Democratic justice: the priority of politics and the ideal of citizenship

In his Democratic justice and the social contract, Weale presents a distinctive contingent practice-dependent model of ‘democratic justice’ that relies heavily on a condition of just social and political relations among equals. Several issues arise from this account. Under which conditions might such just social and political relations be realised? What ideal of equality is required for ‘democratic justice’? What are its implications for the political ideal of citizenship? This paper focuses on these questions as a way to critically reconsider Weale’s model. After presenting Weale’s procedural constructivism, I distinguish his model from an institutional practice-dependent model, one salient example of which is Rawls’s political constructivism. This distinction allows for a formulation of the social and political equality required for justice in each case. The contingent model assumes that an equality of ‘status’ will generate just social practices, yet it fails to recognise that an equality of ‘role’ is also important to ensure citizens’ compliance. The paper ultimately seeks to show that the contingent model is insufficient to ensure that just social practices will become stable.     

Justice,Efficiency, and the New Public Management

In this article I aim to explore the link between two normative values, namely justice and efficiency, and the New Public Management approach. In pursuing this task I offer several critical arguments against some of the recent justice‐based objections levied against New Public Management by David Arellano‐Gault. I claim that Arellano‐Gault's account of the relation between justice and the New Public Management is seriously undermined by two conceptual flaws: (1) a conflation of right‐libertarianism, utilitarianism, and desert theories of justice and (2) a conflation of the technical/productive sense of efficiency with the social/distributive sense. Furthermore, I maintain that even when the different theories of justice and the different senses of efficiency are properly delineated, the case for necessarily linking NPM to a particular theory of justice is markedly unconvincing.     

Conceiving human rights without ontology

Conclusion In his book, World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge sets out to articulate an approach to basic justice that is inversal and cosmopolitan. This notion of justice is to be articulated through the language of human rights. Pogge’s arguments about justice, moral universalism and cosmopolitanism are impressive and reward serious study. It is to be hoped. indeed, that many aspects of his argument might be adopted by the elite ruling classes of world politics; they have much to offer in the project of creating a world that is humane for all. The issues that I have raised in the foregoing argument however are central to the integrity of Pogge’s project. I have argued, in sum that it is not possible to advance a program for the expansion of justice and the implementation of human rights in world politics without making an appeal to a specific account of the nature of justice and of human rights. The account that informs Pogge’s argument is that of political liberalism, and this is an account that has much in its favor as a preferred vehicle for justice in world politics. However, this account makes itself vulnerable when it argues for universal principles without acknowledging their partisan and normative base. My argument has been that this issue is at the center of Pogge’s attempt to isolate the conception of human rights he explicates, which he wants to serve as the language for his global ethical universalism, from the ontological affirmations which make that conception of human rights possible, and which of necessity tie human rights to a specific conception of the nature of the good for human persons and groups. The attempt to establish a single, universal criterion of justice, and to express it in the language of human rights, is undermined from within for as long as it fails to engage with ontological concerns.     

Political theory in historical context. Reflections on Democratic Justice and the Social Contract by Albert Weale

In Democratic Justice and the Social Contract, Weale defends a contractarian theory of social justice following what he calls the ‘empirical method’, which consists in grounding ethics and politics on the observation of concrete examples of social contracts, rather than abstract speculations. In this paper, I will make three critical remarks. First, the empirical method is open to the same objections usually raised against more abstract approaches to social contract theory: by an appropriate choice of the starting point, one can justify any ethical or political position. Second, Weale’s focus on the societies that were successful in managing common pool resources appears arbitrary: other social organizations (e.g. hunters and gatherers societies) would be a more obvious choice. Finally, in following the empirical method, philosophers must be willing to import into ethics and politics the same problems of interpretation one encounters in theoretical social sciences. As an example, I will show that Weale’s position on the welfare state depends on the interpretation he gives of some practices observed in the societies he chooses as models. Different interpretations of the same practices would induce Weale to revise his positions.     

