Taxation by Citation? Exploring Local Governments’ Revenue Motive for Traffic Fines

Anecdotal evidence suggests that local governments may have a revenue motive for traffic fines, beyond public safety concerns. Using California's county-level data over a 12-year period, this article shows that counties increased per capita traffic fines by 40 to 42 cents immediately after a 10 percentage point tax revenue loss in the previous year; however, these counties did not reduce traffic fines if they experienced a tax revenue increase in the previous year. This finding indicates that county governments probably view traffic fines as a revenue source to offset tax revenue loss, but not as a revenue stabilizer to manage revenue fluctuation. This article also finds that low-income and Hispanic-majority counties raised more traffic fines. Counties that generated more revenue from the hotel tax—a tax typically paid by travelers and visitors—raised more traffic fines, indicating a possible tax-exporting behavior by shifting the traffic fine burden to nonlocal drivers.     

Unintended Consequences of Local Sales Tax: Capitalization of Sales Taxes into Housing Prices

Local governments are under pressure to look for alternatives to property taxes as their main revenue source. One response has been to adopt local sales taxes. Prior studies offer little guidance on whether and how much local governments enhance their revenue capacity with local sales taxes. This article unveils the underlying mechanisms by exploring the capitalization of sales taxes into housing prices as a property tax base measure. The empirical analysis reveals a capitalization of local sales taxes into housing prices, indicating the reduction of property tax bases in higher sales tax areas from the long-term perspective. The findings suggest that a sales tax rate increase might not raise local revenue capacity as much as policymakers intend.     

State Policies Affecting Cities and Counties in 1991: Shifting Federalism

States experienced considerable fiscal distress in 1991 as the recession led to widespread revenue shortfalls. In this environment, discretionary spending did not fare well. This article discusses five major policy areas: (1) state financial aid; (2) major changes in the "sorting out" of responsibilities between the state and local governments; (3) revenue diversification; (4) changes in limitations imposed on local taxes; and (5) new mandates handed down to cities and counties.     

Does the Local‐Option Sales Tax Provide Property Tax Relief? The Georgia Case

This study examines the effect of a one percent local-option sales tax (LOST) on property tax level, millage rate, and total spending level in Georgia counties. The study covers a 13-year period for 136 Georgia counties. The findings suggest that the law, which requires rollback of property taxes when the LOST is used, led to actual property tax relief as well as millage rate reduction. Regression results show that counties collecting the LOST tend to have per capita property taxes that are an average of $12 or 1.8 mills lower than counties that do not collect the tax. Whereas an extra dollar of LOST revenue provides about 28 cents in property tax relief, it leads to an increase in total spending of about 48 cents. In sum, the LOST has achieved the objectives of property tax relief, but on balance it is more an augmentation of than an effective substitute for property taxes in Georgia counties.     

Taxation and local government accountability in a clientelist context: Colombia

Increasing the accountability of local government is an important objective of decentralisation. One way to achieve greater accountability is to enhance the reliance of local governments on locally raised taxes. Property taxes are a prime source of increased revenue for local governments. However, it is difficult to levy them effectively in clientelist political systems, like that of Colombia. Recent reforms there have increased the capacity of municipal governments to raise revenue through property taxation. Giving responsibility for assessments of property values to an independent national agency has been especially useful. Municipal government finances are now to some degree independent and protected from the influence of clientelistic political parties. However continuing problems include: the reluctance of mayors to enforce taxation liabilities; the obstacles to opening local political debates on taxation; and the problems faced by national governments in trying to monitor municipal revenues and expenditures. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Local Option Sales Taxes and Fiscal Disparity: The Case of Georgia Counties

While local option sales taxes (LOST) have become an important revenue source for local governments, there has been concern about the distribution of LOST revenues: the uneven distribution of sales tax bases may have introduced a new source of fiscal inequality and exacerbated existing fiscal disparity. Using Georgia county data (N=159, 1970–2000), this study examines whether and how LOST have affected local fiscal disparity. Our findings suggest that the effects of LOST on fiscal disparity vary with the approach to measure revenue‐raising capacity; thus the issue of LOST distribution is sensitive to the underlying conceptualization of “fiscal equity.”     

The politics of digits: evidence of odd taxation

From the concept of odd pricing, i.e., setting rightmost price digits below a whole number, this paper advances the political counterpart of odd taxation using a panel of Danish municipal taxes. First, the distribution of tax decimals is non-uniform and resembles the distribution of price-endings data. Second, nine-ending and other higher-end decimals are found to be over-represented which echoes odd pricing research. It suggests that incumbents take voters’ biases into account and apply odd taxes to minimize the political costs of taxation while maximizing revenue. Attention should be given to how policy digits are arranged to exploit voters’ cognitive biases.     

The Fiscal Impact of Federal and State Aid to Large U.S. Cities: An Empirical Analysis of Budgetary Response

This article examines four types of aid programs to thirty-nine large U.S. cities federal revenue sharing, federal categorical aid, state general aid, and state categorical aid. The central finding is that there is significant variation in the magnitude of property tax reduction resulting from different types of state general aid. Property tax credits and exemptions are less effective approaches in reducing local property taxes than are state lump-sum aid or city use of piggybacked taxes Categorical state and federal aid mostly fund additional city spending and have small but important stimulative effects on the revenue side These results suggest that differences in the design of aid programs have important implications for their fiscal impact and their effectiveness in reducing property taxes.     

The Growth and Stability of the Local Tax Revenue in Japan

This paper estimates the elasticity of the local tax revenue in Japan and analyzes the growth and stability of the Japanese local tax system. The main estimated results are as follows. The growth taxes in the long run are the Individual Enterprise Tax and the Fixed Asset Tax. There are no stable taxes in the short run. The total amount of prefectural tax revenue is low growth in the long run and unstable in the short run. The total amount of municipal tax revenue is low growth in the long run and neutral in the short run. The total amount of the local tax revenue in the prefecture and the municipality does not have stability and growth.     

Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion

According to the “Mill hypothesis”, the tax burden from indirect taxation is underestimated because indirect taxes are less “visible” than direct taxes. We experimentally test the Mill hypothesis and identify tax framing as a cause of fiscal illusion. We find that the tax burden associated with an indirect tax is underestimated, whereas this is not the case with an equivalent direct tax. In a referendum to tax and redistribute tax revenue, fiscal illusion is found to distort democratic decisions and to result in “excessive” redistribution. Yet, voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion.     

Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool

This article discusses the common‐pool problems that arise when multiple territorially overlapping governments share the authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area. Contrary to the traditional Tiebout model in which increasing the number of competing governments improves efficiency, I argue that increasing the number of overlapping governments results in “overfishing” from the shared tax base. I test the model empirically using data from U.S. counties and find a strong positive relationship between the number of overlapping jurisdictions and the size of the local public sector. Substantively, the “overlap effect” amounts to roughly 10% of local revenue.     

State Sales Tax Policy in a Changing Economy: Balancing Political and Economic Logic Against Revenue Needs

Soon after implementation in the 1930s, the general sales taxes emerged as the largest state tax source. In 1990, income taxes produced nearly as much state revenue as did sales taxes. Although income tax revenue have increased significantly, the sales tax is not in jeopardy of being replaced in the immediate future. The sales tax still remains a vital state fiscal concern, particularly to those states without a broad individual income tax.     

Changing the Federal Tax Philosophy: A National Value-Added Tax or Retail Sales Tax?

Moving the federal government from its heavy reliance on taxes on income and profits to taxes on general consumption has been proposed as a way to improve equity, economic efficiency, and transparency of the tax system. The value-added tax and the retail sales tax offer economically equivalent approaches to general consumption taxation, differing only in how they are administered. A comparison of the two taxes as they now operate, however, suggests considerable advantage for the value-added tax as a national revenue source. Only in terms of requiring fewer businesses to collect the tax is there an advantage to the retail sales tax. The value-added tax is superior or equivalent to the retail sales tax in other important fiscal criteria.     

Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues

Like most federal systems, Nigeria has a revenue distributionsystem in which the national government shares revenues withstate and local governments. Since the early 1970s, the bulkof revenue has been collected by the national government. Muchof this revenue has been derived from petroleum taxes and miningrents and royalties. Various proportions of this revenue havethen been distributed to state and local governments under arevenue allocation system (RAS) using different formulas. Akey problem, however, is that revenue allocations since 1970have been driven largely by political considerations and byformula factors, such as jurisdictional population and stateequality, rather than by factors associated with economic developmentimperatives.     

Comparing absentee and precinct voters: Voting on direct legislation

This paper addresses issues related to how absentee voters actually cast their ballots on propositions. If the liberalization of absentee laws changed either the composition or behavior of the electorate, then the outcome of the election may be affected. This paper tests whether the electoral behavior of absentee and precinct voters differs in regards to voting on propositions. The analysis is based on a sample of actual absentee and precinct voter ballots drawn from the approximately three million ballots cast in Los Angeles county for the 1992 general election. The analysis uses a nested model of voter participation and is estimated using the weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood method. We find that precinct and absentee voters do differ on both the propositions on which they cast votes and in their propensity to vote Yes for a proposition. For example, absentees appear to vote on fewer bonds and initiatives than do precinct voters. They also vote on fewer propositions dealing with state taxes, food taxes, and property taxes. In addition, given that a voter casts a valid vote, the propensity for absentee voters to vote Yes is higher on initiatives and propositions related to education, welfare, and health care than it is for precinct voters.     

Local Officials’ Support for PILOTs/SILOTs: Nonprofit Engagement,Economic Stress,and Politics

Nonprofit property tax exemption has become a major policy issue as the collapse of the housing market, the Great Recession, and property tax caps have threatened local tax collections. Consequently, many local governments have sought to obtain payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) from charities that are formally exempt from property taxes. Using a 2010 survey of local government officials in Indiana, this article examines whether support for PILOT policies is related to officials’ personal involvement with nonprofits, their views on government–nonprofit relationships, the type of position they hold, the level of economic distress in the county, local political conditions, and local nonprofit wealth. The findings support most of these hypotheses but also show that attitudes toward PILOTs appear to be shaped by somewhat different concerns than attitudes toward services in lieu of taxes (SILOTs).     

Life at the Bottom of the Fiscal Food Chain: Examining City and County Revenue Decisions

Any shifting of responsibilities from the state or federal governmentsto local governments would fall mostly on the shoulders of general-purposegovernments, namely, cities (municipalities) and counties. Thisstudy explores city and county revenue decisions associatedwith general funds—the governmental fund most likely tobe affected by state requirements for greater local financingresponsibility for new or devolved programs. The results suggestthat state control over local revenue authority affects decisionsregarding the imposition of financial burdens on residents,and that intergovernmental aid to cities and counties does notnecessarily mitigate those burdens. Despite evidence of healthyfinancial reserves, especially for cities, shifting responsibilitiesfrom the state to city or county governments could place citiesand counties in difficult fiscal positions. Given the importanceof own-source revenues to current budgets, and in view of thequestionable impact of intergovernmental aid on city and countyresidents' revenue burdens, questions persist about the abilityof city and county governments to maintain (and, if necessary,to expand) services during economic recession.     

Constitutional Tax and Expenditure Limitation in Colorado: The Impact on Municipal Governments

Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) have become a pervasive influence on local government fiscal affairs. Explanations for the spread of TELs suggest that voters thought local government was growing more than needed. Thus, TELs were intended to constrain growth and reduce the size of local governments. This article's purpose was to determine the impact of two separate kinds of TELs, one a property tax measure, and the other a comprehensive revenue and expenditure limit, upon the growth of municipal governments in Colorado. Using a panel data set on municipal budgets (1975–1996), the article demonstrates three major points: 1) the effectiveness of a TEL in achieving reductions in local government revenue and spending growth depends upon the nature of the TEL; 2) the comprehensive TEL did effectively constrain growth and reduce local government reliance on the property tax, despite the local options for exemption; and 3) TELs do not have uniform impacts among governments of different population.     

A tragedy of the anticommons: local option taxation and cell phone tax bills

When multiple taxing jurisdictions overlap and fail to account for one another’s actions, they over-tax the common base. This is a prediction of the anticommons model, in which numerous parties have authority to exclude others from using a resource. This model further predicts that when governments over-tax the base, private parties will underutilize the resource, and underutilization will be greater as the number of parties with exclusion rights rises. We test these predictions by studying cell phone taxation and local option tax authority, which allows some cities, counties, and special-purpose districts to levy taxes on cell phone use. Consistent with theory, we find that the tax rate on cell phone service is higher when local governments have the option to tax. Further, the percentage of households owning cell phones is lower when there is the local option to tax, and ownership rates fall with the number of taxes levied.     

The local party voter: A localist anti-establishment voter?

In several countries, local parties have increased their share of votes in local elections. This development has received limited scholarly attention compared to the immense interest paid to the fates of national level anti-establishment parties. Against this backdrop, we ask if something distinct characterizes those who choose to vote for genuinely local alternatives compared to other anti-establishment voters. Sweden is taken as the case in focus, a country where local parties have grown in numbers and strength throughout the past three decades. We view local parties as a part of a broader ‘anti-establishment’ family, and we explore if their voters a) are similar to those who vote for the most pronounced anti-establishment party in Sweden (Sweden Democrats), or b) if local party voters are a distinct anti-establishment category in their own right. Drawing on a survey data from 49 Swedish municipalities, we find that local party voters indeed distinguish themselves from both Sweden Democrat's voters and voters for the old and established parties, thus making them a distinct anti-establishment voter category of their own. These voters distrust their local politicians but at the same time are civically engaged.