis of state achievement growth as measured by the National Assessment of Educational progress shows that accountability systems introduced during the 1990s had a clear positive impact on student achievement. This single policy instrument did not, however, also lead to any narrowing in the Black‐White achievement gap (though it did narrow the Hispanic‐White achievement gap). Moreover, the Black‐White gap appears to have been adversely impacted over the decade by increasing minority concentrations in the schools. An additional issue surrounding stronger accountability has been a concern about unintended outcomes related to such things as higher exclusion rates from testing, increased dropout rates, and the like. Our analysis of special education placement rates, a frequently identified area of concern, does not show any responsiveness to the introduction of accountability systems.© 2005 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Limits of regulatory responsiveness: Democratic credentials of responsive regulation

Responsiveness and accountability constitute the process of democratic representation, reinforcing each other. Responsiveness asks elected representatives to adopt policies ex ante preferred by citizens, while accountability consists of the people's ex post sanctioning of the representatives based on policy outcomes. However, the regulatory literature tends to interpret responsiveness narrowly between a regulator and regulatees: the regulator is responsive to regulatees’ compliance without considering broader public needs and preferences. Democratic regulatory responsiveness requires that the regulator should be responsive to the people, not just regulatees. We address this theoretical gap by pointing out the perils of regulatory capture and advancing John Braithwaite's idea of tripartism as a remedy. We draw out two conditions of democratic regulatory responsiveness from Philip Selznick – comprehensiveness and proactiveness. We then propose overlapping networked responsiveness based on indirect reciprocity among various stakeholders. This mechanism is the key to connecting regulatory responsiveness with accountability.     

Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections

Early research led scholars to believe that institutional accountability in Congress is lacking because public evaluations of its collective performance do not affect the reelection of its members. However, a changed partisan environment along with new empirical evidence raises unanswered questions about the effect of congressional performance on incumbents' electoral outcomes over time. Analysis of House reelection races across the last several decades produces important findings: (1) low congressional approval ratings generally reduce the electoral margins of majority party incumbents and increase margins for minority party incumbents; (2) partisan polarization in the House increases the magnitude of this partisan differential, mainly through increased electoral accountability among majority party incumbents; (3) these electoral effects of congressional performance ratings hold largely irrespective of a member's individual party loyalty or seat safety. These findings carry significant implications for partisan theories of legislative organization and help explain salient features of recent Congresses.     

Specific Purpose Programs in Human Services and Health: Moving from an Input to an Output and Outcome Focus

The content and control mechanisms of specific purpose programs are regularly under review, currently through processes associated with the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), with most proposals for reform in this area arguing for a shift to a focus on outputs or outcomes. This article reviews the place and role of specific purpose programs in the human services and health field, and identifies four issues which need to be addressed as part of any refocus onto outputs and outcomes. The four issues are: specification of objectives; measurement of outputs and/or outcomes; mechanisms for ensuring accountability to consumers; and systems of sanctions and rewards.     

The Combet Case and the Appropriation of Taxpayers' Funds for Political Advertising – An Erosion of Fundamental Principles?

This article contains a critical discussion of Combet v The Commonwealth (2005) and the reasons given by the High Court in that case, for dismissing the legal challenge to the present government's political advertising campaign in support of its Workchoice legislation which was conducted before the publication or enactment of that legislation. It also deals with the implications of the case for the declining significance in modern times of the parliamentary appropriation process as a means of ensuring the accountability of governments for the expenditure of taxpayers' funds. The article concludes with a discussion of the possibility of future parliaments (regardless of their political complexion) reasserting their control over the appropriation process and restricting the use of government advertising for political purposes.     

How Citizens Respond to Outputs,Outcomes, and Costs: A Survey Experiment About an HIV/AIDS Program

Government performance measurement is often faulted for focusing on outputs, while citizens are said to demand more information on outcomes to hold government accountable. To compare the influence of these measures, we randomized 774 participants to receive outcome or output information about a real HIV prevention program, with or without cost information, in a survey experiment. Citizens expressed less support for spending on the program when shown outcomes (infections prevented), rather than outputs (people served). Showing participants the high cost of treating HIV/AIDS boosted support for program spending, but did not make outcome information more persuasive. We interpret these results as partly a reaction to the high per-unit cost of an outcome in an HIV prevention program. But it may reflect a tendency of citizens simply to misinterpret less costly outputs, including serving more people, as if these were outcomes. This bias has implications for performance reporting and accountability.     