Falling into the justice gap? Between duties of social and global justice

The literature on cosmopolitan justice has yet to address what principles to adopt when duties of global justice and duties of social justice are in conflict. In this paper, I address David Miller’s contention that some may fall into the justice gap since we need to prioritize duties of social justice in cases of conflict. I argue that Miller’s analysis depends on three stipulations: the incommensurability of the values underlying duties of social justice and those of global justice; the need to justify duties of justice to their holders; and the need to consider the necessary institutions to realize and implement justice obligations. I argue against the incommensurability clause by showing that both conceptions of justice pursue moral equality as the underlying and commensurate value. Instead, I propose that the currencies of justice we employ in the two contexts of justice are different. Discussing the justifiability clause I agree with the stipulation that we have to justify decisions that affect the realization of justice to those who have to carry the burden of realizing them. This implies, however, that we may have to accept that some prioritize duties of global justice over duties of social justice. If this is the case, it seems as though the state has little recourse to prioritize duties of social justice. Finally, discussing Miller’s institutional clause I ask why the justice relevant institutions can only be those of the state. It is plausible to say that in our current world, institutions of humanitarian aid are effective means to satisfy duties of global justice.     

Liberal equality: political not erinaceous

Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs defends liberal political morality on the basis of a rich account of dignity as constitutive of living well. This article raises the Rawlsian concern that making political morality dependent on ethics threatens citizens’ political autonomy. Thereafter, it addresses whether the abandonment of (erinaceous) ethical foundations signals the demise of Dworkin’s liberalism and explores the possibility of laundering his conception so as to facilitate a marriage between the political philosophies of Rawls and Dworkin. The article finishes by rebutting some objections Dworkin raises against Rawls’s account of public reason.     

BEPS,tax sovereignty and global justice

The base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and G20 countries marks an important development in the reform of the international taxation regime. In this paper I argue that the initiative nevertheless fails to provide a coherent account of what global justice requires in the realm of fiscal policy. While the OECD’s ostensible aim to increase and protect the tax sovereignty of states is commendable, there is insufficient attention for the distribution of relative tax sovereignty. I show that current global income inequality is correlated with significant inequality of tax sovereignty, that this inequality is unjust on a plausible conception of what global justice requires, and that the BEPS initiative is unlikely to meaningfully address this injustice. I close by suggesting that an internationalist conception of justice concerned with securing the tax sovereignty of independent polities may need to prescribe the creation of globally redistributive institutions.     

Preserving fairness: Williams against Cohen on just inequality

The view that the choices people make affect what it is fair for them to receive has widespread appeal. This very general thought has found particular and acute expression in the context of distributive justice in the form of the influential view that has become known as luck egalitarianism. In a surprising development, one of luck egalitarianism’s foremost advocates – G.A. Cohen – appeared, in one of his final papers, to reject the commitment to the fairness of chosen inequalities that defines luck egalitarianism. In opposition to the luck egalitarian view, Cohen suggests that choice merely deprives the disadvantaged of a complaint against being worse off, rather than rendering such inequality fair. Against Cohen’s revised view, Andrew Williams has argued that Cohen’s move underestimates an account of equality under which what individuals choose to do with their equal allocation affects what it is to treat them fairly. Here, I seek to show how the Williams response fails to undermine Cohen’s claims about the relation between fairness and choice. I draw on this analysis to show how the disagreement between Williams and Cohen on this issue illuminates a broader methodological divergence over how to approach questions of justice and fairness.     

The good of toleration: changing social relations or maximising individual freedom?

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I take issue with Peter Balint’s recent account of the value of toleration as an instrument for securing freedom-maximising outcomes in pluralistic societies. In particular, I question the extent to which the ideal of toleration can be entirely reduced to someone’s intentional withholding of negative interference whose value lies in the protection of individual negative freedoms. I argue that couching the value of toleration entirely in these freedom-maximising terms fails to do justice to the relational value of toleration. To see this value, we must also have in sight the drastic changes that appeals to toleration make to the nature of what goes on between the tolerator and the tolerated, not only to the state of affairs that is created by their relation.     

