The power triangle in the Indian Ocean: China,India and the United States

The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming the point of focus in assessing Asia's future security challenges. As both India and China are building up their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and as China's stakes in the region (protecting its maritime trade) interact with India's aspirations (being the regional dominant power and security provider), tensions are likely to rise. The United States has an established role in the Indian Ocean, and its approach to the contestation between Indian and Chinese interests may play a key role in limiting frictions. These developments have led many analysts to foresee the emergence of a balance of power system in the Indian Ocean region and East Asia which would be comparable to that of nineteenth-century Europe. In presenting the interplay between the three major stakeholders in the Indian Ocean, this paper aims to outline the implications of a balance of power system in the Indian Ocean region and demonstrate that it may not guarantee peace and stability, but, with regard to Organski's ‘power transition’ theory, could lead to quite the contrary.     

The Struggle for Sea Power: Lessons from the Great War

The history of the contest for naval mastery during the Great War has particular resonance for today because the United States now faces a serious threat from China's increasing capabilities to wage war at sea. China's naval challenge calls into question America's continued command of the maritime commons. The stakes at risk for the United States in today's contest are just as high as they were a hundred years ago for Britain. Defeat at sea would wreck American global leadership in the twenty-first century just as surely as it would have meant the collapse of British power in the twentieth. What, then, can we learn from past struggles for sea power and America's entry into the First World War that offers guidance for understanding our current strategic predicament?     

China's Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment

Over the last fifteen years, the steady rise of China's naval capabilities has received a level of attention unmatched since the Soviet navy's expansion following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet much of that attention has focused on what that rise has meant for Taiwan's security or a possible contest with the United States.¹ But Beijing's seaward territorial concerns also reach far into the South China Sea. And it is there that the military balance has most swiftly swung in China's favor as a result of its modernization program. This article will examine not only how the military balance has shifted, but also what Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, could do to best preserve their territorial interests in response to that shift.     

Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia

Realists agree that great powers balance the military power of rising powers, but there is little agreement regarding secondary-state responses to rising powers. First, there are differences regarding whether secondary states balance or accommodate rising powers. Second, there are differences among realists regarding the distinct roles of economic and military factors in secondary-state alignment policies. Third, some scholars argue that state alignments are not necessarily determined by realist variables, but can reflect preferences shaped by intentions, historical experiences, or cultural influences. This paper addresses these issues in balance-of-power theory. Its empirical focus is the impact of the rise of China on secondary-state alignments in East Asia. After examining the complex mix of China's military and economic reach in East Asia, it concludes that secondary-state behavior is sensitive to local variation in the great power capabilities and that secondary states tend to accommodate rather than balance rising powers. It further concludes that economic capabilities alone are insufficient to generate accommodation, so that the political-economy literature should reexamine cases of apparent secondary-state accommodation to economic dependency, sensitive to the presence of military vulnerability on the part these secondary states to proximate great powers. These conclusions suggest that there is nothing sui generis or culturally-determined in East Asian international politics and that realism can explain alignment behavior among East Asian states as well as it does among European states. Research on East Asia's response to China's rise that is sensitive to intra-regional variations in U.S. and Chinese military and economic capabilities also challenges assumptions of an emerging Chinese regional hegemony or of a costly region-wide U.S.-China competition.     

India’s fitful quest for seapower

Building on several years of research, and many interviews of Indian naval officers and government officials, both serving and retired, this article aims to provide a deeper understanding of the context and ramifications of India's naval rise. In particular, it seeks to explain a troubling paradox: the relative neglect of the navy vis-à-vis the other services, and the seeming misalignment of New Delhi's military strategy with its maritime geography. Indeed, the country's enviable position at the heart of the Indian Ocean, along with its peninsular formation, large exclusive economic zone, and extensive coastlines, would seem to suggest a natural predisposition towards the exercise of naval power. In reality, however, India's navy since independence has consistently been the most poorly funded of its military services, and has frequently struggled to make do with limited resources. The core question this article endeavors to address is whether this trend will persist, or whether various factors will combine in order to provoke a gradual rebalancing of the nation's military strategy and force structure.     

Command,Strategic Contest,and Confidence-building in the South China Sea

Wealth and power have steered global prestige from East to West and back again. History's serial relocations of economic growth and corollary power changed the character of the South China Sea into a conflictual conduit for Eastern and then Western colonialism, a strategic sea space in world war, and now a cockpit of contest to maintain or revise the rules-based international order. For the first time in several centuries, a Chinese blue water navy is projecting power across the Indo-Pacific and prosecuting a national maritime security strategy to transform the South China Sea into China's sovereign territory. In large part, the winner of the Sino-American struggle for preponderance in the South China Sea will steer the course of the twenty-first century in the Indo-Pacific.     

