A comparison of Chinese judges' and US judges' knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony

Abstract

We surveyed 170 Chinese judges about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of 160 US judges. Although the Chinese judges were less knowledgeable than the US judges, both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony, including for such important issues as whether lay people can distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. Unlike the US judges, greater knowledge of eyewitness factors for the Chinese judges was not related to beliefs that may be necessary to reduce eyewitness error. Compared to the US judges, the Chinese judges were much less likely to believe that they needed additional eyewitness training and that they knew more about eyewitness testimony than lay persons. We also discuss the impact of culture, legal systems, investigative procedures, and judges' function on the Chinese judges' responses, and the legal reforms that China may need to implement to reduce eyewitness error.     

A comparison of three studies of the influence of expert testimony on jurors

Three conceptual replications of the effects of expert testimony on jurors' decisions and behaviors were compared. Taken together, these studies demonstrated significant increases in jurors' scrutiny of the evidence presented to them and significant reductions in their beliefs in the general accuracy of eyewitness testimony. The overall effect of expert testimony had a combined probability ofp=.0000084. This means that these combined results would occur by sampling bias alone less than one time out of 100,000. Expert testimony accounted for 3% of the variance in verdicts and 68% of the variance in the time jurors deliberated about eyewitness testimony. Several implications of these findings for psychologists investigating eyewitness identification and for the criminal justice system are discussed.I would like to thank James V. Devine, Judith P. Goggin, Elizabeth F. Loftus, and Gary L. Wells for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.     

Beliefs about secondary confession evidence: a survey of laypeople and defense attorneys

We surveyed students, community members, and defense attorneys regarding beliefs about secondary confession evidence (i.e. when a third party tells authorities that a person has confessed to him or her) from jailhouse informants and other sources. Results indicated that laypeople perceive secondary confessions as less credible than other types of evidence (e.g. forensics, DNA, eyewitness testimony), and they are knowledgeable about factors that may influence the veracity of secondary confessions, such as incentives or previous testimony. However, they underestimated or were uncertain about how persuasive secondary confessions would be to themselves or other jurors. Compared to laypeople, defense attorneys were more sensitive about issues affecting the reliability of secondary confessions.     

The impact of general versus specific expert testimonyand eyewitness confidence upon mock juror judgment

Subjects (n=128) initially viewed an eyewitness of high or low confidence. Subsequently, participants viewed a psychologist who gave either espert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification, specific expert testimony, or no expert (control) testimony. Subjects viewing expert testimony believed the eyewitness identified the gunman significantly less often, gave the defendant lower guilt ratings, estimated a lower general percentage of correct identifications under similar circumstances, estimated a lower percentage of general accurate eyewitness testimony, and gave significantly lower ratings to the belief that one can generally tell from eyewitness confidence whether an eyewitness is accurate than subjects in control conditions. Significant differences were also obtained between general and specific expert testimony. Participants viewing specific expert testimony estimated lower general percentages of correct identifications under the circumstances of the crime and reported relying more upon the psychologist's testimony than subjects viewing general expert testimony. Additionally, subjects viewing general expert testimony had significantly less confidence in their gunman vs. innocent person decision than subjects in specific testimony or control conditions. Subjects who viewed the high confidence eyewitness decided that the eyewitness correctly identified the gunman more often, gave the defendant higher guilt ratings, and estimated the general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony to be significantly higher than jurors in low eyewitness confidence groups. The finding that jurors may continue to rely on eyewitness confidence to gauge the accuracy of the witness even after viewing expert testimony is discussed.     