Networking in the Penumbra: Public Management,Cooptative Links,and Distributional Consequences

ABSTRACT

Recently, some researchers have begun to emphasize that governance networks can have a “dark” side as well as a relatively benign one. This work thus far has mostly emphasized illegal and violent forms of action. But even networks that operate in accord with the law often include covert, or at minimum difficult-to-observe, ties and pathways of influence. Likewise, managers involved in networking engage in behavior that is only partially observable. They can use their discretion to shape network action in ways that are hard to discern—and therefore analyze. Research on such subjects is limited, and the practical results of such behavior can include lack of accountability as well as inequitable distribution of outputs and outcomes. This article shows that individual network nodes can work to bias the actions of the organization in ways that are likely to benefit the organization's more advantaged clientele. This study reports on tests for differential impacts of managerial interactions of and with various network partners. The argument is supported with an analysis of performance data from 500 organizations over an eight-year period. Networks and managerial networking can generate considerable benefits but can also have a less palatable impact that managers and scholars need to consider seriously.     

Public enterprise reform: Managerial autonomy,accountability and performance contracts

The underlying assumption in this paper is that autonomy and accountability are both fundamental prerequisites for the effective functioning of state-owned enterprises. The paper first examines the traditional, dichotomous approach to the autonomy-accountability conundrum. This approach posits the relationship as process oriented, pervasive, quantitative and based on a priori controls. A more recent view of control and accountability as a posteriori, qualitative, strategic, results-oriented and non-zero sum is then briefly analysed. The paper presents a review of the theory and practice of performance contracts (PC) as tools to implement the latter approach. Three basic models of PCs—Senegal's contrat plan, Pakistan's signalling system and India's memorandum of understanding—have been analysed, comparing the negotiating process, major players, substantive elements and results. The contrat plan is more of a legal document, at least in formal terms, than the other two. None of the three models, however, provides any sanctions in case of a violation of the contract by the governments. Although the Indian and Pakistani PCs appeared to be more successful than the Senegalese contracts, the relationship between financial performance and performance contracts remains far from conclusive. In all the three countries, the contracts have failed to provide a single window through which government-enterprise interface can be effectively managed. Thus the problem of multiple principals and single agents remains unresolved.     

WHAT SHAPES CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF THEIR PUBLIC OFFICIALS' ACCOUNTABILITY? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL ETHIOPIA

In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens' views of the local accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local accountability reflect not only citizens' poltical attitudes and beliefs but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large‐N citizen survey (N = 10 651) with contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens' evaluations of local public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to information on political decision making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens' stakes in local planning processes, it positively affects citizens' evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen–government relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of accountability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who controls the machine,revisited: command and control in the United Nations reform effort

Revisiting an analysis done ten years ago during one of the periodic efforts to reform the United Nations, the article suggests that the problem of control and accountability of the programming and budgeting process of the United Nations has not yet been resolved. Noting that the existing process does not allow for major changes in programmes and priorities and that it does not give the Secretary-General or the Member States a means for determining the organization's effectiveness, it argues for a new approach to command and control based on a service-delivery approach and adjustment of existing institutions. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How catchall parties compete ideologically: Beyond party typologies

The catchall party remains a useful concept despite the lack of a widely agreed definition or list of parties. This article suggests defining catchall parties based on how they act strategically. Although catchall parties act strategically on both the organisational and ideological dimensions, this article concentrates on three key ideological features: catchall parties are ideologically centrist, dispersed and flexible over time. Relying on original surveys in the Republic of Ireland, which interviewed two-thirds of parliamentarians, it is confirmed that Ireland's ‘catchall’ and ‘programmatic’ parties clearly differ in terms of how they compete ideologically. Ireland's catchall parties employ all three identified strategies. Smaller, more programmatic parties are consistent over time, non-centrist and extremely ideologically coherent on core programmatic issues. The competition between catchall parties and ideological populist parties is a pressing issue, and the Irish case provides new theoretical insights and empirical evidence to understand these party types.     

Organizational Response to Changing Demands: Predicting Behavior in Donor Networks

The integration of resource dependence theory and a network perspective results in a parsimonious “strategic response model” for the organizational responses of exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment. Four cases illustrate the model's application to nonprofit organizations by focusing on relations with a government aid agency that switched funding priorities. The model helps explain why networks of recipients of funding may change over time and predicts organizational responses to changing demands from resource providers.     

Bringing accountability for results to government in British Columbia

In British Columbia, Canada, an initiative is underway to introduce results-focused accountability reporting for government ministries and Crown corporations. This significant change is coming about through a unique collaboration of government, the Legislative Assembly, and the Office of the Auditor General of British Columbia. This article describes: the background leading to the initiative; the conceptual framework, including the areas of government covered by the initiative and the methods of accountability reporting; the issues around implementation of results-focused government, including education and cultural change at administrative and political levels; and the success of the initiative to date. While the real success of this initiative will only be evident in a few years' time, the coming together of many parts of government to develop a common vision of what government should look like, and the development of a better understanding by all the parties to this process of one another's position and priorities, are already paying dividends.     

'Managing for Outcomes': Accountability and Thrust

Central agencies in New Zealand are now defining public management performance to include both the quality of a manager's 'account' of output-outcome links and the manager's record of delivering efficient outputs. This article: (1) argues that the hard edge of accountability for deliverables must be dulled somewhat in order to pursue outcomes more vigorously; (2) shows how managers can use evaluation tools known as theories-in-action or logic models to give accounts of policy and management thrust; (3) proposes preliminary performance criteria for outcomes-focused management; and (4) attempts to sketch a new 'managing for outcomes' accountability bargain. The conclusions apply broadly to any jurisdiction interested in holding managers accountable for outcomes-focused management.     

Subnational Government Performance: Testing Multiple Dimensions of Governors' Experience

This article tests whether governors' work experience explains their state performance. Although the experience‐performance relationship has been researched, empirical studies report inconsistent results. This inconsistency might be due to the dissimilar conceptualization and operationalization of the work experience construct, for it can be conceptualized in qualitative or quantitative components. To address this disparity, the authors follow Tesluk and Jacob's conceptualization by operationalizing gubernatorial experience across three dimensions: type (qualitative component), number of jobs, and years of work experience (quantitative component). The study tests the moderating effects of state context (level of violence) on the experience‐performance relationship, relying on data derived from 32 Mexican states over 16 years. Education outputs (high school enrollment) and health outcomes (infant mortality rate) are used to assess state performance. Results indicate that only the qualitative dimension of governors' work experience boosts state performance by reducing infant mortality and increasing high school enrollment. However, this positive effect is undermined by state violence. The number of jobs decreases gubernatorial performance, magnified by the degree of state violence.     

Democratic Order,Autonomy, and Accountability

Accountability is a principle for organizing relations between rulers and ruled, and making public officials accountable is a democratic achievement. There are, however, competing claims about what is involved in demanding, rendering, assessing, and responding to accounts; what are effective accountability institutions; and how accountability regimes emerge and change. This article provides a frame for thinking about institutional aspects of accountability regimes and their cognitive, normative, and power foundations. A distinction is made between accountability within an established regime with stable power relations and role expectations and accountability as (re)structuring processes in less institutionalized contexts and in transformation periods. A huge literature is concerned with the first issue. There is less attention to accountability as (re)structuring processes. The article, therefore, calls attention to how democracies search for, and struggle over, what are legitimate accountability regimes and political orders.     

Varieties of accountability: How attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight

This article demonstrates how attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight across policy fields. Building on the accountability literature, the study develops the argument that parliamentarians will more likely oversee policy fields where cooperative forms of governance are more present, since these policies are more difficult to assess and have a higher need of legitimation. Using the example of policy evaluation demand by members of parliament in Switzerland, the study suggests that parliamentarians seek more control in a policy field, where public activities are more often delegated to nopublic actors or the need for legitimation is particularly high. Both effects increase with the policy field's closeness to science. These findings could be very relevant in order to understand how attributes of policy fields shape political institutions.     

A Preliminary Theory of Informal Accountability among Network Organizational Actors

Widespread government contracting for nonprofit social service delivery has resulted in extensive reliance on networks of service providers, which involve complicated accountability dynamics. The literature has tended to emphasize formal aspects of accountability in contract relationships, focusing on the specification of contract terms, performance measures, reporting relationships, and stipulated consequences. Far less attention has been focused on the interorganizational and interpersonal behaviors that reflect informal accountability. This article examines the informal norms, expectations, and behaviors that facilitate collective action and promote informal accountability among nonprofit network actors. The data are based on in‐depth interviews with nonprofit senior administrators in four major metropolitan areas. Based on this research, the authors propose a preliminary theory of informal accountability that links (1) the shared norms and facilitative behaviors that foster informal accountability for collective outcomes, (2) the informal system of rewards and sanctions used to promote and reinforce behavioral expectations, and (3) the challenges that may undermine informal accountability.