中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析

中美两国安全关系在两国总体关系中扮演着重要的角色,研究中美之间的战略稳定关系,对于维护两国安全关系的稳定具有重要意义。中国的核威慑实力弱于美国,中美之间呈现出不同于传统战略稳定关系的不对称核稳定态势。中国对美国存在一定的核威慑能力,但有效性仍有差距和不足。这一差距容易使美国产生压制和削弱中国核报复能力的机会主义思想。实施限制损伤战略、发展导弹防御能力、进行战略反潜是美国对中国实施战略机会主义的主要行动。美国谋求削弱中国核报复能力、打破中美不对称核稳定的企图,与中国努力维持核威慑能力、维持中美不对称核稳定的行为形成了两股力量相持的态势。中国应重点提升核武器的质量,提高威慑信号的传递效能,以可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力打消美国战略机会主义心态,维持两国间的战略稳定,特别是危机稳定性,筑牢遏制战争爆发的基础。     

On Extended Nuclear Deterrence

This analysis discusses the central challenges that countries face when they practice extended nuclear deterrence. One key problem has to do with credibility: potential aggressors may not believe that a country would fight to defend an ally, particularly if doing so risks a nuclear attack against its homeland. Countries might be able to address this issue by forging formal alliances with protégés or by stationing nuclear forces on the protégé’s territory. Do these measures discourage third-party aggression? Defence pacts involving nuclear-armed states effectively bolster extended deterrence. One risk of extending nuclear protection from the American perspective, however, is that it might pull the United States into unwanted wars by risk-acceptant protégés. Yet, in a nuclear context, the risk of alliance entrapment is generally overblown. Placing nuclear weapons on an ally’s territory does much less to bolster extended deterrence than one might initially think. Although foreign nuclear deployments may reassure allies and promote non-proliferation to some degree, their value for extended deterrence is fairly minimal. The United States continues to deploy nuclear weapons in five European countries, but the case for maintaining these deployments is decidedly weak.     

Geopolitics of Nuclear Hypertrophy. America,the Bomb and the Temptation of Nuclear Primacy

The United States’ grand strategy has consistently been marked by a distinct tendency toward nuclear hypertrophy. Especially the inherent difficulties in extending deterrence to its allies and friends, compounded by the geopolitical characteristics of the US as an unassailable ‘insular’ fortress off Eurasia, have generated, rather paradoxically, a strong incentive for Washington to pursue a wide margin of nuclear superiority, if not nuclear primacy. This has implied, in turn, the deployment of redundant arsenals, robust counterforce capabilities and even a ballistic missile defence. Significantly, not even the Obama administration, though solemnly committed to nuclear disarmament, abstained from embracing a very ambitious modernisation program of American nuclear forces.     

China, Nuclear Security and Terrorism: Implications for the United States

This article outlines Chinese strategic nuclear forces and the Chinese philosophical approach to nuclear security. It then focuses on the domestic conditions in China which could precipitate vulnerabilities to its nuclear forces. From information about internal security conditions in China, specific internal threats to Chinese nuclear security will be derived. Based on these threats, several outsider and insider scenarios will be outlined involving a variety of terrorist or terrorist related behaviors. These notional scenarios will include everything from overrun or attack, to diversion, to cyber terrorism, to sabotage. The article will then cover what these scenarios and the possible Chinese reaction to them may mean for the security, military and diplomatic strategies of the United States.     

Quantum Sensing's Potential Impacts on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare

This article examines the impact of quantum sensing on strategic deterrence and modern warfare. It has two related objectives. The first is to highlight quantum sensing as an important area of research for the policy communities considering the role of emerging technologies on strategic deterrence and countering weapons of mass destruction. The second aim is to present the potential warfighting implications of quantum sensing if employed by either the United States or its adversaries. While quantum sensing technologies offer opportunities to transform modern warfare, they also present challenges and risks. The article contends that the quantum sensing investment, research, and development should be prioritized within the Department of Defense's quantum science modernization agenda to ensure that the U.S. military does not cede technological advantage to competitors, such as the People's Republic of China, who are actively investing in quantum sensing applications that could upend the United States’ existing deterrence and warfighting capabilities.     

Russian Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: What to Know and What to Fear

Recent news of hypersonic tests in both Russia and China stoke fears of a technological gap for the United States. However, a sober analysis of the state of hypersonic technology raises doubts of its capabilities, or usefulness in military operations. Instead, overassessment of hypersonics gives them their strategic value: political leverage. A nuclear-tipped hypersonic might not actually tilt the balance of deterrence at all but would nonetheless require a complex arms control negotiation between the United States, Russia, and China. A conventional hypersonic would have to overcome serious technical barriers to even match current precision weapon systems, but not fulling knowing the system’s capabilities means the United States must treat it as a credible threat. Without a careful measure of the technology, policymakers risk diplomatic missteps, budgetary waste, and an escalatory miscalculation.     

Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation

Nuclear weapons' defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. Sooner or later, however, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish; but if they are right, it is exploitative. Like big cars and cheap flights, nuclear deterrence benefits us at the expense of future generations. States that do not already have the bomb should not get it. Britain and France should consider disarmament, while Russia and the United States should slash their arsenals. Minimum deterrence should be equally stable, but most nuclear optimists, being neorealists who hold that war will continue, should want deep cuts even if it is not.     

Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy

International relations theory has difficulty explaining how similar policies produce different outcomes. Iraq and North Korea have been identified as members of the "axis of evil" with weapons of mass destruction programs that threaten the United States. Yet in late 2002, the United States prepared to attack Iraq whereas it chose to negotiate with North Korea, even after North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear program in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with the United States. Moreover, a direct comparison with Iraq shows North Korea to possess the greater material capability to threaten the United States. I argue that a language-based constructivist approach can explain these differences in U.S. foreign policy where other theoretical approaches cannot. By examining the U.S. entanglement in intersected language games—the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea and the enforcement of United Nations Resolutions in Iraq—it becomes possible to show how the United States could construct North Korea's nuclear program as a manageable threat that could be dealt with diplomatically.     

俄罗斯与美国反恐战略之比较

在当今世界,俄罗斯和美国是遭受恐怖主义威胁最为严重的两个大国,反恐战略在俄罗斯和美国国家安全战略中都是不可或缺的组成部分。俄美两国在反恐战略的形成、恐怖主义威胁判断、反恐目标、军事反恐战略实践和国际反恐合作等方面有相同之处,也存在显著差别。随着俄美领导人的更换,两国反恐战略都在调整,并且选择了不同的战略取向。反恐是俄美两国合作的重要领域,但俄美反恐战略的分歧可能导致双方之间爆发摩擦乃至冲突。     

Weapons of mass disruption and terrorism

New perceptions of weaponry have developed in some counter‐terrorism circles, based on the concept of Weapons of Mass Disruption which target bonds and relationships, rather than things, at the systemic level. These capabilities are derived, in many instances, from advanced (cyber) forms of weapons which could eventually be employed by terrorists against the United States.     

Material forces and the force of ideas: Interview with Robert Gilpin

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is an innovative, multi-pronged action aimed at enhancing the domestic capacities of a state, as well as its ability to interconnect internationally and to deal with the risk of a terrorist attack involving nuclear or radioactive materials. The GICNT, a joint US-Russian initiative, has now evolved into an informal network of over 70 countries. It pursues an objective of boosting the protection, detection, prosecution and response capabilities of a state by fostering cooperation on three levels: between a government and its agencies; between government and the private sector; and between like-minded states. Given its comprehensive approach to the nuclear terrorism threat, the initiative has great potential. Nevertheless, structural flaws such as the absence of any evaluation mechanism and the exclusion of military-related nuclear materials and sites are likely to make its impact far less global than expected.     

Nuclear Terrorism Redux: Conventionalists, Skeptics, and the Margin of Safety

The casual media observer might well believe that nuclear terrorism is highly likely in the United States and it is a question of “when, not if.” This is the view of the “conventionalists.” But there is a second school, the “skeptics,” that believes the nuclear world is more secure than at any time in history and that the possibility of a nuclear terrorist event is overstated. This article articulates arguments made by these two schools of thought and develops a framework for analyzing the issue. It concludes that while enhanced national and international vigilance against nuclear terrorism is necessary, when viewed through an historical lens, today's margin of nuclear safety may actually be higher than in the past.     

《中导条约》与全球战略稳定论析

《中导条约》是冷战期间美苏达成的一项重要军控条约,是全球战略稳定的支柱之一。2019年8月,美俄相继退约,引发国际社会极大关注。人们担心,条约退场将冲击全球战略稳定,刺激军备竞赛,影响欧亚安全形势,削弱国际军控体系。中国是美国退约重要借口之一,条约作废势必深刻影响中国外部安全环境。《中导条约》从诞生、发展到消亡,有着深刻的国际、国内和个人三个层面的演变动因,归根结底起决定性作用的是国际格局变迁。20世纪80年代,苏美攻守异势促成了《中导条约》的诞生;进入21世纪后,北约对俄的挤压以及中导技术扩散促使俄罗斯抛出条约全球化倡议;近年来,美国霸权地位相对衰落促其选择退约。但美俄两国政治形势变化及领导人更迭也深刻影响了条约的“生、住、变、灭”的时机和方式。戈尔巴乔夫的“新思维”改革与当时高涨的核裁军运动为签署《中导条约》提供了特殊的政治、社会背景。特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”理念,频频废约“退群”,《中导条约》随之沦为牺牲品。在不同历史时期,陆基中导在全球战略稳定中所起的作用不同。在20世纪60年代初,它是美苏中央威慑的支柱。在20世纪70~80年代,它是影响延伸威慑的重要因素。进入21世纪后,它成为俄罗斯对付美国导弹防御的斗争手段。当前,陆基中导在跨域威慑中扮演日益重要的角色。大国中导博弈正卷土重来,但它必将带有与以往不同的诸多新特点。     