Effects of Experiencing the Eyewitness Identification Procedure on Juror Decisions

Mistaken eyewitness identifications are believed to contribute to a preponderance of wrongful convictions, underscoring the need to identify methods to help decrease the likelihood of false convictions based on eyewitness testimony. The present study tested the hypothesis that providing jurors with first-hand experience with eyewitness identification procedures could help further sensitize them to the limitations of eyewitness testimony. Eighty college students watched a videotaped mock trial in which the prosecution’s sole evidence was eyewitness testimony. In a 2 × 2 randomized factorial design, we manipulated whether participants heard expert psychological testimony (henceforth referred to as expert testimony) on the limitations of eyewitness identification and whether they experienced an eyewitness identification procedure. As predicted, experiencing the eyewitness identification procedure had a significant impact on juror decisions, suggesting that this procedure could further help reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions.     

Expert psychological testimony

Experimental psychologists increasingly are asked to give expert testimony in court, especially with regard to issues of eyewitness reliability. Whether or not experimental psychologists should give expert testimony on these matters is a controversial issue. The empirical literature suggests that potential jurors do not have a good understanding of the variables influencing eyewitness accuracy and that they cannot discriminate adequately between accurate and false eyewitness identification testimony. Experiments using expert testimony as a treatment variable, however, have not made a definitive case that expert testimony can benefit trial outcomes. The question of whether or not to give expert testimony must be broadened to consider not only the effects on verdicts but also the effects of expert testimony on the process by which verdicts are reached, the practices of police in subsequent investigations, the public's view of psychology, the practices of judges in subsequent cases, and the interaction between expert testimony and research activities.     

Two conjectures about the issue of expert testimony

This article responds to concerns about expert testimony in experimental psychology by conjectur that disagreements about the propriety of the testimony are camouflaged arguments about the strength of psychological knowledge. Differences between proponents and opponents of expert testimony are about the state of psychological knowledge and certainty, rather than about the proper standard for psychologists to use when deciding whether to testify. A second conjecture is stimulated by the assumption that laypersons generally overvalue eyewitness testimony and that expert psychological testimony is a required corrective. The truth of this assumption rests on the debatable assertions that eyewitness identifications, without more, are potent sole determinants of trial outcome, and that lay juries need instruction from experimental psychologists about aspects of human behavior of which the jurors are definitive producers and consumers. One need not resolve these debates in order to understand that psychologists should not rely on the legal community to set the psychologists' standards for expert testimony. And psychologists, in considering their role as courtroom experts, should guard against a self-serving critique of the acumen of lay juries.     

Courtroom testimony by psychologists on eyewitness identification issues

This article makes two major points in regard to expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. First, the attention devoted by psychologists to eyewitness identification issues is far out of proportion to the incidence of trials involving eyewitness identifications of criminal defendants; furthermore, the often-expressed concern over wrongful convictions is probably misplaced. Second, the experimental methods used in studies of eyewitness performance are fundamentally unsuited for drawing conclusions about actual witnesses. Hence, there is not an adequate scientific foundation for expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification. Archival research is perhaps the most promising approach to the study of the criminal justice system.     

The impact of differential information between lay participants and professional judges on deliberative decision-making

The authors investigate the effects of information differentials among judicial panel members on group decision-making. Professional judges are exposed to pre-trial information, including inadmissible evidence and testimony. Lay participants, on the other hand, are only allowed to view and evaluate evidence presented in trials, thereby forming a knowledge gap in regards to evidentiary information and materials. In order to examine the effect of these information gaps on deliberative processes and trial outcomes, a total of 24 civic participants were randomly assigned to three-person groups and deliberated on two fictitious criminal cases. The scenarios that the participants received prior to deliberation varied in the amount of information given. The deliberations were both video-recorded and transcribed. Analysis of the deliberations showed that both shared knowledge among members and unshared knowledge held by the member to whom had been given more information appeared more salient during the deliberative process.Our study suggests that lay participants may be at a disadvantage during deliberation not only because of their lower social influence but also due to their lack of evidentiary information for a given trial.     

Comparing the effectiveness of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Henderson</Emphasis> instructions and expert testimony: Which safeguard improves jurors’ evaluations of eyewitness evidence?

Objectives

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently determined that jurors may not be able to effectively evaluate eyewitness evidence on their own. As a result, the Court proposed the use of judicial instructions to assist jurors (called Henderson instructions) and suggested the implementation of these instructions would reduce the need for expert testimony. We tested the efficacy of these instructions compared to alternative instructions and expert testimony.

Methods

We utilized a mock trial paradigm, randomly assigning 452 participants to 1 of 20 videotaped trial conditions that varied the quality of eyewitness evidence (both witnessing and identification conditions) and the type of safeguard presented during the mock trial.

Results

Jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions on their own. Jurors were more likely to convict when identification conditions were good and less likely when identification conditions were poor. This relationship was mediated by eyewitness credibility ratings. Expert testimony resulted in skepticism by reducing the likelihood that jurors would convict regardless of the quality of witnessing and identification conditions. No variation of the instructions influenced verdicts.

Conclusions

While jurors were sensitive to the quality of identification conditions on their own, we observed no such effect for the quality of witnessing conditions, even with the aid of instructions and/or expert testimony. Both Henderson instructions and expert testimony may be insufficient for assisting jurors to effectively evaluate problematic witnessing conditions. Future research should examine the use of alternative safeguards.

     

Citizens’ knowledge and perceptions of legislatures in Canada,Britain and the United States

This study has two major parts. The first uses survey data to reveal what citizens in Britain, Canada and the United States know about their national legislatures and what factors ‐ including cognitive ability, opportunity, motivation and media exposure ‐ affect that knowledge. We find that US citizens are the least knowledgeable. The second part of the study looks at whether the level of knowledge in each country has any importance for understanding levels of public support for the national legislature. In the United States, the more knowledgeable citizens are less likely to support Congress, in sharp contrast to the tendency of knowledgeable Canadian citizens to be more supportive of their parliament. Knowledge is not a significant predictor of support in the British model. Some implications of the findings are discussed.     

US police officers’ knowledge regarding behaviors indicative of deception: Implications for eradicating erroneous beliefs through training

Abstract

The current study surveyed a random sample of Texas law enforcement officers (n?=?109) about their knowledge regarding behaviors indicative of deception. The officers were not highly knowledgeable about this topic, overall performing at a chance level in assessing how various behavioral cues relate to deception. Confidence in one's skill was unrelated to accuracy, and officers who reported receiving the most training and utilizing these skills more often were more confident but no more accurate in their knowledge of the behaviors that typically betray deception. The authors compare these results to previous studies that have examined officers’ beliefs in other countries and discuss the implication of these results in terms of developing future training programs that may debunk the common misconceptions that officers possess.     

Influences of accent and ethnic background on perceptions of eyewitness testimony

Abstract

The purpose of the present work was to investigate the effect two eyewitness factors, accent and ethnic background, have on the perceived favorability of eyewitness testimony and case disposition in criminal trials. Six variations of testimony were created and videotaped. The videotapes varied by accent and ethnic background of the eyewitness; the testimony text was identical. Four eyewitness favorability variables, (a) credibility, (b) judgment of accuracy, (c) deceptiveness, and (d) prestige, as well as their relationship to case disposition, were measured. One hundred and seventy-four undergraduate participants viewed one of the six videotapes. Results indicate that there was a significant main effect of accent for the four eyewitness favorability variables. Accent by ethnic background interactions also yielded significant findings for the four variables as well as for the defendant's degree of guilt. Results were interpreted using the Elaboration Likelihood Model. The potential importance of these results for judicial settings is discussed.     

