International Mediation and Social Networks: The Importance of Indirect Ties

This study extends the previous literature on actors' incentives in conflict management by examining how direct and indirect links between fighting parties influence the prospects for mediation onset from a social network perspective. The paper argues, contrary to existing research, that direct links, i.e., bilateral ties between warring parties, do not notably increase the likelihood of mediation. Rather, indirect links, i.e., ties that connect two states via one or more than one third party to each other, are more likely to determine whether a conflict sees mediation. Although direct links can indicate mutual interests, shared preferences, and decreased uncertainty between the warring parties, these ties either lose importance or become cut off when states enter a conflict. By contrast, indirect ties create a social network that involves outside parties in the dispute process, and indirect ties increase the exchange of information between belligerents and potential mediators and the chances that third parties will have a vital interest in intervention. My empirical analysis using conflict and social network data in 1946–1995 provides strong support for the theory.     

Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict

We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion–intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.     

Why Are Subordinates Less Satisfied with Mediation? The Role of Uncertainty

This study explores the influence of hierarchical position on both mediation satisfaction and uncertainty about the mediation. As parties involved in hierarchical conflict typically behave differently and have different perceptions and experiences, we think it is most likely that hierarchical position will affect the mediation process and its outcomes. In this article, we investigate the influence of hierarchical position on both uncertainty about the mediation and satisfaction with the mediation and its potential moderating role on the relationship between uncertainty and satisfaction. To test our hypotheses, we use data from fifty real mediation cases dealing with hierarchical labor conflicts in the Netherlands. As expected, uncertainty has a stronger negative effect on subordinates' satisfaction with the mediation than it does on the supervisors who were involved in mediation. Implications for mediation theory and practice are discussed.     

Centers of Gravity: Regional Powers,Democracy, and Trade

Classic studies on hegemonic stability and power transition suggest that concentration of capabilities favoring a single state can promote economic cooperation and discourage militarized conflict. However, tests of these arguments have been primarily limited to examining temporal variation in global capability distributions and corresponding levels of system-wide cooperation; few have examined the impact of capability concentration at the region level. In this article, we contend that concentration of regional military capabilities corresponds to lower trade costs for states throughout a region and to an incentive for weaker states to de-prioritize expenditure on the military, freeing resources that can be used to promote trade. As a result, this condition promotes higher levels of trade, particularly within the region. We also argue that democratic regional powers are better able to foster confidence in the sustainability of cooperation; thus, the trade-enhancing impact of concentrated regional capabilities is stronger when the predominant state is more democratic. We find evidence in support of our expectations in statistical models examining state trade between 1960 and 2007.     

East Asia in a unipolar international order and Europe’s role in the region

This article attempts to explore the post-Cold War international system in which regional orders intermingle their influence. It pays special attention to regional conflicts in East Asia in the new era and what roles global powers could play to maintain regional stability. I will first examine the characteristics of the new global order after the end of the bipolarity. I will then focus on American foreign policy in the new international system in the context of its dealing with major global events that have strategic implications for its relations with other major global powers. As to discussions of regional orders, this article focuses on East Asia, where conflicts between states have not evaporated despite the relaxation of the global Cold War confrontation. What makes this area special is the involvements of many great powers and less-powerful nations that could somehow easily manipulate the seniors into the conflicts to their favour. While the regional order in East Asia is being shaped by the post- Cold War international order, the regions peace and conflicts will in turn significantly influence global order. Finally, I will argue that dealing with problems in East Asia should acquire involvements of powers that would give necessary momentum to the existing participants to solve conflicts by the means of multilateralism. The European Union (EU) is often forgotten for its role in contributing to world order, and the EU should be taken seriously by the powers in East Asia as a possible player in maintaining the regional peace. I conclude that both global and regional security depend on continuing US unipolarity, strengthened by the co-operation of the EU in the form of multilateralism. By the same token, US unilateralism without a EU counter-balancing it, only invites potential challengers, such as China, to threaten the USs preponderant position, thereby destabilising world peace.This article was supported by a research project (NSC-P3-2414-H-004-018) of the National Science Council, Taiwan, which is gratefully acknowledged.     

