The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts'Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R.

Historians and political scientists have noted that appointments of judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals are not determined by senatorial courtesy alone. What has not been adequately explained is why and when a president defers to a senator's choice rather than seek to control the selection. This article attempts to understand the politics of federal appellate court appointments. The author first identifies a major change in the work of the courts of appeals during the years 1900-1945—the growth in review of the actions of newly created federal regulatory agencies. Then, by examining Justice Department files and presidential correspondence, he discoveres three patterns of appointment emerging in the same period. The patterns vary with presidential perceptions of the role of the federal government and of the courts of appeals' ability to affect accomplishment of administration goals. Appointments during the first years of the presidencies of Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and during the Harding and Coolidge administrations were dominated by patronage concerns. Those administrations yielded to the recommendations of senators and demonstrated no interest in the policy-making potential of these courts. In the two other patterns the White House played a more active role, with senators more often deferring to the president's selection. Concerns about professionalism dominated selections in Taft's and Hoover's administrations: because they recognized the policy importance of those judgeships but saw the role of government as limited, they sought judicial craftsmen who would make policy only incrementally. Policy concerns dominated selections during Wilson's administration and the latter years of both the Roosevelts' administrations: Justice Department officials screened nominees to determine their policy orientation, because federal appellate court judgeships were perceived as crucial policy positions that could affect the president's ability to implement his reform programs.     

Using Computer Simulations to Measure the Effect of Gerrymandering on Electoral Competition in the U.S. Congress

Recent research has leveraged computer simulations to identify the effect of gerrymandering on partisan bias in U.S. legislatures. As a result of this method, researchers are able to distinguish between the intentional partisan bias caused by gerrymandering and the natural partisan bias that stems from the geographic sorting of partisan voters. However, this research has yet to explore the effect of gerrymandering on other biases like reduced electoral competition and incumbency protection. Using a computer algorithm to design a set of districts without political intent, I measure the extent to which the current districts have been gerrymandered to produce safer seats in Congress. I find that gerrymandering only has a minor effect on the average district, but does produce a number of safe seats for both Democrats and Republicans. Moreover, these safe seats tend to be located in states where a single party controls the districting process.     

美国司法政治变迁的内在逻辑——从“罗伊案”说开去

美国的司法政治是司法与政治交互作用的产物。随着司法权的扩张,联邦最高法院突破"政治问题不审查"之传统,主动或被动地介入政治争议;随着政党对峙的尖锐,政治力量乐于将棘手的政治争议交由司法裁断;藉此,司法政治演变为常态政治,司法判例成为经久不衰的政治争点。自上个世纪70年代以来,围绕罗伊案半个多世纪的争议,不仅客观地暴露了美国司法政治发展的内在逻辑,而且也充分地展示出司法政治在美国的作用方式和涵摄空间。     

Public Expectations of State Legislators

When members of Congress neglect the needs of their districts or vote contrary to the wishes of their constituents, their public approval suffers. Does the same hold true for representatives at the state level? Using experiments, I explore whether people dole out similar rewards and penalties to state legislators and members of Congress for their successes and shortfalls in representing constituents. I find that a similar model of political accountability travels from national politics to state politics. People value policy representation, casework, and attention to the district as much from state legislators as they do from members of Congress.     

Last Post for “The Greatest Generation”: The Policy Implications of the Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress

This paper characterizes the behavioral and policy implications of the decline in the number of military veterans in the U.S. Congress, from more than 70% of legislators in the early 1970s to less than 30% in the contemporary House and Senate. Many scholars argue that military service shapes information and beliefs, and that this decline has had negative effects on defense policy. The analysis tests these arguments using voting data from the House and Senate in the 1990s and the House in the 1970s, showing that the impact of veteran status on votes is generally small and has a relatively minor effect on legislative outcomes.     

Breaking gridlock: the determinants of health policy change in Congress

Prior to the 2010 health care reforms, scholars often commented that health policy making in Congress was mired in political gridlock, that reforms were far more likely to fail than to succeed, and that the path forward was unclear. In light of recent events, new narratives are being advanced. In formulating these assessments, scholars of health politics tend to analyze individual major reform proposals to determine why they succeeded or failed and what lessons could be drawn for the future. Taking a different approach, we examine all health policies proposed in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1973 and 2002. We analyze these bills' fates and the effectiveness of their sponsors in guiding these proposals through Congress. Setting these proposed policies against a baseline of policy advancements in other areas, we demonstrate that health policy making has indeed been far more gridlocked than policy making in most other areas. We then isolate some of the causes of this gridlock, as well as some of the conditions that have helped to bring about health policy change.     

Presidential Candidates and State Crime: Views of Some U.S. College Students

This is a preliminary investigation of hawkish public opinion, understood as criminogenic in that it provides political support for state crimes of aggressive militarism. Our critical criminology approach treats public support for, or acceptance of, state aggression as part of criminogenic political culture. Despite growing interest among critical criminologists in broader perspectives on state crime and the politics of culture, there has been no work on this topic. Our survey of 53 criminal justice students at a liberal arts college finds both hawkish (militarist) and dovish (peaceful) beliefs and preferences regarding U.S. policy and the two major 2008 presidential candidates, Obama and McCain. We investigate whether authoritarianism helps explain hawkish opinions, but find little evidence for that expectation. We find evidence of respondent underestimation of the hawkishness of U.S. politics. We also find extensive evidence of dovish policy preferences, such as approval of diplomacy, a major attraction to Obama.     

