``Greenwich, 1 January 2000': De-inventing the Law of Britain in a Tent

This is an essay on what happened during January 2000 on Greenwich peninsula, London. The Millennium Dome in Greenwich, London, is read here as a site of the nomadic law of the labyrinth. At the Dome, a law of hyper-nomadics is emerging. In the Dome – a nomadic home, a temporary home quickly pitched of/for/by nomads – Britishness, I argue, is being seriously played as perpetual de-invention in a labyrinthine space, somewhere in-between the Law of Lures and the Law of Commands, in-between the Law of the Desert, the Law of the Game and the Law of Orderings. The Dome is being read here as an image/space through which New Britishness forces/forges itself to the fore, as well as an image/space that forces/forges New Britishness to force/forge itself to the fore. In this essay, ``Law', as well as ``Semiotics', are being used in a very broad sense. The ``Law of Britain', i.e. that which keeps ``Britain' apart/together, or, in other words, ``Britishness', so I will argue, not only elusively occupies a labyrinthine space in-between said Laws (of Lures, of Commands, as well as those of the Desert, of the Game, and of Orderings), which it articulates while it nevertheless also weakens them, dissolves them. ``It', the Law of Britain, Britishness, I will argue, also roams nomadically in-between ``spaces of belonging' and ``spaces of becoming'. In and through the Dome, an interstitial, meridional space, ``it' surfaced – it shaped surfaces – forming a labyrinth that articulates various nomadics, while not allowing any of these to fully emerge. This is ``its' newness, this could be read as the Law of ``New Britain' or ``New Britishness': an ever-elusive labyrinthine mes(s)(h) of surfaces in-between belonging and becoming. This essay is part of an attempt at ``reading the figural', to use Rodowick's words here. Rodowick reads Deleuze who reads Foucault – theorist of spatialization – who reads figures, such as Magritte('s). Figures are clusters of ``visibles' and ``expressibles'. Their light and sound – ``light, sounds and shapes', says the Millennium Dome leaflet – form imaginary spaces – ``spatial images' – that allow for specific ``statements' to be produced and to be read in them; which, in turn, allows for the (re)production of specific ``visibles' and ``expressibles'. The specificity of the Dome, the spatial image of New Britain, of New Britishness, is that the Law of Britain whirls in there, in labyrinthine windings, on surfaces, somewhere in-between belonging and becoming, roaming elusively in-between statements, allowing and (re)producing myriads of specific statements, though none specifically.     

Families, Foreignness, Migration

Introducing the special issue on ‘Families, Foreignness and Migration. Now and Then’, this essay starts from the observation that in Western Europe migrating with or without one's family in the last century was increasingly shaped by state policies. As a result, migrants' identities and family experiences not only depended, and still depend, on their cultural backgrounds but also on very time-specific politics of foreignness and citizenship. The essay's main argument is that comparing and deconstructing perceptions, policies and practices of ‘family’ and migration help to overcome the limited attention given to age and kin in the study of gender and migration. From an overview of contributions to this interdisciplinary issue, it is clear that deconstructing ‘family’ in migration studies should be developed further along three axes: child migration, the multi-level analysis of family and migration, including societies of origin and migrant organizations, and the comparison of ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ migrants, which contributes to uncovering the relationship between foreignness, gender and age.     

Rorschach Tests,Pluralism, and Hopes for the Future: A Response to the Responses

In this essay, I address some of the concerns raised by contributors to the Symposium on Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. I argue that law and society scholarship focusing on race increasingly offers some of our field's best empirical analyses of the interpenetration of law and society; I emphasize the importance of the methodological and theoretical diversity that characterizes our fragmented field, arguing that our pluralism is one of our greatest strengths; I clarify my intended meaning of the term “real law” as I use it in the book's subtitle, as a way to underscore the socially constituted quality of all law; I attempt to rescue the reputation of dialectics from charges of “relativism”; and I reiterate my appreciation for our field's engagement with questions of social justice that has characterized it since its inception. In the second half of the essay, I briefly describe my current prison research and offer some thoughts for the future of our field.     