Seeing the Lexus for the Olive Trees? Public Opinion,Economic Interdependence,and Interstate Conflict

Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties between countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite considerable research on the “capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdependence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence or fail to understand the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China and varying information about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases support for peaceful solutions with China.     

Intervention Without Leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators

Existing research on international mediation emphasizes the importance of leverage in altering the combatants' ability to reach a negotiated settlement. Less understood is the role of third parties that do not have access to sources of leverage even though they comprise a substantial amount of mediation efforts. This paper highlights two potential explanations for the prevalence of “weak” mediators. First, a choice of third parties without leverage might be a product of the “supply side” preferences of the international community, in particular, the great powers. Second, the inclusion of third parties without any leverage can result from actors hedging their commitments to the peace process when they suspect with some uncertainty that one side will use third-party involvement insincerely for ends other than peace. Using data from the Managing Intrastate Low Level Conflicts (MILC) project, in conjunction with the PRIO/UPPSALA Armed Conflict data, empirical results using competing risk models confirm both logics. Mediators with weak leverage are more likely when an actor has strong incentives to stall: specifically, when the immediate costs of conflict are high, there is domestic political pressure in the absence of democratic accountability, and relative bargaining power is shifting. The findings also suggest that supply-side dynamics matter. Weak mediators are less likely in the presence of substantial foreign investment and in neighborhoods with strong states, but mediators of all types are more likely in democratic neighborhoods. To further explore the role of insincere motivations, the paper considers the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in Sri Lanka, brokered by Norway.     

Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade

Intra-industry trade—trade in different varieties of the same product between countries with similar factor endowments—has been an important and surprising feature of the postwar international economy. Economists have explained this trade with models of monopolistic competition, which suggest that intra-industry trade does not have the stark distributional consequences that the more traditional "endowments-based" trade does. I do not dispute that claim here, although I do dispute a political implication drawn from it—that intra-industry trade produces less political action than endowments-based trade. I argue that, because firms involved in intra-industry trade are monopolists, lobbying essentially becomes a private good . If intra-industry trade places costs on firms, they do not have less incentive to take political action to stop it, as the conventional wisdom suggests. I provide evidence for this contention from complaints lodged with the International Trade Commission. The results show that the higher the degree of intra-industry trade the more likely an industry will request protection from the ITC.     

Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000

Past studies regarding the success and/or failure of conflict management activities have brought about a wide range of results. In this paper we attempt to gain more definitive conclusions about effectiveness by accomplishing two tasks. First, using a basic theoretical framework we identify expectations of efficacy as they relate to differences between states, coalitions, and IGOs. Second, we also examine the utility of different conflict management techniques in an effort to place in greater perspective the effectiveness of mediation, the most utilized technique of third party intermediaries. Using a new dataset on third-party intermediary behavior in militarized disputes from 1946 to 2000, we find that while all conflict managers are useful in assisting belligerents in reaching a negotiated settlement, IGOs are the most effective. Additionally, while mediation is an effective technique to produce settlements, military intermediary actions, such as peacekeeping, are much more useful.     

Analysis of the Current Situation in North Africa ＆ the Middle East

After the upsurge of domestic turmoil in Tunis last December,unrest spread rapidly through North Africa and the Middle East,having a profound effect on current international relations.It will continue to affect relations between the major powers and the international system as a whole for some time to come.The regional turmoil of North Africa and the Middle East is of particular interest to International Political Economy(IPE)studies.It seems to embody a geostrategic conflict between the US and the EU in contending for leadership in North Africa and the Middle East.It is also an expression of the competition for dominance of the global financial structure between the major powers during a period of transition in the international system.Lastly,it is a manifestation of America’s struggle to maintain its global economic hegemony.     

Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power

To account for variance in great powers responses to threats and the implications for the peacefulness of the international system since the late nineteenth century, this article elucidates a theory which refines and synthesizes economic liberal perspectives and realist balance of power theory. I argue that different patterns and levels of economic interdependence in the great power system generate societal-based economic constraints on, or incentives for, state leaders of status quo powers hoping to mobilize economic resources and political support to oppose perceived threats. This mobilization process influences strongly the preferences of status quo powers, other states beliefs about those preferences, and the interpretation of signals in balance of power politics. In this way, economic ties influence the strategies great powers pursue. Firm balancing policies conducive to peace in the international system are most likely, I then hypothesize, when there are extensive economic ties among status quo powers and few or no such links between them and perceived threatening powers. When economic interdependence is not significant between status quo powers or if status quo powers have strong economic links with threatening powers, weaker balancing postures and conciliatory policies by status quo powers, and aggression by aspiring revisionist powers, are more likely. I then illustrate how these hypotheses explain the development of the Franco-Russian alliance of the 1890s and its effectiveness as a deterrent of Germany up to 1905, British ambivalence toward Germany from 1906 to the First World War, the weakness of British, French, Soviet, and American behavior toward Germany in the 1930s and World War II, and the American and European responses to the Soviet threat, including the NATO alliance, and the "long peace" of the post-1945 era.     

Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992

This article studies the management of territorial claims using an issue-based approach that reconceptualizes processes of interstate conflict and cooperation as reflecting contention over issues. Hypotheses on issue management techniques are tested using newly collected data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) research project. Empirical analysis of territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere supports the general model, with issue salience and past issue interactions systematically affecting states' choices between peaceful and militarized techniques for managing or settling their contentious issues. In particular, action over territorial claims is most likely when more valuable territory is at stake, in the aftermath of militarized conflict, and when recent peaceful settlement attempts have failed. Third parties are more likely to become involved in nonbinding activities when the claim appears more threatening to regional or global stability, and submission of claims to binding third-party decisions is most likely between adversaries that have begun to build up a legacy of successful agreements. The article concludes with a discussion of directions for future research on territory and on other issues.     

Militarism and Dual-Conflict Capacity

This research note examines how domestic institutions can moderate the relationship between domestic and interstate conflict involvement. Previous work has found that military dictatorships are more likely to become involved in either domestic or international conflicts, compared to party-based autocracies. We argue that the same institutional explanations for why military autocracies are more conflict-prone also make them less capable of successfully carrying out multiple conflicts at the same time. Analyzing interstate and domestic conflict involvement on a sample of dictatorships over the period 1947–2004, we show that military autocracies dealing with internal armed conflict are less likely than their nonmilitary counterparts to become involved in an international conflict.     

Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Expectations Theory

Studies find that members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are less likely to be involved in militarized conflict. An expectation of continuing amicable trade relations is among the factors linking PTAs to peace. However, this role of PTAs is difficult to test due to the problem of observational equivalence; PTAs correlate with trade levels and liberalization, factors also linked to peace. In this article, we isolate the impact of PTAs on trade expectations by distinguishing between signed agreements and those in force. A focus on signed but not-yet-in-force PTAs allows us to assess the correlation between agreements and peace before other pacifying, and therefore potentially confounding, elements emerge. Statistical tests spanning 1957 to 2000 demonstrate that signed PTAs are pacifying, while in-force agreements have no statistically significant impact when controlling for other factors linked to peace.     

Trade Interdependence and the Use of Force: Do Issues Matter?

In this project, we investigate the relationship between the use of military force and trade interdependence, suggesting that the influence of trade on militarized conflict varies based on the issue under dispute. For some issues, trade is likely to attenuate the chances that states escalate a dispute to the use of military force, while for others trade can intensify disputes so that military conflict is more likely. Specifically, we hypothesize that greater trade interdependence decreases the probability of military conflict over realpolitik issues like territory. On the other hand, greater trade interdependence increases the probability that states use military force when the issue under dispute concerns the regime, policies, and conditions in the target. To test our hypotheses, we employ new data on dyadic uses of force from the International Military Intervention data set that records the initiator’s reason(s) for using force against the target. The statistical tests support our hypotheses; trade decreases the use of force against a target for territorial and military/diplomatic reasons, which is consistent with arguments from the liberal paradigm. However, trade interdependence increases the use of force for humanitarian and economic reasons as well as to affect the regime or policy of the target. Thus, our study improves upon current research about the relationship between economic interdependence and foreign policy by specifying a conditional relationship based on the issues under contention.     

Enduring trade disputes: Disguised protectionism and duration and recurrence of international trade disputes

Why do some WTO trade disputes endure and recur while others do not? States have difficulty resolving trade conflicts when they involve certain types of trade-restrictive domestic regulations. While such regulations vary in their extent of legitimacy—fulfilling non-trade domestic regulatory objectives and availability of less trade-restrictive options—complainant states cannot always distinguish legitimate barriers from illegitimate ones. In such scenarios of disguised protectionism, which I argue is most prevalent with policies involving WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, disputants confront difficulties concluding their disputes. Disputes last longer and are more likely to recur. I test the argument against a data set of WTO disputes structured in an innovative manner—one that links together related and recurring disputes into single conflicts. Both an event history analysis of conflict duration and a count analysis of conflict recurrence using this data strongly support this argument.     

Leadership in the WTO: Brazil,India and the Doha development agenda

The Doha round of multilateral negotiations has witnessed the relocation of Southern powers towards the core of the World Trade Organization (WTO) decision-making structure. Brazil and India are the only developing countries that have participated consistently in all major ministerial phases of the Doha round between 2001 and 2008. Their consolidation as trading powers cannot be attributed solely to their status as emerging economies. Their projected legitimacy as representatives of the global South has operated as a catalyst in facilitating their relocation. In various phases of negotiations, however, Brazil and India have refrained from playing a proactive role in driving negotiations forward. Their defensive stance has raised questions about the two countries' prospects for systemic leadership in world trade. In explaining this condition, this article will argue that Brazilian and Indian trade diplomacy is consistently directed towards maintaining broad bases of followership. Brazil and India are disposed to exercise assertive leadership only when that accommodates the expectations and preferences of their followership in the global South. Their preoccupation with constantly reasserting their Third World image often renders blocking agreement the preferable strategy to avoid paying a high price in terms of legitimacy.     

A Conceptual Typology of Kin‐State Mediation

In this article, I argue that kin states can play major roles in international mediation processes involving their kin communities. Although kin states may be naturally biased toward their kin, kin states are sometimes actively involved in mediation processes and such involvement is even encouraged by third‐party mediators. In this study, I divide the various roles assumed by kin states in mediation into four main conceptual categories: promoter, quasi‐mediator, powerbroker, and enforcer. My analysis presumes that a kin state can use its close ties with its kin community to make third‐party mediation more successful. I support and illustrate this model using cases of kin‐state involvement in peace processes and examine both the benefits and complications that kin‐state mediation can entail. This study contributes to scholarship examining the effectiveness of biased mediators. I conclude that the role a kin state assumes in a mediation is often context‐dependent, but that third‐party mediators and the international community can use their leverage over kin states to improve the peace process.     

从博弈到共赢：中印在中亚的竞争与合作

中亚以其独特的战略地位吸引了各大国的关注。中国和印度作为亚洲两个崛起中的大国，又是中亚的两个邻国，地缘和能源因素使两国与中亚联系在一起。本文阐述了中印两国在中亚的战略和能源博弈，并进一步分析了两国在这一地区竞争的可能性和合作的必要性，指出中印合作无论对两国的国家利益还是中亚的发展和稳定都是最佳的抉择。