Buying Negative Agenda Control in the U.S. House

We explore the foundations of the legislative party cartel, as theorized by Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) , to determine how majority‐party moderates who suffer net policy losses from the majority leadership's use of negative agenda control are kept from defecting from the cartel arrangement. First, we identify formally the group of majority‐party members who are net policy losers. We find that those members occupying the initial 30% of the space within the majority‐party blockout zone—that space closest to the floor median—are hurt on a pure policy basis by the cartel arrangement. Second, we find that members in this “30% zone” are rewarded disproportionately by majority‐party leaders (relative to members in other intervals on the same side of the floor median) via side payments in the form of campaign contributions. In addition, majority‐party members within the 30% zone receive side payments commensurate with their particular policy loss.     

A losing gamble. How mainstream parties facilitate anti-immigrant party success

The emergence of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe has provoked very different responses from mainstream parties. Some have tried to counter the anti-immigrant parties while others have tried to recapture lost voters by taking a tougher stance on immigration. Country comparative studies have tried to determine the effectiveness of different strategies, but systematic testing has been impaired by small-n problems. This paper therefore exploits sub-national variation in 290 Swedish municipalities to investigate the effect of mainstream party strategy on anti-immigrant electoral success. The paper finds that a tougher stance on immigration on the part of mainstream parties is correlated with more anti-immigrant party support, even when controlling for a large number of socio-economic, historical and regional factors. This result indicates that mainstream parties legitimize anti-immigrant parties by taking a tougher position on immigration. However, the results presented in the paper show that it is not sufficient for one mainstream party to take a tougher position; it is only when the entire political mainstream is tougher on immigration that the anti-immigrant party benefits. What is more, the toughness of the parties on the left seems to be more legitimizing than the toughness of the parties on the right.     

Measuring the ideological preferences of U.S. presidents: A proposed (extremely simple) method

Several observations can be made concerning the data presented in the preceding tables. First, as one might expect, not all Democratic or Republican presidents are alike. As shown in Table 3, John Kennedy has a higher cumulative pro-ADA rating than does Lyndon Johnson than does Jimmy Carter. On the Republican side, Dwight Eisenhower comes in at roughly the middle of the ADA liberal/conservative ideological spectrum and considerably to the left of both Ronald Reagan and George Bush.Second, while there appear to be significant differences between the ideological preferences of presidents from the same party, the correlation between a president's annual or cumulative pro-ADA percentage and a dummy variable reflecting the party of the president (Democrats equal unity, Republicans equal zero) is still fairly high. For example, the correlation between the nine post-World War II presidents' cumulative pro-ADA percentages (Table 3) and a party dummy variable is 0.93. The correlation between presidents' annual pro-ADA percentages (Table 2) and a party dummy variable is 0.87. Thus, while a dummy variable reflecting the party of a president may not be the most preferred measure of presidents' ideological preferences, such a variable may be a reasonably accurate substitute for the pro-ADA percentages reported in Tables 2 and 3.     

Strategic Voting in a U.S. Senate Election

Due to the strength of its two-party system, the opportunity for voters to strategically defect in favor of third party or independent candidates is rare in high profile American elections. Indeed, it has been almost a century since a third party candidate finished better than one of the major party presidential nominees—in 1912 Bull Moose Progressive Teddy Roosevelt finished ahead of Republican William H. Taft. In this study we examine strategic voting in a U.S. Senate election where the independent candidate also finished above one of the major party nominees. In the 2010 Florida Senate contest the sitting Governor Charlie Crist shed his Republican label in order to compete in the general election since he was certain to lose in the GOP primary to Marco Rubio, the eventual winner. Crist finished second by taking a substantial share of votes away from the third place candidate, Democrat Kendrick Meek. Because this type of contest seldom occurs, in American politics there is scant empirical research on strategic voting under these conditions. We employ an unobtrusive survey of a large sample of registered Floridians in order to assess the likelihood of strategic voting among respondents who preferred the Democrat Kendrick Meek. For voters who sincerely preferred the Democrat, a significant portion defected in favor of the Independent Charlie Crist if they expected him to finish ahead of Meek. Additionally, we find that after a major news story broke, in which former President Bill Clinton allegedly advised Meek to drop out of the race so that Crist might win, respondents surveyed after this event were more likely to vote strategically in favor of Crist. Our study clearly demonstrates the importance of political context. Under the appropriate conditions, we find a high likelihood of strategic voting.     

The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century

One of the most important developments affecting electoral competition in the United States has been the increasingly partisan behavior of the American electorate. Yet more voters than ever claim to be independents. We argue that the explanation for these seemingly contradictory trends is the rise of negative partisanship. Using data from the American National Election Studies, we show that as partisan identities have become more closely aligned with social, cultural and ideological divisions in American society, party supporters including leaning independents have developed increasingly negative feelings about the opposing party and its candidates. This has led to dramatic increases in party loyalty and straight-ticket voting, a steep decline in the advantage of incumbency and growing consistency between the results of presidential elections and the results of House, Senate and even state legislative elections. The rise of negative partisanship has had profound consequences for electoral competition, democratic representation and governance.     

Neglected and Unloved: Does the Hinge Party Deserve That?

This article focuses on the hinge party both as a concept and a strategy. It seeks to ‘liberate’ the hinge party from the clutches of such close conceptual relatives as the ‘pivot party’, the ‘genuine pivot party’, the ‘pivotal centre party’, the ‘pivotal middle party’ and the ‘pivotal median party’. This is a taxonomical jungle and while some use the terms ‘hinge party’ and ‘pivot party’ interchangeably, this study urges a ‘velvet divorce’. The main theoretical question is in two parts: (1) What are the distinguishing features of the hinge party and how does it differ from the pivot party?; and (2) What set of legislative party system circumstances would seem most likely to favour a hinge party strategy of keeping options open to both left and right? Self‐styled centrist parties would seem most likely to favour a hinge party strategy and the empirical question is: To what extent have the Nordic Centre‐label [former agrarian] parties sought and been able to do so?     

Terrorism,gender, and the 2016 U.S. presidential election

The 2016 U.S. election provides the opportunity to assess how gender, party, and experience shape candidate evaluations when terrorist threat is elevated. The presidential contest featured the first woman major party nominee (Hillary Clinton), a major party nominee without political experience (Donald Trump), and terrorism was salient. We argue that security threats dampen public confidence in Democratic women running for office, yet an experience advantage could countervail against those tendencies. We test expectations using the 2016 ANES and two experimental studies. We first affirm that individuals worried about terrorism held lower evaluations of Clinton and higher evaluations of Trump. We then test an active manipulation of the salience of national security experience and find that it mitigates Clinton's disadvantage, but only in the absence of a counter-message. The results underscore the difficulty that Democratic women face in overcoming the negative influence of party and gender stereotypes when running for office in times of terrorist threat.     

Partizipation in politischen Parteien. Eine empirische Analyse des Mobilisierungspotenzials politischer Parteien sowie der Struktur innerparteilicher Partizipation in Deutschland

Why do citizens become members of political parties? And why are some party members activists and others not? These guiding questions are analyzed within the context of the general incentives model proposed by Seyd and Whiteley. The basis of the empirical analyses is a survey of the German population as well as a survey of the German party members. It is shown that soft incentives can be sufficient for the decision to become a member of a political party while hard incentives are the main predictor of the decision to become active within a party. Since soft incentives had become less widespread these findings contribute to an explanation of the declining number of party members in Germany.     

