Administrative problems of the provincial sales tax on beer in Papua New Guinea

With the establishment of provincial government in Papua New Guinea, the Organic Law has conferred on the provincial governments the authority to raise revenue using local revenue bases including retail sales taxes. These taxes have significant advantages and a sales tax on beer has particular benefits in P.N.G. in terms of potential yield and ease of administrative management. The tax is levied on the two breweries and the breweries collect the tax at their breweries and wholesale warehouses on behalf of the provincial governments. For the brewery with the dominant share of the market the arrangement under which it collects the tax for a commission and pays over quarterly to the provincial governments brings financial advantage. The brewery with a smaller share of the market and localized sales is less likely to be benefitting by the arrangement. For the future given expected beer consumption a change from a quantity based tax to ad valorem rates would be financially advantageous to the provincial governments, and would reduce the need for some provinces to seek tax sources elsewhere, but experience shows the general benefit of raising the tax, not at the point of final sale, but on the wholesaler or manufacturer.     

On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries

Sustainable budgets are important quality signals for the electorate. Politicians might thus have an incentive to influence tax revenue forecasts, which are widely regarded as a key element of national budget plans. Looking at the time period from 1996 to 2012, we systematically analyze whether national tax revenue forecasts in 18 OECD countries are biased due to political manipulation. Drawing on theories from the field of political economy, we test three hypotheses using panel estimation techniques. We find support for partisan politics. Left-wing governments seem to produce more optimistic, or less pessimistic, tax revenue forecasts than do right-wing ones. Contrary to the theoretical prediction based on the “common pool” problem, we find that more fragmented governments and parliaments tend to produce more pessimistic, or less optimistic, tax revenue forecasts. We find no empirical evidence that political business cycles play a role in tax revenue forecasts.     

Taxation by Citation? Exploring Local Governments’ Revenue Motive for Traffic Fines

Anecdotal evidence suggests that local governments may have a revenue motive for traffic fines, beyond public safety concerns. Using California's county-level data over a 12-year period, this article shows that counties increased per capita traffic fines by 40 to 42 cents immediately after a 10 percentage point tax revenue loss in the previous year; however, these counties did not reduce traffic fines if they experienced a tax revenue increase in the previous year. This finding indicates that county governments probably view traffic fines as a revenue source to offset tax revenue loss, but not as a revenue stabilizer to manage revenue fluctuation. This article also finds that low-income and Hispanic-majority counties raised more traffic fines. Counties that generated more revenue from the hotel tax—a tax typically paid by travelers and visitors—raised more traffic fines, indicating a possible tax-exporting behavior by shifting the traffic fine burden to nonlocal drivers.     

Unintended Consequences of Local Sales Tax: Capitalization of Sales Taxes into Housing Prices

Local governments are under pressure to look for alternatives to property taxes as their main revenue source. One response has been to adopt local sales taxes. Prior studies offer little guidance on whether and how much local governments enhance their revenue capacity with local sales taxes. This article unveils the underlying mechanisms by exploring the capitalization of sales taxes into housing prices as a property tax base measure. The empirical analysis reveals a capitalization of local sales taxes into housing prices, indicating the reduction of property tax bases in higher sales tax areas from the long-term perspective. The findings suggest that a sales tax rate increase might not raise local revenue capacity as much as policymakers intend.     

Diversifying Municipal Government Revenue Structures: Fiscal Illusion or Instability?

This paper examines (1) whether revenue diversification leads to greater instability as represented by revenue volatility, and (2) whether revenue complexity produces fiscal illusion as represented by increased public expenditures. These questions are answered by analyzing panel data on municipal governments between 1970 and 2002. The findings suggest that fiscal illusion does not occur among municipal governments, but revenue diversification does influence levels of volatility. However, the way in which municipalities diversify is important for achieving revenue stability. When diversification is considered in isolation, both tax and nontax diversification reduce revenue volatility. When diversification and complexity are considered simultaneously, the statistical effect of nontax diversification disappears. But, when a tax revenue structure is both diversified and complex, the likely outcome is greater revenue volatility rather than stability.     

The Politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross–national analysis

Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.     

The politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross-national analysis

Abstract Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.     

经济开放对地方财政收入规模及结构的影响实证分析

使用中国1999—2007年度省级面板数据,实证分析了经济开放对地方财政收入规模和内部相对结构变化的作用。研究表明:贸易开放度的提高显著增加了地方个人所得税、行为税、财产税和非税收入,整体上也引起地方财政总收入的增加;并使地方财政收入中个人所得税、财产税和非税收入比重上升,城建税收入比重下降。投资开放的提升显著增加了地方营业税、个人所得税、行为税、非税及预算外收入,同时减少了地方增值税和企业所得税收入,总体上对地方财政收入有负效应;并提高了地方财政收入中营业税、个人所得税、行为税、财产税、非税收入及预算外收入的比重。由于外资和外贸对经济及税基的作用差异、现行分税制、地方各项财政收入自身特征、地方政府基于多元目标为促进外资投资呈现出的策略行为等,使经济开放对地方各项财政收入规模及其相对结构的影响具有复杂和非一致性。     

Tax and expenditure limitations and the fiscal relationships between state and local governments

This paper uses comprehensive data on state and local tax and spending limitations for forty-nine states between 1976 and 1990 to estimate the effects of these limits on the fiscal relationships between state and local government. Results indicate that tax and spending limits on local governments are only partially effective in reducing revenues because political agents bypass limitations by transferring revenue reliance to unconstrained revenue sources, or because unconstrained levels of government take on additional revenue responsibilities. In particular, the empirical analysis demonstrates that binding local government fiscal constraints are associated with reductions in local revenues and increases in state aid to local governments. In contrast, state government limitations are related to reductions in both state and local own source revenues.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.     

The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from India

The flypaper effect refers to the phenomenon whereby expenditure stimulus from unconditional grants exceeds that from an equivalent increase in income. The flypaper effect has been described as "money sticks where it hits." The present study empirically tests the flypaper effect for the Indian economy. The study also tests the asymmetry hypothesis that looks at the impact of retrenchment in grants. Results obtained in the present study show the flypaper effect to be vindicated. We find that both capital and revenue expenditures receive a greater stimulus from grants than would an increase in income. Results show that in the prereform period both revenue and capital expenditures are maintained during periods of grant cuts. However, in the postreform period it is only expenditures on revenue accounts that are maintained in periods of grant reduction. We also find that during periods of grant reduction, state governments maintain their expenditure programs by raising their own tax revenue. This suggests that grants from the center have had a disincentive effect and could be a reason that state governments have not exploited their tax potential to the fullest. By bringing to the fore the disincentive effect of grants we wish to emphasize the urgency of taking a closer look at restructuring and redesigning our system of intergovernmental transfers.     

Municipal Communications Tax Revenue Reliance and Fiscal Impact of Possible Federal Preemption

This paper presents empirical evidence of the extent to which municipal governments might be affected by federal preemption in the communications sector in light of the substantial variation in municipal governments' reliance on communications tax revenues. The results suggest that the federal preemption would have a negative fiscal impact on the majority of municipal governments, and the extent of the impact would vary substantially. The analysis also indicates that it would be challenging or legally impossible for some city governments to make up for the magnitude of revenue loss due to the states' constraints on municipal revenue‐raising capacity.     

Coping With the Loss of General Revenue Sharing in Ohio

The authors examine the impact of the loss of general revenue sharing on Ohio local governments. A study of seven large cities and surrounding counties found that the loss of the federal funds did not trigger any fiscal crises: it came as no surprise. Localities engaged in a number of coping strategies including cuts in spending and replacement of lost federal funds from local surpluses, increased debt, and some tax increases.     

On distinguishing between Leviathan and Public Interest governments in a federal state

The purpose of this paper is to derive testable implications for the proposition that provincial governments in a specific federal system are Leviathans, that is, revenue maximizers. The Leviathan model, associated with Brennan and Buchanan (1980) hypothesizes that governments behave like monopolies who seek to maximize their revenue. This model is contrasted with an alternative hypothesis, the Public Interest Theory. A theoretical model of a federal state, based on the Canadian system, is constructed and testable implications are derived. The principal feature of the model is that it is set in the context of a particular game involving the federal government, provincial governments and a consumer. In attempting to model this situation, care has been taken to try to incorporate as many institutional features of the Canadian federal system as possible, while still allowing the model to be somewhat parsimonious. With some modification, the model may be applicable to other countries with similar federal systems.     

Property tax administration in developing countries: Alternatives for land registration and cadastral mapping

The property tax is a widely used fiscal tool in many developing countries. However, property tax evasion and underpayment are common. This fact underscores the need for governments to administer the property tax effectively if they are to maximize revenue for development. A workable system of land registration and cadastral mapping is one of the principal prerequisites for efficient administration of the property tax. This paper examines alternative methods of land registration and cadastral mapping appropriate for governments in developing countries. The registration of deeds and titles is discussed, as are the most appropriate means for their implementation. Similarly, the different types of cadastral systems, fiscal, legal and multi-purpose, and the survey methods necessary for their implementation, are reviewed.     

Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

An important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods, primarily education and health care. In Norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector. The development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes. The important revenue sources of the local and county governments, grants and income tax revenue, have been controlled nationally, and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900–1990. The approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income-elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength. The decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups, and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome. The analysis shows how politics matter, and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30% more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run.     

The real costs of tuition tax credits

Calculations of the costs of tuition tax credits should include estimates of the induced migration from public to private schools. The estimate by the President's advisors that his 1983 tax credit proposal would cost up to $800 million by 1986 neglected the migration factor. It is demonstrated that a migration from public to private schools of about from 1 to 1.4% of the present public school enrollment is all that is necessary to secure savings from migrants that just offset the loss in federal tax revenue from tax credits granted to incumbent private school families. Greater migration will generate net revenue gains to governments as a whole.     

Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Response of Local Government: Asymmetric Intra-Local Fiscal Effects

This article empirically investigates the effects of introducing statewide measures to limit the ability of local jurisdictions to raise revenue or make expenditures. It does so in intervals of five years over a 25-year period, using fiscal observations for 31,804 units of local government in 787 metropolitan counties across the contiguous United States. Specifically explored is the effect of tax and expenditure limitations on the variation in revenues and expenditures between general purpose governments and school districts within county areas. Rather than imposing a uniform constraint across jurisdictions, tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are associated with increased variation across both general purpose and school district revenues and expenditures and, by implication, increased service differentials. Effects are found to be asymmetric, with increased variation greatest within counties comprising the urban core and those with relatively more disadvantaged populations. The implications are that TELs are most constraining on the ability of governments serving economically less prosperous and at risk populations to meet public service needs. Such differential effects are of more than questionable merit and are the result of the application of blunt instruments to what is often an undemonstrated need. The outcome impairs both the efficiency and responsiveness of the local public sector.     

The role of tax bases and collections costs in the determination of income tax rates,seigniorage and inflation

A growing theoretical literature on optimal taxation predicts that governments will set the tax rates on money holdings and on more traditional tax bases to minimize the deadweight losses of collecting government revenue. Under the presumption that relative collection costs and tax bases have not changed significantly over time, the empirical time-series seigniorage literature has focused on the theory's tax smoothing implication, finding only weak support. We show that changes in collections costs and tax bases played an important role in the determination of tax composition and find stronger support for tax smoothing when this is taken into account.     

Elections and the structure of taxation in developing countries

This article analyses the impact of the electoral calendar on the composition of tax revenue (direct versus indirect taxes). It thus represents an extension of traditional political budget-cycle analyses assessing the impact of elections on overall revenue. We appeal to the opportunistic political budget model of Drazen and Eslava (2010) to predict the relationship between taxation structure and elections. Panel data from 56 developing countries over the 1980–2006 period reveals a clear pattern of electorally-related policy interventions. Taking the potential endogeneity of election timing into account, we find robust evidence of lower indirect taxes being applied by incumbent governments in the period just prior to an election. Indirect tax revenue in election years is estimated to be 0.3 GDP percentage points lower than in other years, corresponding to a fall of about 3.4% of the average figure in the sample countries, while there is no such relationship with direct tax revenue.