美国强化亚太同盟体系的缘由——基于同盟理论三要素的分析

亚太地区国际体系的特殊性使中国崛起面临来自美国亚太同盟体系的巨大压力。奥巴马政府将关式霸权的软性特点融入其亚太同盟政策之中,使美国依然强大的权力继续受到追捧和攀附,中国则反被视为威胁地区稳定的因素。权力制衡观点对此解释力不足,威胁均衡和利益同盟的观点不失为较好的观察角度。     

美国对“中国崛起”的认知与战略回应

冷战后美国对华战略目标保持了相当的连续性,即防止中国崛起为势均力敌的战略对手,但对如何防范中国崛起却充满了争论,这主要源于美国各界对“中国崛起”认知存在分歧.与此相一致,美国对华战略也经常表现出前后不一、自相矛盾.美国对“中国崛起”的认知源于其根深蒂固的战略文化和意识形态偏见,但受国际环境、利益需求和国内政治的掣肘,“认知”并不能简单地转化为政策.在中美利益高度融合的背景下,美国实际上缺少应对中国崛起的有效手段,这凸显了美国对华战略困境.     

后危机时代的美国霸权与中美的亚太博弈

美国霸权是冷战后世界秩序中最重要的特征。金融危机的爆发以及中国崛起引起了人们对美国全球领导地位的广泛争论。奥巴马政府高调宣布“重返亚太”战略，中美之间围绕亚太地区的博弈愈加剧烈。全球格局／战略与地区格局／战略息息相关，本文立足对后危机时代美国全球霸权地位的判断，对美国亚太战略的基本目标和政策手段以及中美关系的新博弈进行了分析。     

百年未有之大变局下中国对美公共外交的使命与内涵

从贸易战到新冠肺炎疫情,美国宣布对华"接触政策"失败,开始推行"脱钩""新冷战",其直接原因在于中国崛起打破了美国神话,挑战了美国霸权。美国国内的四类群体"商人""军人""传教士"和"律师"深刻影响着美国外交决策,四类群体在人员构成上相互交错,其关于中国崛起后的"已知"与"未知"深刻地影响着美国对华政策。美国对华认知出现偏差的根源在于对百年未有之大变局的不适和对所谓"中美权力转移"的担忧。疫情的暴发放大了美国对中国的偏见。如何避免心理脱钩成为事实脱钩,避免新冷战变成自我实现的预言,成为对美公共外交的重大而紧迫的课题。百年未有之大变局下的对美公共外交使命在于消除美国错误的对华认知,促进中美民心相通,维持中美和平共处的大势,在"认识""认同"和"认可"原则指导下开展对美公共外交,做到中美"共通""共鸣""共振""共情",讲清楚中国共产党的执政理念、中国崛起的逻辑、中美合作的担当、中美不合作的后果以及人类命运共同体的内涵。     

尼克松政府对智利的外交政策:基于进攻现实主义的解读

与阶级斗争论、经济决定论和权力制衡论等传统观点相比,米尔斯海默的进攻现实主义理论在引进"小国"变量和"软进攻"外交手段之后,能够较好地解释美国尼克松政府对智利的外交政策。按照进攻现实主义有关大国政治互动的观点,可以演绎出两个结论:地区霸主在区域霸权体系内对于小国潜在或者现实的离心倾向会采取进攻性外交政策;在军事上的进攻与制衡这个硬手段被视为不可行或者得不偿失的情况下,霸主会采用软进攻的方法。根据该理论,从本质上看,尼克松政府对智利的外交政策是区域霸主的进攻性外交政策,与美国历届政府对拉美尤其是智利的外交战略在本质上没有差异。出于对阿连德的内政外交政策会损害自己霸权根基的担心,尼克松政府对智利采取了一系列以和平演变为主的软进攻政策并得偿所愿。这些对于认识美国的拉美战略和全球战略有着重要意义。     

美国与亚太经济合作例证分析

本文用对策论的方法，分析了两个有着内在联系的问题：１．美国的政治体制为什么会倾向于产生不一致的对外政策？其根本原因在于美国政治体制里的制衡原则，这种原则是美国的开国先辈们为限制权力膨胀，保护个人自由而有意设计进宪法的，他们的出发点在于美国人民的利益而不是对外政策的连续性。２．制度化的亚太经济合作组织（ＡＰＥＣ）在削弱美国对外政策不一致性上所起的作用。关于这一问题作者认为，一个更正规的ＡＰＥＣ会提供这样一种机制，使得美国的贸易政策较少受国内政治的影响，从而增加政策的连续性。     

