Deciding mental retardation and mental illness in capital cases: The effects of procedure,evidence, and attitudes

Abstract

When finding unconstitutional the execution of defendants who were mentally retarded at the time of their crime in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the US Supreme Court left the States to decide on procedures for deciding a defendant's mental retardation. This has and will lead to substantial variation, and will include juries being responsible for these verdicts. Two studies are presented that test procedural, evidentiary, and attitudinal effects on mock juror verdicts as to a capital defendant's mental retardation. Both studies show significant effects of procedural variables. Making the retardation and death decision at the same trial phase changed jurors’ interpretation of evidence, including severity of mental problems. Jurors were insensitive to differences in the burden of proof on mental retardation verdicts, although demanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt may make jurors more sensitive to retardation evidence when deciding on a death sentence. Areas for future research are outlined.     

Life underWainwright v. Witt: Juror dispositions and death qualification

The current standard for determining juror qualification in cases in which the prosecution is seeking the death penalty was formulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1985 inWainwright v. Witt. This standard differs importantly from its predecessor, and requires that prospective jurors be dismissed if their views would prevent or substantially impair their ability to perform their functions as jurors. We assessed respondents according to the criteria imposed byWitt. We also measured independently prospective juror's abilities to perform the various specific tasks of a capital juror and their disposition to impose the death penalty automatically upon defendants convicted of murder punishable by death. Data from 148 respondents, selected randomly from juries on previously tried felony cases, indicated that 28.2% of those includable by theWitt standard would automatically impose the death penalty. Considering all respondents who would be erroneously included or excluded, a total of 36% of the sample showed inconsistencies with theWitt criterion. These findings are discussed in terms of jurors' difficulties in anticipating their roles as capital jurors.     

The Role of Mitigating Factors in Capital Sentencing Before and After McKoy v. North Carolina

In 1990, the United States Supreme Court ruled that capital jurors do not have to be unanimous in deciding whether or not to accept any particular mitigating circumstance presented to them by the defense during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial. This study examines whether this shift in procedure may have altered the role of mitigation in predicting capital sentencing outcomes by comparing death sentencing predictors before and after the McKoy decision with data from an extensive sample of capital cases in North Carolina tried between 1977 and 2002. The results indicate that (1) both the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances accepted by capital jurors had statistically significant and substantial effects on capital sentencing outcomes both before and after the McKoy decision; (2) the number of mitigating circumstances presented to and accepted by capital juries in North Carolina doubled during the post‐McKoy period; and (3) the influence of mitigating circumstance on capital sentencing outcomes was attenuated in the post‐McKoy period. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Kids are Different: The United States Supreme Court Reforms Youth Sentencing Practices for Youth Prosecuted in the Criminal Justice System

In a series of decisions issued between 2005‐2016, the United States Supreme Court relied on emerging scientific research detailing the developmental differences between children and adults to revamp its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment. The research established that youth’s developmental immaturity reduces their culpability for their criminal conduct, while also demonstrating their heightened capacity for change and rehabilitation. The Court focused on the most extreme sentences for youth, banning the imposition of the death penalty on youth under the age of eighteen in Roper v. Simmons (2005), and severely limiting the availability of life without parole sentences even for youth convicted of murder, in Graham v Florida (2010) and Miller v Alabama (2012). This article traces the Court’s evolution in reviewing sentences for youth in our justice system, and considers how the Court’s reasoning in these cases may influence further reforms in the justice system’s treatment of youth looking ahead.     

Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation from the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2002–2006

This paper examines race-based peremptory challenges. Such challenges occur during the voir dire jury selection process. The process allows both the defense and the prosecution to strike jurors who they believe will not decide cases fairly. However, in the case of Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court ruled that race could not be used as a factor in eliminating prospective jurors. This paper examines federal litigation for five years in which it was alleged that race was used as a factor in removing a juror. An examination of the cases revealed that most of the cases involved sole male litigants who allege that there were multiple race-based peremptory challenges used in their cases. Moreover, most of the cases that led to the allegations involved violent offenses. Other case characteristics are noted, but of most significance was the finding that most appellants lost their cases. As such, the courts felt that most of the challenges were, in fact, race neutral. The implications of this research are discussed. This study was funded by an undergraduate research grant from Penn State University.     

Comprehending life and death matters

Modern capital jurisprudence places special significance on judicial instructions to guide the discretion of the capital jury in reaching a penalty phase decision. Yet, previous social science research has raised doubts about the extent to which judicial instructions are generally understood by jurors and questioned their utility in producing intended effects. The present study measured the comprehension of the capital sentencing instruction employed in California. Data suggest widespread inability to define accurately the central concepts of aggravation and mitigation in use in virtually every state that currently has a death penalty statute, as well as the inability to distinguish properly the sentencing significance of the enumerated factors jurors are directed to use in reaching their life and death verdicts. In addition, an inordinate focus on the circumstances of the crime—to the exclusion of other potentially important factors—was identified, as well as special problems in comprehending the crucial concept of mitigation in constitutionally required ways.We would like to thank Suzanne Ban, Cori Nardello, and Maryanne Tagavilla for assistance in transcribing and content-analyzing the data.     

Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt

In Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt the Supreme Court of the United States passed down its most important decision on abortion for just under a decade. By a majority of 5‐3, the Court ruled that two provisions in a Texas law regulating abortion on grounds of women's health were constitutionally invalid, placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of women seeking to exercise their right to abortion. This comment delineates the key ways in which the Court's application of the standard of constitutional review under Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) to the Texas provisions marks a landmark development for the protection of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe v Wade, not the least by making clear that state abortion regulations which cite ‘women's health’ justifications should not pass constitutional review where those justifications lack a credible factual basis.     

The role of neurological and psychological explanations in legal judgments of psychopathic wrongdoers

Although brain imaging has recently taken center stage in criminal legal proceedings, little is known about how neuroscience information differentially affects people’s judgments about criminal behavior. In two studies of community participants (N = 1161), we examined how mock jurors sentence a fictional psychopathic defendant when presented with neurological or psychological research of equal or ambiguous scientific validity. Across two studies, we (a) found that including images of the brain did not alter mock jurors’ sentencing judgments, (b) reported two striking non-replications of previous findings that mock jurors recommend less severe punishments to defendants when a neuroscientific explanations are proffered, and (c) found that participants rated a psychopathic individual as more likely to benefit from treatment and less dangerous when a neurological explanation for his deficits was provided. Overall, these results suggest that neuroscience information provided by psychiatrists in hypothetical criminal situations may not broadly transform mock jurors’ intuitions about a psychopathic defendant’s sentence, but they provide novel evidence that brain-based information may influence people’s judgments about treatability and dangerousness.     

Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide”

This article examines the nature of racial bias in the death sentencing process. After reviewing the various general explanations for the continued significance of race in capital cases, we report the results of an empirical study in which some aspects of racially biased death sentencing are examined in depth. Specifically, in a simulated capital penalty‐phase trial setting where participants were assigned to small group “juries” and given an opportunity to deliberate, white male jurors were significantly more likely to sentence black defendants to death than were women and nonwhite jurors. This racialized pattern was explained in part by the differential evaluation of the case facts and the perceptions of the defendant that were made by the white male jurors. We discuss these findings in light of social psychological theories of contemporary racism, and we conclude that the demonstrated bias in capital jury settings should be understood as an interaction of several factors, including individual juror characteristics, group‐level demographic composition, and group deliberation processes.     

The Attorney–Client Relationship in Capital Cases and Its Impact on Juror Receptivity to Mitigation Evidence

The United States Supreme Court has placed a great deal of trust in the ability and willingness of capital jurors to consider mitigation evidence during sentencing deliberations as a constitutional aspect of capital sentencing. This paper examines the jurors’ perception of the affective warmth and friendliness shared by attorney and client, and the degree to which the defense attorney appears to regard the defendant as a close working member of the defense team. Using data obtained from interviews with 725 jurors in capital trials, regression analysis revealed that respondents were more receptive to mitigation evidence when they viewed the relationship between the attorney and client as warm and friendly, but less receptive when they reported the attorney–client as having a close working relationship. Analysis of interaction terms revealed that the negative effects of the close working relationship can be suppressed by modeling a warm affective attorney–client relationship.     

Assessing the best interests of the child in cases of cross-border surrogacy: inconsistency in the Strasbourg approach?

This article examines the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to assessing the best interests of the child in three recent cases of cross-border surrogacy, namely Mennesson v France, Labassee v France and Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy. It is argued that these cases reveal inconsistency in the ECtHR’s assessment of the best interests of the child. In Mennesson and Labassee, the ECtHR found that the national authorities’ refusal to legally recognise the relationships between the children and the intended parents amounted to a violation of Article 8 ECHR, whereas no violation was found in Paradiso. A notable distinguishing feature of Paradiso was that there was no genetic relationship between the child and the intended parents, and it is this point that seemingly led the Court to assess the best interests of that child differently to the others.     

The Effects of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Disorders on Institutional Misconduct Among Female Inmates

The US Sentencing Guidelines are among the most ambitious attempts in history to control sentencing discretion. However, a major sea change occurred in January of 2005, when the US Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Booker and Fanfan, that in order to be constitutional, the federal guidelines must be advisory rather than presumptive. The impact of the Booker/Fanfan decisions on interjurisdictional variation and sentencing disparity is an opportunity to examine the issue of whether the increased opportunity to sentence according to substantively rational criteria entails increased extralegal disparity. We draw on a conceptualization of courts as communities and a focal concerns model of sentencing decisions to frame expectations about federal sentencing in the wake of Booker/Fanfan. We test these expectations using USSC data on federal sentencing outcomes from four time periods: prior to the 2003 PROTECT Act, the period governed by the PROTECT Act, post-Booker/Fanfan, and post-Gall v US. In general, we find that extralegal disparity and between-district variation in the effects of extralegal factors on sentencing have not increased post-Booker and Gall. We conclude that allowing judges greater freedom to exercise substantive rationality does not necessarily result in increased extralegal disparity.     

Race and the Death Penalty

Abstract

Scholars have learned a great deal about race and the death penalty. Yet the field has limitations: (1) prior research focuses on African Americans and Hispanics but ignores Asian Americans; (2) researchers have not explored Donald Black's (1989) plan to eliminate discrimination called the “desocialization of law.” Black notes that jurors who do not know the race of the offender and victim cannot discriminate. Black then outlines proposals aimed at removing race information from trials, while still providing jurors with relevant legal information. We address both issues through an experiment in which mock jurors (N = 1,233 students) recommended a sentence in a capital murder trial consisting of four conditions: (1) Asian American-white; (2) white-Asian American; (3) African American-white; (4) race of offender and victim unknown. The results suggest that Asian Americans are treated the same as whites, while African Americans continue to suffer from discrimination. Here, we consider the potential role of social status in such outcomes. The results also suggest that African American offenders and unknown offenders face the same odds of a death sentence. Here, we consider two potential interpretations. On one hand, jurors in the unknown condition could have seen an African American offender and a white victim in their “mind's eye,” effectively merging the conditions. On the other hand, death sentences could be the same in the conditions for distinct reasons: Death sentences could be high in the unknown condition because of relational distance between the juror and offender, while death sentences could be high in the African American-white condition because of discrimination. We conclude by considering the theoretical and public policy implications of both the central findings.     

The Role of Emotion and Cognition in Juror Perceptions of Victim Impact Statements

Recent legislation has contributed to an increasing number of victims participating in the trial process by way of providing victim impact statements (VISs). The present study evaluated jurors’ perceptions of VISs in a jury-eligible sample. Participants were 402 jury-eligible community members in the southwestern United States. Using a vignette-based method, VIS presence and content (i.e., Victim Harm versus Victim Emotion information) were examined for their influence on sentencing decisions and blame attribution. Individual differences of need for affect (NFA) and need for cognition (NFC) were featured as moderators of these relations. Notable results included significantly lengthier sentencing recommendations and decreased levels of victim blame in the presence of a VIS, regardless of content. In addition, juror NFC was significantly positively associated with perpetrator blame, while NFA moderated the relation between VIS content and sentencing length. The presence of a VIS impacted blame and sentencing, although jury panel member individual differences moderated such effects. Implications for victim rights policy, trial consultation, and social–emotional theory are discussed.     

Race and Jurors' Receptivity to Mitigation in Capital Cases: The Effect of Jurors', Defendants', and Victims' Race in Combination

This paper examines the variation in receptivity to mitigation evidence by capital jurors as it varies by the race of the juror, defendant, and victim individually and in combination. Attitudinal and racial characteristics from 865 respondents in the Capital Jury Project were used in the analysis. Using a generalized form of multiple regression, the respondent's receptivity to mitigation evidence was predicted and changes in receptivity were calculated as the race of the main trial participants (juror, defendant, and victim) were varied. Statistical controls were put in place for gender of respondent; respondent's perception of the dangerousness of the defendant, heinousness of the crime, and view of the defense attorney; respondent's formation of a premature sentencing decision; and whether the trial took place in a southern state jurisdiction. Results indicate that Black jurors in cases where a Black is charged with killing a White victim are chiefly responsible for the observed variance in receptivity to mitigation.     

Defendant and juror race in a necessity case: An ultimate attribution error

This study investigated whether Black and White mock jurors would commit the ultimate attribution error (i.e., over-rely on dispositional explanations to understand the negative actions of out-group members) in a necessity defense case. Participants (N = 97) read a fictional looting case, in which the race of the defendant varied. Mock jurors were expected to show out-group severity through more guilty verdicts and blame attributions. Mock juror and defendant race were not significantly related to verdicts, but for the Black defendant, White mock jurors attributed more control to him, and believed he was likely to reoffend more so than did Black mock jurors. This study adds to the literature on the mechanism by which racial bias interferes with juror decisions.     

THE APPRENDI‐BLAKELY CASES: SENTENCING REFORM COUNTER REVOLUTION?

Recent Supreme Court decisions have extended jury trial rights and beyond‐reasonable‐doubt proof standards to certain sentence‐enhancement facts. The first two cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona, were narrow in scope and relatively uncontroversial. But Blakely v. Washington marked a substantial expansion of the rationale and scope of Apprendi, and threatened to invalidate entire sentencing reform systems, both legally‐binding guidelines of the type at issue in Blakely and it's sequel, Booker v. United States, and statutory determinate sentence systems like the one invalidated in Cunningham v. California. Each of these decisions has potential effects not only on sentencing severity and disparity in the cases controlled by that decision, but also on prosecutorial, legislative, and sentencing commission measures designed to comply with the decision, avoid it, and/or mitigate its impact. Field resistance and avoidance measures are likely to be stronger in jurisdictions where the existing sentencing system enjoyed broad support; in such jurisdictions, resistance may be particularly strong to the more controversial Blakely ruling. Impact assessments must therefore carefully distinguish the separate impacts of Apprendi and Blakely in each jurisdiction being studied, and the extent of support for the existing sentencing system. Such assessments should also examine pre‐existing trends and other independent sources of change; leadership by sentencing commissions or other officials in crafting responsive measures; structural and other features of the sentencing system which render compliance more or less difficult; and second‐stage effects, on sentencing, prosecutorial, or sentencing policy decisions, that reflect the prior compliance, avoidance, and mitigation measures adopted in that jurisdiction. The greatest long‐term effects may be on prosecutorial, legislative, and commission decisions, rather than on sentencing outcomes.     

Applying Moral Foundations Theory to the Explanation of Capital Jurors’ Sentencing Decisions

Abstract

This study applies moral foundations theory to capital juror decision making. We hypothesized that binding moral foundations would predict death qualification and punitive sentencing decisions, whereas individualizing moral foundations would be associated with juror disqualification and a leniency effect. Additionally, we considered whether moral foundations can explain differences in death penalty application between conservatives and liberals. Respondents from two independent samples participated in a mock-juror task in which the circumstances of a hypothetical defendant’s case varied. Results revealed moral foundations were strong predictors of death qualification. The binding and individualizing foundations were related to sentencing decisions in the expected ways. Supporting our contention that moral foundations operate differently across different types of cases, heterogeneity in the effects of moral foundations was observed. Finally, we found support for the hypothesis that the relationship between sentencing decisions and conservatism would be attenuated by moral foundations.     

Religious fundamentalism,religiosity, and priming: effects on attitudes,perceptions, and mock jurors’ decisions in an insanity defense case

Jurors are asked to use their personal knowledge and experience to make verdict decisions; thus, it is no surprise that their religious beliefs might influence their decisions. During legal insanity trials, jurors might also be exposed to religious stimuli (e.g. crucifix, prayer, Bible, etc.), which could evoke (prime) religious beliefs and thus influence decisions. Two studies examined whether dimensions of religiosity and religious beliefs relate to attitudes and decisions concerning mental health defenses, testing social identity theory against Allport and Ross’s religiosity hypothesis. In Study 1 (attitudes survey) and Study 2 (mock juror decision-making paradigm), religious fundamentalist beliefs consistently predicted punitive attitudes and decisions related to mental health defenses and verdicts, and this was moderated by intrinsic religiosity, such that religious fundamentalist beliefs only predicted punitiveness for individuals low in intrinsic religiosity. Also, priming fundamentalist beliefs increased punitiveness in both verdict and sentencing decisions. Combined, these results suggest that religious beliefs play a role in jurors’ verdict decisions in an insanity case, and that priming fundamentalist beliefs increases jurors’ punitiveness. Allport and Ross’s religiosity hypothesis was supported, but social identity theory was not.