China's Foreign Policy Comes of Age

Although China has acquired new weight in world affairs, its foreign policy is driven primarily by domestic considerations. This is true of China's approach to international norms, where it largely resists the case for humanitarian intervention as accepted by most of the international community. The Chinese government still adheres to the doctrine of non-interference, albeit with some flexibility, when its prestige as a responsible great power may be at stake. Its management of regional security issues is conducted with a wary eye to the intense nationalism evident among the educated young at home. China's deepening economic interdependence with the outside world is raising new problems for China and its main trading partners as their respective societies become more deeply engaged with each other.     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese Military Modernization

According to a recent RAND report, the United States will not be able to defend Taiwan from Chinese military aggression by 2020. However, this study, like many others, raises more questions than it answers about the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) current defense posture.¹ Is there a Chinese plan to claim Taiwan by force after 2020? In contrast to the conclusions of the RAND report, this article argues that China's strategic approach is not designed primarily for fighting a war over Taiwan, or over any other matter of critical interest to China, but to create a disposition of forces so favorable to Beijing that China will not need to fight a war. Rather than thinking of China's strategy as a blueprint for using military power to secure territory or vital resources, such as oil, it may be more appropriate to consider the possibility that Beijing's actions are directed at obviating the need to fight. Beijing may calculate that it can render its interests unassailable by constructing a network of friendly or dependent states by means of arms transfers and the like. The basis of such a strategy is the assumption that China's prospective enemies, finding themselves encircled or obstructed by powers aligned with Beijing, will be unable to envision a military campaign to deny China oil at an acceptable level of costs. They will, therefore, be deterred from threatening China, e.g. by interrupting its oil supplies. It is a mark of the efficacy of this broader deterrence strategy that American security analysts are already ruling out a successful defense of Taiwan in 2020. Similarly, the early stages of an effort to insulate China from an energy-related challenge are already visible.     

Marketization,Class Structure,and Democracy in China: Contrasting Regional Experiences

After two and half decades of market reforms in China, the question of whether reforms have created favourable social conditions for democracy and whether the country's emerging entrepreneurial class will serve as the democratic social base have become hotly debated issues in both academic and policy circles. Based upon an analysis of two regions – Sunan and Wenzhou, the two prototypical local development patterns in China – the article argues that different patterns of economic development have produced distinct local level social and political configurations, only one of which is likely to foster the growth of democratic practices. It suggests that China's political future is largely dependent upon the emerging class structure and class relations that reform and development have produced. If the market reforms and economic development only enrich a few (like the Sunan case), then the possibility of democratic transition will likely be very bleak. Nonetheless, the possibility of a brighter alternative exists, as demonstrated by the Wenzhou case. These arguments thus link China's political transition to critical social conditions, echoing Barrington Moore's influential work on the social origins of democracy and dictatorship.     

Long-term outlook for China’s political reform

China’s post-1978 economic reform is generally acclaimed as success, for the Chinese economy has expanded nine-fold in a matter of 25 years and the country rose from the world’s 34th largest trading nation in 1978 to the third largest in 2004 ahead of Japan. Interestingly, the Chinese experiment is often described in the West as “economic reform without political reform”. This begets the question: how could a politically un-reformed system be able to deliver such an economic miracle? In reality, China has conducted, by its own standards, major political reforms since 1978. Though far short of the Western expectations, the Chinese experience since 1978 should better be described as “great economic reforms with lesser political reforms”, without which China’s economic success would be inconceivable. China’s “lesser political reforms” have reduced country’s opportunities for greater political change, thus alienating many reform-minded intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may also have helped China avert the possible economic and social upheavals which could have resulted from rushing too fast into a radically different economic and political system. There is a strongly held belief, especially among the more ‘ideological’ observers of Chinese affairs that unless there were a radical political reform, perhaps tantamount to a revolution, to rid China of its “oppressive” Communist Party, the Chinese system would inevitably collapse just like what had happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As the party has been in power, China had been predicted to face collapse in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the Soviet Union’s disintegration of 1990, the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2003 outbreak of SARS. Yet all these forecasts turned out to be wrong and the track record of the China doomsayers over the past 20 years is indeed poor. Will China become a democracy through its political reform in 20 years? Indeed, a full democracy could be the best scenario for China, the region and beyond, but it is difficult to give a definitive answer, which will, to a great extent, depend on how to achieve democracy in China, i.e. the costs/risks involved, as well as what kind of ultimate shape such a democracy will take. If full-fledged democratisation will take more time, the pressure for a more accountable government and more democratic society is growing, and this trend will continue with the rise of China’s middle class and civil society. Therefore, the most likely scenario for China in the coming two decades is that China will continue its own approach to political reform, and the relative successful experience of China’s economic reform may well set a pattern for China’s political reform in the years to come. As part of Europe’s general approach towards China’s political change, it is in Europe’s interest to assist, in line with the view of most Chinese, gradual reform rather than revolution or ‘regime change’, which could produce hugely negative consequences for China itself, Sino–European relations and European interests in China and even East Asia.     