The literal truth about terrorism: an analysis of post-9/11 popular US non-fiction books on terrorism

More books with the word ‘terrorism’ in the title have been published in the twenty-first century than the combined total of all such books prior to that. Over half of these were on the subject of ‘Islamic terrorism’. The sheer volume of such texts, without even taking into consideration their contents, contributed to rendering as ‘true’, the existence of the phenomenon they publicised. Such an increase in the literature on the subject of Islamic terrorism was made possible by an overall relaxation of usually strict enunciative rules and regulations governing discursive production. This article explores the effects of the loosening of the latter controls through an analysis of popular non-fiction books published on the subject of terrorism in the United States in the early years of the ‘war on terror’ and the authors of these books, as the existence of these texts – never mind their influence – has been ignored by terrorism scholars to date.     

Restoring Deterrence

While the strategy of deterrence has faced considerable criticism since September 11, it needs to be reexamined. This article addresses serious challenges to the deterrence strategy. It also considers the deterrence strategy as it relates to states such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran and others. Ultimately, it argues that deterrence is a security policy offering a way forward for the United States that is not only more effective because more tailored, but is also more moral than its alternatives.     

Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel

This article argues that Israel experiences a unique perception of the perils of anarchy that drives it to a strategic preference for disproportionately offensive action against rivals and enemies. Actions taken pursuant to that doctrine have caused serious inconvenience to U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast for over four decades. This article argues that by reassuring Israel, both diplomatically and with arms sales, that the United States is committed to its survival, the United States has obtained significant measures of strategic restraint on Israel's part. That restraint has brought significant benefit to the United States as it seeks to guarantee regular access to the vital resources of the Middle East. This article provides examples of both successful reassurance and reassurance denied to illustrate the argument that U.S. support produces tangible strategic benefits for the United States.     

After One Hundred Years of Service: Hegemony,Pan-Americanism,and the Monroe Doctrine Centennial Anniversary, 1923

ABSTRACT

In 1923, the United States celebrated the centennial anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine. Overlooked by historians, the centennial served as more than an isolated moment of memorialisation; this analysis investigates the ways in which it shaped and reflected domestic perceptions of the place of the United States in the world during the early 1920s. The various celebratory events that took place across the nation re-enforced the discordant nature of United States national security by emphasising and exacerbating the doctrine’s disputed meaning. By providing a forum in which it could be scrutinised, the centennial emphasised the policy’s fractured meaning and demonstrated that both regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and Pan-Americanism were perceived as core values of United States national security that emanated from the doctrine’s enunciation in 1823.     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

“There’s only three things he mentions in a sentence – a noun,a verb and 9/11”: terrorism,fear and the after,after 9/11

In the years since 11 September 2001, pundits, politicians and scholars of terrorism and international relations routinely have declared that 9/11 “changed everything”. This article explores not only how those decisions transformed the United States and the global response to terrorism, but also how both the decisions and response sustained a sense of fear. Further, they made possible, to paraphrase then candidate Joseph Biden’s critique of former New York Mayor Rudy Guiliani, the framing of so much of the global political debate about terrorism, and national security references as simply 9/11 accompanied by a noun and a verb. Finally, the article examines the consequences of this framing for not only our understanding of terrorism, but also our understanding of terrorism and violence within the current global system.     

Extremist Groups in Egypt

On 11 September, terrorism became a much greater reality for Americans and much of the rest of the world. Indeed, that date marks the beginning of a new era for the global community, an era that may be called the Violent New World Order, or the Age of Fear. Since the events of 11 September, the United States has been working to build a coalition against terrorism consisting of countries throughout the world. More recently, the United States launched attacks on positions inside Afghanistan in order to wipe out Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization and assisted the Northern Alliance in the overthrow of the Taliban government that had protected al-Qaeda. Given the military prowess of the United States and its allies, these acts have largely achieved their short-term goals. Over the long term, however, the United States, its allies, those countries that have been breeding grounds for terrorist organizations and those whose citizens sympathize with terrorist organizations need to look deeper at the causes of terrorism. On the surface, the religious zeal associated with the most prolific terrorist organizations appears to be something with which the United States and its allies cannot negotiate. The frustrations that drive people to acts of terror, however, are often rooted in adverse socio-economic conditions as well as cultural and political tensions that need to be addressed by underdeveloped nations and the larger international community. Since the deserts of Egypt gave birth to the rise of the first Islamic militant organizations, the Egyptian experience provides a perspective.