Can my religion influence my conception of justice? Political liberalism and the role of comprehensive doctrines

In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.     

Self-respect and public reason

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argues that self-respect is ‘perhaps the most important’ primary good, and that its status as such gives crucial support to controversial ideas like the lexical priority of liberty. Given the importance of these ideas for Rawls, it should be no surprise that they have attracted much critical attention. In response to these critics I give a defense of self-respect that grounds its importance in Rawls’s moral conception of the person. I show that this understanding of self-respect goes well beyond giving support to the lexical priority of liberty, also supporting Rawls’s still more controversial view of public reason. On my account, taking self-respect seriously requires the coercive enforcement of public reason. This is a novel argument for public reason, in that it grounds the idea in justice as fairness and mandates its coercive enforcement.     

Occupancy rights: life planners and the Navajos

ABSTRACT

This Comment focuses on the limitations of Stilz’s individualist conception of occupancy rights. Her account of occupancy is critical to her attempt to answer the question of where one holds territorial rights as well as related place-related rights like the right of return. Her account appeals to the geographical location of individual life plans. This Comment argues that this fails to distinguish between Indigenous People who are connected historically and in many other ways to a place and individual Life-Planners: it treats the two as equivalent, which I argue is counter-intuitive. I also argue that Stilz’s occupancy account fails to explain the scope of occupancy rights in a number of cases that she appeals to in her examples, such as the Navajos’ expulsion from the area in which they lived. What she needs, I argue, is a group based conception of occupancy rights, in addition to the idea of individual rights of residency.     

Control,consent and political legitimacy

In this essay, I evaluate Philip Pettit’s theory of republican political legitimacy and maintain that it fails to provide a more satisfactory account of legitimacy than consent-based theories. I advance two interrelated theses. First, I argue that in so far as Pettit successfully narrows the scope that his theory of political legitimacy has to address, his arguments could be adapted to support consent-based theories. Second, I argue that Pettit’s theory fails to satisfy the high standards it sets for itself and is thus unsuccessful. My critique focuses on Pettit’s notions of historical, political and normative necessity, before evaluating whether his requirement of equally individualised popular control of government should be endorsed.     

Transcendental institutionalism and global justice

In The Idea of Justice (2009 Sen, A. 2009. The idea of justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), Amartya Sen distinguishes between ‘transcendental institutional’ approaches to justice and ‘realization-focused comparisons,’ rejecting the former and recommending the latter as a normative approach to global justice. I argue that Sen’s project fails for three principal reasons. First, he misdiagnoses the problem with accounts that he refers to as transcendental-institutionalist. The problem is not with these kinds of accounts per se, but with particular features of prominent approaches. Second, Sen’s realization-focus does not account well for the value of institutions of global justice. And even Sen agrees that reforms to institutions are urgently needed. And third, the distinction between transcendentalism and comparative approaches is implausible. I close by suggesting a strategy for an alternative institutionalist approach that can offer the kind of guidance for reforming the global order that Sen rightly takes as urgent.     

Palpable insecurity and Sen’s comparative view of justice: anthropological considerations

Amartya Sen’s comparative approach to justice makes clear that notions of justice are shaped by human agency and experience, and both his focus on the ‘internal view’ of well-being that emphasizes suffering as a central feature of illness and his recognition that social and cultural factors shape perceived injustice are critical to this approach. However, Sen questionably depicts the contributions of anthropological research to this project as limited to ‘the sensory dimension of ill-health.’ Focusing on mental health in the context of global justice, I argue that Sen’s treatise on justice can be refined through an ethnographic method that synchronizes attention to (1) cultural knowledge and social relations in ecological settings; (2) fundamental human needs; and (3) levels of analytic specificity involving situations, categories, and events. This method integrates analysis of internal phenomenology and external constraints of political economy and ideology. To demonstrate I discuss three cases involving students and violence in Rio de Janeiro, women and witchcraft in Ghana, and historical migration and war trauma among Vietnamese immigrants in which external conditions of insecurity and inequality contributed to deteriorating mental health conditions including depression, trauma, and debilitating anxiety.     

Democratic justice and contractarian injustice

This paper places Weale’s theory in its historical context, clarifying the dispute between Brian Barry’s justice as impartiality and David Gauthier’s justice as mutual advantage. Contra Weale, who argues that justice can involve both mutual advantage and impartiality, this paper suggests that impartiality and mutual advantage are incompatible, and that Barry’s position is preferable to Gauthier’s. Three specific issues will be addressed: First, Weale’s theory of democratic justice includes an account of injustice which is unpersuasive. Secondly, deliberative democracy does not only require equality of power, as Weale suggests, but also material (economic) equality. Thirdly, Weale’s claim that workers should be allowed to keep the full fruits of their labour is questionable.     

The deep error of political libertarianism: self-ownership,choice, and what’s really valuable in life

ABSTRACT

Contemporary versions of natural rights libertarianism trace their locus classicus to Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. But although there have been many criticisms of the version of political libertarianism put forward by Nozick, many of these objections fail to meet basic methodological desiderata. Thus, Nozick’s libertarianism deserves to be re-examined. In this paper I develop a new argument which meets these desiderata. Specifically, I argue that the libertarian conception of self-ownership, the view’s foundation, implies what I call the Asymmetrical Value Claim: a dubious claim about the importance of choice relative to other valuable capacities. I argue that this misunderstands what is really valuable in life, and show how it causes libertarianism to generate counterintuitive public policy recommendations.     

Three cheers for liberal modesty

ABSTRACT

Many liberals have been immodest in postulating that their own progressive, secular liberalism is the only one that can be justified in public reason. In Liberalism’s Religion, I articulate a more modest theory of liberalism and religion. While I personally endorse progressive secular liberalism, I argue that it is only one of the reasonable conceptions of liberal justice. This liberal modesty has profound, hitherto unnoticed implications for (i) the role of religious arguments in the public sphere, (ii) the legitimacy of religious establishment, and (iii) the justifiability of religious exemptions. In this article, I defend these three claims by providing replies to my critics.     

Cohen vs. Rawls on justice and equality

G.A. Cohen criticizes Rawls’s account of justice because his difference principle permits inequalities that reflect the relative scarcity of different skills and natural abilities. Instead of viewing the ‘basic structure’ as the primary subject of justice, Cohen argues that individual citizens should cultivate an egalitarian ethos, which would enable a just society to dispense with the use of incentive payments to induce individuals to use their talents in socially ideal ways. This study examines Cohen’s critique, including his rejection of ‘incentives,’ and vindicates Rawls’s approach. Ultimately, Cohen’s argument fails to grapple with the moral pluralism that characterizes modern, democratic societies, whereas Rawls’s theory is constructed to accommodate such pluralism.     

The integrity of religious believers

ABSTRACT

According to Cécile Laborde, persons with religious commitments that are incidentally burdened by generally applicable laws should, under certain circumstances, be provided with an exemption from those laws. Laborde’s justification for this view is that religious commitments are a type of commitment with which a person must comply if she is to maintain her integrity. I argue that Laborde’s account is insufficiently demanding in terms of the other-regarding attitudes it expects people to have before they can make claims to exemptions based on their integrity. The reason it is insufficiently demanding is that Laborde’s account rests on what I call a ‘non-moralised’ view of integrity. I raise some criticisms of this view and defend the alternative, ‘moralised’ view of integrity, according to which the value of a religious person’s integrity depends on whether the practice she wishes to perform complies with certain moral constraints.