韩国公众对中国崛起的认知与态度分析

为了解韩国公众如何看待中国崛起,“韩国人心目中的中国形象”课题组委托韩国相关调查机构进行了1000份电话问卷调查和5组焦点集团访谈。调查结果表明,韩国受访者认可中国崛起的可能性,但对中国崛起的评价则出现了明显的分化。44．3％的受访者认为中国崛起对韩国利弊各半;约36．6％的受访者认为中国崛起对韩国弊大于利;18．6％的受访者认为中国崛起对韩国利大于弊。受访者对中国这个“战略合作伙伴”的国际影响力评价、信赖度也远低于其盟国美国,因此,他们更倾向于主张韩国在安全上利用美国制衡中国。     

美国重返亚洲的理论基础： 以全球公域论为例

在亚太地区,随着中国的快速崛起,美国传统的“辐辏”霸权体系难以为继,离岸 制衡理论也遭到重大挑战。为此,美国理论家近年提出“全球公域论”,成为美国“重返亚洲” 战略的理论基础之一。以此为指导,美国加紧推行全球公域战略,重点是改变在南海问题上传 统的中立政策,以所谓的“海上自由航行”原则突破《联合国海洋法公约》限制,实施“空海 一体战”,为美国亚太双边联盟体系寻找新的合法性并强化这一体系,以实现美国亚太霸权从“ 霸权稳定性”到“霸权可持续性”的转型。形成中的美国全球公域理论与全球公域战略对亚太 秩序和中国国家安全带来一系列挑战,值得中国高度关注     

中国与国际体系的变革：西方学者的视角评析

中国崛起对美国主导的现行国际体系正在产生深远影响，这引起西方学界的高度关注。相对于欧洲学者较为积极的态度，美国学者中的主流观点认为，中国将对现行国际体系发起挑战，但冲突不是不可避免的，因此亟需通过改善和加强美国与其欧洲盟友的关系来共同维护和巩固该体系，以便将中国纳入该体系，驾驭迅速崛起的中国。本文认为，这是一种极力维护美国霸权的消极态度，而积极的态度应该是有力地推动现行国际体系的变革，以使其更好地适应新兴大国的兴起，满足发展中国家对建立公正合理的国际政治经济秩序的要求。     

中国崛起及其战略应对

本文从现实主义理论范式出发 ,探讨中国崛起的战略应对之道。本文的主要内容是 :首先 ,概述权力转移理论、国际周期理论、霸权转移理论等对大国崛起及其国际影响的经典解释 ,强调协调、对抗和模糊是应对大国崛起的三种主要模式 ,其中搭便车、推卸责任属于协调模式 ,平衡、预防性战争属于对抗模式 ,而接触、约束属于模糊战略 ,作者从中提炼出“大国崛起困境”的概念 ,并指出既有霸权国更常采用混合战略 ;其次 ,剖析既有大国应对中国崛起的战略选择 ,指出遏制战略与接触战略并用可能成为既有大国尤其是美国的主流选择 ,但诸大国的战略选择远未定型 ,作者认为 ,中国崛起过程中的变革性———包括中国自身的变革、各国对中国崛起的认知等———是影响既有大国战略选择和中国战略选择的重要因素 ;其三 ,指出中国将会继续采取积极的参与战略 ,但这一战略尚乏细化策略 ,强调大战略思维储备不足、缺乏清晰的大战略框架是中国崛起战略谋划的根本性缺陷 ,呼吁加强大战略研究     

Business as Usual

In the years since 9/11, there is no doubt that the emphasis of U.S. global strategy has been on counter-terrorism and the war in Iraq. During this period of time, the U.S. investment in strategic, political and military resources in the Middle East, Iraq, and the war on terror, which are the top priorities on the list of Bush＇s foreign policy, has been far greater than in any other fields. However, there are some in the U.S. who believe that China＇s rise has been much ignored by the U.S., due to the global war on terror （GWOT）, and that America should, in fact, be focusing more on China, not the Middle East. However, as we see it, China has by no means been ignored by the U.S., neither has China＇s rise been the result of U.S. ignorance.     

Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy

Soft power, like so much else in relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, is asymmetrical and freighted with implications for U.S. policy and U.S.-China relations. For China, soft power largely serves—or strives—to reduce alarm (or at least reaction) among other states concerned about China's new-found hard power or, perhaps more realistically, the hard power that China's economic rise can underwrite. Much of the value for Beijing of soft power is—and is likely to remain for quite some time—its potential contribution to reducing the likelihood that other states will react to China's rising hard power in ways that could threaten China's interests.     

