Beijing and the Myanmar problem

Abstract

The re-emergence of China as a major economic and political power has drawn attention to the role it might play in solving regional problems. Prominent among many Asian issues on Beijing's agenda is its southwestern neighbour, Myanmar, and in particular the military machine that has long ruled the country with an iron fist. The junta in place today is both acknowledged as problematic by policymakers in Beijing, and seen by the wider world as a regional challenge on which China should take the lead. However, there is little agreement on ways forward. To determine how Beijing might handle the Myanmar problem, this article first examines the concept of intervention, reviewing the manifold modes found in the contemporary world and drawing up a typology. Then it surveys arguments about intervention, focusing on perspectives that are relevant in this context. Next it presents arguments about intervention in Myanmar, and follows up by looking in some detail at China's current low-level engagement. Finally it considers where Beijing might go from here in dealing with Myanmar. The argument pulled together in the conclusion is that while nobody has a full solution to the Myanmar problem, a case for enhancement of China's role can be grounded not only in its global obligations, but also in precepts found deep in its national tradition. It is here that efforts to boost Beijing's engagement should be directed.     

‘The rock that can't be moved’: China's revised geostrategies in Myanmar

ABSTRACT

Since 2011, Myanmar has undertaken a series of domestic and foreign policy reforms, including democratisation and peacebuilding, before and after the watershed November 2015 elections in the country. These reform processes have called into question whether China, which has been Myanmar's dominant great power neighbour throughout the previous era of military government in the country formerly known as Burma, would find its strategic position eroding as Myanmar further opens to the international community. However, the concept of China ‘losing’ diplomatic ground to other actors, including the West, in Myanmar implies a zero-sum game that does not adequately address Beijing's still-formidable geostrategic presence vis-à-vis its southern neighbour. China has now started to implement a more multi-faceted, ‘resilience network’-building approach to maintaining its special status in Myanmar's foreign policy, a situation which will persist as Myanmar continues its uncertain path towards further reform.     

Challenging hydropower development in Myanmar (Burma): cross-border activism under a regime in transition

Abstract

Although general elections in Myanmar (Burma) in November 2010 have transformed the political landscape, many of the characters remain the same. While there is evidence of incremental domestic political openings many of the political constraints that existed during military rule remain in force. As a consequence of decades of military authoritarian governance and civil conflict, it is Myanmar's contested ethnic borderlands that have been the important locales for the development of environmental movements, despite increased recent domestic activity. This article analyses a case study of the largely cross-border campaign against hydropower dams on the Salween River in Myanmar and finds that through the suppression of opposition and dissent at home the regime has stimulated the creation of an ‘activist diaspora’, a dynamic transnational community of expatriates who engage in environmental activism beyond the reach of the regime. Due to their relative freedom on the border and in Thailand this community has developed expertise and international networks that have proved crucial in communicating the social and environmental impacts of hydropower development in Myanmar to the international community. Through increased cooperation with an expanding domestic civil society this established activist community is stimulating improved environmental governance of hydropower development and simultaneously assisting in the creation of a more open and democratic Myanmar.     

Chinese traditional world citizenship thoughts and its impact on the cultivation of Chinese world citizenship awareness

To better cultivate their world citizenship awareness better in the future, the Chinese citizens today need to inherit the fine Chinese traditional world citizenship thoughts. The Chinese traditional world citizenship thoughts, with ideas such as ‘Datong shijie’ (‘a world of grand unity’), ‘Tianren heyi’ (‘unity of heaven and human’), ‘Rendao zhuyi’ (humanitarianism), and ‘Heping zhuyi’ (pacifism), contained the seeds of a concept of world citizenship. In comparison with the Western counterpart, the citizen consciousness in China's traditional society was very weak, China's traditional minzhong (people) concepts were based on its state concept of ‘Tian Xia’ (All-under-Heaven), and a sense of citizenship in the late Qing was built by using the cultural resources of both Confucianism and Western philosophy. For the transcendence of Chinese citizenship toward world citizenship, the first thing to do is to foster a civil spirit in China, the second, to promote the growth of China's civil society, the third, to encourage Chinese citizens to actively take part in global governance and bear international responsibilities, and the fourth, to pay more attention to the role of Chinese universities, which serve as the fundamental basis, support, channel, and venue for fostering world citizenship awareness.     

Transparency without Democracy: The Unexpected Effects of China's Environmental Disclosure Policy

This article examines the impact of transparency regulations enacted under authoritarian conditions, through a study of China's environmental transparency measures. Given China's decentralized administrative structure, environmental disclosure ends up being weakest in the most polluted cities. However, the measures have allowed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to affect environmental governance through unusual pathways. Multinational companies (MNCs) have used NGO pollution databases to monitor Chinese suppliers, whereas local governments have responded to a transparency index with greater NGO engagement. That said, these civil society initiatives have had limited impact on key stakeholder behavior. For the environment ministry, enforcement costs remain high. Local government behavior depends on their economic priorities and the nature of their relations with enterprises. Chinese enterprise behavior depends on the character of their relations with government and MNCs. Given China's authoritarian structure, improved governance does not translate into stronger accountability, challenging common assumptions about the relationship between transparency and accountability.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

Scar Literature reconsidered: Yan Geling's novels The Criminal Lu Yanshi and A Woman's Epic

This paper reconsiders the political dynamics, social disorder, and personal traumas endured during China's socialist revolutionary times by examining the Chinese American writer Yan Geling's (b. 1958) two Scar Literature novels, The Criminal Lu Yanshi (Lufan Yanshi, 2011) and A Woman's Epic (Yige nuren de shishi, 2006). Employing Hannah Arendt's theory on totalitarianism, this paper investigates how Mao's authoritarian rule transmutes Chinese society into an atomized and individualized society. It will reveal how this totalitarian rule over the Chinese intellectuals, by the brutal use of the re-education system, succeeded in isolating them, which then led to intense feelings of solitude. The objective of this paper is to undo and rectify the historical and cultural “memory loss” caused by the current trend of depoliticizing, commercializing, and sensualizing the socialist revolutionary memories as demonstrated by the televisual postmodern repackaging of the Maoist past to be found in the mediasphere of present-day China, which forgets the horrors of the Cultural Revolution as crimes against the Chinese people.     

China's engagement-oriented strategy towards North Korea: achievements and limitations

In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009–2012) facilitated North Korean convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these diverging results and their implications for China's strategy towards North Korea. Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime's pursuit of WMDs as the basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits of China's strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea's WMD potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China's strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South Korea.     

China's defence industries

Abstract

The implementation of foreign direct investment (FDI) policies in China shows that domestic considerations were not the only factors shaping the course of China's opening up to the world economy. Foreign response was often taken into account as the Chinese government felt its way through the process of reform. Focusing on Japanese FDI in China, this article explores the liberalization of China's FDI regime and traces the impact of China's negotiations with and accommodation to pressure from foreign business and governments.     

Acting one way and talking another: China's coercive economic diplomacy in East Asia and beyond

Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond.     

Opening-up labor mobility? Rising powers' rulemaking in trade agreements

This article analyzes China's and India's role as emerging rulemakers in one of the most contested fields of international cooperation: labor mobility. It shows how both countries have seized the trade venue to negotiate labor mobility clauses that go well beyond the original preferences of established powers. Whereas India's more vocal claims have faced resistance, China's success in concluding far-reaching bilateral deals with Western countries is explained with stronger domestic regulatory capability and capacity. Maintaining a technocratic approach in trade negotiations, supported by the centralization of relevant competences in the trade ministry and consistently synchronizing external commitments with domestic reforms, China has been able to convey its market power into regulatory influence. As a result, the global standard for negotiating mobility in trade agreements has risen – notwithstanding the enduring stalemate at the multilateral level.     

Civil society participation in global governance: Insights from climate politics

A rather unique feature of global climate negotiations is that most governments allow representatives of civil society organisations to be part of their national delegation. It remains unclear, however, why states grant such access in the first place. While there are likely to be benefits from formally including civil society, there are also substantial costs stemming from constraints on sovereignty. In light of this tradeoff, this article argues for a ‘contagion’ effect that explains this phenomenon besides domestic determinants. In particular, states, which are more central to the broader network of global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other states' actions and policies toward civil society. In turn, more central governments are likely to include civil society actors if other governments do so as well. This argument is tested with data on the participation of civil society organisations in national delegations to global climate negotiations between 1995 and 2005. To further uncover the underlying mechanisms, the article also provides an analysis of survey data collected at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Durban in 2011.     

Domestic regulatory reform and transgovernmental networks: Brazil and China in the global competition regime

Developing countries increasingly participate in transgovernmental networks of global regulatory governance, but they do so in different ways. This article aims to provide an explanation for this variation for two of the major emerging powers in the world economy, Brazil and China, in their transition toward more active players in the global competition regime. Distinguishing between bilateral and multilateral transgovernmental networks and examining the domestic factors conditioning the transition of their national competition agencies from rule-takers to rule-promoters or rule-makers through these networks, the article makes theoretical contributions to the linkage between transgovernmentalism and the regulatory state. I argue that differing political needs and the incomplete process of regulatory state formation push domestic agencies to join transgovernmental networks, with a need for greater legitimacy steering the Brazilian regulators to multilateral networks and facilitating their transition from rule-takers to rule-promoters. The Chinese agencies' primary need for expertise rather than legitimacy, by contrast, led them to pursue technical assistance and cooperation via bilateral relationships. The Chinese approach has slowed its transition from rule-taker to rule-promoter where its norms and practices are aligned with the established powers. Such approach will further impede its transition into a global rule-maker in areas of competition law and policy where China's preferences diverge.     

Domestic actors and agendas in Chinese aid policy

Abstract

As China's aid has increased, so has scrutiny by the international development and foreign policy community. Despite recognition that foreign aid policy is a result of domestic political contests, the existing literature tends to overlook Chinese debates about the purpose of aid, and how that purpose should be achieved. This paper argues that examining these debates shows that Chinese aid is not a well-considered element of an overarching strategy. Rather, where foreign aid is considered relevant vis-à-vis China's goals, its use is hotly contested. Competing actors' varying agendas, rather than any coherent strategy, underpin inchoate aid projects.     

How Plausible is Chinese Annexation of Territory on the Moon?

This article argues that a hypothetical decision by the People's Republic of China to assert territorial sovereignty over the area surrounding its planned manned Moon base is plausible. Enhanced international prestige in the near term and access to natural resources and strategic military positions in the long term may be sufficient temptations for China's leaders to challenge the United States to a twenty-first century space race. Strategic surprise could be successfully employed, given the opacity of Chinese decision-making; the conceptual blindness of external observers, including decision-makers, analysts, and academics; and China's repeatedly demonstrated capacity for executing military or diplomatic surprises of comparable magnitude. The ability of signatory states to withdraw from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty with one-year's notice means that international law only poses a temporary obstacle to such a decision. A manned Moon base would fulfill the condition of effective occupation necessary for territorial sovereignty under international law. An international relations constructivist approach discourages consideration of the advantages to states of territorial aggrandizement or the weakness of international law in restraining the behavior of states.     

Governance and civil society

As part of the ECPA's regular contribution to the Journal, Tom Spencer reviews the new fashionability of governance and examines its confused interface with civil society. He invites participation in the ECPA civil society project, reviews some recent relevant literature and appeals for a coherent current bibliography in this politically urgent field. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Domestic legislatures and international human rights law: Legislating on religious symbols in Europe

This article examines the dynamics of domestic legislatures' application of international human rights law. Specifically, this article asks the following: What factors shape how domestic legislatures apply international human rights law while they enact national law and policy? Lawmakers have a variety of motives for invoking and deliberating international law. Given these motives, the article identifies two factors — civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law — that are likely to contribute to if and how national legislatures interpret and apply international human rights law while legislating. These factors are examined through case studies on religion in schools in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. This article argues civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law inform lawmakers' estimation of political costs related to compliance and thus how they apply international human rights law to domestic legislation.     

Political survival and the Yasukuni controversy in Sino-Japanese relations

Abstract

This article presents a reinterpretation of Japan's responses toward China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue. It is generally taken for granted that Japan's official responses to China's pressure over the issue are determined by the personality of individual leaders, the emergence of Japanese conservative nationalism and the calculations of Japan's national interests with regard to China's strategic role. With the examination of two cases during the Koizumi and Abe administrations between 2001 and 2007, this paper offers an alternative interpretation by highlighting the rationality of individual political actors and the primacy of domestic political survival. The article suggests domestic political legitimacy of individual leaders is a vital factor that affects Japan's official responses to China's pressure over the Yasukuni issue.     

China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues

This paper explores the causes for China's change of policy from silence to making public demands that Indonesia do more to protect its ethnic Chinese population in the wake of the riots in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia in May 1998. First, China saw it in its own interest to minimize potential damages to its state-to-state ties with Indonesia, allowing as little room as possible for Taiwan to exploit in the long-lasting China-Taiwan diplomatic rivalry. Second, Indonesia, in spite of its domestic problems, remains a country of significance to China in regional issues like the South China Sea disputes. Third, China needed to retain its reputation as a responsible actor in the process of regional economic crisis. Finally, the loyalty of the Indonesian Chinese to China continues to be a question and China could further weaken that loyalty if it contributed to the worsening of their predicament. In short, China may have wished to maximize its possible gains and minimize the potential risks through its action over the May riots.     

Leadership,regime security,and China's policy toward Taiwan: prospect theory and Taiwan crises

Abstract

Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US–China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait.