Contours of the Naga Upsurge

The Naga upsurge is the manifestation of one of the earliest ethnic unrests in North East India. The Nagas claim that they have been living in their present quarters since ancient times and that they have never been conquered by any foreign force. In their view their fight cannot be considered to be secessionist and is rather a freedom movement. But there are others who view that the Naga nation formation is rather a post British phenomenon. Nagas are a very heterogenous group with various linguistic affiliations. But they have been able to carve out a niche and many new tribes are being drawn to the Naga constellation. The Naga drive may be correct, but their rationale needs to be viewed from the process of formation of the Indian nation–state and its democratic foundation which is rather skewed. In a just confederation of states, the Nagas can hope to attain an equal share as any other nationality. But it needs to be realized that the Indian nation–state cannot be looked upon in a frozen time frame as political boundaries are bound to alter with changing aspirations of the people, in line with the shifts in politico–economic equations globally and regionally.     

Gangsters or Gandhians? The Political Sociology of the Maoist Insurgency in India

This article combines concepts from political sociology with evidence from newspaper reports, insurgent and state documents, and ethnographic studies in order to understand the nature of the Maoist insurgency in India. The first section argues that the insurgency should be conceptualized as a state building enterprise rather than organized crime. It demonstrates that both insurgent violence and fundraising serve, on the whole, the collective interests of the state building enterprise – i.e., to consolidate insurgent control in their base areas – rather than the private interests of individual insurgents. The second section seeks to understand how Maoist state builders undermine and fragment the Indian state’s monopoly of the means of violence and administration in areas where they operate. In some areas the state is totally absent, while in others the state forms alliances with the insurgents at the local level in order to maintain the semblance of a sovereign and democratic ruler.     

Insurgency theory and the conflict in Algeria: A theoretical analysis

In the early nineties it was widely feared that Algeria was on the verge of an Islamic revolution. These fears proved to be unfounded. This article seeks to explain the failure of the insurgency to topple the current government through the use of three models of successful insurgency movements: urban insurrection, peasant‐based guerrilla warfare and focoism. Analysis shows that the first two of these models cannot be applied to the situation in Algeria because of the nature of the Algerian topography, the lack of foreign sanctuaries for the insurgents and the authoritarian nature of the Algerian regime. The single success of the third model is a historical anomaly, unlikely to lead to the overthrow of the current Algerian government, but leading to a fourth and final model; urban terror. It is the clandestine nature of this fourth model which provides for the longevity of the current insurgency, yet because of its inability to meaningfully challenge the state, gain recruits, and maintain centralized control over the movement, the insurgency degenerates, perpetrating the seemingly senseless acts of violence currently occurring in Algeria today, the natural aftermath of a failed insurgency.     

The Polish Blitz,More than a Mere Footnote to History: Poland and Preventive War with Germany, 1933

The January 1933 appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany marked the beginning of the end of the fragile post-war peace throughout Europe. The Polish leadership had good reason to fear his threats of revising the Treaty of Versailles. Realising that Hitler was too dangerous to remain in power, the Polish leadership led by Marshal Józef Pi?sudski prepared for a preventive war against Germany. Unfortunately, the appeasement policy among the Western Powers condemned this plan to failure and forced Poland into signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934; thus dooming Poland's existence. To test his premonitions about Hitler, Pi?sudski created several international “incidents” concerning the Free City of Danzig, designed to test both Germany and whether the Western Powers would fight to uphold the Treaty of Versailles. Pi?sudski's efforts offer proof that Poland deserves more credit for its determination to deal with a rising tide of Nazi Germany.     

‘This gun is our food’: Disarming the White Army militias of South Sudan

The continued presence of ‘other armed groups’ poses a significant challenge to furthering peace and stability in post-conflict environments. A good example of this was ‘White Army’ militias, which maintained an armed presence after the signing of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This article presents an empirical mapping of the White Army militias as well as a detailed analysis of the disarmament strategies that were implemented for them during the course of 2006. The article concludes with an analysis of the successes in achieving disarmament of White Army militias as well as the continuing challenges faced by Sudanese authorities and the international community alike in building sustainable conditions for peace.     

Rivalry and Rapprochement in Early Cold War Central America

Under what conditions does a common threat cause rival states to achieve rapprochement? To inform not only contemporary policy debates about coalition-building against terrorism and insurgency, but also theoretical debates about obstacles to cooperation and conflict resolution, this article examines the pattern of rivalry and rapprochement among Central American states—non-Communist allies under the Rio Treaty—in the shadow of the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Given a common threat, why did Honduras and Nicaragua shift from rivalry to rapprochement while Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and El Salvador and Honduras, did not? Drawing on rarely explored published primary sources in English and Spanish, the article argues that the major obstacle to cooperation was the parochial interest of the armed forces in perpetuating the old mission of international rivalry despite the attractive new mission of internal security, and that presidents were able to achieve rapprochement only where state resource constraints compelled a trade-off between the old and new missions. This argument is tested against realist alternatives including balancing and bandwagoning, and liberal alternatives including democratic peace and counterrevolutionary ideology. The article demonstrates that spoilers within the state can perpetuate international conflict, but also indicates conditions under which they can be convinced to support international cooperation.     

