The Soldier, The State, and The Clash of Civilizations: The Legacy of Samuel Huntington

The major military challenge that the United States faces today is the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. military is engaged in a grueling counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist movement known as the Taliban, which is based among Pashtun tribes in Southeastern Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan, who have never been permanently subdued by a foreign military force. This challenge comes in the wake of that other grueling counterinsurgency war that the U.S. military has had to conduct in Iraq, where its chief adversary was the Islamist movement known as al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Moreover, the challenge in Afghanistan comes on what could be the eve of an impending military challenge, perhaps even a war, with Iran, as that Islamist state relentlessly moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons. In its entire history of two- and-a-quarter centuries, the United States has never been engaged in an unbroken succession of three wars, in three different countries. Together, the U.S. wars with or within Islamist countries add up to what is a “long war,” indeed.     

How Many Lives Do the Taliban Have?

After having participated in the civil war and later ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, the current Taliban have a third life as insurgents against the Afghan government and its foreign supporters. Their aim is to return to power and establish an Islamic system. Pakistani shelter and support, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist tactics allowed the Neo-Taliban to extend their influence, particularly to the south and east of Afghanistan. They used the weakness of the Hamid Karzai regime to set up shadow governments. Since even the coalition forces have abandoned the aim of defeating them, the Taliban are guaranteed survival after foreign combat troops leave Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Due to the different interests of the main stakeholders—the Afghan government, the Taliban, the United States, and Pakistan—it is unlikely that the conflict will end by negotiations any time soon. Thus, the civil war will continue. When the Taliban try to extend their reach beyond rural areas and into non-Pashtun districts, they will meet tough resistance. Therefore, it is likely that the fragmentation of Afghanistan will persist and that the Taliban will not return as rulers of a united Afghanistan.     

Communication Breakdown: Strategic Communications and Defeat in Afghanistan

The author reflects on our decade long conflict in Afghanistan and identifies what he considers a main contributor to the malaise. He believes it is a failure to communicate: a message of purpose which answers the oft-asked “why are we there?” question amongst Western audiences; a message of resolve on which Afghans can bet their lives that ISAF will remain there until the Taliban is beaten or compelled to reasonable compromise; and, a message of what success will look like which is accompanied by a compelling rationalization of the cost.     

Former combatant reintegration and fragmentation in contemporary Afghanistan

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process in Afghanistan, widely acknowledged as flawed, has contributed to fragmentation and insecurity within Afghanistan. Based upon discussions with more than 500 DDR programme beneficiaries, the article describes the manner in which the reintegration process increased former combatants' and commanders' vulnerability to remobilisation in support of or in opposition to the Taliban-led insurgency by weakening cohesion between combatants and their former commanders and by fostering ineffective and culturally inappropriate livelihoods. The author argues that the DDR process and other international and Afghan government interventions have, furthermore, contributed to the fragmentation of the country and the straining of internal, regional tensions. The Taliban, as well as those fighting under its banner, has been the primary beneficiary of this fragmentation and has consolidated a highly diverse coalition of fighters. The opposing trends of a fragmented social, economic and political context—in relation to both individual former combatants and the country as a whole—and an increasingly cohesive insurgency will continue to contribute to greater insecurity and the potential for intra-state conflict.     

Parallels with the Past - How the Soviets Lost in Afghanistan, How the Americans are Losing

This article assesses seven startling and unsettling similarities between Soviet strategies and tactics in Afghanistan during their Afghan war of 1979-1989 and American coalition strategies and tactics in Afghanistan since October 2001. It concludes with the implications of this dynamic. In particular, the similarities between Soviet and U.S. approaches to Afghanistan that focus on key population centers, reconciliation/reintegration, and the development of “Afghan” solutions to a variety of security concerns are extremely disturbing and, we believe, should be the focus of national attention and debate.     

阿富汗大变局:地缘政治和安全格局的演变

当前,阿富汗正在经历重大变局.阿富汗塔利班(阿塔)成功卷土重来,并且完成临时政府组建.尽管仍有多重挑战,但阿塔执政已不存在根本性威胁.这引发阿富汗地缘政治格局和地区安全形势的深度调整.在地缘政治格局方面,整体呈现"美国西方影响力下降,地区国家影响力上升"这一"东升西降"趋势.美国正在从"局内人"变为"局外人",但仍将发...     

Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment’

With the end of the Cold War, the subsequent global war on terror, the global economic recession, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one would think that the United States would have formulated a grand strategy for dealing with these problems. This, however, is not the case. This article advances a grand strategy of “restrainment,” as a guiding concept for our approach to international politics. It builds from the principle that U.S. policy must seek to restrain—individually and collectively—those forces, ideas, and movements in international politics that create instability, crises, and war.     

War on terror. Islam and the imperative of democracy

The war on terror, which began with the horrific terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the Pentagon in the United States (US) on 11 September 2001, has now entered its second year. Much has been happening since. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a regime believed to have harboured Al-Qaeda, is now gone. The terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden is believed to have been disrupted and weakened. The despotic regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, believed by the US as a regime that supported terrorism and posed a threat to international security, has been toppled, and the country is now under American occupation. Despite such significant developments, however, a clear fact remains: terrorism has not been defeated, and in fact, is increasingly more dangerous and more active in perpetrating horrendous terrorist acts against humanity. As long as the world remains threatened by terrorism and terrorists, it seems that the war on terror will still go on indefinitely.¶This paper provides a reflection on the world since the war against terror initiated by the US, the predicaments of Southeast Asian Muslims in such a war on terror, and the imperative of democracy as an important element in a long-term strategy to counter terrorism.     

论奥巴马政府的“阿富巴”战略困局

奥巴马在阿富汗战争问题上继承了布什的失误，将不具有连续性的恐怖主义和具有连续性的战争混为一谈，采取增兵阿富汗的方针，战争造成的死伤人数激增，美国已有半数以上的人反对这场战争。奥巴马又将战争扩大到巴基斯坦，遭到塔利班的疯狂报复，恐怖主义袭击遍及巴基斯坦各大城市，巴基斯坦形势恶化。在阿富汗启动和平进程，解决美国和北约撤军问题，成立联合政府，恢复阿富汗的和平与稳定，在巴基斯坦实现停战，是值得探索的出路。     

Diplomacy of Estrangement: The Dealings of the United States with Pakistan before 9/11

Diplomatic correspondence between Washington and the American Embassy in Islamabad published by the National Security Archive shows that during the last 35 years of the twentieth century American diplomacy toward Pakistan faced a mutually de-escalating relationship. Pakistan wanted American economic and military assistance as well as support in its conflicts with India. The United States was ready to aid Pakistan, but only so far as Islamabad respected American demands. These focused on containing Soviet influence in the region and, more recently, fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States also asked Pakistan to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. To enforce this policy, successive American administrations showered Pakistan with sanctions. These sanctions were lifted again and again, because they undercut American diplomatic influence with the Pakistani government. Washington did not intend to support Pakistan in its conflicts with India. Pakistan let down the United States by not using its leverage over the Taliban to capture Osama Bin Laden. Mistrust resulting from this roller coaster relationship should have warned American diplomats not to take Pakistan's support in the war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for granted.     

Central Asian Countries: Learning to Live Next to the Taliban

With the withdrawal of the US and coalition forces from Afghanistan and the rapid takeover by the Taliban, most Central Asian governments recognized the Taliban in a pragmatic decision to peacefully coexist with the neighboring extremist regime that will likely remain in power for the foreseeable future. Tajikistan is, however, denying the Taliban recognition and indirectly supporting the resistance movement in Panjshir. The political and human catastrophe in Afghanistan is threatening to boost autocratic tendencies and further deepen political gaps in Central Asian societies. This article discusses the rationale behind each Central Asian government’s approach to the Talibanized Afghanistan and the looming domestic and external challenges to the region.     

美国阿-巴“全面新战略”评析

奥巴马政府的阿一巴“全面新战略”是美国实施阿富汗反恐战争进入新阶段对反恐力量的一次大规模转移和重新部署,战略目标更加明确;美国在增加兵力的同时更注重加强阿富汗和巴基斯坦自身的反恐能力,达成战略目标的手段更加全面和明智。“全面新战略”出台尚不足一年,完全落实尚需时间以及复杂的政治和军事运作,其实际效果也同样有待时间的考验。     

The Alienated Frontier: Why the United States Can’t Get Osama bin Laden

Since the Russian-supplied Afghan army overthrew progressive President Daud in 1978, the nation has endured the long Soviet-Afghan war, the Taliban, and the arrival of U.S troops. These military actions have only heightened the historical alienation of the Pashtun tribes who overspread the long-contested border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These are the people who are almost certainly sheltering Osama bin Laden. The Alienated Frontier is a centuries-old problem that must be solved if we are to win the war on terror, and solving it will require rebuilding the infrastructure, developing alternatives to poppy cultivation, and solving the “Pashtunistan” question. The capture or elimination of given individuals will achieve little if the conditions that allow radicals to thrive are not addressed     

Corruption and clientelism in the lower levels of the Afghan police

Some scholars argue that the Afghan police are regularly engaged in bribery and drug-related corruption. Prevalent corruption in the Afghan police has demonstrably resulted in greater support for the Taliban which is a threat to security. This suggests that a robust anti-corruption strategy is needed to restore legitimacy in the Afghan state and police and to counter the insurgency. This article initially provides a discussion of police corruption in Afghanistan that reveals four interrelated explanations: (1) structural causes of corruption, patronage and nepotism, (2) low pay, (3) state capture, and (4) ethnic favouritism. The research methodology included 70 semi-structured interviews with elites conducted by the author in Kabul during May–June 2010 and 100 surveys conducted with patrolmen and lieutenants in various Afghan provinces during January–March 2012. The article finds that it can prove counterproductive to post poorly paid policemen in distant provinces in order to challenge patronage relations as it tends to exacerbate survival-based corruption. Moreover, improved pay reform could help reduce survival-based corruption in the Afghan police but systemic corruption, clientelism and state capture will remain if it is not implemented alongside other wider structural initiatives.     

De-antagonising the Other: Changing Constructions of the Taliban and the Possibility of Reconciliation

Shortly after 9/11 any kind of engagement, let alone reconciliation, with the Taliban was considered absurd. Recently, however, Afghan as well as Western elites have announced that they are now willing to talk to parts of the Taliban in an attempt to begin a reconciliation process in Afghanistan. This article focuses on the discourse theoretical framework developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and illustrates the merits of such an approach for explaining how such a shift became possible. It argues that the turn to reconciliation with the Taliban was enabled by a transformation of the discursive construction of the Taliban. The article focuses on the discursive dynamics of the (de)coupling and differentiation of signifiers as a central mechanism of meaning production. It argues that antagonistic identity constructions in the context of the global war on terror formed the discursive background against which the Taliban were first articulated as part of the terrorist “Other”, which made any engagement impossible. From 2009 onwards, however, it can be observed how the signifier “Taliban” was decoupled from the identity of the “terrorist”, how it transcended the antagonistic frontier and came to be seen as an entity worthy of engagement.     

Cheap Hawks, Cheap Doves, and the Pursuit of Strategy

The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.     

On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010

This article provides a review of the history of jihadi foreign fighters in Afghanistan over the last 30 years. It details the post-9/11 period and the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. forces, focusing on the ethnic origin of the foreign fighters and how different groups engaged in different aspects of the conflict. Additionally, the piece explains that while the foreign fighters who came to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan included, among others, Uzbekistanis (not Afghan Uzbeks), Turks, and Arabs, there was also a significant force of Pakistanis—of both Pashtun and Punjabi origins—that joined, bolstering the Taliban army.     

‘Unlawful Combatants’: The West's Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’

The West's treatment of irregular fighters in the “war on terror” was highly problematic. This article contends that we must look beyond the assumption that political and strategic considerations compromised the law and led to the “invention” of the category of the “unlawful combatant.” Rather, the law of armed conflict itself includes strong exclusionary mechanisms towards irregular fighters. These exclusionary strands in the law came to dominate the West's strategic decision-making on the treatment of irregular fighters. Moreover, the fact that irregular fighters became such a vital issue post-9/11 was not a result of the war on terror being a new kind of war, as has often been argued. Rather, this article suggests that it reflects an identity crisis of the West's regular armed forces at the start of the twenty-first century.     

A FAREWELL TO THE GREAT GAME? PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Long before 9–11, Russia and the United States found common ground in their efforts to undermine the Taliban government in Afghanistan, despite serious disagreements over policy in other parts of the world. The events of 9–11, however, changed Russian foreign and security policy drastically. One of the most fundamental and controversial shifts came when President Putin chose not to interfere in US negotiations with the Central Asian states to use their airbases for the US war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Putin also offered to use Russia’s oil reserves as a means to stabilize jittery world markets. In return, Russia gained US support for its bid to pipe Caspian Sea oil over Russian territory. More importantly, the US government gave Russia essentially a free hand in its war against separatist Chechnya. While there are many potential scenarios in highly unstable Central Asia that could serve to sour relations once again, Russia and the United States have an unprecedented opportunity to build trust and cooperation through peacekeeping and problem solving in the region.     

America's Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement

One consequence of using labels such as the “global war on terrorism,” “the long war,” “the global struggle against violent extremism” or any name that dissociates the conflict from the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi movement is that Americans lack the necessary framework for assessing U.S. policies. Misconceptions concerning the war proliferate on both the Left and the Right because of the absence of an analytical framework to provide precise vocabulary identifying the origins and objectives of the enemy. The current war and the sources of Al Qaeda's conduct can only be understood by examining the complex history of Arabia, the U.S.-Saudi alliance, and a particular historical cycle of corruption, decadence, violent purification, and moral restoration that characterizes the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi narrative.