Stuck in the Middle: Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry,the U.S.-China Tech Fight,and Cross-Strait Stability

The Trump administration has worked to restrict the People's Republic of China's ability to manufacture and acquire semiconductor chips since 2018. Caught in the crossfire of this burgeoning tech war is Taiwan, which is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world's largest semiconductor chip manufacturer. With the United States banning companies that use U.S. technology in their chip manufacturing process from doing business with Huawei, TSMC can no longer do business with the Chinese tech company, one of its most important clients. Until the Trump administration announced the license restriction on Huawei, TSMC had managed to walk the fine line of doing business with both China and the United States, without riling either. This article argues that the TSMC example is indicative of how great power competition between the two countries will play out for the foreseeable future. TSMC has announced that it will build a new factory in Arizona as it faces Chinese firms poaching its employees and Chinese actors hacking its systems and code for trade secrets—all actions demonstrating how great power competition will play out for tech dominance. Avoiding direct live-fire conflict, China and the United States will work to restrict the other's actions and development by forcing important tech companies, such as TSMC, into picking a side.     

The Soldier, The State, and The Clash of Civilizations: The Legacy of Samuel Huntington

The major military challenge that the United States faces today is the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. military is engaged in a grueling counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist movement known as the Taliban, which is based among Pashtun tribes in Southeastern Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan, who have never been permanently subdued by a foreign military force. This challenge comes in the wake of that other grueling counterinsurgency war that the U.S. military has had to conduct in Iraq, where its chief adversary was the Islamist movement known as al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Moreover, the challenge in Afghanistan comes on what could be the eve of an impending military challenge, perhaps even a war, with Iran, as that Islamist state relentlessly moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons. In its entire history of two- and-a-quarter centuries, the United States has never been engaged in an unbroken succession of three wars, in three different countries. Together, the U.S. wars with or within Islamist countries add up to what is a “long war,” indeed.     

Vietnam's Better War

When General Creighton Abrams took command of U.S. forces in Vietnam a better war resulted from his superior understanding of the war and more effective conduct of it, including improvement of South Vietnam's armed forces and emphasis on pacification. As American forces were progressively withdrawn, the South Vietnamese took on more and more of the load, winning the counterinsurgency war and fighting valiantly and effectively against the enemy's conventional invasion until the United States Congress drastically reduced materiel and financial assistance at the same time communist forces received massively increased support from their patrons. Thus, inevitably, South Vietnam succumbed.     

中美舆论战与中国的国际传播

美国政府视中国为首要战略竞争对手,并进行遏制打压,激起中国的强烈反对,而舆论战是中美博弈的重要组成部分。中美两国舆论战涵盖的议题广泛,影响波及全球,并发展到意识形态对抗和互相驱逐媒体从业人员的地步。中美双方的舆论攻势和各自国家的政治制度、社会形态的特点息息相关,其阶段性效果与中美既有的国际影响力相匹配。在美国对华大打舆论战的情况下,中国在西方发达国家的形象受损,但在国内极大地凝聚了人心、提振了士气。未来,美国可能仿效针对苏联和俄罗斯的做法,将舆论战更多地和心理战、政治战相结合,以服务其遏制中国的目标。为增强自身的国际传播力,更好地服务与美国的舆论战,中国需要维护好政治安全,提高话语和叙事能力及舆论反击效果,将传统媒体和新兴媒体相融合,并将发展中国家作为国际传播的重点,以逐步形成同我国综合国力和国际地位相匹配的国际话语权。     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

From Jerusalem to Baghdad? Israel and the War in Iraq

The prevailing opinion that the Bush administration took the United States to war against Iraq in March 2003 under false pretenses has led many to believe that Israel's security was the secret rationale for the war. According to this "war for Israel" thesis, neoconservative policymakers in the Bush administration, the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, and Israel's government all pushed the United States to go to war with Iraq for the sake of Israel's security. This article critically assesses this controversial claim and examines Israel's role in the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. I argued that while neoconservatives were instrumental in promoting the Iraq war, Israel was not their primary concern and that although American Jewish organizations and the Israeli government did largely support the Iraq war, they did not seek it or actively lobby for it.     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

National Security in the Post-Pandemic Era

The geopolitical implications of COVID-19 are profound in the near term, and will have a ripple effect throughout the U.S. economy and the foundations of U.S. power. It could be more strategically contagious over the longer term if it compels a sharp change in how Americans see their role in the world and adapts its conception of national security. This article presents both the economic and fiscal impact of the pandemic in the United States, as well as the likely consequences for national security investments and the Pentagon's budget. It offers three potential defense strategies, at three possible spending levels, to examine options for the next administration.     