Opinions of attorneys and law enforcement personnel on the accuracy of eyewitnes identifications

A survey was conducted to obtain the opinions of attorneys and law enforcement personnel regarding several important aspects of eyewitness evidence: (1) legal procedures concerning eyewitness evidence; (2) estimated frequency of mistaken eyewitness identification; (3) the effects of certain witness/ suspect characteristics on identification accuracy; (4) the amount of emphasis placed on eyewitness evidence by judges and juries; (5) the relationship between a witness' identification accuracy and certainty; and (6) the effect of stress and arousal on identification accuracy. The questionnaire was sent to a sample of defense and prosecuting attorneys in each of Florida's 20 Judicial Circuits, to each of the 67 county Sheriff's Departments in Florida, and to 100 randomly sampled Police Departments in Florida. Prosecuting attorneys and law enforcement officers indicated that they regard eyewitness identification as relatively accurate and that judges and juries appropriately emphasize its importance. Defense attorneys, on the other hand, felt that eyewitness identifications are often inaccurate and are overemphasized by triers of fact. The implications of these findings for the criminal justice system and their possible applications within the legal system are discussed.     

Citizen's psychological knowledge,legal knowledge,and attitudes toward participation in the new Japanese legal system,saiban-in seido

A new procedure, saiban-in seido, was introduced in the Japanese criminal court in 2009.1 1. This article was written before the Saiban-in seido started. A mixed tribunal of three professional judges and six lay people selected from a list of voters deliberate the verdict in serious criminal cases such as murder, rape, and arson. This study researched lay people's attitudes toward the new system, their psychological knowledge (e.g. the reliability of eyewitness testimony) and legal knowledge (e.g. ‘presumed innocent’), and the relationship between attitude and knowledge. Study 1 examined the responses of 294 citizens to a questionnaire; 90 responses were examined in Study 2 (both samples consisted of two age groups, i.e. (1) 20s and (2) 40s and 50s, and two education levels, i.e. (1) college or below and (2) university or more. In both studies, respondents showed concerns about their lack of ability and knowledge to become a lay judge. Although legal knowledge was related to attitude – i.e. the more legal knowledge, the less negativity – no relationship was found between psychological knowledge and attitude. Relevant support for citizens to become lay judges was discussed.     

Lineup Administrators' Expectations: Their Impact on Eyewitness Confidence

This research focuses on how lineup a administrators influence eyewitnesses' postidentification confidence. What happens to witness confidence when a witness makes an identification that confirms the lineup administrator's expectations; what happens when this expectation is not confirmed? In Experiment 1, participant interviewers (n = 52) administered target-absent photo lineups to participant witnesses (n = 52). The interviewers did not view the simulated crime, but were told the thief's position in the lineup. In every instance this information was false (we used a target-absent lineup). A one-way ANOVA revealed that eyewitness identification confidence was malleable as a function of interviewers' beliefs about the thief's identity. In Experiment 2, participant jurors (n = 80) viewed 40 testimonies of Experiment 1 witnesses (2 participants viewed each testimony). Participant jurors judged all participant witnesses as equally credible despite their varying levels of postidentification confidence.

     

Expert testimony about eyewitness identification

Recent research concerning eyewitness identification is surveyed with respect to its adequacy (reliability and validity) to support expert testimony. The conclusion is that the scientific basis is generally inadequate and that the more we have learned about various aspects of eyewitness identification, the most inadequate it appears. The argument is made that presentation in policy settings requires greater circumspection than would be required in presentation to scientific audiences. Prudential rules are suggested. They would have the effect of sharply reducing participation in the adversarial system.     

Women judges who judge women offenders: a Chinese case study on gender and judging

ABSTRACT

Based on an empirical study, this article examines Chinese female judges’ life experiences and worldviews by asking: are women judges feminist or pro-feminism? Given the very nature of feminism, if a large number of women judges are feminist or pro-feminism, they are likely to bring attention to women’s issues in the judiciary and the judicial process. If so, women’s equal participation in courts would make a vital difference in law and judicial production. The article first provides the context of the research on which this article is based. Next, it briefly outlines several key methodological issues. Then, it presents findings on female judges’ perceptions of women’s gender roles, their views about female offending and their awareness of feminism. Finally, it highlights the evidence presented and offers implications of the research.