Ambivalent Albion,Ambitious Ally: Britain's Decision for No Separate Peace in 1914

When Britain entered the First World War it did so as an especially hesitant belligerent. One month later, the British enthusiastically signed the Treaty of London, stating that the Entente powers would prosecute the war in common and that none would pursue a separate peace. Why would a state long known for jealously guarding its ability to maintain a free hand initiate a binding alliance that restricted its war termination prospects after one month of combat? And what were the effects of its decision to do so? Answering this question requires not only that we examine British decision making but that we understand No Separate Peace Agreements and why states sign them. I hypothesize that a state will initiate a No Separate Peace Agreement when it has reason to fear that one of its cobelligerents may defect. I also hypothesize that No Separate Peace Agreements will cause states to reconcile war aims with their allies, agreeing to different terms of peace than might have been necessary to satisfy any one of them individually. Using new archival documents, I analyze a case study of British decision making in the early weeks of World War I and find substantial support for the hypotheses.     

太平洋战争期间英国对缅甸政策出台始末

战前 ,缅甸的民族独立运动已使英殖民当局难以招架 ,英国政府不得不向民族主义者许诺 ,在条件成熟时 ,英国将给缅甸自治 ,但这个许诺不过是一个遥遥无期的长把伞。欧战爆发 ,使英国政府无力顾及它在远东的殖民地 ,缅甸民族主义者再次看到独立的希望 ,但是 ,英国政府逆历史潮流而行 ,仍然采用欧战爆发前的殖民政策来对付缅甸的民族主义 ,特别是在太平洋战争爆发后 ,缅甸民族主义提出联英抗日 ,促进缅甸独立的政治主张遭到英殖民当局的拒绝 ,英国不顾已经变化了的国际形势 ,采取高压政策 ,大肆逮捕民族主义领袖 ,使缅甸民族主义者转向日本 ,以…     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

Italy and monetary events of 1971

The many regional and intrastate wars and conflicts have contributed significantly to Africa's overall economic, political and strategic marginalisation in world affairs. The AU's new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is designed to provide conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-building on the continent, but lacks autonomy. The UN, EU, G8 countries, China and, to some extent, NATO and India are active players on the African peace and security scene and are engaged in assisting APSA's operationalisation. But the multiplicity of actors, the magnitude of resources involved and the enormity of the challenges point to the need to enhance coordination by setting up a single entry point for channeling international assistance. Having provided the most funding to date, and with its strong strategic ties with Africa and its extensive participation in other regional and global fora, the EU is best equipped to coordinate support to minimise wasteful duplication, ensure synergy in developing the APSA and implementing its mandate.     

“How many miles make an inch?” Center-state relations and the 1967 India-Burma boundary agreement

ABSTRACT

Unabated protests in Manipur against India’s boundary with Myanmar and the lack of demarcation of some boundary pillars, despite the signing of the India-Burma Boundary Agreement in 1967, makes it an important case to study how center-state relations impact India’s foreign policy decision-making and implementation processes. Based on fresh archival material, this article explains why New Delhi refused to consult state governments in Northeast India before signing the boundary agreement, and the limiting consequences of such a top-down decision-making approach during the demarcation phase. A postcolonial entity that struggled to generate legitimacy in and assert sovereign control over the Northeast, India’s approach on this issue offers an opportunity to reflect upon the (limited) conceptualization of, and ongoing debates around, the idea of a ’state’ within foreign policy analysis.     

From Tremors to Talks: Do Natural Disasters Produce Ripe Moments for Resolving Separatist Conflicts?

This article suggests that natural disasters can produce a ripe moment for conflict resolution because governments faced with the demand for effective disaster relief have incentives to offer concessions to separatist challengers. An analysis of the prevalence of new negotiations, ceasefires, and peace agreements during 12-month periods before and after natural disasters for separatist dyads 1990–2004 reveal some support for this proposition. Natural disasters increase the likelihood that parties will initiate talks or agree to ceasefires but have less effect on the signing of peace agreements. In line with the proposed mechanism, these results are particularly strong in democracies and following more severe disasters where the need to provide relief is most acute.     

印度对第一次印支战争的政策演变

印度独立后对印度支那人民的反法斗争采取中立的＂不卷入＂政策,但到1954年日内瓦会议前后,印度抛弃＂不卷入＂政策,以外交斡旋的方式积极介入调停。印度在日内瓦会议上的外交斡旋促进了日内瓦协议的签订。印度对第一次印度支那战争的政策演变是印度对国家利益认知不断提升的结果。     

Asymmetric Federalism and the Question of Democratic Justice in Northeast India

This article intends to fill a glaring void in the existing academic literature on the issues and challenges which stem not only from crafting, but also making asymmetric federalism work in northeast India. It examines the extent and limits to which asymmetric federalism—specifically under Article 371A of India’s Constitution—not only negotiates Nagas’ sovereignty claims over their land and resources and caters to the demands of democratic justice, but also the extent to which it consolidates India’s state-nation and democracy building in its northeastern periphery. Contending that the extant asymmetric federal arrangement in India’s polity stems from a centralist federal framework, the article makes a case for a more robust asymmetric federalism, which goes beyond this framework.     

Genealogies of the colonial present: the rediscovery of the local in conflict management interventions in Mindanao,the Southern Philippines

This article argues that the current attention on indigenous institutions, and the ‘local’ more generally, in peace-building and conflict management bears similarities with colonial and post-colonial attempts at pacifying volatile borderlands. This will be illustrated through a historical case study of the Southern Philippine island of Mindanao, which has witnessed a recurring Muslim insurgency throughout different phases of its history. In an attempt to cope with these violent uprisings, both the American colonial authorities and the authoritarian Marcos regime, as well as a range of contemporary international NGOs, have endorsed traditional institutional avenues of informal mediation. The argument for the deployment of the local in state reconstruction and peace-building as propagated in current literature on hybrid peace should therefore be reframed as a reinvention of colonial governance techniques of indirect rule. It will hereby also be argued that the underlying rationale for this current deployment of local/traditional institutions of mediation and governance confirms and builds further upon a colonial framing of the non-Western other as incapable of modern, liberal democracy.     

Political violence in Sri Lanka: A diagnostic approach

The main objective of this article is to examine the causes and pattern of political violence waged by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. It is the argument of the article that the origin and development of the JVP and the LTTE relate more closely to the social expansion and the lack of economic and political development in Sri Lanka since the beginning of the 1960s. Basically, both groups are more action‐oriented than ideology‐oriented and dominated by youth with a similar socio‐economic background. Their ideology is a mixture of ethno‐nationalism and various interpretations of Marxism. The strategy of the JVP was based on an objective of launching a short‐term armed insurrection. The LTTE's aim is to overthrow the forces of the Sri Lankan government through a protracted armed struggle. Although the left‐wing insurrection of the JVP was crushed by the government security forces, it is evident that there is a possibility of its re‐emergence in its violent form. The on‐going separatist guerrilla warfare by the LTTE seems to be an unwinnable war. In the presence of youth insurrections in Sri Lanka, the utmost requirement is a sound counter‐insurgency policy accompanied by political reforms.     

Hanging the Kaiser: Anglo-Dutch relations and the fate of Wilhelm II, 1918-20

The flight of the German Kaiser to the Netherlands at the end of the First World War led to a crisis in Anglo-Dutch relations. Prime Minister David Lloyd George made the trial of the Kaiser a key issue in the British general election campaign of December 1918. Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles called for the Kaiser's surrender by the Netherlands government for trial before an international tribunal, a request the Dutch repeatedly refused during the period January to March 1920. Using both British and Dutch sources, this article highlights the internal Dutch debate over the fate of the Kaiser, and the confusion and hypocrisy with which the problem was handled by the British government.     

IAI annual report, 1971

Despite the belief of some that British Prime Minister Brown's attitudes towards the European Union could not be predicted, much in his period as Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that Britain's role within the European Union would not be a high priority of his premiership. Early indications bear out this expectation. There will probably not be a British referendum on the Reform Treaty, but the rhetoric employed by Brown's government to describe the Treaty will be negative and minimalist. Although no significant body of British opinion favours withdrawal from the European Union, British popular resentment towards the Union is unlikely to disappear under Brown's leadership.     

印度与冷战后联合国维和行动

参与联合国维和已成为多年来印度外交政策的重要组成部分。冷战后,随着国际格局的变化以及印度外交政策调整,印度参与联合国维和行动力度进一步加大并出现新的趋向。印度通过参加维和在一定程度上促进了冲突地区的和平与稳定。不过,印度参与联合国维和也有着较为明显的战略利益诉求,印度希望通过此保障自身地缘政治利益、促进与他国的政治联系、遏制巴基斯坦以及争当联合国安理会常任理事国。     

Hanging the Kaiser: Anglo‐Dutch relations and the fate of Wilhelm II, 1918–20

The flight of the German Kaiser to the Netherlands at the end of the First World War led to a crisis in Anglo‐Dutch relations. Prime Minister David Lloyd George made the trial of the Kaiser a key issue in the British general election campaign of December 1918. Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles called for the Kaiser's surrender by the Netherlands government for trial before an international tribunal, a request the Dutch repeatedly refused during the period January to March 1920. Using both British and Dutch sources, this article highlights the internal Dutch debate over the fate of the Kaiser, and the confusion and hypocrisy with which the problem was handled by the British government.