The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.     

The Struggle for Sea Power: Lessons from the Great War

The history of the contest for naval mastery during the Great War has particular resonance for today because the United States now faces a serious threat from China's increasing capabilities to wage war at sea. China's naval challenge calls into question America's continued command of the maritime commons. The stakes at risk for the United States in today's contest are just as high as they were a hundred years ago for Britain. Defeat at sea would wreck American global leadership in the twenty-first century just as surely as it would have meant the collapse of British power in the twentieth. What, then, can we learn from past struggles for sea power and America's entry into the First World War that offers guidance for understanding our current strategic predicament?     

新一届美国政府对外政策及影响前瞻笔谈

近年来,世界多极化趋势不断发展,美国主导的全球秩序开始显露坍缩征兆。然而,美国仍然保持着当今世界唯一的超级大国地位,其内政外交政策选择一直具有全球性影响。特朗普政府实施的"美国优先"政策对全球秩序造成了严重冲击,特别是对华发动极限施压性的"贸易战"和战略竞争,使中美关系发生严重倒退。特朗普政府随心所欲、极端强硬的执政风格,不仅招致很多国家的激烈批判和反对,在美国国内也引起了巨大争议。美国大选已经落下帷幕,尽管现任总统特朗普仍然没有承认和接受败选事实,但美国政府更迭已经无可逆转。新一届美国政府将采取什么样的对外政策?我们将如何应对美国因政府更迭而发生的政策调整?为加强对美国对外政策的前瞻研究,2020年11月5日,本刊编辑部联合吉林大学经济学院、现代国际关系研究所、东北亚研究院、东北亚研究中心、美国研究所等单位召开了"美国大选后的世界格局与中美关系"学术研讨会,10位专家做了会议发言。本刊选择其中3篇和另外1篇投稿摘要刊发,希望能够促进对美国新一届政府内政外交政策的前瞻性研究。     

Cause,effect, and consistency: A response to Kenneth Waltz

In The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, we argued that the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel is due largely to the influence of a domestic interest group—comprised of Jews as well as non-Jews—and that this unusual situation is harmful to both the United States and Israel. Jerome Slater's thoughtful review endorses many of our central arguments, but it also highlights several points of disagreement. He argues that we overlooked important alternative sources, defined the lobby too broadly, and exaggerated its influence on Congress and especially the Executive Branch. Although Slater is even more critical of U.S. Middle East policy than we are, he argues that the special relationship is due to strong cultural and religious affinities and broad public support in American society, and not to the influence of the lobby. In fact, the alternative sources cited by Slater do not undermine our basic claims; a broad conception of the lobby makes more sense than his narrower definition; and there is little disagreement between us about the lobby's influence on Capitol Hill or in the White House. Most importantly, public opinion in the United States does not explain why the United States gives Israel such extensive and nearly unconditional backing. Although most Americans have a favorable image of Israel, surveys show that they also favor a more even-handed Middle East policy and a more normal relationship with Israel. Thus, the special relationship is due primarily to the lobby's influence, and not to the American people's enduring identification with the Jewish state.     

论中美之间的权力转移

经过60余年的物质性和社会性成长,中国的国家实力已经有了明显提高。中国实力的增长和美国实力的相对衰退使中美之间出现了权力转移现象。由于中国坚持和平发展道路和对现存国际秩序持基本满意的态度,中美之间的权力转移未必引起冲突与战争,权力能否和平转移取决于美国对中国崛起的战略判断。中美之间的权力转移并不意味着中崛美落,而是中美和其他主要国家或国家集团一道在国际事务中发挥重要作用。     

Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy

International relations theory has difficulty explaining how similar policies produce different outcomes. Iraq and North Korea have been identified as members of the "axis of evil" with weapons of mass destruction programs that threaten the United States. Yet in late 2002, the United States prepared to attack Iraq whereas it chose to negotiate with North Korea, even after North Korea admitted to a secret nuclear program in direct violation of its 1994 agreement with the United States. Moreover, a direct comparison with Iraq shows North Korea to possess the greater material capability to threaten the United States. I argue that a language-based constructivist approach can explain these differences in U.S. foreign policy where other theoretical approaches cannot. By examining the U.S. entanglement in intersected language games—the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea and the enforcement of United Nations Resolutions in Iraq—it becomes possible to show how the United States could construct North Korea's nuclear program as a manageable threat that could be dealt with diplomatically.     

A Fine Balance: India Walks a Tightrope between Iran and the United States

India confronts the conflicting imperatives of Indian domestic politics and its strategic interests when dealing with Iran. As India's global profile has risen in recent years and its ties with the United States have strengthened, this conflict has come into sharper relief. India's traditionally close ties with Iran have become a major factor influencing how certain sections of U.S. policymakers evaluate a U.S.-India partnership. India has tried to balance carefully its relations with Iran and the United States; however, due to intense American pressure, especially after the signing of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact, India has moved closer to the United States concerning the Iranian nuclear program. But strong domestic constraints remain that will prevent India from completely abandoning its ties with Iran, even as a re-evaluation of India-Iran bilateral ties is long overdue.     

Keeping Friends Close and Enemies Closer: Classical Realist Statecraft and Economic Exchange in U.S. Interwar Strategy

This article addresses the relationship between economic exchange and grand strategy and explains why rival states exchange with each other. The theoretical debate among realists is defined, while a novel, yet classical, realist exchange theory is proffered and evaluated against the record of U.S.-Japanese exchange, 1918–41. In this particular case, the origins of Japan's oil dependency on the United States are detailed for the first time as is the U.S. policy toward Britain and the Netherlands that created this dependency. The article finds U.S. strategic coordination of Japan's economic vulnerabilities and their use advanced U.S. grand strategy leading into WWII. The article concludes that the July 1941 U.S. oil embargo against Japan was purposeful and the product of a larger policy arc from the early post-WWI period.     

21世纪初美国经济发展趋势分析

美国经济在全球经济中占有非常重要的地位,因此美国经济的未来走势直接关系到全球经济的发展,美国在经济发展中所具有的优势地位以及在未来经济发展中所要面对的挑战与风险,美国未来经济面临着巨额的经常项目逆差、财政收支赤字、能源价格高涨以及房地产泡沫破灭的威胁,使美国必须采取措施进行调整,这将导致本世纪初美国未来经济发展速度减慢。     

Navigating two Asias: how Washington deals with the Indo-Pacific’s rising powers

ABSTRACT

The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India’s rise as a means of balancing against China’s ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States’ pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition.     

Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq

The need to demonstrate America's resolve is a major argument among those who oppose a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. According to this argument, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility and embolden the forces of radical Islam in their war against the United States. This article assesses this “reputational” argument and concludes that evidence from radical Islamists’ pronouncements gives the argument significant and unprecedented forcefulness. These pronouncements unmistakably call into question the United States’ resoluteness by pointing to America's past withdrawals from theaters of war and declare Iraq as the central front, raising the reputational stake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq considerably. The potency of the reputational argument is also unprecedented when it is compared to its similar formulation during the Vietnam War, when it was vague and short of supporting evidence. The reputational argument may play an important rationale in maintaining a substantial level of American forces in Iraq for years to come.     

If Not Soft Balancing,Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China

Some scholars argue that soft balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of the power distribution in the system, unipolarity, but also a rational behavior under another condition, economic dependence. We argue that the interplay between power disparity and economic dependence shapes a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. Using U.S. policy toward China after the Cold War as a crucial test, we suggest that the huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China. We conclude that future U.S.-China relations depend on whether the United States declines as a result of China's rise and on the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries.