Still the One? The Role of Europe in American Defense Strategy

According to the 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States continues to rely on Europe as its most likely, most capable military partner for dealing with the most vexing security challenges. However, the conventional wisdom in Washington holds that European allies are not terribly capable militarily or very willing to use force. So why would the United States rely on such lax partners? In fact, the evidence on European defense spending, capabilities, and willingness is decidedly mixed, with many positive trends among the negative ones. To build on the positive, the United States can bring to the table assets and resources necessary to facilitate the transatlantic partnership before it needs to be exercised.     

Imperial Allies

The United States has had, and will continue to have, a difficult time gathering allies because of the supremacy it enjoys. States support the United States not because they share a common objective, but because they want to benefit politically, economically, and strategically from being associated with Washington. In other words, the United States has allies not because of the objective it tries to achieve but because of what it can offer to them. Such alliances are fickle and last only as long as the benefits allies derive from Washington outweigh the costs. For the United States, managing this situation requires three skills: first, the continued ability to offer benefits to potential allies; second, diplomatic dexterity to manage mostly bilateral alliances; and third, the strategic flexibility required in order to be able to change swiftly from one ally to another.     

The AfPak Campaign and the Limits of Canadian Diplomacy

Initially, recognition of the vital role played by regional diplomacy did not accompany NATO’s substantial commitment to economic and political development in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Pakistan in particular had a major influence on the conduct of reconstruction efforts and NATO’s efforts to lay the institutional foundations in Afghanistan. Canada, an early and committed participant in the International Security Assistance Force, would by 2005 come to recognise the vital importance of the role of Pakistan in the outcome of the mission. However, regional limits to the influence of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and Canada made comprehensive efforts unattainable.     

The beginning of a new cold war?

The proactive policies of the United States in expanding NATO, its bombing of Iraq in December 1998, NATO's air war on Yugoslavia in 1999 in which the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was accidentally bombed, and the United States’ new perspectives on the use of force in the global arena have led to increasing resentment and tensions on the part of Russia and the PRC. As Washington is seeking new rationales for the unilateral use of force worldwide, or circumventing the use of sanctions, of the UN Security Council before taking military actions, Russia and China are becoming increasingly convinced that the United States is bent upon establishing its global hegemony. Obviously, neither Russia nor China will let this increasing proactivism go unchallenged.     

The Quad,AUKUS, and I2U2 formats: Major lessons from minilaterals

Over the past two decades, a trend has emerged where US partners and allies look outside of their bilateral relationship with the United States and pre-existing multilateral bodies to join ad-hoc networks. They are joining these networks to both obtain their own security goods and to provide regional public goods. Yet, these ad-hoc networks, or “minilaterals,” often include multiple US allies or shared partners of the United States. For example, the revived Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) includes Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, encompassing two separate US treaty alliances. Similarly, the tripartite pact AUKUS connects the US-UK transatlantic alliance relationship to the US-Australia alliance in the Indo-Pacific. The newest addition to this growing trend in minilateralism, the I2U2, which redefine the Middle East as West Asia by bringing together the United States, India, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), provides additional insight into the benefits of minilaterals as mechanisms for organizing interstate cooperation.     

The bush administration's security strategy: Implications for transatlantic relations

There are signs of growing transatlantic estrangement over multiple international issues. An important catalyst for this estrangement is the National Security Strategy (NSS) that the Bush administration promulgated in September 2002, a document that is a detailed imperial blueprint. Despite its pretensions, however, it is not a global strategy, but instead appears to apply primarily to the 'Islamic Arc'--the territory from North Africa to the border of India. The administration's security strategy has important implications for the transatlantic relationship, since the United States is encouraging NATO to become a junior partner for missions throughout the Islamic Arc. Given the growing divergence in US and European interests and policy perspectives, the role that the Bush administration envisages for NATO is probably not sustainable. The 'West' was an artificial geostrategic concept that needed an extraordinarily threatening common adversary (the Soviet Union) to give it substance. The US and its allies will continue to drift apart strategically, and the Bush administration's security strategy may actually hasten that process. It is uncertain, however, whether the European Union will achieve the cohesion necessary to counterbalance US power. The main task facing statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic is to learn how to disagree about specific policies without becoming disagreeable.     