Peace as Immobility

This essay speculates on howimageries/imaginations of peace emerge beforeand beyond the words of peace talk andpractice. Exploring the example of OperationRestore Hope (1992–1993) in Somalia, itis argued that imageries/imaginations of peace,e-merging from and into everyday socialities and tribal puissance –echoing Maffesoli – to a significant degree tostructure the outcome of (international)peacemaking operations. The essay describeshow, during Restore Hope (a test casetowards President Bush's ``new world order')imageries/imaginations of peace as immobilitye-merged, before and beyondthe words of a medic's Law of Stabilization.This essay explores the imaginary ofinternational peacekeeping operations. As such,it tries to move beyond the words and the signsof international law. It wants to explore theimages, the imageries, the imaginations thatroam – merging and dissipating – beforelaws, before the Law of the Symbolic.     

On Some Connections Between Legal Communication and Violence

The first version of this article was written and published in 1989 in Tartu in Russian.¹ As perestroika gathered strength the possibility emerged to take a fresh academic look on concepts which had been dogmatically frozen by “historical Marxism” for many years. One of those laying in the dead end was the Marxist concept of law together with its relation to violence. For a young scholar studying at Tartu University 15 years ago, there was always a possibility to try to apply some ideas and approaches drawn from Yuri Lotman’s articles and lectures. The power of his ideas and its brilliant presentation had already for years fascinated everybody dealing with problems of society and culture in Tartu. The other sources of the present analysis are the ideas about the nature of law and legal communication as they appeared in the 1920s–30s in the works of several Soviet scholars as Eugene Pashukanis and Mikhail Reisner. Both scientists were later condemned and forgotten in the Soviet Union. I also felt very comfortable with the understanding of the nature of law as “language of interaction” expressed and developed by the American lawyer and scholar Lon L. Fuller. The present article focuses only on the logic of communication based on the principle of exchange, reciprocity/contract and mechanism (code) of symbolic equalizations necessary, for achieving such reciprocity. But it is appropriate to point out that in a broader context, contract and reciprocity in society are balanced by different types of principles of human interaction. In this broader understanding, L. Fuller and Y. Lotman are close in their interpretations of cultural interaction and human communication. If we compare Fuller’s article “Two Principles of Human Association”² to Lotman’s “‘Contract’ and ‘Devotion’ as Archetypical Models of Culture”³ we see their approaches are in fact complementary.¹ Kannike, S.H., “O nekotorykh svjazjakh pravovogo obshchenija s nasilijem. Istorija I sovremennost’”, in Tartu Ülikooli Toimetised 850. Studia luridica. Historia et theoria3 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikool, 1989), 76–93² Fuller, L., “Two Principles of Human Association”, in L. Fuller, (ed), The Principles of Human Order(Durham: N.C. Duke University Press, 1981), 67–85³ Lotman, Y.M., ““Dogovor” i “vruchenie sebja” kak arhitipicheskie modeli kul’tury”, in Uchenye zapiski Tartuskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 513. Trudy po russkoi I slavjanskoi filologii 332. Literaturovedenije: problemy literaturnoi tipologii I istoricheskoi preemstvennosti(Tartu, 1981), 3–16     

Derrida,Semiotics and Justice

In this essay, one of Derrida’s early texts, Plato’s pharmacy, is analysed in detail, more specifically in relation to its reflections on writing and its relation to law. This analysis takes place with reference to a number of Derrida’s other texts, in particular those on Freud. It is especially Freud’s texts on dream interpretation and on the dream-work which are of assistance in understanding the background to Derrida’s analysis of writing in Plato’s pharmacy. The essay shows the close relation between Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s texts and Freud’s study of the dream-work. The forces at work in dreams, it appears, are at play in all texts, which in turn explains Derrida’s contentions in relation to the pharmakon as providing the condition of possibility of Plato’s texts. The essay furthermore points to the continuity between this ‘early’ text of Derrida and his ‘later’, seemingly more politico-legal texts of the 1990s. A close reading of Plato’s pharmacy, with its investigation via ‘writing’ of the foundations of metaphysics, and thus also of the Western concept of law, is obligatory should one wish to comprehend how Derrida attempts to exceed the restricted economy of metaphysics through his analysis of concepts such as justice and hospitality.     

Legal Practice and Modes of Dying: Bruno Latour,Technology and the Critical Legal Instance

Few who have ever observed the workings of a legal office would have witnessed a lawyer engaged in file management. Of course, lawyers, together with their clients, will construct the narrative that makes up the file, but the lawyer will not store it, nor see that it is properly labeled, nor ensure that its contents are in place, nor dust it, nor, finally, remove it for disposal at the end of whatever time is deemed sufficient for it to perform all of its functions. At a time when lawyers are being criticized for their levels of client care this paper explores the opportunities that the handling of the legal file affords for the development of an ethic of care that can then be transposed more broadly across legal practice. The essence of the argument is that the legal file is (as much as the client) a proper object of care, and that the care of the file – its maintenance and management – is an appropriate objective for lawyers, and necessary for the development of a legal profession that is truly ‘client-centered’. The argument is developed in three parts, and is largely informed by Bruno Latour’s works on being and technology as developed in We Have Never Been Modern, Aramis or the Love of Technology, and particularly, in an essay, published in 2002, entitled ‘Technology and Morality: The Ends of the Means’. The first part explores how the handling of the legal file exposes those engaged in this activity to legal histories, legal philosophies and legal ethics. The second part explores the content or nature of the obligation of care owed toward the file by the keeper of the file. It argues that the legal file represents human passions quelled or suppressed by legal conflict, and that ‘technical action’, falling broadly under the rubric of maintenance and handling, are ways in which care is expressed when the object of care is supine, dead or passing. The concluding part advances the care of technology as a means of preventing technological domination, or, in the terms of legal practice, the care of the file as a means of deflecting the development of a file culture.     

‘Legal Critique’: Elements for a Genealogy

While teachers and students of law tend to take for granted that critical legal campaigning originates in the late 20th century, many historians suggest that the summons of law and its state of accusation before the tribunal of critique dates back to the days of the Enlightenment. I am arguing, in contrast, that, in the West, the history of legal critique is by no means shorter than the history of law; that Western legal evolution embraces and supposes anti-legalism or ‘antinomianism’ since the days of early Christianity and throughout; that, conversely, an adequate assessment of Christianity must stress its character as an anti-institutional, anti-legal, and anti-religious campaign; that the standard view of Humanism, Enlightenment, and Modernity, which tends to foreground their antagonism to Christian institutions and to deny their nature as instantiations of the Christian campaign, misses the crucial point both about them and about Christianity (and, implicitly at least, about geopolitics); that key concepts of political modernity thrust their roots, not only and not most importantly into Political Theology, but rather into Saint Paul’s legal ‘new deal’; that, far from giving rise, as intended, to a deactivation of law, Paul’s action has resulted, instead, in the interlinking build-up of a militant denial of law on the one hand, and an emerging intensification of law on the other hand. Let the reader be warned that the article strings together a bouquet of snap-shots from a work in progress.     

