Gorillas in the closet? Public and private actors in the enforcement of transnational private regulation

This paper examines to what extent the background presence of state regulatory capacity – at times referred to as the “regulatory gorilla in the closet” – is a necessary precondition for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation. By drawing on regulatory regimes in the areas of advertising and food safety, it identifies conditions under which (the potential of) public regulatory intervention can bolster the capacity of private actors to enforce transnational private regulation. These involve the overlap between norms, objectives, and interests of public and private regulation; the institutional design of regulatory enforcement; compliance with due process standards; and information management and data sharing. The paper argues that while public intervention remains important for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation, governmental actors – both national and international – should create the necessary preconditions to strengthen private regulatory enforcement, as it can also enhance their own regulatory capacity, in particular, in transnational contexts.     

Out of tune or well tempered? How competition agencies direct the orchestrating state

This article analyzes the impact competition agencies have on the orchestrating role of states in domestic private regulation. I argue that these agencies can significantly affect interactions in the governance triangle through the way they apply a “logic of the market” to evaluate agreements between firms. The regulatory framework of European Union competition law has increasingly constrained the ability of firms to take into account broader interests when making agreements to foster social objectives. This logic of the market clashes with the ever‐increasing emphasis governments place on enabling firms to enter into such agreements. I analyze this tension through a case study of a pact of Dutch retailers to collectively introduce higher animal welfare standards for poultry. Using regulatory network analysis I trace the governance interactions between the governance triangle on the one hand (government, non‐governmental organizations, and firms), and the Dutch competition authority, Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM) and the European Commission on the other hand. Attempts by the Dutch government to instruct the ACM to be more lenient toward private regulation were blocked twice by the European Commission. As a result, the Dutch government abandoned private regulation as the preferred mode and proposed a bottom‐up process that would generate public regulation as a way to avoid conflict with competition policy. I argue that paradoxically enough the intervention of these non‐majoritarian competition agencies against the “will” of the governance triangle has potentially increased the effectiveness and legitimacy of orchestration processes.     

Testing responsive regulation in regulatory enforcement

The policy ideals of responsive regulation have been developed on the basis of substantial empirical evidence. The overall formulation of responsive regulation theory itself, however, has rarely been empirically tested. This article sets out the theoretical concept of responsive regulation in the context of business regulation enforcement and discusses how we might operationalize and empirically measure it. We develop two alternative theoretical interpretations of responsive regulatory enforcement: “tit for tat” responsive regulation and “restorative justice” responsive regulation. We then measure business firms' perceptions of the reactions and counter‐reactions of a regulatory enforcement agency throughout the investigation and enforcement process. We find little evidence of tit for tat responsiveness actually occurring in practice. To the extent that tit for tat responsiveness does exist, we find a small amount of evidence that it has the hypothesized effects on behavior but not on attitudes. We find clearer evidence of restorative justice responsiveness having the hypothesized effects on attitudes but not on behavior.     

When risk‐based regulation aims low: A strategic framework

This article develops a strategic framework for regulators to employ when choosing intervention strategies for dealing with low risks and reviewing performance, building on the analysis by the same authors in the previous edition of this journal. The framework occupies the operational “middle ground” between risk analysis and formal enforcement action. At its core is a matrix, the Good Regulatory Intervention Design (GRID), which provides a framework to categorize sites or activities on the basis of two factors: the nature of the risk and the nature of the regulatee. Using GRID, regulators can select which intervention tools to use, and determine the overall level of regulatory intensity that should apply. GRID is accompanied by the Good Regulatory Assessment Framework (GRAF) for agencies to use in reviewing their performance and provides a step‐by‐step process for enabling “double loop learning.” The article also argues that the process of developing such a framework highlighted the extent to which “low risk” and “high risk” regulation are distinct. “Low risk” means “low priority.” Justifying why certain risks should not receive much regulatory attention requires a particular type of engagement, and has a bearing on the regulatory strategies that are adopted.     

Regulatory capabilities: A normative framework for assessing the distributional effects of regulation

This paper develops the normative concept of “regulatory capabilities.” It asserts that nobody – individuals, groups, or entities – should be subjected to a regulatory regime without some freedom to determine its nature. Self‐determination in this context means the ability to accept or reject a regulatory regime imposed by others or to develop viable alternative approaches. We use the term “regulatory capabilities” to capture the importance of enabling conditions for regulatory self‐determination. This is particularly important in the transnational context where private, hybrid public–private, and public actors compete for influence, shape domestic regulation, and, in doing so, limit the scope for democratic self‐governance. In short, this paper seeks to contribute to the general debate on the normative foundations of and the requisite conditions for transnational regulation and governance.     

The Limits of Regulation: Indirect Party Access to State Resources in Australia and the United Kingdom

The way in which political parties use state resources indirectly (e.g., parliamentary expenses) receives substantial attention in public debate, particularly when surrounded by perceptions of misuse. However, scholarly studies of resources indirectly available to parties through their functions in the state, how they are used and regulated, are rare. This article presents an analytical framework that identifies and categorizes the range of indirect resources linked to parties' institutional roles. It locates these resources within a four‐fold matrix of regulation, distinguishing regimes that vary in their detail and whether compliance is externally monitored. Undertaking comparative case studies of parliamentary resource use in the United Kingdom and Australia, we argue that the blurring of party‐political and parliamentary roles can impede the effectiveness of regulatory regimes that democracies adopt, regardless of detail and external enforcement. These findings have important implications for regulatory reforms that seek to constrain parties' behavior to depoliticize democratic governance.     

Regulatory inspection and the changing legitimacy of health and safety

The regulation of conduct via law is a key mechanism through which broader social meanings are negotiated and expressed. The use of regulatory tools to bring about desired outcomes reflects existing social and political understandings of institutional legitimacy, the meanings attached to regulation, and the values it seeks to advance. But these contextual understandings are not static, and their evolution poses challenges for regulators, particularly when they reflect political framing processes. This paper shows how inspection has been reshaped as a tool within the United Kingdom's health and safety system by changes in the meanings attached to the concept of “risk‐based regulation.” While rates of inspection have fallen dramatically in recent years, the nature and quality of inspection have also been fundamentally reshaped via an increasingly procedural and economically rational “risk‐based” policy context. This has had consequences for the transformative and symbolic value of inspection as a tool of regulatory practice.     

Intermediary roles in regulatory programs: Toward a role‐based framework

This paper develops a role‐based framework of intermediaries in regulatory programs. In examining the types of roles that organizations adopt in regulation and governance, we argue that roles have important implications for understanding organizational and program level dynamism and outcomes. We use the Regulator–Intermediary–rule‐Taker framework to describe how organizational roles can be adopted through assignment, appropriation, or promotion. We then go deeper into how intermediaries adopt a variety of different roles in key regulatory programs. We examine generic intermediary roles across programs that involve four main groups of activities: creating and/or organizing, coordinating between programs, supporting implementation, and voicing an opinion. All in all, our role‐based framework allows for a novel relational way to understand interorganizational and institutional dynamism in complex, interactive, and ever‐changing regulatory regimes.     

Understanding the rise of the regulatory state of the South*

This paper, and the special issue it introduces, explores whether, and how, the rise of the regulatory state of the South, and its implications for processes of governance, are distinct from cases in the North. With the exception of a small but growing body of work on Latin America, most work on the regulatory state deals with the US or Europe, or takes a relatively undifferentiated “legal transplant” approach to the developing world. We use the term “the South” to invoke shared histories of many countries, rather than as a geographic delimiter, even while acknowledging continued and growing diversity among these countries, particularly in their engagement with globalization. We suggest that three aspects of this common context are important in characterizing the rise of the regulatory state of the South. The first contextual element is the presence of powerful external pressures, especially from international financial institutions, to adopt the institutional innovation of regulatory agencies in infrastructure sectors. The result is often an incomplete engagement with and insufficient embedding of regulatory agencies within local political and institutional context. A second is the greater intensity of redistributive politics in settings where infrastructure services are of extremely poor quality and often non‐existent. The resultant politics of distribution draws in other actors, such as the courts and civil society; regulation is too important to be left to the regulators. The third theme is that of limited state capacity, which we suggest has both “thin” and “thick” dimensions. Thin state capacity issues include prosaic concerns of budget, personnel and training; thick issues address the growing pressures on the state to manage multiple forms of engagement with diverse stakeholders in order to balance competing concerns of growth, efficiency and redistribution. These three themes provide a framework for this special issue, and for the case studies that follow. We focus on regulatory agencies in infrastructure sectors (water, electricity and telecoms) as a particular expression of the regulatory state, though we acknowledge that the two are by no means synonymous. The case studies are drawn from India, Colombia, Brazil, and the Philippines, and engage with one or more of these contextual elements. The intent is to draw out common themes that characterize a “regulatory state of the South,” while remaining sensitive to the variations in level of economic development and political institutional contexts within “the South.”     

Agenda‐Setting at the Energy‐Water Nexus: Constructing and Maintaining a Policy Monopoly in U.S. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation

Despite calls to increase federal oversight of hydraulic fracturing (HF), the U.S. Congress has maintained a regulatory system in which environmental regulatory authority is devolved to the states. We argue that this system is characterized by a long‐standing “policy monopoly”: a form of stability in policy agenda‐setting in which a specific manner of framing and regulating a policy issue becomes hegemonic. Integrating theories on agenda‐setting and environmental discourse analysis, we develop a nuanced conceptualization of policy monopoly that emphasizes the significance of regulatory history, public perceptions, industry–government relations, and environmental “storylines.” We evaluate how a policy monopoly in U.S. HF regulation has been constructed and maintained through a historical analysis of oil and gas regulation and a discourse analysis of eleven select congressional energy committee hearings. This research extends scholarship on agenda‐setting by better illuminating the importance of political economic and geographic factors shaping regulatory agendas and outcomes.     

The regulatory style of environmental governance in China: the case of EIA regulation in Shanghai*

The body of literature that examines how institutional contexts affect environmental governance in advanced industrial countries finds that style of environmental regulation is country‐specific. In the pluralist form of democracy like the United States, environmental policy formulation involves bargaining and compromises among interest groups and regulation enforcement through relatively formal and legalistic means. In the corporatist form of democracy like Sweden and Great Britain, in contrast, environmental policies are more accommodating to divergent societal interests and tend to be less formal in their enforcement. These variations in regulatory style have been attributed to differences in basic constitutional structures, regime types and cultures. How do institutional contexts affect the style of environmental regulation in China, which is both a non‐democratic and developing country? This article examines China's regulatory style by focusing on environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulation in Shanghai. The Shanghai EIA system is analyzed in terms of policy ideology, policy content, regulatory process, public participation and policy consequences. It is shown that China's being a single‐party regime with a ‘rule of persons’ tradition has heavily shaped its environmental governance. Based on Shanghai experience, China's style can be characterized as formal in requirement, agency‐dominated in the regulatory process, legalistic in enforcement, and informal politics as the substance of regulation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Different encounter behaviors: Businesses in encounters with regulatory agencies

Studies on regulatory encounters have shown that the interaction between regulator and regulatee is important for implementation of public policy. Much of this research examines how the behavior of frontline workers in such encounters affects regulatee compliance, that is, an outcome of the encounter, but we know less about the behavior that regulatees bring to these encounters. This paper therefore examines how businesses behave in encounters with regulatory authorities, and whether we can identify distinct, multidimensional types of encounter behavior. Using survey data from representative samples of Danish businesses and an exploratory cluster analysis, we identify five types of encounter behavior. We label these “Cooperators,” “Accommodators,” “Game players,” “Protesters,” and “Fighters.” We believe this framework provides a useful next step in a research agenda on businesses' behavior in regulatory encounters.     

The culture of risk regulation: Responses to environmental disasters

Disasters challenge the equilibrium of regulatory regimes and make policy shifts more likely. Using an institutional theory of cultural biases and the concept of cultural “surprise”, this article analyses the direction and intensity of media argumentation in respect of policy shifts. Instead of assuming a demand for greater State intervention after dramatic focusing events, as suggested by other theoretical frames, cultural theory opens a variety of options that range from embracing regulatory responses from different cultural biases to the radicalization of current, but failing, instruments. The analysis of media reaction to the environmental disasters caused by the oil spills of Exxon Valdez (United States), Erika (France) and Prestige (Spain) shows that the demand for more hierarchy does not monopolize the overall argumentation. The change demanded often implies a radicalization of a particular prevalent view where the associated institutional setting is failing its supporters.     

The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences

There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of “politics” has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement.     

Regulation by generalization

Both criminal and regulatory laws have traditionally been skeptical of what Jeremy Bentham referred to as evidentiary offenses – the prohibition (or regulation) of some activity not because it is wrong, but because it probabilistically (but not universally) indicates that a real wrong has occurred. From Bentham to the present, courts and theorists have worried about this form of regulation, believing that certainly in the criminal law context, but even with respect to regulation, it is wrong to impose sanctions on a “Where there’s smoke there’s fire” theory of governmental intervention. Yet, although this kind punishment by proxy continues to be held in disrepute both in courts and in the published work, we argue that this distaste is unwarranted. Regulating – even through the criminal law – by regulating intrinsically innocent activities that probabilistically, but not inexorably, indicate not‐so‐innocent activities is no different from the vast number of other probabilistic elements that pervade the regulatory process. Once we recognize the frequency with which we accept probabilistic but not certain burdens of proof, probabilistic but not certain substantive rules, and probabilistic but not certain pieces of evidence, we can see that defining offenses and regulatory targets in terms of non‐wrongful behavior that is evidence of wrongful behavior is neither surprising nor inadvisable.     