Troubled Waters: China's Claims and the South China Sea

Among China's unresolved frontier questions, the South China Sea has become the most complex and troubled, and arguably the most significant and disconcerting. The economic and security stakes are high and the stake-holding states numerous and diverse. The claims that China (and others) make about the region reflect such interests but they are, ultimately, legal claims. Beijing's assertions of rights to the disputed areas have rested on three conceptually distinct grounds. Each presents a different mix of challenge and accommodation to international legal norms and the interests of other states, including China's neighbors, near-neighbors and the United States.while China's behavior (as well as that of other interested states) has been more and less assertive at various times, China's three basic arguments claiming rights to the region have been comparatively stable. Both China's pattern of multiple legal arguments and fluctuating actions and rhetoric do little to resolve the debate over whether a rising China will be deeply disruptive of the regional and international order or whether it can—with sufficient skill and tolerable adjustments—be accommodated and integrated. Although China's stance on rights in the South China Sea may be partly the accidental product of conflicting agendas and shifting assessments, Beijing's embrace of three distinct lines of legal argument arguably constitutes a strategy that serves China's interests given the factual, legal and strategic environment that China faces.     

How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's Foreign Policy Toward China

In the past 60 years, India-China relations have oscillated between friendship, hostility and indifference. In recent times, both countries have started competing for global economic gains and political status. In light of these events, the objective of this article is to analyze various strategies used by China against India, and India's policy response to these strategies. The article evaluates the process of foreign policy decision making in India, and traces the historical evolution of India's foreign policy towards China. It then deconstructs China's foreign policy towards India, and provides the rationale behind its strategies. The article suggests that after initial engagement with India on the question of boundary disputes, Chinese foreign policy has undergone a dramatic shift since 2007. It specifically evaluates the twin Chinese tactics of military incursions and denial of legitimacy to the Indian territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Based on an analysis of China's previous boundary disputes resolution record with neighbors, these tactics are identified as an extension of China's new strategy for resolving such disputes. The article concludes by suggesting various policy options available to India to counter China's new strategy on the Sino-Indian border.     

Defending the Nation: The Role of Nationalism in Chinese Thinking on Human Rights

This article examines the symbiotic relationship between Chinese thinking on human rights and Chinese nationalism. It analyses the three key periods in the Chinese discourse on human rights: late Qing, Republican, and post-Mao. In each case, discussions of rights have often (but not always) taken place within a wider debate about the protection of China's national interests from foreign infringement, although the nature of the foreign infringement has changed over time. During the late Qing debate, with China increasingly threatened by foreign military imperialism, scholars argued enthusiastically for the introduction of a new system of democratic rights as a vital tool of national resistance. During the Republican era that followed, the threat from outside remained the same. However by now many theorists had grown disillusioned with democracy and rights, believing that the only way China could withstand further foreign encroachments was to withhold rights from its people. In the post-Mao debate on rights, the interests of the nation are again at the fore. But with China now an emerging rather than a collapsing power, rights are often analysed – at least from an official perspective – within the context of cultural rather than military imperialism, the new ‘threat’ from abroad. The article then examines the views of China's ‘non-official’ rights thinkers, most of whom tend to be much less affected by nationalist concerns and ends with an assessment of the prospects for democracy and rights in China.     

