The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.     

伊拉克战争与美国的大战略失误

美国发动对伊战争有着长远的战略考虑,但伊拉克战争本身在目标和手段上都无助于实现或推进美国在“9.11”事件后所确立的大战略目标。美国在伊拉克战争期间的大战略失误,突出地表现为大战略目标与单个军事行动目标之间的模糊和抵触,大战略目标与手段之间严重失衡。长远地看,如果美国偏重于单边主义和军事力量,其巩固“单极”世界的图谋会遇到更大的国际障碍。     

美国对伊拉克动武的强势与弱势

3月 2 0日 ,伊拉克战争爆发。美国对伊动武有其强势的一面 :强大的军事力量 ,有利的地缘政治因素 ,凭借阿富汗反恐战争胜利的余威 ,伊拉克实力大大削弱 ,萨达姆在国际社会缺少支持。同时 ,美国对伊动武也有其弱势的一面 :理由不充足 ,指控缺少说服力 ;冲击国家主权原则 ,缺少合法性 ;美国的单边主义受到多极化的掣肘 ,西方大国间存在着深刻裂痕 ;战争受到多数穆斯林国家反对 ,加剧了穆斯林世界的反美情绪 ;战争违背历史潮流 ,违背世界人民的和平愿望     

从美国例外论的视角看美国对伊战争

本文以作用于美国外交的美国例外论为出发点,首先阐明这一政治文化传统的基本内涵,通过个案研究的方法,结合最新形势,分析它对美国发动伊拉克战争决策所产生的影响,并对美国外交今后的走向进行了初步的预测.     

伊拉克战争解读

伊拉克战争是一场有着巨大争议的战争,国际社会的反对与美国国内很高的支持率形成了鲜明的对照。反战者与战争发动者都有着无可争议的理由,但他们的理由又都不是压倒一切的。伊拉克战争不是一场偶然的战争,它是国际社会基本矛盾不可调和的产物。     

Re-negotiating the Just War: The Invasion of Iraq and Punitive War

This article examines the arguments pertaining to punitive war presented by President George W Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair and various just war theorists, in order to examine how they relate, first, to the case made for war against Iraq in 2003 and, second, to the classical just war tradition. In highlighting the confluence between contemporary justificatory rhetoric and the classical just war tradition, this article sketches an account of the mode by which the tradition has developed over time. By drawing attention to the homologies linking just war arguments, classical and contemporary, it constructs a basis for a critical perspective: understanding the idea of punishment as it has figured historically in just war tradition past may enable us to gain a degree of critical purchase on how it figures in just war tradition present.     

Using Process Tracing to Improve Policy Making: The (Negative) Case of the 2003 Intervention in Iraq

This article argues that applying the Bayesian logic of process tracing can improve intelligence estimates, appraisals of alternative policy options, and reassessments of whether policies are working as planned. It illustrates these points by demonstrating how more systematic use of this logic could have improved each of these three elements of policymaking regarding the 2003 US military intervention in Iraq.     

Foreign Policy Making Under Koizumi: Norms and Japan's Role in the 2003 Iraq War

Japan's policy toward the 2003 Iraq War is a test of the constructivist argument about the weight of norms as opposed to material systemic factors in foreign policy making. Constructions of external threats and interests were contested between a largely realist-minded elite around prime minister Koizumi bent on Japan's remilitarization and those still holding to antimilitarist norms. This contest is traced in an analysis of the policy-making process, including the role of bureaucratic and political institutions, the opposition parties and the public. Indicative of the power of norms, Koizumi was forced to compromise his ambition to use the Iraq crisis to help make Japan a normal great power.     

The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War

Why did the Bush administration take the United States to war with Iraq in the aftermath of September 11, 2001? The constructivist approach used in this article to answer this question argues that the ideas of a handful of policy intellectuals affected political outcomes in remarkably consequential ways. These ideas shaped administration assessments of every major aspect of the Iraq war, beginning with its necessity and justification. Although the administration's ideational commitments were complex and evolving, four sets of ideas were central to its risk-filled gambit in the Middle East: a belief in the necessity and benevolence of American hegemony, a Manichaean conception of politics, a conviction that regime type is the principal determinant of foreign policy, and great confidence in the efficacy of military force. Taken together, these ideas defined the social purpose of American power, framed threats to the United States, and determined appropriate solutions to core problems. Ideas are not the sole factors setting the course of u.s. foreign policy, but they are essential to explaining an otherwise puzzling administration decision.     

伊拉克战争对国际关系的影响

推翻萨达姆政权并控制伊拉克和中东的石油资源,扫除在美国实现其独霸世界目标道路上的障碍,是美国发动伊拉克战争的主要原因。美对伊战争的胜利将使美国的霸权地位得到进一步巩固和提高,对未来世界格局的走向产生深远的影响。     

Realpolitik or Imperial Hubris: The Latin American Drug War and U.S. Foreign Policy in Iraq

Robert Kaplan has suggested that America employ elsewhere the same “stealth imperialism” tactics as are being used to combat drugs and guerrillas in Colombia. In fact, decades of U.S. efforts there have achieved little. The real lessons to be learned from Colombia are the perils of relying on flawed assumptions about the threat presented; the difficulties of creating and training a military capable of achieving U.S. objectives; and the risk of mistaking symbols, signals, and credibility for core U.S. interests. Moreover, in both regions, policymakers often fail to understand the fundamental sources of the conflict, particularly class, ethnicity, and nationalism. They incorrectly believe that U.S. policy has nothing to do with the continuation of the conflict and presume U.S. omnipotence.     

