State Performance‐Based Budgeting in Boom and Bust Years: An Analytical Framework and Survey of the States

The authors examine the track record of applying performance‐based budgeting (PBB) across three time periods within a sample of U.S. state governments: (1) throughout the 1990s, (2) in the early 2000s, and (3) during the Great Recession. State‐level PBB is analyzed according to four elements: (1) the development of performance measures, (2) its applicability to budgeting and management processes, (3) its utility across the business cycle, and (4) its usefulness for budget players. An analytical framework is devised that highlights the “publicness” of American government, draws on the principal–agent model, and considers incentive mechanisms theory. Findings confirm that a good performance measurement system takes time to develop and operate well and that PBB functions more effectively for executive management than legislative purposes. PBB is used more by the states during strong economic times as opposed to during economic downturns. More importantly, PBB is only selectively applied by legislators in most states, whereas top executive policy makers, middle managers, and staff embrace and utilize PBB systems more extensively.     

Implementing PBB: Conflicting Views of Success

A modern budget reform, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) emphasizes the measurement of government performance by agencies and public servants. In this article we define PBB as requiring strategic planning regarding agency mission, goals and objectives, and a process that requests quantifiable data that provide meaningful information about program outcomes. Performance‐based budgeting requirements are now pervasive in the states. Of forty‐seven states with PBB requirements, thirty‐one have legislated the process to be conducted, while sixteen have initiated the reform through budget guidelines or instructions.¹What remains unknown, yet of vital interest to state administrators, their staff, legislators, and citizens, regards implementation status of PBB systems. How many states are utilizing a PBB process as prescribed by law or administrative directive? And if PBB has been implemented, has it been successful regarding improvement of agency effectiveness and decision making about spending? Perhaps most importantly, has PBB influenced appropriation decisions?. This research is based on responses to a mail survey of executive and legislative budgeters regarding the PBB system established in their state. Results discussed in this article consider budgeters’ response about PBB implementation status and effectiveness as conducted. We find that there are differing perceptions across the branches of government regarding both the extent of PBB implementation as well as its success. Results show that states with better‐known PBB systems have not necessarily realized greater success in terms of effectiveness from this budget reform than states with less popularly known systems, at least as perceived by the budgeters included in this article.     

Implementing Performance-Based Program Budgeting: A System-Dynamics Perspective

The article proposes a model for evaluating budget reforms that combines insights from budgeting, policy implementation, and system-dynamics literatures. System-dynamics modeling combines both quantitative and qualitative research techniques to provide a new framework for applied research; its use is illustrated using performance budgeting as an example. Applied to the implementation of Florida's performance-based program budget, the model identifies actions in the short run that will increase the reform's likelihood of success: providing clear communications; facilitative budget and accounting routines; reliable performance information. The model also identifies critical legislative behaviors that influence executive implementation: how the legislature in the long-run uses performance information to inform resource allocation and how it applies incentives or sanctions to programs that achieve or fail to achieve their performance standards. The legislature has the opportunity to use program reviews prepared by legislative staff to invigorate the executive branch's resolve to continue implementing the reform.     

Individual Engagement to Collective Participation: The Dynamics of Participation Pattern in Performance Budgeting

Active participation from all stakeholders in the budget process is one of the key issues to the integration of performance information with budgeting. While individual stakeholders' participation is cited as important by various studies, participation pattern, that is, how they engage relative to each other in performance measurement, is less known. Empirical studies on participation patterns and their collective impact on performance budgeting are scarce. Using the survey data collected in Georgia, this study conducted a cluster analysis in order to further provide a dynamic understanding of the mechanism and structure of a participative process in performance budgeting. The findings suggest that participation pattern is a different construct than individual participation and that the effective patterns vary by the purpose for which performance information is used. In addition, the patterns that are open to external professionals and citizens, with shared responsibilities among the agencies, executive offices and the legislative branch, and tailored to various purposes are more likely to be effective in integrating performance information with management and budgeting.     