Interrupting the Myth of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Partage</Emphasis>: Reflections on Sovereignty and Sacrifice in the work of Nancy,Agamben and Derrida

Agamben traces the bio-political essence of modern politics to the non-sacrificial killing of Homo Sacer in Roman law. Nancy, on the other hand, links the history of Western politics to the fundamental logic of sacrifice in Western metaphysics. He nevertheless contemplates the possibility that Western societies may finally have arrived at the threshold of a non-sacrificial existence. Derrida seeks to resist the sacrificial logic of Western metaphysics and politics, but nevertheless appears to accept it as an irreducible fact of human co-existence. Unlike Nancy, he envisages no actual or actualised beyond beyond the realm of sacrificial metaphysics and politics. He thus can be said to interrupt Nancy’s ‘myth’ of a non-sacrificial partage. This article compares these three philosophical stances in the hope of throwing more light on the role of sacrifice in the law and politics of our time. Professor of Law, Rand Afrikaans University. Conversations with Ann van Sevenant, Carol Clarkson, Louise du Toit, Peter Fitzpatrick, Costas Douzinas and Adam Thurschwell gave impetus to many of the themes developed in this article. Concomitant shortcomings and inaccuracies, as always, are mine.     

A Different Reason for “De-Coasing” Environmental Law and Economics

The so-called Coase Theorem is one of the cornerstones of the Law and Economics approach. This paper investigates whether it is appropriate to apply the Coasean framework in the context of Environmental Law and Economics. Even when transaction costs are zero, it is argued that in the specific case of environmental policy the initial assignment of rights will seriously affect the final allocation of resources. To support this thesis empirical evidence backed up by theoretical explanations are presented. The methodological distinction between negligible, domain and heuristic assumptions and the elaboration of a ‘logical time’ of the Coase Theorem are crucial to understand why eventually the Coase Theorem should not be applied to the realm of environmental law and policy.JEL Classification: D23, K0, K32, Q2     

The philosopher’s courtly love? Leo strauss, eros, and the law

This essay poses a critical response to Strauss’ political philosophy that takes as its primary object Strauss’ philosophy of Law. It does this by drawing on recent theoretical work in psychoanalytic theory, conceived after Jacques Lacan as another, avowedly non-historicist theory of Law and its relation to eros. The paper has four parts. Part I, ‘The Philosopher’s Desire: Making an Exception, or “The Thing Is...’’’, recounts Strauss’ central account of the complex relationship between philosophy and ‘the city’. Strauss’ Platonic conception of philosophy as the highest species of eros is stressed, which is that aspect of his work which brings it into striking proximity with the Lacanian-psychoanalytic account of the dialectic of desire and the Law. Part II, ‘Of Prophecy and Law’, examines Strauss’ analysis of Law as first presented in his 1935 book, Philosophy and Law, and central to his later ‘rebirth of classical political philosophy’. Part III, ‘Primordial Repression and Primitive Platonism’, is the central part of the paper. Lacan’s psychoanalytic understanding of Law is brought critically to bear upon Strauss’ philosophy of Law. The stake of the position is ultimately how, for Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Law is transcendental to subjectivity, and has a founding symbolic force, which mitigates against speaking of it solely or primarily in terms of more or less inequitable ‘rules of thumb’, as Plato did. Part IV, ‘Is the Law the Thing?’ then asks the question of what eros might underlie Strauss’ paradoxical defense of esoteric writing in the age of ‘permissive’ modern liberalism – that is, outside of the ‘closed’ social conditions which he, above all, alerts us to as the decisive justification for this ancient practice.     

Loyal Opposition: Minorities and State Law

This essay on Mitra Sharafi's Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture, 1772–1947 (2014) focuses on the relationship between certain minorities and the law of the state. It seeks to expand the discussion found in Sharafi's book in three directions: first, by comparing the attitude of Parsis in South Asia to the law of the state with the attitude of German Jewish immigrants in mandatory Palestine and Israel to state law; second, by asking whether the Parsis' embracing of state law was linked to their economic success; and, finally, by pointing to the nature of law itself as a “minority discourse.”     

Law's Allure and an Interbranch Perspective on Law and Politics

This essay views Gordon Silverstein's book Law's Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (2009) from the perspective of the burgeoning interbranch literature on law and courts, which seeks to place judicial decision making within the context of ongoing political and policy-making processes. It argues that Law's Allure reflects the strengths and weaknesses of this literature. On the plus side, it compellingly reinterprets the concept of legal precedent in political terms, showing how the content of judicial decisions serves as an iterative framing mechanism within and across various policy areas. On the downside, it struggles to provide a rigorous framework for analyzing the risks of the juridification of American politics. Despite any weaknesses, its attempt to map different pathways of legalistic court-based policy development in diverse settings represents a useful step for those interested in bringing the study of law and courts back into the core of analyzing American politics and policy making.     

From Movement to Mentality,from Paradigm to Perspective,from Action to Performance: Law and Society at Mid‐Life

Kitty Calavita's Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law (2010) offers a broad and useful overview of the intellectual accomplishments of law and society scholars and a self‐confident assertion that they perform an invaluable service by focusing on “real law,” that is, law in action rather than law on the books. This essay argues that the field is more fragmented than Calavita notes and that law and society research is neither engaged with a common set of questions nor organized around a single central insight or an agreed‐upon paradigm. Moreover, this essay raises questions about Calavita's claims about “real” law and suggests that we complement law and society's traditional focus by examining the varied performances of law, whether in texts or in the world beyond those texts.     

Calavita's Law & Society: (En)racing Law and Society

One of the sharpest critiques of law and society scholarship in recent years has come from scholars who maintain that law and society scholarship fails to address the issue of race appropriately. This essay considers several critiques of law and society scholars' engagement with issues of race and uses them to evaluate Kitty Calavita's exploration of race in Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law (2010). The essay advocates the use of “race as process” as a mode of analysis that will allow for greater explanatory power to law and society scholarship when it touches on racial issues.     

Calavita's Invitation to Law & Society: Introduction to the Symposium

This essay introduces a Law & Social Inquiry symposium on Kitty Calavita's book Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law (2010) that features comments on the law and society enterprise by Jeannine Bell, Austin Sarat, and Christopher Tomlins. It briefly discusses the commentators' views of this enterprise as revealed in their essays and challenges points made by each of them. It goes on to discuss the book's suitability as a student‐oriented introduction to the field of law and society, filling a gap the commentators left open.     

Michel Foucault: Regimes of Punishment and the Question of Liberty

‘Sex abuse’ has recently become an object of knowledge of the human sciences and thereby, juridical punishment. While not diminishing the problem of sexual violence, this paper explains the intensification of the sexual abuse discourse as contingent upon an incitement to talk about it in a ‘confessional society’. The paper argues that notions such as ‘normality’, ‘deviance’ and therefore (ab)use, are produced by power and are, consequently, contestable. It examines the ways that under the current punitive disciplinary rationality, there is an imperative of continuous production of knowledge that incites the sex abuse discourse. In a liberal society, failure to determine such knowledge is a threat to liberty and thereby, liberalism itself.     

Negligence, Public Bodies, and Ruthlessness

The Law Commission has concluded in a recent consultation paper ('Administrative Redress') that claimants are able to sue public bodies successfully in negligence in an unacceptably wide range of circumstances. For this reason, it has proposed the introduction of a new touchstone of liability: 'serious fault'. The Law Commission regards the liability regime it proposes as superior to the existing law since it would reduce the number of occasions on which claimants deflect public bodies from their core concerns (delivering goods and services that serve the public interest). The Law Commission also finds support for its proposal in a 'principle of modified corrective justice'. On the analysis offered in this essay, the requirement of 'serious fault' is better understood as strengthening a commitment to ruthlessness (in the sense specified by Thomas Nagel) that is present in the existing law. This essay also argues for a reform of negligence law (as it applies to public bodies) that is very different from that proposed by the Law Commission. This is the application of the proportionality principle at the third stage of the duty of care test in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman . More generally, this essay criticises the Law Commission on the ground that it assumes that public bodies have sufficient information to perform a wide range of tasks effectively. This is often not the case. Moreover, negligence law in its existing form is a (non-market) discovery-procedure by means of which public bodies can, when defending novel claims, become better acquainted with the environment in which they operate.