The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists

The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of both the debate over the war in Iraq and its implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy by examining the relationship between neoconservatism and realism. The article begins by establishing the connection between the tenets of neoconservatism and the arguments for war against Iraq. The primary focus is on the neoconservative Bush Doctrine that served as the primary justification for the Iraq War. Next, we turn to the arguments that realists put forth in their attempt to steer America away from the road to war. The realists, however, proved to be unsuccessful in their attempt to prevent war and in the final section we address the central question of the article; why did realism fail in the debate over Iraq?     

The Iraq War and International Relations: Implications for Small States

The Iraq War exposes the new shape of world politics. It discredits the idea of a benign hegemon defending world order, content to be an ‘offshore balancer’, exercising its power through multinational institutions and constrained by mutually agreed rules. Rather, the hegemon, facing few external constraints in a unipolar world, is driven by the particularistic interests of its ruling group, in the pursuit of informal empire wherein military force is used to impose client regimes and economic subordination. The impotence of both a realist power balance and of liberal institutions to restrain it calls into question the main bases of global order, leaving imperial overreach as the main limitation on hegemonic power. Small states may be able to adapt to, even temporarily profit from, bandwagoning with the hegemon, but it is they that are potentially most threatened when a hegemonic power undermines the international constraints on the use of power.     

“打伊”战争对美国和世界经济影响的一组数据

表1:美对伊战争的成本评估(按2的2年价格计算)开支类别1991年海湾战争2(X)3年对伊战争A(卷入25万美士兵) 单位:亿美元 2003年对伊战争B(卷入12.5万美士兵) 661 13一134146一24179we一1277Oweto-101飞l‘f0气飞l6︸r︶21)仅卫乞015611,︸弓JI‘‘空运和海上补给人员支持行动支持和燃料投资其他总计①总计②483一598751一930476一613注:①排除利息支出。②含10年利息支出。资料来源:美国众议院预算委员会“伊战成本评估”报告。表2:美对伊战争未来ro年的成本估计单位:亿美元成本构成 低成本(短期、有利的情况下) 高成本(拖延、不利的情况下…     

Analysis: The effects of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey

This article examines the potential repercussions of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. An introduction to the Kurdish problem and its securitisation in Turkey precedes an analysis of the Gulf War's impact on Turkey's policies towards the Kurds—in both Turkey and Iraq. The article briefly documents the struggle between the EU's pressures on Turkey after 1999 to improve Kurdish rights and the state's reluctance to implement reforms. Impacting reforms is the heightened sense of insecurity in Turkey after the Iraq War and the perceived threat of greater autonomy for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. In response, Turkey has identified the Turkmen minority as a key strategic concern. None the less, increasingly the ruling Justice and Development Party's attitude towards Iraqi Kurdish groups indicates the evolution of a more pragmatic approach. In conclusion, two possible options emerge: the continued desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey or its re-securitisation.     

Anatomy of Failure: Bush's Decision-Making Process and the Iraq War

The Bush administration's decision-making process leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been singled out for its many shortcomings: failure of intelligence; lack of debate concerning options; an insufficient invading force; and poor postwar planning. Contrary to the administration's claim that no one foresaw the difficulties of waging a war in Iraq, many concerns about the challenges the United States would face were raised inside and outside of government. Yet, none of this information had a significant effect on the decision-making process. This paper develops a decision-making model that integrates elements from the individual to the organizational level and explains how important information was marginalized, leading to a poor policy outcome. The model illustrates how the combined effects of the president's formal management style, anticipatory compliance on the part of key players, bureaucratic politics, and the intervening variable of the 9/11 terrorist attacks contributed to a defective decision-making process.     

Power and Rhetorical Bargaining: The UN Security Council Debate on the Iraq War

The UN Security Council (UNSC) was an important arena of confrontation between the major powers during the recent pre-war crisis on Iraq, yet the realist-materialist focus of IR theory does not provide a useful perspective for analysing the debate and the ensuing defeat of American interests. This paper seeks to establish the meaning of “power” within a rhetorical context, applying insights from Searle's theory of institutional facts, constructivism, and self-presentation theory. Rhetorical strategies are then examined empirically by means of thematic and structural analyses of key texts from the UNSC debate on Iraq.     

Alliance Behaviour,the Absentee Liberator and the Influence of Soft Power: Post-communist State Positions over the Iraq War in 2003

Thirteen post-communist governments gave diplomatic support to the Anglo-American position on Iraq in 2003; many also gave military assistance to the war itself and most contributed to post-war operations. However ‘small states’ may be defined, none of these 13 actors can be considered a major power in international relations. This article assesses the reasons for their support of the United States. It first considers what material gains they expected and gained, and applies their support of the US against expectations of alliance behaviour. It then contrasts the behaviour of those Central and East European states with that of Belarus and of Serbia. The article then argues that an important explanation for post-communist state behaviour over Iraq comes from an expression of existential values that can be understood through the notion of ‘soft power’.