混合型监管：政策工具视野下的中国药品安全监管

在当代中国,社会性监管正在被越来越多地运用到公共卫生、生产安全和环境保护等公共治理过程.以药品安全监管为个案,结合西方社会性监管的有关理论,从建章立制、设立标准、建立奖惩机制以及优化执行系统四个政策工具角度,对当代中国药品安全监管的政策过程进行分析,结果表明,由于受到社会治理模式转型的影响,中国药品安全监管模式可以被界定为"混合型监管".一方面,中国的药品安全监管政策在形式上已经具有了一些现代监管型政府的特点,例如建章立制、设立标准,并综合运用经济、法律和行政等手段;另一方面,却在许多方面仍然带有许多前监管型政府特征,而这些特征大都是计划经济时代的产物.虽然监管型政府正在逐渐取代全能型政府而成为未来中国政府可能的治理模式,但是从政策分析的角度来看,监管型政府的建设在中国并不是一蹴而就的.建设一个高效的现代监管型政府,仍然是市场经济时代下中国国家政权建设过程中的重要目标.     

When soft regulation is not enough: The integrated pollution prevention and control directive of the European Union

Recent debates regarding the effectiveness of regulatory policymaking in the European Union (EU) focus on the merits of soft, non-binding forms of regulation between public and private actors. The emergence of less coercive forms of regulation is analyzed as a response to powerful functional pressures emanating from the complexity of regulatory issues, as well as the need to secure flexibility and adaptability of regulation to distinctive territorial economic, environmental, administrative, and social conditions. In this article we empirically assess the above normative claims regarding the effectiveness of soft regulation vis-à-vis uniformly binding legislation. We draw on an exploratory investigation of the application of the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive of the EU in four countries. Our study reveals that effectiveness in the application of soft policy instruments is largely contingent upon strong cognitive, material, and political capacities of both state regulators and industrial actors involved in regulatory policymaking. In the absence of those conditions, the application of soft, legally non-binding regulation may lead to adverse effects, such as non-compliance and the “hollowing out” of the systems of environmental permits to industry. In the medium term, such developments can undermine the normative authority of the EU.     

The political and practical obstacles to the reform of the judiciary and the establishment of a rule of law in China

Is China’s “socialist rule by law” (社会主义法制) qualified to be called “rule of law” (法治) or a “thin rule of law” proposed by Randall Peeremboon, without abolishing the political supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of an independent judiciary? Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese legal system and its judiciary have gone through reforms and on the whole modernized. However, the Chinese judiciary still faces many problems, and among them the lack of professional jurists, corruption and local protectionism appear as crucial ones. The current political and institutional arrangements and lack of freedom of the press and freedom of association clearly intensify these problems. “Rule of law” (法治) or “rule by law” (法制) in China is still more often interpreted in the light of the respective political, bureaucratic and economic powers of the parties involved than according to principles of law or equity. The modernization of the legal system will continue, but the political translation of the legal demands of society and the international community will take time to materialize. In the meantime, risks, setbacks and difficulties will continue to prevent China from establishing a truly independent judiciary and what is universally called a rule of law.     

私法在乡村治理法治化中的独特功能

针对如何构建乡村治理体系所涉法治,既有研究多围绕《中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法》等公法展开,故存在不足,亟待考察私法能否发挥某些独特功能。鉴于公法在培养村民的基本法治意识上存在一定的不足,同时,村民与私法的现实联系更为密切,尤其是考虑到私法严格奉行“私法自治”根本原则,由该原则所引申的“私法自治”“合法私利”以及“德法融合”等重要法治意识,不但有益于培养村民的基本法治意识,而且将极大促进在乡村治理进程中,对相通的、根本性的村民法治意识的良好培养。     

Subnational Responses to Fracking in Canada: Explaining Saskatchewan's “Wild West” Regulatory Approach

This article assesses the regulatory response to fracking by Saskatchewan, Canada's second largest oil‐producing province. Public officials and industry representatives claim fracking regulations are “comprehensive” and “robust”; however, there has been no comparative assessment of this claim. To address this gap, we outline the dominant regulatory pathways of U.S. states and Canadian provinces, ranging from applying existing regulations with minimal revisions, to enacting broader revisions or bans. We account for this variation using a framework from Davis ( 2012 ) emphasizing governments’ dependence on the oil sector, the level of support for fracking among elected officials and policy makers, and the influence of key “constituencies.” The article then traces the growth and impact of fracking in Saskatchewan and analyzes new trends in the province's regulation of fracking. Given the province's application of existing regulations with minimal revisions and active weakening of enforcement, we identify Saskatchewan as taking Rabe and Borick's ( 2013 ) “conventional” regulatory approach, typical of Davis's “energy dominant” states.