Crack as Proxy: Aggressive Federal Drug Prosecutions and the Production of Black–White Racial Inequality

In this article, we empirically examine jurisdictional variations in federal crack prosecutions to measure whether aggressive crack prosecutorial practices are associated with racial inequality in federal caseload characteristics and outcomes. Building on theories that address the production of inequality in institutional settings, we hypothesize that U.S. Attorneys’ offices that are more proactive in charging defendants with crack, relative to other kinds of drugs, and relative to case strength and seriousness, will demonstrate higher rates of black–white racial inequality in case outcomes across the entire criminal caseload. Consistent with theories of institutional racism, our findings demonstrate that aggressive crack prosecutions at the district level are a strong predictor of black–white inequality in conviction rates across the entire criminal caseload, and a much more modest predictor of inequality in final sentence outcomes. We conclude by discussing the importance of organizational‐level empirical analyses for more effectively uncovering the conditions under which inequality can and does flourish in legal settings, and suggest possible future lines of inquiry along these lines.     

试论人大制度作用在法律文本与政治现实上的不对称

政治文明的精髓是关键在于制度建设.作为我国根本政治制度和民主政治建设重要载体的人大制度,在社会主义政治文明建设中具有无可替代的重要作用,但其作用在法律文本与政治现实上存在明显的不对称,需要通过优化人大工作环境、完善根本政治制度、扩大公民政治参与等途径,使人大制度作用得以充分发挥,从而推进社会主义政治文明建设.     

The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional Elections

Political dynasties, families in which multiple members have held elected office, commonly feature in the U.S. Congress. I explored the electoral origins of this phenomenon and determined that members of political dynasties have a significant advantage over first‐generation politicians in open‐seat House elections. Using an original dataset containing candidate‐ and district‐level covariates for all candidates in open‐seat House contests between 1994 and 2006, I found that dynastic politicians enjoy “brand name advantages,” giving them a significant edge over comparable nondynastic opponents. In contrast, hypotheses concerning potential advantages stemming from past political experience and fundraising ability yield null results.     

Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: Extra‐Guidelines Factors and District Variation

The guarantee of the right to a jury trial lies at the heart of the principles that underlie the American criminal justice system's commitment to due process of law. We investigate the differential sentencing of those who plead guilty and those convicted by trial in U.S. District Courts. We first investigate how much of any federal plea/trial sentencing differences are accounted for by substantial assistance to law enforcement, acceptance of responsibility, obstruction of justice, and other Guideline departures. Second, we investigate how such differences vary according to offense and defendant characteristics, as well as court caseloads and trial rates. We use federal sentencing data for fiscal years 2000–02, along with aggregate data on federal district court caseload features. We find that meaningful trial penalties exist after accounting for Guidelines‐based rationales for differentially sentencing those convicted by guilty plea versus trial. Higher district court caseload pressure is associated with greater trial penalties, while higher district trial rates are associated with lesser trial penalties. In addition, trial penalties are lower for those with more substantial criminal histories, and black men. Trial penalties proportionately increase, however, as Guideline minimum sentencing recommendations increase. We also supplement our analysis with interview and survey data from federal district court participants, which provide insights into the plea reward/trial penalty process, and also suggest important dimensions of federal court trial penalties that we cannot measure.     

The Incidence and Timing of PAC Contributions to Incumbent U.S. House Members, 1993‐94

In this article, we discuss how donor and recipient characteristics affected the incidence and timing of political action committee (PAC) contributions to incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1993‐94 election cycle. We contribute to the campaign finance literature by modeling the timing of contributions, which is important because timing affects the perception of political actors about the competitiveness of elections and the loci of power among members of Congress, interest groups, and between members of Congress and interest groups. Split‐population event history models allow us to compare and contrast determinants of whether and when contributions are made across various types and sizes of PACs.     

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Nearly all studies of pork‐barrel politics in the U.S. Congress focus on the House, biasing our conception of how politics influences federal spending and skewing our attention toward factors that are active in the House. This article highlights differences between the Senate and House in how pork is allocated. We identify four important differences between the House and Senate, generate hypotheses regarding how each difference should influence the distribution of pork projects, and test these hypotheses using data from earmarks in the Appropriations bills passed by the two chambers for fiscal year 2008. The results support three of our four hypotheses, suggesting that senators are driven by different motivations than House members. These results imply that theoretical accounts of pork‐barrel spending need to account for these interchamber differences. Our findings also highlight how studies of legislative behavior, more generally, need to account for important differences in legislative structure and organization.     

Laws and Roll Calls in the U.S. Congress, 1891–1994

Recent empirical studies of lawmaking activity by legislatures rely heavily on roll call based measures and assume that roll call activity reflects lawmaking activity. We question this assumption for the case of the U.S. Congress. We examine several plausible sources of dissonance between the set of enacted public statutes and the universe of recorded votes in the U.S. Congress, using a comprehensive dataset of public enactments and roll call activity between 1891 and 1994. Because only 11.9% of the bills signed into law receive a recorded vote in the House, only 7.9% receive a recorded vote in the Senate, and only 5.5% receive a recorded vote in both the House and Senate, we provide guidance as to when studying voting behavior is likely a reasonable proxy for lawmaking behavior. There are sometimes important differences between the laws that do and do not receive a roll call that researchers should account for when using roll calls to study lawmaking in the U.S. Congress.     

Adjudicating Executive Privilege: Federal Administrative Agencies and Deliberative Process Privilege Claims in U.S. District Courts

Government transparency is a key component of democratic accountability. The U.S. Congress and the president have created multiple legislative avenues to facilitate executive branch transparency with the public. However, when the executive branch withholds requested information from the public, the federal judiciary has the power to determine whether agencies must release documents and information to requestors. When enforcing standards of executive branch transparency, judges must balance concerns of executive autonomy and judicial intrusion into administrative decisionmaking. While much judicial scholarship focuses on the decisionmaking on high courts, in the U.S. context, federal district courts play a key role in adjudicating transparency disputes. In this article, I examine case outcomes in disputes involving agency claims of deliberative process privilege over internal agency documents litigated between 1994 and 2004. I find that U.S. federal district courts largely defer to administrative agencies in transparency disputes. However, factors such as agency structure and the congruence between judicial and administrative agency policy preferences influence whether federal judges require executive branch officials to release requested information.     

Hidden convergence: toward a historical comparison of U.S. and U.K. health policy

The social science literature on the comparative history of the welfare state offers conflicting accounts of the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. At first blush, the comparative history of health care policy in the United States and the United Kingdom seems to affirm the dominant view that the U.S. and U.K. welfare states have diverged substantially during the twentieth century. A comparison of U.S. and U.K. health policy, however, suggests that there are more parallels and points of tangency between the two systems than are readily apparent. The comparative history of health policy over the past century reveals common political and policy challenges and frequent interchanges of policy ideas, and helps uncover the political dynamics behind the development of health policy in the two countries, which can, in turn, help illuminate the contemporary politics of reform in both countries.     

Felony and misdemeanor defendants filed in the u.s. district courts during fiscal years 1990–95: An analysis of the filings of each offense level

The number of criminal defendants in cases filed in the federal courts increased by fewer than 1,000 from 1990 to 1995. Separate analyses of filings of felony and misdemeanor defendants revealed that there are different factors that influence the magnitude of the caseload of each offense level. The number of federal felony filings is strongly linked to staffing levels within the ninety-four U.S. attorneys’ offices, while the types of filings are a reflection of prosecution priorities. As a result, the magnitude of the felony caseload in the federal courts does not mirror either local or national crime rates. Misdemeanor filings, on the other hand, are dependent on enforcement practices of local authorities at military bases and/or national parks, and are concentrated within a few federal courts. The number of misdemeanor filings and traffic violations, in particular, are susceptible to dramatic changes when these local authorities modify their enforcement procedures.     

The political and economic context of mental health care in the United States

Since the mid-1970s, the mental health treatment system in the U.S. has faced budgetary famine. This is in stark contrast to the growing cornucopia of fiscal resources enjoyed by the overall health care system. This paper explores the complex reasons for this disproportionate allocation in health spending. On the one hand, mental health may suffer from the perception that its diagnoses are largely "subjective" and its treatments do not fit the traditional "medical model" that can be defined precisely and paid for by third-party insurers. But more importantly, the death of mental health resources can be attributed to the peculiar nature and characteristics inherent in American politics. This paper describes the American political environment, from both a historical and a contemporary perspective, to give some insight into the development of policies affecting the mental health system in the U.S. Given the current climate of fiscal conservatism in this country toward any increases in social spending, it is likely that the profound mismatch in need and spending for mental health programs will continue indefinitely.     

Warranted and Unwarranted Complexity in the U.S. Sentencing Guideline

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are highly complex because of both initial policy decisions and subsequent pressures from Congress and appellate courts. The two initial policy decisions that were largely responsible for this complexity were (a) basing guidelines on "relevant conduct" rather than on the offense of conviction and (b) specifying in detail the number and precise sentencing value of aggravating and mitigating factors. Given this initial bias toward specificity, it was inevitable that the complexity in the guidelines would become worse as Congress pressed for further distinctions and the Sentencing Commission responded to those statutory actions. The complexity of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines has detrimental effects on both the perceived and actual fairness of the laws. Although statistical analyses indicate that the most complex guidelines (as indexed by the length of each guideline, the length of application notes for each guideline, and the number of amendments to each guideline) are also those that are most frequently used, there is also evidence that at least some of the complexity in the guidelines (the number of specific offense characteristics in each guideline and the number of cross references) is unwarranted.