Budgeters' Views of State Performance-Budgeting Systems: Distinctions across Branches

Given that a majority of states have had some sort of performance‐budgeting initiative on the books for several years, how has implementation of such reform progressed? To answer this question, we surveyed legislative and executive budgeters from the 50 states, asking them for their impressions of performance‐budgeting implementation in their state. Specifically, we asked these budget officers about the reasons for introducing performance budgeting in their state; the types of activities required of their system; responsible oversight bodies; extent of application across state agencies and departments; and perceived levels of effectiveness and problems experienced with implementation of the budget reform. Our findings indicate that implementation of performance‐based budgeting systems is proceeding slowly. While there are some benefits to highlight, results show that implementing performance budgeting is not without problems—perhaps the greatest being differing perceptions of use and success among budget players, particularly across branches of government.     

Budgetary Decision Making by Executive and Legislative Budget Analysts: The Impact of Political Cues and Analytical Information

We explore the extent to which attributes of individual analysts and institutional factors lead to budgetary decisions based on political cues and/or analytical information among executive and legislative budget analysts. We surveyed executive and legislative budget analysts in 13 western states to ascertain the factors that influence their budgetary decisions. The findings build on evidence from previous studies that confirms the complexity of factors affecting budget analysts' decisions, and they provide empirical support to analysts' use of a combination of information labeled "budget rationality" by Thurmaier and Willoughby. Also, we provide more conclusive evidence that both executive and legislative analysts follow similar decision-making patterns.     

Executive budget proposal,executive veto,legislative override,and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.     

Appropriations Politics in Congress: The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies

In the topsy-turvy world of congressional budgeting, last year's analysis is often out of date this year. How, then, could a work as old as most college sophomores have any relevance today? Richard Fenno's The Power of the Purse is a classic that passes the most challenging test of all time. Despite the very significant changes that have occurred in the congressional budget and appropriations processes, more than mere historical interest is to be found in Fenno's masterful study. While there are many relevant parts of the book, the following selection is from Fenno's exploration of the interplay between agency budget officials and the appropriations subcommittees. It was a pleasure to read these chapters again and I suspect that many other readers will be surprised at how insightful and fresh the study remains.     

Budgeting and Rebudgeting in Local Governments: Siamese Twins?

The literature on budgeting in the public sector has traditionally focused on the annual budgetary process. Much less attention has been paid to rebudgeting—that is, what governments do to revise and update their budgets during the fiscal year. Because of its potentially large impact on appropriations, rebudgeting seemingly deserves more attention than it has been granted so far. This article uses data from a sample of Italian municipalities to test hypotheses on the main drivers of budget revisions. According to the results, rebudgeting is strongly affected by the degree of incrementalism in the initial budgeting process, as well as by several internal and external determinants, such as political variables, organizational features, financial conditions, and the local socioeconomic environment.     

Gubernatorial Use of the Item Veto for Narrative Deletion

Legislative use of narrative, such as conditions and riders, in appropriations bills has become common and has had negative consequences for the executive budget and veto, as well as for the legislative process. Some governors have used the item veto as a remedy. While they have not necessarily diminished the amount of narrative, they have achieved some protection of the executive budget and veto power. Their success depends greatly on the type of legal authority embodied in this constitutional power.     

Financial Control in Australian Government Budgeting

With the arrival of accrual accounting and "accrual output budgeting," there have been huge changes in the mechanism of central financial control in the budget-dependent Australian public sector. This article outlines and evaluates these changes. The new parliamentary appropriations arrangements are discussed, as is the increased role played by nonappropriated departmental "own-source" funding. The shift of emphasis from legislative to administrative financial controls is noted and analyzed. Consideration is given to the implications of this shift of emphasis, and of the increased complexity of the financial control framework, for fiscal transparency and democratic accountability.     

Treated politicians,treated voters: A natural experiment on political budget cycles

Although pre-electoral political manipulation of the budget — the political budget cycle (PBC) — has been long investigated by scholars, empirical findings are mixed at best. This is partly because of the non-random nature of election timing. There also exist ongoing debates over how the budget is manipulated for electoral purposes. We address these issues by exploiting a natural experiment in Japan, where the timing of both executive and legislative elections in municipalities is fixed, staggered, and as good as random, and by using the detailed items of the municipal budget. We find that total and capital expenditures follow the PBC, but tax revenue does not. We also find that executive elections are associated with the PBC, but legislative elections are not. Against the conventional wisdom that democratic or developed countries are free from the PBC, our case of Japan offers an intriguing exception.     