Strategic Balance in the Asia-Pacific Region

The authors analyze events in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War and then draw three conclusions about the strategic balance of "one superpower, multiple major powers" in this region. First, compared with a stable superpower, the U.S., current multiple powers-China, Japan,Russia, ASEAN, India and Australia-are more dynamic.Second, two kinds of forces maintain order-a combination of national strength and non-national strength. On one hand, there are four different models which could ensure Asia-Pacific order in the future the U.S. model of hegemony, China's model of a harmonious Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN's model of regional cooperation, and the model of non-states actors. On the other hand, four different structures-security, production, finance and knowledge-are closely linked in this area. Third,globalization of the market economy brings dynamic and diverse development. The authors believe that China's"Harmonious Asia-Pacific" model is the best choice for the Asia-Pacific strategic pattern of "One superpower, multiple major powers."     

An Analysis of U.S.Involvement in the South China Sea Dispute

The U.S. is the largest country outside of the region to involve itself in the South China Sea dispute. U.S. policy on this issue is guided by the principle of containing China＇s rise and this will continue to be the case in the near future. Meanwhile, the U.S. has proposed a new multi-lateral security mechanism, incorporating itself, in the South China Sea. This article will put forward some reflections and suggestions on the above issues.     

The Diplomacy of a Rising China in South Asia

The author argues that U.S. interest in Asia traditionally has been maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony. Yet against this anti-hegemony objective is balanced an attempt to accommodate China. If China keeps this commitment, the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with America to address common challenges and mutual interests.     

Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism,and the War in Iraq

This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.     

Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy Toward China (1949–50)

American policy toward China during the early Cold War has long been considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory. Many realists have argued that domestic forces caused a confrontational policy, overriding structural imperative to accommodate China to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. Refuting the domestic explanation, I argue that balance of power consideration primarily determined the U.S. policy. Under the powerful pressure of bipolar competition, the Truman administration persistently pursued a realist policy of forming an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralizing it, through accommodation in order to balance the Soviet Union in Asia. This policy was based on the assessment of Soviet superiority in Asia. However, my analysis of the power structure shows that there was little structural incentive for China to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union because the latter was in a somewhat disadvantageous position globally and had limited offensive capabilities in Asia. Further, Chinese leaders perceived the United States as the superior power in bipolarity. Consequently, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to check the United States according to its own balance of power logic.     

Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia

Realists agree that great powers balance the military power of rising powers, but there is little agreement regarding secondary-state responses to rising powers. First, there are differences regarding whether secondary states balance or accommodate rising powers. Second, there are differences among realists regarding the distinct roles of economic and military factors in secondary-state alignment policies. Third, some scholars argue that state alignments are not necessarily determined by realist variables, but can reflect preferences shaped by intentions, historical experiences, or cultural influences. This paper addresses these issues in balance-of-power theory. Its empirical focus is the impact of the rise of China on secondary-state alignments in East Asia. After examining the complex mix of China's military and economic reach in East Asia, it concludes that secondary-state behavior is sensitive to local variation in the great power capabilities and that secondary states tend to accommodate rather than balance rising powers. It further concludes that economic capabilities alone are insufficient to generate accommodation, so that the political-economy literature should reexamine cases of apparent secondary-state accommodation to economic dependency, sensitive to the presence of military vulnerability on the part these secondary states to proximate great powers. These conclusions suggest that there is nothing sui generis or culturally-determined in East Asian international politics and that realism can explain alignment behavior among East Asian states as well as it does among European states. Research on East Asia's response to China's rise that is sensitive to intra-regional variations in U.S. and Chinese military and economic capabilities also challenges assumptions of an emerging Chinese regional hegemony or of a costly region-wide U.S.-China competition.     

论中美之间的权力转移

经过60余年的物质性和社会性成长,中国的国家实力已经有了明显提高。中国实力的增长和美国实力的相对衰退使中美之间出现了权力转移现象。由于中国坚持和平发展道路和对现存国际秩序持基本满意的态度,中美之间的权力转移未必引起冲突与战争,权力能否和平转移取决于美国对中国崛起的战略判断。中美之间的权力转移并不意味着中崛美落,而是中美和其他主要国家或国家集团一道在国际事务中发挥重要作用。     

Africa and the New World Order-The Role of China in Africa''s Regeneration

Sino-African relations, economic relation in particular, are developing steadily when the continent is trying to rejuvenate. During this process, China is not trying to overthrow the western order. It is more about how to reconcile China＇s scientific pragmatic foreign policy with western humanitarian interventionism. An inclusive world system will be better managed by striking a balance between Chinese pragmatism and U.S. idealism.