Fertility,development, and family planning, 1970–1980: An analysis of cases weighted by population

A series of related studies (Freedman and Berelson, 1976; Mauldin and Berelson, 1978; and Tsui and Bogue, 1978) have presented empirical findings based on multiple regression analysis which indicated that family planning program effort (FP), as measured by an index developed by Lapham and Mauldin (1972), was the single most important predictor of (or influence on) fertility reduction in less-developed countries (LDCs). The basic results have been confirmed repeatedly. A more extensive data set was used to extend the analysis to a comparison of results of corss-sectional models circa 1970 and 1980. The study builds upon the results of past studies yet differs from them in several ways. All the variables in the present study were measured at 2 points in time: circa 1970 and circa 1980, allowing a comparison between cross-sectional models for 1970 and 1980. Among the cases included in this multivariate analysis was China, a country usually excluded for lack of data. The analysis was extend to 85 countries. Cases were weighted by population, having the effect of increasing the impact of larger countries such as India and China on the outcome of the analysis. Total fertility rate (TFR) was used as an indicator of fertility. For 1970, family planning program effort had the strongest direct influence on fertility (a result consistent with previous studies). Life expectancy at birth was the other direct influence. The direct influence of life expectancy at birth was less than that of family planning, but the total influence was greater. After life expectancy and family planning, school enrollment and relative educational status of women had the strongest indirect and total influences. The other variables all had a positive influence on fertility. When the total variance attributable was considered, directly and indirectly to each of the independent variables, urbanization, carlorie supply, and per capita gross national product all accounted for less than 5% of the variance in fertility, all of it indirect. Life expectancy, family planning, and school enrollment each explained (directly plus indirectly) more than 10% of the variance in fertility. The pattern differed somewhat for 1980. Calorie supply, per capita gross national product, and relative educational status of women had no influence, direct or indirect on fertility. Also for 1980, life expectancy had a stronger direct influence on fertility than family planning. Overall, life expectancy at birth, family planning program effort, and total school enrollment emerged as the principal influences on fertility.     

Fertility,development, and family planning

Earlier studies by Tsui and Bogue (1978) and Mauldin and Berelson (1978) suggested that family planning efforts account for 3-4 times the variance in fertility than is explained by indicators of socioeconomic development. This paper replicates, extends, and revises these analyses. Selection of a different set of countries for sampling was found to have little effect on the earlier results. In addition, neither factor scaling nor the addition of distributional variables had a substantial effect. However, weighting countries by population size was found to produce a decline in explained variance. It was found that although family planning has a stronger direct effect on fertility than any other variable when countries are considered, the effect of education is stronger when people are considered. When more developed countries were included in the analysis, the combination of prior fertility and mortality explained almost all the variation in current fertility. This finding suggests that fertility is more responsive to longterm, stabilized changes in mortality than to short-term changes. 4 methodological conclusions are derived from these analyses: 1) unless a sample of countries is overtly biased, the selection of a sample on the basis of available data has little impact on the results; 2) stepwise methods can be utilized to avoid the inclusion of a large number of variables in a regression equation; 3) weighting of cases has a substantial impact on results; and 4) since most variables have little direct influence on fertility change, analysis should be extended to examine indirect influences. These results suggest a policy which invests economic resources in education and mortality reduction as well as family planning efforts. Investments in primary and secondary education may reduce mortality as well as fertility.     

Fertility,family planning,and development: Indirect influences

This paper focuses on the indirect influences on changing fertility and on the direct and indirect influences on family planning effort. Complete data on the variables under consideration were gathered from a variety of sources for 65 developing countries. The results here should be generalized only to high fertility, high mortality, low education, and low per capita gross national product nations. 1) Some social variables, like education, are more important than others for explaining fertility and family planning effort. The treatment of social setting as a single variable obscures the importance of lower level education (literacy, primary, and secondary school enrollment) for fertility and family planning. 2) Ignoring the indirect influences on fertility may lead us to understimate the importance of some variables on fertility, and perhaps to overestimate the importance of others. When both direct and indirect effects (the latter through family planning effort) are examined, the impact of education increases to nearly equal that of family planning effort in 3 of the 4 models developed here. 3) Program effort can be explained at least as well with a single variable (literacy or female school enrollment) as with the composite variable "social setting." 4) In addition to its importance in explaining fertility, education may also be important in explaining mortality. 5) It appears that the absolute and relative status of women may be an important variable which has not yet been adequately measured. Overall, the results of this study lend additional support to the position that, in addition to family planning effort, education may play a more crucial role than is obvious in fertility reduction in developing countries.     

The effects of family planning effort and development on fertility: An intervening variables framework

To pinpoint the intervening variable that transmit the impacts of development and family planning effort on fertility, a modified proximate determinants model was applied to data from 59 developing countries. The intermediate variable included level of exposure to sexual intercourse (the percentage of women 20-24 years old in a union), deliberate marital fertility control (the percentage of married women of reproductive age who were using contraception), and natural marital fertility (operationalized as average per capita calorie consumption). The regression equations indicated that both social development and family planning effort can influence fertility levels substantially through their association with higher levels of contraceptive use. Interestingly, the direct effects of family planning and social development on the crude birth rate became insignificant when the intermediate variables were included in the same equation. Path analysis revealed that social development has an indirect effect of -0.083 via its influence on marriage patterns and of -0.316 due to its effect on contraceptive usage. Family planning has a lesser indirect impact on fertility (-0.487), and -0.111 of this effect reflects program effort's dependence on the level of social development. Economic development is positively linked to fertility, and future research should assess whether this factor is partially counterbalancing the fertility-reducing impact of social development and family planning programs. Although this analysis confirms that delayed marriage and widespread adoption of contraception are key intervening variables, they cannot influence fertility in societies where there are social or cultural impediments to such changes.     

Cross-national models of fertility,Family planning,and development: Testing for reciprocal effects

Cross-national models of fertility, family planning, and development commonly assume that there are no reciprocal effects between fertility and other variables in the model, and when path models are used, that there are no reciprocal or nonrecursive effects among any set of variables in the model. The present study tests for nonrecursiveness using two-wave panel data, and finds that nonrecursive effects are present among variables commonly used in models of fertility, family planning, and development. In addition, the pattern of relationships found has implications for the explanation of the relationship between mortality and fertility in demographic transition theory. Scott Menard is a research associate at the Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Campus Box 442, Boulder, Colorado, 80309-0442. His publications includePerspectives on Population with Elizabeth W. Moen (Oxford University Press, 1987) as well as several previous articles in SCID on fertility, family planning, and development.     

Fertility decline and social service access: Reconciling behavioral and medical models

In this summary of fertility literature the author attempts to differentiate between the effects of behavioral and medical models of family planning programs on the fertility rate. This is done by determining the effects of access to social welfare services by assessment of: the function of children within the family life survey conducted in the Cameroons are also used. It was found that 7 interdependent elements of social service are involved: 1) general health care; 2) social security for sick and aged; 3) employment training and opportunities for adults; 4) literacy and education; 5) communication and transportation systems; 6) housing and infrastructure; 7) child care and welfare. The presence of these elements is shown to accompany low fertility while their absence is expressed in high rates of child bearing. These elements are major variables in both the nomological and public policy senses. 2 additional components are knowledge of and favorable attitudes towards effective means of fertility control plus effective mechanical, chemical, or natural means of limiting fertility. The concept of fertility norm and its impact on the fertility rate is explained as being the result of the collective force which social affiliations exert on people to reproduce in a certain way. The "stopping rule" is that which will fulfill the fertility norm. An example of this is a culture which continues child bearing until a son has been born and then controls reproduction after this has happened. Such factors must be considered for family planning programs to succeed in these cultures. Therefore fertility levels are found to be the product of prevailing norms and technical ability to achieve these norms. Improvement in levels of access to social services can bring about the lowering of these norms.     

Ideas,Economics and 'the Sociology of Supply': Explanations for Fertility Decline in Bangladesh

The persistence of high rates of fertility in Bangladesh, despite the poverty of its population, has been given alternative, and apparently competing, explanations, including the absence of effective forms of family planning, the resilience of pro-natalist values and norms and the existence of material constraints which led to the reliance on children as economic assets. The recent and dramatic declines in fertility rates, in the absence of any apparent major economic changes in the decades prior to the onset of fertility decline, appears to contradict materialist explanations for fertility behaviour and to support explanations which stressed ideas about the acceptability of birth control and the availability of the means for doing so. This article argues that such an interpretation is based on an historical analysis of events in Bangladesh. It offers an alternative explanation which stresses socio-economic change as the primary motor for change in family size preferences, but which recognises the role of modern forms of family planning in facilitating the pace of the resulting fertility decline.     

A multilevel analysis of fertility behavior in Korea

This analysis of the socioeconomic determinants of fertility behavior in Korea develops a model that simultaneously considers both individual and community-level differences. The model includes 3 fertility process components: onset, early fertility, and later fertility, which are defined by reference to maternal age. The analysis traced the effects of respondents' education and childhood residence through their intermediate consequences for work experience before and after marriage, husbands' education and occupation, current residence, childhood mortality, and sex composition of offspring. The data were derived from the 1974 Korean National Fertility Survey. The results of this analysis indicate that socioeconomic development results in increased age at 1st birth and reduced number of children. Socioeconomic development is accompanied by desires for smaller family size, creating the conditions for fertility decline even in the absence of a national family planning program. The results for early fertility supported the hypothesis that there would be no effect of employment in the modern sector before marriage on fertility before age 30 years in traditional contexts, but a positive effect in transitional contexts. Aside from age at 1st birth, none of the micro coefficients were statistically significant in explaining the early fertility model. For later fertility, the relationships between micro and social context variables were negative, as hypothesized, but dampening effects of development due to family planning were not detected. Childhood residence played a small role in explaining fertility measures, but women's education did not work either additively or interactively.     

Civic engagement and uncontrolled ballot votes: Evidence from Swiss cities

Citizens are increasingly encouraged to get more directly involved in policy-making, especially at subnational levels of government. By letting the electorate decide on policy measures, direct democratic institutions add a veto player to political processes and change the decision-making game of a political system. Besides influences of interest groups and political actor's strategies, however, little is known about how institutional, political and other contextual factors bear on the use of direct democracy. This is of particular interest if ballot processes are neither initiated nor controlled by governing majorities. This contribution shows that institutions have little if no impact on the use of optional referendums and citizen-initiated petitions in Swiss cities. Rather, voting on uncontrolled ballots is largely determined by contextual variables, including foremost a commune's social complexity. In addition, the total number of other ballots, economic diversity and social satisfaction prove to be key to explaining optional referendum votes, whereas the launching of popular initiatives is explained by social complexity together with economic difficulties.     

The Soviet ideology of industrialization : A review article

This paper studies reproductive behaviour (ideal family size, completed family size and family planning acceptance) in a rural Indian area which was rapidly industrialising. Two castes and eleven villages were sampled. It was found that family planning was quite common and that fertility differentials among couples were related to the couples’ unique socioeconomic characteristics as well as to two group level variables (caste and village). The latter result was shown to be statistically significant, for all three measures of reproductive behaviour, even after many unique socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes of each couple were accounted for statistically.     

Network Formation During Disasters: Exploring Micro-Level Interorganizational Processes and the Role of National Capacity

Despite common assumptions about the processes associated with interorganizational network formation, the resulting structures and relevant factors often vary. This variation suggests that there are likely contextual or meta-network variables that moderate the influence of well-established micro-level mechanisms. Because much of the existing research on disaster response networks relies on single case studies, the role of meta-network variables in shaping network formation remains unexplored. We look to fill this gap by comparing network formation patterns in multiple countries that vary in their disaster management capacity. This article uses social network analysis to analyze the formation of response networks after earthquakes in Indonesia, Haiti, and Japan. This study contributes to existing literature by examining how transitivity, homophily, and brokerage vary in their salience under different macro-level constraints. The results suggest that national response capacity may influence the jurisdictional level at which bridging and bonding strategies take place.     

Level of living and fertility among a rural population of the Philippines

This study examines the issue of whether the relationship of fertility to measures of economic resources is different at lower income levels than at higher levels. Testing was done in a rural Philippine setting in 1978-79. 3 measures of economic resources were utilized -- income, quality of housing, and provision of schooling for children. The data were drawn from a survey of rural families residing in 5 muncipalities of Iloilo province, on Panay Island in the central Philippines. In the study design, villages (or barangays) were selected from the 5 municipalities to obtain equal numbers of 3 agricultural types -- upland, rainfed lowland, and irrigated lowland farms. Interviews were conducted during a 4-month period in late 1978 and early 1979. Completed interviews of 1077 married women were obtained from 1066 households in 46 villages. These women were under age 50. The number of children ever born was used as the measure of fertility. To derive household income for the families in the survey both farm production and nonfarm income were converted into Philippine pesos. For a measure of housing quality, an index was formed based on 7 household items which could be considered amenities for the family and on the reported construction materials for 5 parts of the dwelling. This sample of households in the rural villages of Iloilo Province exhibited evidence of a threshold in the relationship between housing quality and fertility and between per capita income and fertility. For those families with per capita income less than 200 pesos per year, there was a strong positive relationship between 2 of the economic resource measures and fertility. This threshold for families of very low income showed support for the presence of limiting factors other than contraception. When the contracepting women of low income were removed from the analysis, the slope below the threshold became steeper. The poor nutrition and poor health that are associated with very low income can result in lower fecundity, thus biologically or nonvolitionally limiting fertility from what it could be with conditions of good health and nutrition. Among the families with higher per capita income, there was a negative relationship between per capita income and fertility. Housing quality yielded the strongest evidence of the threshold effect. Education of the children was not related to fertility in this model. Study findings indicate that for about 1/3 of this rural population initial increases in their economic level or living standard could result in increasing fertility up to a threshold level.     

Dynamic properties of Taiwanese fertility, 1950–1972

This extensive statistical study focuses on fertility patterns during the postwar period in Taiwan. The analytical technique is economic, with socioeconomic variables generally considered the important determinants of fertility; on the other hand, female education and labor force participation were seen to exert a strong negative effect on fertility. Taiwan has reduced birth rates nearly 50% in the period from the 1950s-1970s. In 1972, Taiwan's birth rate/woman was 3.4, a 50% reduction from 1950, generally attributed to institution of a well-conceived family planning program in 1964. It is hypothesized that the socioeconomic forces (presented in 7 comprehensive tables) which influenced negatively the rate of births, worked primarily to reduce excess rather than desired fertility. The clear connection between women's participation in the labor force and reduction in desired fertility leads to the suggestion that stronger economic incentives must be presented to women. Given the already wide availability and low cost of birth control devices, further fertility reductions caused by expanded participation in the family planning program are not likely to reduce desired family size significantly. Instead, it is argued that such reductions tend to occur slowly and to be associated with more economically meaningful roles for women. Analyzed on a cost-benefit basis, the fertility control efforts of the Taiwanese government should be directed to achieving a synchronization between the skill levels demanded by the economy and those acquired in the system of higher education. Economic incentives for fewer births would then augment, rather than offset, the presently extant negative effects of slowly changing attitudinal variables and economic development. The formulation and usefulness of statistical methods are developed extensively within this article.     

Population and development: fact,fancy and politics

Massive population growth is an accepted fact in developing countries at a time when developed, Western countries, i.e., the U.S., have become increasingly disenchanted with foreign aid. The gap between the very rich and very poor becomes wider and sharper. Most people live either in countries where the per capita income is below $320 or above $1,280. Lowering fertility rates would be favorable to economic conditions in the long run but with little short-run effect, population control is not a high priority government activity. The theme of the 1974 Bucharest Conference was that if development were encouraged, fertility would take care of itself. Programs which directly influence fertility rates are needed to improve development. Family planning programs are low cost compared to other development policies, and they improve maternal and child health. Women cannot be educated or employed unless they have the freedom of choice not to have children or when to have children. Western enthusiasm for fertility control has been met with suspicion in many devleoping areas. Western attitudes should be balanced by restructuring world trade and constructing relationships which would hasten economic development.     