State Court Strategies and Politics during the Appropriations Process

This article explores state court budgetary strategies and their effectiveness in the appropriations process as perceived by key budgeting actors. In general, we find evidence of state judiciaries that try to remain "above politics" when dealing with budget issues. The most important strategies to this effect include submitting realistic requests, providing documentation to support needs, and not using budget "weapons" at their disposal (e.g., writs of mandamus). However, the survey results do indicate that state judiciaries use certain strategies that have a more political tint, such as lobbying by court officials.     

Assessing the Power of the Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Institutions

To compare parliamentary capacity for financial scrutiny, I construct an index using data for 36 countries from a 2003 survey of budgeting procedures. The index captures six institutional prerequisites for legislative control, relating to amendment powers, reversionary budgets, executive flexibility during implementation, the timing of the budget, legislative committees and budgetary information. Various methods of index construction are reviewed. The results reveal substantial variation in the level of financial scrutiny of government by the legislature among contemporary liberal democracies. The US Congress has an index score that is more than three times as great as those for the bottom nine cases, predominantly Westminster systems. Even allowing for US exceptionalism, the top quartile of legislatures score twice as high on this index as the bottom quartile. These findings suggest that the power of the purse is a discrete and non-fundamental element of liberal democratic governance. For some countries it is a key safeguard against executive overreach, while others maintain a constitutional myth.     

The Executive Budget in the Federal Government: The First Century and Beyond

This article reviews the history of executive budgeting in the United States a century after President William Howard Taft's Economy and Efficiency Commission proposed an executive budget. This history, the authors argue, does not suggest that giving more budget power to the president will improve budget outcomes. Instead, what is needed is more cooperation between the branches of government and a better‐educated public—goals that were shared by budget reformers when the Taft report was published.     

Fiscal Planning, Budgeting, and Rebudgeting Using Revenue Semaphores

Revenue forecasts play an important role in the state government budget and policy process. These forecasts are generally reported to executive and legislative leaders as point estimates, with no acknowledgment of their corresponding risk and uncertainty. The revenue semaphores proposed in this article outline procedures by which revenue uncertainty directly influences the planning process. The goal is not to make forecasts more accurate, but to make discussions of budget and revenue alternatives more comprehensive. Explicitly incorporating risk and uncertainty measures into the budgeting process increases the degree of real-time budgeting and reduces some adverse effects of budget revisions after the fiscal year begins. The discussion occurs in the context of budget control, management, and policy making.     

The Line‐Item Veto in Georgia: Fiscal Restraint or Inter‐Branch Politics?

This article about use of the line‐item veto in Georgia concludes that the item veto has been used not as an instrument for reducing the budget total or the size of state government, but as an instrument for protecting the executive budget. Using appropriations data and drawing upon interviews with participants in the budget process, including seven governors, the authors present evidence that in Georgia the item veto (1) is not frequently used, (2) when used, is more likely to remove legislative language than delete dollar amounts, and (3) enables the spending priorities and fiscal policy preferences of the governor to prevail as state policy.     

The Politics of Court Budgeting in the States: Is Judicial Independence Threatened by the Budgetary Process?

Judicial independence in American politics has been hailed as a means of preserving individual liberty and minority rights against the actions of the majoritarian branches of government. Recently, however, legal professionals and scholars of the courts have begun to question the magnitude of judicial independence, suggesting that budgeting and finance issues pose a threat to judicial independence. This article explores whether state judiciaries are being threatened on this front by soliciting the perceptions of key state officials. Using surveys of court administrators, executive budget officers, and legislative budget officers in the states, we examine three aspects of the politics of judicial budgeting: competing for scarce resources, interbranch competition, and pressure to raise revenues. The survey responses suggest that, in a substantial number of states, judicial independence has, at times, been threatened by interbranch competition and pressures to raise revenues.     

The contractual nature of budgeting: A transaction cost perspective on the design of budgeting institutions

Viewing budgets as contracts, transaction cost theory focuses on the costs of negotiating and enforcing the myriad political agreements by which policymakers allocate the government's resources. This essay provides an overview of transaction cost theory and its implications for the design of budgeting institutions. It contrasts the behavioral premises (bounded rationality and opportunism) of the transaction cost approach with those of more traditional budgetary theories, and examines whether commitment and agency costs have structured budget actors' institutional choices. Investigation of the usage of key budget instruments- entitlements, multi-year appropriations, and tax expenditures - suggests that Congress has been more discriminating in its institutional choices than is commonly supposed. Sensitivity to the importance of transaction costs would increase the effectiveness of budget reforms.