Minor parties and strategic voting in recent U.S. presidential elections

I measure and explain strategic voting in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 U.S. presidential elections. Aggregate polling and election data from the 50 states and District of Columbia indicate whether a minor party candidate's support rose or fell between the final poll and Election Day. A negative vote-poll gap is evidence of classic strategic voting while a positive vote-poll gap is evidence of expressive strategic voting. Expressive voting was widespread in 1992 and 1996, but instrumental voting was dominant in 2000. In 2000 Ralph Nader lost support in most states, particularly those where the major party contest was competitive. In contrast, Ross Perot gained in most states due to expressive strategic voting facilitated by the noncompetitive national race. I also show that the vote-poll gap is a product of changes in voter turnout and, to a lesser extent, elite mobilization.     

Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000

In this article, we provide a critical review of the evidence and arguments about party polarization in the House of Representatives during the late 20th century. We show that inferences about party polarization are significantly affected by voting reform in the early 1970s. We observe that a decomposed roll-call record alters our view of the timing of changes in party polarization and therefore requires that we reconsider explanations of the trend. We revisit explanations of party polarization and establish a strong case for placing substantial emphasis on party strategies in explanations of party polarization in floor behavior during the 1980s and 1990s.     

Principle vs. Pragmatism: Policy Shifts and Political Competition

This article investigates the electoral effect of party policy shifts. I argue that whether party policy shifts are damaging or rewarding depends on whether the shift occurs in the pragmatic or principled issue domain. On pragmatic issues, voters value "getting things done." Policy shifts in this domain signal responsiveness to the changing environment and are likely to be rewarded. Principled issues, however, concern core beliefs and values. Any policy shift in this domain is a sign of inconsistency and lack of credibility, which is likely to lead to voter withdrawal. These arguments are supported by evidence from 23 advanced democracies over a period of 40 years.     

When long-distance relationships don't work out: Representational distance and satisfaction with democracy in Europe

We assess the impact of party representation on satisfaction with democracy. Our proposition is that such representation is not only about having a chosen party in government; citizens also derive satisfaction from having their views represented by a political party. We test this through an individual-level measure of policy (in)congruence: the ideological distance between a voter and his or her closest party. Via multi-level modelling of European Election Study data from 1989 to 2009, we find that perceived policy distance matters: the further away that voters see themselves from their nearest party – on either a left-right or a European unification policy dimension – the less satisfied they are with democracy. Notably, this effect is not moderated by party incumbency or size. Voters derive satisfaction from feeling represented by a nearby party even if it is small and out of office. Our results caution against a purely outcomes-driven understanding of democratic satisfaction.     

Why Party Leaders are More Extreme than Their Members: Modeling Sequential Elimination Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives

Grofman et al. (forthcoming) find thatparty leaders in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives tend to be more extremethan the median member of their party, andthat they tend to come from the party'sideological ``heartland'' between the medianand the mode. This paper shows that if thedistribution of preferences is skewed (asis the case with both parties in theHouse), then we should expect sequentialelimination elections to choose on averageleaders between the median and modalpositions. We show that this is the casewhether or not the party is factionalized.     

Testing a Predictive Model of Voter Behavior on the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election

Abstract

Utilizing a predictive model of voter behavior, this study identified the motivations behind a sample of voters who cast a ballot for George W. Bush and AI Gore in the 2000 presidential campaign. The motivations of the voters were differentiated on the basis of the “value” they sought in a president. In other words, just as companies in the “commercial marketplace” have to create value to attract customers, so does a candidate in the “political marketplace” who is seeking to carve out a niche for himself that separates him from his competition. Pairwise discriminant analysis is used to identify the motivations behind the choice behavior of voters at both the candidate and party level. The results reveal the complimentary roles that the political party and each candidate's campaign organization played in their respective marketing strategies.     

Inheritance and the Dynamics of Party Identification

Extensive research efforts notwithstanding, scholars continue to disagree on the nature and meaning of party identification. Traditionalists conceive of partisanship as a largely affective attachment to a political party that emerges in childhood through parental influences and tends to persist throughout life. The revisionist conception of partisanship is that of a running tally of party utilities that is updated based on current party performance. We attempt to reconcile both schools of thought in an individual difference perspective, showing that the party loyalties acquired through parental influences confirm better the traditional view, while the attachments of individuals who did not inherit their parents’ party loyalties exhibit features more closely matching the revisionist predictions. The analysis is facilitated by uniquely suited longitudinal household data emanating from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study that allow to study party identifications of young adults and their parents on an annual basis from 1984 to 2007.     

Turning your back on the EU. The role of Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections

This paper analyses how disaffection with the EU influenced individuals' likelihood of turning out to vote and of casting a vote for a Eurosceptic party in the 2014 EP elections, and how these relationships were moderated by the Eurosceptic partisan supply of each country. We argue that the degree to which political parties oppose European integration, as well as the ideological leaning of Eurosceptic parties, should influence both the likelihood of disaffected citizens turning out to vote, and their likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. Our empirical findings show that, in the presence of a party that is strongly opposed to European integration, disaffected citizens are more likely to turn out to vote and to vote for a Eurosceptic party provided that this party also shares their ideological leaning in the left-right dimension. These results indicate that Eurosceptic parties are important actors for the politicization of the European integration conflict and for the Europeanization of EP elections, but, at the same time, they suggest that opposition to European integration is subordinate to the traditional left-right conflict.     

心理关怀服务元素在高职院校学生党建工作中的运用

近年来,随着高校中党员和入党积极分子比例不断增加,反映了高校党建和思想政治工作的成果,也暴露出学生党建工作中存在的问题。要注重心理关怀服务在高校学生党建工作中的地位和作用,通过科学有效的心理健康教育机制进一步加强对学生党员和积极分子的心理疏导,做到晓之以理、动之以情,导之以行,持之以恒,让人文关怀和心理疏导在大学生党建中发挥应有作用。     

Analysing ‘Successor Parties': The Case of the True Finns

Whilst the ‘successor party’ (SP) has a well-established place in the literature on post-communist Eastern and Central Europe, occasional references to its West European counterpart have tended to use the term loosely and not separate it out from other varieties of new party. Focusing on the question, ‘where do parties come from?’ – that is, the process of party origination – this article makes a case for viewing the SP as a distinct genus in the West European party hemisphere. The SP is defined as a party which is nominally and legally a new entity that takes the place of, and fills at least some of the political space vacated by, a single, defunct party of origin. The mortality of the ‘original party’ is a sine qua non. SPs emerge with a clear political inheritance. What this is and how they interpret and respond to the inheritance makes the case for their systematic study. The paper also asks, ‘where do new parties go to?’ (how do they evolve?). The question of party change in SPs is analysed by reference to the True Finns.     

Equilibrium Party Government

In this article, I present an equilibrium model of party government within a two-party legislature. The theory is predicated upon members of the majority party having potentially conflicting individual and collective interests. In response to this potential conflict, the members of the majority party endogenously choose a degree of control to grant to their leadership. The equilibrium level of party strength is decreasing in the size of the majority party and increasing in the strength of opposition among members of the minority party. The theory implies that the average performance of W-Nominate estimates of majority party members' ideal points will be a decreasing function of the size of the majority party while the performance of these estimates for members of the minority party will not be affected by the size of the majority party. Using data from the U.S. House and Senate between 1866 and 2004, the theory's predictions are largely consistent with roll-call voting in both chambers.     

Party ambiguity and individual preferences

Although the literature on party ambiguity does not lead to a consensus, recent findings suggest that party ambiguity is a good strategy for electoral success. However, the literature on decision processes shows that individuals generally dislike ambiguity. The aim of the present project is to test the effect of party ambiguity on party preferences at the individual level, to see if findings in decision processes still apply. Using election data from eight Western European democracies, I define a measure of party ambiguity at the individual level and find that ambiguity has a negative effect on party preferences. In addition, I find that individuals with a high interest in politics are less likely to like ambiguous parties.