The world population situation

Population experts appear to be reaching a consensus that there has been a perceptible decline over the last decade in the growth of the world's population. The decline is accounted for by the "new demographic transition" in the less developed countries (LDCs). The decline in fertility rates began in the 1950s in some LDCs and became more widespread during the 1970s. The process has not yet begun in many of the LDCs. During the 1960s it was observed that the declines in birth rates (to levels of 30 of less per 1000) were occurring mostly in small countries. Many of these countries were islands with levels of social and economic development above the developing country average. The key question is whether the recent downward trend in fertility in LDCs will continue, stabilize at the current level, or rise again. A primary concern about the future is that the poorer and less developed countries will end up with an increasing share of the world's population, with the share of the developed countries declining from 34% to 22% over the 1950-2000 period. Considerable differential exists in demographic growth patterns among various regions. The 12 largest LDCs (China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey) contain 55% of the current world population, and the fertility decline of these nations is expected to have the maximum impact. 7 of these countries have had fertility declines of 14-35%. The force of the "population momentum" must also be considered. Most developing country populations have a young age distribution with considerable potential for population growth even after the fertility level reaches a replacement level and the net reproduction rate equals 1.     

Agricultural development in Ethiopia: Government budgeting and development assistance in the pre and post 1975 periods

An analysis of rural development programmes in pre‐ and post‐1975 Ethiopia demonstrates the importance of international donor agencies in rural development activities. Since pre‐1975 Development Plans largely neglected agriculture, current and capital expenditure budgets allocated few financial resources to agriculture. While acknowledging the importance of agriculture in promoting economic growth in its Third Five Year Plan, the Imperial Government recognised its lack of resources and absence of an articulated rural development plan and turned to donor agencies for both programme formulation and financing. The post‐1975 government, while continuing to utilise donor agency assistance, is not only allocating a greater proportion of capital expenditure to agriculture, but has also articulated specific rural development objectives within which it has outlined the role of donor agency assistance.     

An Exploratory Analysis of Fertility Differentials in India

The association between improving economic conditions and declining growth of population has led economists and demographers to hypothesise a direct relationship between indicators of economic development and fertility rates. Using recent National Family Health Survey data and the 1991 Census to explore factors contributing to fertility rates in India, we found that economic variables explain 70 per cent of the interstate variations in India's fertility rates. However, several non-economic variables explain an even greater proportion, for example, indicators of female autonomy explain 84 per cent of the variations. Our analysis demonstrates that to successfully explain Indian fertility rates, models must rely heavily on non-economic variables.     

Population,economy and society in West Bengal since the 1970s

West Bengal, a major state of eastern India, is conspicuous not only for being ruled by an elected Leftist coalition since 1977 (often described as sound ‘political stability’), but also for its widely acknowledged successes in fertility transition, execution of redistributive land reform and political decentralisation programmes. Ironically, however, the state, in almost all comparative assessments of social, human and infrastructural developments occupies a lagged position vis-à-vis many other states, especially in the south and even against all-India records. This paper seeks to examine this paradox by comprehensively evaluating West Bengal's relative performance in demographic and socio-economic transformations. A well-disciplined grassroots political mobilisation network, and the machinery of the Left Front parties, have been highly instrumental for comparatively fast declines of fertility and population growth and for lasting political stability in an otherwise ‘laggard’ development regime. However, a government geared to ensuring mass electoral support overwhelmingly via a grassroots mobilisation network but, with a relative neglect of social movements, economic infrastructure and human development, is likely to suffer adverse consequences in the longer term.     

Economic development and population

Conclusion Neo-Malthusian analysis that high and increasing population density hinders economic development and results in poverty has been demonstrated to be false. The two major structural variables negatively associated with rate of population increase are wealth and socialism, and the major determinants of economic growth are level of economic development and economic organization. If our analysis is correct the various campaigns supported by AID, the major U.S. foundations and other groups to discourage population growth in Third World countries in order to increase their rate of economic growth are misguided. Every baby born is not only a new mouth to feed, but also within a few years two more hands to work. There are great potentialities for economic growth in the Third World that await only the proper economic organization to be realized. That is, if the two hands are used efficiently, they will more than feed themselves. Attempts to reduce the birth rate by propaganda and making contraceptives readily available, ignore the structural causes of high fertility and so are not likely to succeed in reducing the birth rate. Our data suggest that only when the structural causes of high fertility—the poverty and economic insecurity associated with capitalism—are removed is the birth rate likely to fall significantly.