The long march: the lessons of China's economic transition

It is widely known that Chinese transition to market economy was influenced by the newly industrialized Asian countries—Malaysia, Taiwan, and Hong Kong—but it is not as much evident that Chinese reform was also influenced by the economic reforms of Hungary. Hungary started market-oriented reforms in the late 1960s by introducing market-orientated measures in agriculture, in manufacturing, in retail trade, and in finances, which made Hungarian economy more flexible and efficient than other European socialist countries. It could be shown that the first market-oriented reform measures applied in China during the 1980s and 1990s have large similarities to the Hungarian reform introduced earlier. In that respect, we can say that Chinese economic reform has adapted lots of elements of the early Hungarian economic reform. At the same time, Hungarian reforms have died away, but after the “lost decade of the 1980s,” there was an extremely rapid transition to market economy, which—in spite of the seemingly successful beginning—could not contribute to a long-term and healthy economic development. Meanwhile in China, economic reform was rather successful, resulting in an unprecedented economic development at the end of the twentieth century. Authors of the present article analyse similarities of the Hungarian and Chinese reforms and try to explain the causes of the Hungarian failure and the Chinese success. “Let China Sleep, for when the Dragon awakes, she will shake the world.” The saying is attributed to Napoleon and he seems to have been right. Now that China has reversed the process of globalization and has become the winner, we should resignedly accept that China is wide awake. The country's economy has followed a rapid growth path thus China's economic dominance is felt in the entire Far East; moreover, the country with the highest population in the world the country is taking steps to emerge as a world power. The dragon is awake, and she is not going to take a great leap forward but instead it is now on the long march. In lieu of her specific tools, China is about to win: she is already one of the winners, if not the only winner of globalization.     

试析奥巴马政府亚太战略

奥巴马政府调整美国亚太战略,将美国全球战略和军事战略的重点转向东亚地区。其主要特点：一是高调宣示＂重返亚洲＂;二是通过加强与盟友关系和建立加入多边组织以强化美国在亚太地区的领导地位;三是加强美国在东亚和西太平洋地区的军事存在;四是争取区域经济合作的主导权;五是在地缘战略上以南海问题形成联盟。奥巴马政府亚太战略将受到经济上力不从心、以军事力量为主要手段支撑其亚太领导地位作用有限等因素的制约。但奥巴马政府调整美国亚太战略将使东亚地区特别是南海地区形势更加复杂化。     

China's Overseas Energy Investment: Myth and Reality

China's rapidly increasing demands for energy has been a subject for debate for years.To Chinese observers,the most important issue is how to safeguard energy supply and maintain economic growth.To most Western analysts,however,the more crucial issue is how Chinese energy policies and activities will affect world energy markets and world politics.One point is not in dispute: China's international energy activities,especially investment overseas,have been the main cause for international concern,causing a degree of unease outside China.     

The Construction of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area: A Study of China's Active Involvement

The central argument of this paper is that China's economic diplomacy not only improves its political relations with ASEAN countries but also promotes regional economic co-operation and integration. This paper is organised into two parts. The first part starts with a review of Chinese foreign policy changes in order to show how Beijing adjusted its foreign policy to pursue its economic and political interests. It also examines China's political and institutional efforts to forge the coming Free Trade Area (FTA) with ASEAN. The second part studies China–ASEAN trade relations from three aspects: the adjustment of Chinese industrial structure, foreign direct investment to both sides and the formation of a production network with China at the centre. While difficulties and problems are unavoidable in the construction of CAFTA, with China's active efforts and the enhanced co-operation between China and ASEAN, the building of CAFTA is moving towards fulfilment.     

China's expanding influence in Africa: projection,perception and prospects in Southern African countries

China's multi-faceted endeavour to expand its influence in Africa has attracted worldwide scholarly and media attention. This article examines the different moments of China's soft power endeavour, from projection through its state media to representation and lived experiences in South Africa and Zimbabwe, two African countries which receive a significant level of attention in China's policymaking. Through interdisciplinary methodologies such as content analysis, online questionnaires and in-depth interviews conducted in China, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the authors found that China's state-engineered soft power initiatives have resulted in partial success in the two countries. The conclusions indicate that China faces many challenges in fully accomplishing its intended goal. The findings provide new insight into China's political impact in Africa within the context of Beijing's growing influence on Africa's political and economic future.     

The rule of law ‐ meaning and significance for security policy and reform

Given Russia's history of legal expediency and the emphasis of Western policy on economic liberalization, it is not surprising that Russian reforms have yet to produce a functioning market economy and effective political institutions, including civil‐military control. A Western‐style economic and military model is fundamentally built on the rule of law as a supreme and impartial tool of conflict resolution and distribution of rights and power. Without it, government action cannot be predicted, destroying trust in the institutions and denying private and public activity a basis for long‐term planning which is based on trust and predictability. Without long‐term planning neither companies nor armies can be successful, giving rise to a pseudo‐legal state of de facto laws. For its economic, political and military reforms to be successful Russia needs to emphasize the building of the institutions for developing and predictably enforcing a set of laws, an effort that needs to receive priority support from Western partners.