Diplomacy of Estrangement: The Dealings of the United States with Pakistan before 9/11

Diplomatic correspondence between Washington and the American Embassy in Islamabad published by the National Security Archive shows that during the last 35 years of the twentieth century American diplomacy toward Pakistan faced a mutually de-escalating relationship. Pakistan wanted American economic and military assistance as well as support in its conflicts with India. The United States was ready to aid Pakistan, but only so far as Islamabad respected American demands. These focused on containing Soviet influence in the region and, more recently, fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States also asked Pakistan to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. To enforce this policy, successive American administrations showered Pakistan with sanctions. These sanctions were lifted again and again, because they undercut American diplomatic influence with the Pakistani government. Washington did not intend to support Pakistan in its conflicts with India. Pakistan let down the United States by not using its leverage over the Taliban to capture Osama Bin Laden. Mistrust resulting from this roller coaster relationship should have warned American diplomats not to take Pakistan's support in the war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for granted.     

The United States,Europe, and Homeland Security: Seeing Soft Security Concerns Through a Counterterrorist Lens

The attacks of 11 September 2001 created a new paradigm for domestic security in the United States. The struggle against terrorism, particularly catastrophic terrorism, became the government’s most important priority. In the wake of these attacks, the Department of Homeland Security was established, with broader powers of enforcement, set forth in new legislation such as the Patriot Act. This new focus on homeland security will have a secondary effect on the efforts of the US to deal effectively with a range of soft security threats in that it will increase attention to those concerns, particularly as they are seen as enablers of terrorism. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security is the largest reorganization of the US government in over 50 years, and will necessitate a reordering of the inter-departmental relationships on security matters as well as those critical to soft security cooperation with friends and allies abroad. Although the new department has absorbed many aspects of enforcing the nation’s laws, other functions key to soft security remain spread throughout other US government agencies. A comprehensive understanding of this new order will be key to enhancing the international struggle against soft security threats.     

The Radical Crescent: The United States,the Palestine Liberation Organisation,and the Lebanese Civil War, 1973–1978

This analysis examines the efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] to formalise relations with the United States before and after the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War. It details the public and private attempts by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to present the organisation as a legitimate partner for negotiations with Israel. However, the American secretary of state and national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, hindered the PLO’s diplomatic initiatives during the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations. Kissinger viewed the PLO as an impediment to his efforts to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict through separate peace agreements, rather than a comprehensive solution. Despite Washington’s objections to the PLO, the organisation had regional and international legitimacy, its stature aided by its political and ideological allies. Yet these ties also contributed to the PLO’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war. Kissinger encouraged Syria’s June 1976 invasion of Lebanon to weaken, if not destroy, the PLO as an independent actor. Although the PLO survived Syria’s intervention, Kissinger’s actions and agreements limited the diplomatic initiatives of the Jimmy Carter Administration.     

Eisenhower, arms control and disarmament: United States diplomatic documents, 1958-60

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60: Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998.     

Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council

The unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1441 marked the onset of the most severe crisis of legitimacy that the United Nations has faced in the post-Cold War period. While some have asserted that the diplomatic clashes between erstwhile allies France and the United States were inevitable given the rise of American unipolarity, an analysis of events leading to the failed US attempt to gain a second resolution reveals that the outcome was among the least preferred for both participants. Using the Verbs In Context system, we conduct a computer-based content analysis of the public statements of the United States and French leaders. Our findings suggest that the diplomatic breakdown was exacerbated by each leaders' elevated sense of control over the situation and their inaccurate perception of their opponent's preferences.     

Extremist Groups in Egypt

On 11 September, terrorism became a much greater reality for Americans and much of the rest of the world. Indeed, that date marks the beginning of a new era for the global community, an era that may be called the Violent New World Order, or the Age of Fear. Since the events of 11 September, the United States has been working to build a coalition against terrorism consisting of countries throughout the world. More recently, the United States launched attacks on positions inside Afghanistan in order to wipe out Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization and assisted the Northern Alliance in the overthrow of the Taliban government that had protected al-Qaeda. Given the military prowess of the United States and its allies, these acts have largely achieved their short-term goals. Over the long term, however, the United States, its allies, those countries that have been breeding grounds for terrorist organizations and those whose citizens sympathize with terrorist organizations need to look deeper at the causes of terrorism. On the surface, the religious zeal associated with the most prolific terrorist organizations appears to be something with which the United States and its allies cannot negotiate. The frustrations that drive people to acts of terror, however, are often rooted in adverse socio-economic conditions as well as cultural and political tensions that need to be addressed by underdeveloped nations and the larger international community. Since the deserts of Egypt gave birth to the rise of the first Islamic militant organizations, the Egyptian experience provides a perspective.     

Eisenhower,arms control and disarmament: United States diplomatic documents, 1958–60

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–60: Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998.     

