Bite the Bullet

This paper discusses the Fedon case‐law of the European Court of Justice (Court of Justice), which involved a claim for compensation by Fedon (an Italian producer of eyeglass cases) from the EU for the imposition of World Trade Organization (WTO)‐authorised retaliatory trade barriers by the USA following the failure by the EU to comply with an adverse ruling by the WTO regarding its import regime for bananas. As a result of the EU non‐compliance, European banana distributors and some bananas producers benefited from WTO‐illegal protection, at the expense of a set of EU exporters, including Fedon, that were hit by US countermeasures. Fedon contested the non‐compliance by the EU before the Court of Justice and sought compensation. This paper assesses the ruling of the Court of Justice against Fedon and argues that the Court got it wrong, both in terms of legal principle and as a matter of legal technicalities.     

Competing Supremacies and Clashing Institutional Rationalities: the Danish Supreme Court's Decision in the Ajos Case and the National Limits of Judicial Cooperation

On 6 December 2016, the Supreme Court of Denmark (SCDK) ruled on the grounds of Ajos case. The ruling concerned the scope of the principle of non‐discrimination on the grounds of age and whether a national court could weigh the principle of non‐discrimination on grounds of age against the principles of legal controversy, as the protection of legitimate expectations. The ruling has caused a great deal of controversy as the SCDK defied clear guidelines from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the ruling. Moreover, the case has been seen by some as an example of a new ‘sovereigntism’ in Danish law that is at odds with the project of European integration through law. This article explains the case from both an EU law and Danish constitutional law perspective. It concludes by providing a set of explanations of the new course of the SCDK in its relationship with the EU.     

Relatively Absolute? The Undermining of Article 3 ECHR in Ahmad v UK

The recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Ahmad v UK dangerously undermines the well‐established case law of the Court on counter‐terrorism and non‐refoulement towards torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Although ostensibly rejecting the ‘relativist’ approach to Article 3 ECHR adopted by the House of Lords in Wellington v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Court appeared to accept that what is a breach of Article 3 in a domestic context may not be a breach in an extradition or expulsion context. This statement is difficult to reconcile with the jurisprudence constante of the Court in the last fifteen years, according to which Article 3 ECHR is an absolute right in all its applications, including non‐refoulement, regardless of who the potential victim of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment is, what she may have done, or where the treatment at issue would occur.     

Sickness Absence and the Court of Justice: Examining the Role of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment Law

Being absent from work due to sickness is a critical issue for individuals and their employers, but it has traditionally fallen outside the scope of EU employment legislation. This article argues that this is changing; it examines case‐law under the Working Time and Employment Equality Directives. The article considers the justifications that the Court of Justice has advanced to explain this expansion in EU employment law. It finds that the Court has, at times, invoked fundamental social rights as a basis for interpreting employment legislation in a manner favourable to workers. Yet the way in which the Court deploys rights‐based reasoning can be difficult to anticipate, not least the countervailing weight attached to the interests of employers. The case studies indicate that fundamental rights discourse offers a possible foundation for more extensive readings of employment legislation, but it is not a simple ‘trump card’ for advocates of stronger worker protection.     

Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice

On 15 April 2008, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) raised for the first time a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This decision (see judgment No 102/2008 and order No 103/2008) represented a turning point in the ICC's case‐law, and calls for a careful assessment of the motives backing such revirement as well as of the legal reasoning that the Italian judges used to wrap it up without repudiating their previous case‐law. In addition to this preliminary analysis, the aim of this essay is to explore two themes: i) the developments of the ICC's case‐law as regards the role of Community Law and the ECJ, and ii) the appraisal of the interplay between the ICC and the ECJ in the light of the notion of ‘interpretive competition’.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

How Does the European Court of Justice Reason? A Review Essay on the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

This review essay analyses two significant recent contributions to the debate over the reasoning of the Court of Justice (CJ). These contributions highlight the impossibility of a wholly scientific and deductive approach to attributing ‘correct’ outcomes to the Court's case‐law. At the same time, their analysis adds significant findings for the debate over the Court's possible ‘activist’ or political role. Following from these contributions, this essay makes two arguments: firstly, that the inability of the Court to anchor its reasoning solely in a deductive form of legal reasoning should encourage the CJ to engage in a more advanced ‘constitutional dialogue’ with the EU's political institutions; and secondly, that truly understanding the Court's reasoning involves a closer analysis of the institutional and personal dynamics influencing Court decisions. Understanding European judicial reasoning may require a closer look at the social and political—as well as doctrinal—context within which European judges act.     

Of Values and Legitimacy – Discourse Analytical Insights on the Copyright Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) increasingly faces societal value‐conflicts in EU law disputes. For example, in EU copyright law, in the digital age, diverse fundamental values, as well as cultural and societal developments, are at stake. This article discusses the role of the CJEU in the European value discourse, using copyright law as a case study. The methodological approach used, critical discourse analysis, is seldom applied in jurisprudential studies, but is well suited for teasing out value‐related aspects of case law. Exploratory research of seminal copyright cases suggests that the CJEU's discourse of the various values seems unnecessarily one‐sided and shallow. A lack of discursiveness in the jurisprudence would diminish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, and would not offer adequate guidance to national courts or private decision‐makers, to whom the Court at the same time may be leaving more of the task of value reconciliation.     

The EPO as patent law‐maker in Europe

This article examines the role of the European Patent Organisation (EPO) in the European patent system. It shows how the delineation of European patent law has been handed over by governments to an autonomous, quasi‐judicial technocracy at the EPO and reveals how the process of hollowing out economic and political factors in the grant of patents is assisted by the deference of national courts to the EPO and the creation of the Unified Patent Court. It suggests that these developments pose a threat to democratic governance of the patent system in Europe because the delineation of intellectual property rights has inherent economic and political dimensions which are not reducible to technical legal issues of interpretation or technocratic expertise.     

Unravelling Osman

The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Osman v United Kingdom , decided in October 1998, has proved very controversial. Its implications for the UK law of negligence appear to be immense. Not the least of the complexities associated with the decision is the widespread perception that the reasoning of the Court is extremely difficult to understand, indeed, that it is at times contradictory. This article subjects the Osman judgment to close analysis. It explains the Court's approach to Article 6(1) by reference to the way in which the Strasbourg court has over many years developed its case law on this provision. The article includes an overview of the way in which, so far, the decision has been deployed in UK law. The author suggests that, whatever about the actual result of the case, the reasoning of the European Court in Osman is deeply flawed, and that the UK judiciary should be mindful of this fact when considering its deployment in domestic law.     

Comparative Institutional Analysis,the European Court of Justice and the General Principle of Non‐Discrimination—or—Alternative Tales on Equality Reasoning

The general principle of equality in European law is often held to be inconsistently applied by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and insufficiently supported by methodology. Contrary to this assessment, this paper argues that there is substantial coherence and theoretical underpinning to the court's equality reasoning. First, it shows that the respective case‐law can be subdivided into three groups, depending on the level of scrutiny applied. Second, it establishes that the prevailing accounts have difficulty in explaining the court's choice of scrutiny due to their limited selection of analytical parameters. Third, it concludes that comparative institutional analysis offers an alternative framework to make the ECJ's testing approaches in equality matters more intelligible.     

Commons as possessions: The path to protection of the commons in the ECHR system

The ‘commons’ is not mentioned in the texts of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P‐1). This essay argues that ‘possessions’ — which does appear in the latter — should be interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to protect commons against national governments' undue interferences. The argument comprises two parts. First, we analyse the polysemic term ‘possessions’ to show how the current understanding of this category is marred by flawed assumptions and by false dichotomies. Then, we propose an ‘ecological’ construction of legal relationships between subjects and objects. We find support in the ECtHR case law on Article 8. We argue this approach should be extended to Article 1 P‐1: once disentangled from possessive individualism and market paradigms, ‘possessions’ encompass the commons and the category offers a solid legal basis toward the justiciability in Strasbourg of privatisations.     

Accommodating Religious Beliefs: Harm,Clothing or Symbols,and Refusals to Serve Others

Is there a middle path between the existing case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which rarely requires accommodation of a religious individual's beliefs, and a ‘general right to conscientious objection’, which would exempt religious individuals from all anti‐discrimination and other rules interfering with manifestations of their beliefs? The author argues that failure to accommodate is better analysed as prima facie indirect discrimination, to highlight the exclusionary effects of non‐accommodation on religious minorities, and that the presence or absence of direct or indirect harm to others (or cost, disruption or inconvenience to the accommodating party) could guide case‐by‐case assessments of whether the prima facie indirect discrimination is justified. The author then applies a harm analysis to the examples of religious clothing or symbols and religiously motivated refusals to serve others, recently considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom.     

Judicial Interpretation or Judicial Activism? The Legacy of Rationalism in the Studies of the European Court of Justice

During the last two decades, law as a factor in European integration has attracted great scientific interest. Numerous studies and theoretical analyses have been published that have undertaken the task of examining and explaining the role of law in the progress of integration. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in particular, as Europe's judiciary body, draws much attention in this context. However, the inflexible, mechanistic and universalistic notion of rationality that these works employ leads to serious misinterpretations and unjustified criticism regarding the role the ECJ takes in the course of integration. Within the frameworks of contemporary approaches, the Court is perceived as just one more political player among other actors and institutions, able to shape the EU in the pursuit of its own rational interests. By outlining the theoretical concept of context rationality, this article shows that the logics of law and judicial lawmaking are based on a non‐trivial and non‐political rationality and cannot be understood appropriately without paying attention to the context of European law.     

Anti‐suit Injunctions and the Doctrine of Comity

Hin‐Pro International Logistics Limited v CSAV is an important case in the areas of anti‐suit injunctions, contractual interpretation and private international law. Despite the ambiguities surrounding the jurisdiction clause contained in the bills of lading, the Court of Appeal construed the jurisdiction clause as ‘exclusive’ in the context of a ‘contractual background’, and affirmed the continuation of the anti‐suit injunction granted by the Commercial Court. It is argued that the approach of applying the common law principles of contractual interpretation to a bill of lading is questionable. The approach used to apply English private international law is problematic in a number of ways. There are legitimate reasons for concern that the doctrine of comity in English private international law may become undermined as a result.     

European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard Principles?

This article analyses whether and how competition soft law instruments are taken into consideration by the European Courts and the Advocates General. The quantitative analysis of the case‐law reveals that even if arguments based on competition guidelines or notices were brought to court since the early days of European law, it is only during the last two decades that they have been taken seriously. The results of the qualitative analysis point to the fact that soft law instruments are considered by the European Courts an important and specific part of the body of European norms that they should use when deciding cases submitted for their judgment. Legal effects are recognised to these not legally binding instruments, but only when it serves the enforcement of hard, general principles of law.     

Responsive Adjudication and the ‘Social Legitimacy’ of the Internal Market

This article is concerned with the social legitimacy of EU free movement adjudication. What does social legitimacy entail within the multi‐level ‘embedded liberalism’ construction of the internal market? How can the objective of free movement (market access) and a commitment to social diversity both be pursued without one necessarily trumping the other? This article seeks to contribute to these questions on the basis of a discussion of what has come to be known as the argument from transnational effects and the development of an adjudicative model that can be termed ‘socially responsive’. On the basis of an ‘ideal types’ analysis of the case law of the Court, it is concluded that responsiveness to Member State social context is lacking in any coherent form in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, a responsive model of adjudication can be (re)constructed by streamlining the identified ideal type adjudicative rationales. In the midst of this process of discovery, an operational rationale to establish the substantive (social) scope and reach of the internal market shall be submitted.     

The Value of ‘Integration’ in European Law—The Implications of the Förster Case on Legal Assessment of Integration Conditions for Third‐Country Nationals

The European Court of Justice's Förster judgment can lead to a reduction of legal uncertainty caused by integration requirements for third‐country nationals. The judgment has created a strong ‘assumption of integration’ after five years of legal residence because it equalised integration requirements for European students to access the welfare system of host Member States with a requirement of five years legal residence. Almost all pieces of European legal migration law also contain five‐year residence requirements after which the status of third‐country nationals improves. However, these improvements are mostly subjected to the fulfilment of additional integration requirements. To keep coherence with European law, courts will not be able to disregard the Förster‘assumption of integration’ when assessing the legality of integration conditions for third‐country nationals put in place in addition to residence requirements.     

欧洲法律下的提单管辖权条款

本文通过对荷兰法律及有关管辖权和民商事判决执行方面的两个主要公约 (EEX公约和 L ugano公约 )的介绍 ,结合大量的案例和欧共体法院对公约的解释 ,论述了欧洲法律下一个有效的标准格式中的管辖权条款所包含的条件及公约和各国国内法对当事人自由订立的标准格式中的管辖权条款的限制。