Security challenges and institutional responses: An Austrian perspective

Common wisdom is that NATO's future hinges solely on the outcome of the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. While the state of Afghanistan will impact the future of the Alliance for better or for worse, it will not be the sole or even primary factor to influence the future of NATO. In many ways, Afghanistan has become an excuse for the Alliance to ignore some of the in-built problems of the organisation. The allies' inability to define clearly the nature of the Alliance and its core missions, a lack of capability and poor funding, topped off by exceedingly weak and troubled relations with other international organisations, particularly the European Union, all pose significant challenges that the alliance must address to remain relevant, coherent, and equipped to engage effectually in future operations.     

Rising to the Challenge: Europe’s Security Policy in East Asia amid US-China Rivalry

ABSTRACT

China’s growing power and assertiveness towards its smaller and weaker neighbours has been a wakeup call for the European Union and its member states which, as a result, have stepped up their involvement in East Asia. EU security policy in the region shows many elements of alignment with the United States, but also differences. In North East Asia, the EU has adopted harsh sanctions against North Korea but, contrary to the Trump administration which continues to seek regime change, has left the door open for dialogue. Moreover, the EU supports the process of trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea, while Washington has traditionally been lukewarm towards a process that excludes the US and risks being dominated by Beijing. The transatlantic allies also show differing approaches with regard to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While EU security policy in East Asia is largely complementary to that of Washington, in some cases Europe tends – albeit inadvertently – to favour Beijing.     

Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’ Relationships

Affect exists among close allies and influences their actions and reactions vis-à-vis each other. These countries’ perceptions of, and affective attachment to, the specialness of their relationships explains why, in certain circumstances, big clashes occur among them. In this sense, affect explains why crises among close allies are more signals of strength than weakness: the passionate nature of such crises—as opposed to more routine or recurrent disagreements—is triggered by the high value placed by close allies on their ties and not, as often stated in the literature, by the erosion of these ties. After developing this argument, I illustrate it with the analysis of two crises among close allies: the Suez crisis between Britain and the United States in late 1956, and the Iraq crisis between France and the United States in early 2003. I then contrast these episodes with a crisis between two allies with a much less affectively charged relationship—the United States and Turkey, also in early 2003 over the Iraq War issue.     

Geopolitics of Nuclear Hypertrophy. America,the Bomb and the Temptation of Nuclear Primacy

The United States’ grand strategy has consistently been marked by a distinct tendency toward nuclear hypertrophy. Especially the inherent difficulties in extending deterrence to its allies and friends, compounded by the geopolitical characteristics of the US as an unassailable ‘insular’ fortress off Eurasia, have generated, rather paradoxically, a strong incentive for Washington to pursue a wide margin of nuclear superiority, if not nuclear primacy. This has implied, in turn, the deployment of redundant arsenals, robust counterforce capabilities and even a ballistic missile defence. Significantly, not even the Obama administration, though solemnly committed to nuclear disarmament, abstained from embracing a very ambitious modernisation program of American nuclear forces.     

War Powers and the Atlantic Divide

As within the United States debates have arisen over how much unilateral power the President has to deploy force, so too debates are being raised across Europe. Depending on each country's history, system of government, and economic status, various historic positions are shifting. Public, as well as elite, voices are shaping the debate. Another point of tension is NATO's changing role as countries develop autonomous war caveats. Extended analysis of how Great Britain and Germany are grappling with these concerns has great import for U.S. policy. Learning to skillfully persuade its European allies will gain the United States better cooperation from those who do not share the U.S. war powers model.     

Before salt: Ten years of US arms control policy, 1958-68

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958-60, Vol. Ill, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1996); FRUS, 1961-3 VII, Arms Control and Disarmament (1995); FRUS, 1961-3, VIII, National Security Policy (1996); FRUS, 1964-8, XI, Arms Control and Disarmament (1997).     

西方“技术联盟”组建的战略背景、目标与困境

美国因战略背景变化不断进行战略工具调试,其主导的西方"技术联盟"作为关键的战略遏制工具,曾经成功地限制了战略竞争对手的经济与技术进步。面对新历史环境下的战略博弈,美国再次谋求联合西方盟友组建新的排他性"技术联盟",并加大与战略对手在新技术维度的战略竞争与博弈力度。目前的全球技术结构特征、全球价值链的结构制约、欧美技术治理结构等多重矛盾因素,给"技术联盟"的建立及其战略有效性带来了新困境,但"技术联盟"作为一种战略工具,依旧可能是未来美国政府在"战略安全"语境下的优先战略选项。"技术联盟"扩散的"战略安全"逻辑阻碍了全球技术进步,并将催生全球技术格局的"隔离"状态,同时其外溢效应还可能包括瓦解全球价值链的潜在风险。