Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

This paper examines individual attitudes in six industrialized democracies to determine what factors condition citizens' support for trade liberalization. We argue that public support for trade liberalization is influenced by politically driven views and individual economic utilitarian considerations. To test our propositions, we develop and estimate a series of logistic regression models of public support for trade liberalization. That data are derived from The World Values Surveys (1995–1997). We find strong empirical support for the economic utilitarian factors—primarily education, but also gender and income—as the principal factors shaping individual attitudes toward trade liberalization. Conversely, while some empirical support is found for political factors such as one's geographic orientation and level of cognitive mobilization, we find that the political predictors of support are weaker overall than the economic interest predictors.     

中国与拉美:竞争,合作,抑或"威胁"?

经济改革和对外开放促进了中国经济的蓬勃发展,中国国力的迅速增强引起全世界的普遍关注。中国的崛起对世界产生什么影响?拉美国家面临什么样的机遇与挑战?中国未来的发展以及同拉美的经济关系的走势如何?就这些问题,拉美地区各国政府、企业界、学术机构、该地区的国际组织(如美洲开发银行、拉美经委会、拉美经济体系等)纷纷召开研讨会,或设立专题研究项目,进行深入探讨。2004年11月中旬,中国国家主席胡锦涛对巴西、阿根廷、智利和古巴进行了国事访问,进一步加强了中国与拉美国家的合作关系。这次访问成果颇丰。在政治领域,进一步完善和加强…     

De-Democratisation and Rising Inequality: The Underlying Cause of a Worrying Trend

This article is concerned with the question of why economic inequality has increased so dramatically in recent decades and what can be done about it. It suggests that the fundamental cause of the recent rise in economic inequality, underlying all the more proximate factors, is a major process of de-democratisation that has taken place since the 1970s, which has increased the political representation of capital while reducing that of labour. The article pulls together a wide range of research from different disciplines in order to decisively show the ways in which economic governance has been de-democratised in this period. This analysis has important consequences with regard to policy attempts to reduce inequality and suggests that these must focus not on technical issues but on ways to strengthen democracy. And if the dynamics of de-democratisation are fundamentally global, then solutions must also be global. These conclusions are in stark contrast with current academic and policy approaches which tend to focus on technical, rather than political, solutions, and which focus overwhelmingly at the national, rather than the global, level. This article thus calls for a major rethinking of the causes of rising inequality and the policy changes needed to reduce it.     

越南：新兴的东盟中坚力量

1995年7月,越南正式加入东盟,成为东盟的第七个成员国和东盟自冷战结束后吸收的第一个新成员国。至今,越南加入东盟已有12年,在这短短的12年中,越南迅速地融入到东盟组织当中,积极发挥作用,成为东盟新兴的     

The Diplomacy of a Rising China in South Asia

The author argues that U.S. interest in Asia traditionally has been maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony. Yet against this anti-hegemony objective is balanced an attempt to accommodate China. If China keeps this commitment, the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with America to address common challenges and mutual interests.     

Retaliation in Rebellion: The Missing Link to Explaining Insurgent Violence in Dagestan

This article posits that the remnants of archaic sociocultural norms, particularly the honour-imposed custom of retaliation, play a crucial role in the process of insurgent engagement in Russia's autonomous republic of Dagestan. Through a series of interviews with former insurgents, this study outlines two retaliation-centred mechanisms: “individual retaliation” and “spiritual retaliation” in order to explain the microcosm of motives behind insurgent activity in Dagestan. In doing so, this study problematizes the role of Salafi/Jihadist ideology as the main impetus for insurgent violence. Reversing the traditional causal link between violence and religion, this study also demonstrates that the development of Jihadist ideology is a by-product of insurgent mobilization rather than its cause.     

俄罗斯金融工业集团的兴盛与式微

由原苏联官僚权贵阶层转化而来的俄罗斯金融工业集团在苏联解体的历史契机中迅速崛起 ,而后 ,借助政府的大力支持 ,很快就壮大发展起来 ,并进而多方拓展势力 ,直至问鼎政权 ,走向极盛。但是 ,在金融危机冲击和后来的政权排斥下 ,金融工业集团很快就走向了没落 ,匆匆地走过了其由兴盛到式微的短暂历程。     

Assessing State Preferences and Explaining Institutional Choice: The Case of Intra–German Trade

A solid knowledge about states' interests in the case under investigation is required to reinforce the neoinstitutionalist hypothesis that international institutions are built to reap joint gains in issue areas in which uncoordinated activities may lead to a suboptimal outcome. However, most neoinstitutionalists who apply game theory to international politics seem to assume that, regardless of the outcome to be explained, no case–specific empirical assessment of actors' interests is needed to understand regime formation. This article aims to empirically assess the constellation of state interests on the basis of which the intra–German trade regime came into existence. Furthermore, solution concepts are used merely as indicators for describing a situation, they are not taken as unqualified predictions of what will happen. This application of game theory still proves useful. By demonstrating that the intra–German trade regime emerged from a constellation of interests resembling a prisoner's dilemma, the neorealist argument that international institutions are unable to regulate important issues in a really competitive relationship is challenged. At the same time, the article points to at least one necessary addition to the neoinstitutionalist argument, as the explanation of given international institutions requires a two–step procedure: first, the explanation of state interests, and second, the explanation of behavior brought to light on the basis of these interests.     

Intervention Without Leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators

Existing research on international mediation emphasizes the importance of leverage in altering the combatants' ability to reach a negotiated settlement. Less understood is the role of third parties that do not have access to sources of leverage even though they comprise a substantial amount of mediation efforts. This paper highlights two potential explanations for the prevalence of “weak” mediators. First, a choice of third parties without leverage might be a product of the “supply side” preferences of the international community, in particular, the great powers. Second, the inclusion of third parties without any leverage can result from actors hedging their commitments to the peace process when they suspect with some uncertainty that one side will use third-party involvement insincerely for ends other than peace. Using data from the Managing Intrastate Low Level Conflicts (MILC) project, in conjunction with the PRIO/UPPSALA Armed Conflict data, empirical results using competing risk models confirm both logics. Mediators with weak leverage are more likely when an actor has strong incentives to stall: specifically, when the immediate costs of conflict are high, there is domestic political pressure in the absence of democratic accountability, and relative bargaining power is shifting. The findings also suggest that supply-side dynamics matter. Weak mediators are less likely in the presence of substantial foreign investment and in neighborhoods with strong states, but mediators of all types are more likely in democratic neighborhoods. To further explore the role of insincere motivations, the paper considers the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in Sri Lanka, brokered by Norway.     

Gambling for Resurrection Versus Bleeding the Army: Explaining Risky Behavior in Failing Wars

This article examines the behaviors of political leaders who implement costly and risky measures during wars in which victory has become highly unlikely. It advances two related claims. First, counter to the prevailing logic, leaders with little to no culpability for starting a war remain susceptible to blame and domestic repercussions for how a war ends. Second, with these new leaders, the impetus to avoid blame can prompt risky behaviors that look like gambling for resurrection; but the underlying objectives differ. Through similar behaviors, new leaders do not necessarily hope to salvage victory but instead seek to simultaneously exhibit resolve and demonstrate the futility of further fighting, thus securing support for a less-than-favorable settlement while hedging against domestic punishment. To assess this “bleeding the army” logic as distinct from gambling for resurrection, the article looks at the case of the French Government of National Defense during the Franco-Prussian War.     

柬埔寨：东盟国家中冉冉升起的新星——柬埔寨2007年回顾和2008年展望

2007年对柬埔寨第三届政府来说是本届执政的最后一年，也是关键的一年。这一年的形势比以往任何一年都好，政治稳定，社会安定，经济持续快速发展。执政的人民党，在4月举行的地方选举后，在国家政治中的主导地位得到进一步的确立。政府提出的发展经济的“四角战略”等各项政策获得顺利推行。桑兰西党取代奉辛比克党（简称奉党）成为第二大党后，柬埔寨两党政治局面初步形成。     

Countering Aggressive Rising Powers: A Clash of Strategic Cultures

The United States has to contend with rising powers ranging from the prc, which is already an economic and political great power and potentially a military threat, to Al Qaeda and the network of Islamist terror organizations, whose means to power remain limited but whose will to power and aggression are great. In the middle are states that already or may soon possess nuclear weapons. Each of these powers has its own “strategic culture” that affects its decision-making, and attention needs to be paid to how the strategic habits of today's rising and aggressive powers might intersect with U.S. strategy.     

Thickening Civil Society: Explaining the Development of Associational Life in Mexico

Scholarship has demonstrated the important role that associational life has played in democratic transitions, democratic consolidation, and making democracy work. Unfortunately, however, many countries that have recently completed the transition to democracy lack a strong history of autonomous associations. Given their importance, this research seeks to understand how nonprofit organizations emerge in current-day Mexico, a recent transition country with a traditionally weak associational life, historically controlled by the state. Through a comparison of four Mexican cities this research finds that a transition from one-party rule to competitive elections was necessary to break the incentives for clientelism. Even following the transition, however, the persistence of informal rules from the old regime operating in both government and society restricts the opportunities available to potential ‘public entrepreneurs’. As a result, such entrepreneurs are highly dependent on already existing social infrastructure to obtain necessary human, organizational, and financial resources.     

Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-Propensity

The Middle East is one of the most war-prone regions in the international system. What is the most powerful explanation of the war-propensity of this region? I argue that neither realism nor liberalism are able to account for variations in regional war-proneness. Instead, I advance an alternative explanation based on the concept of the state-to-nation balance in the region. This balance refers to the degree of congruence between the division of the region into territorial states and the national aspirations and political identifications of the region's peoples. The balance also refers to the prevalence of strong versus weak states in the region. Thus, I explain the Middle East's high war-proneness by focusing on its relatively low level of state-to-nation balance. This imbalance has led to a powerful combination of revisionist ideologies and state incoherence. While other regions suffer from state incoherence, powerful revisionist nationalist forces, notably pan-nationalist and irredentists (the “Greater State”), aggravate this problem in the Middle East. These revisionist forces are often transborder and are especially powerful in the Middle East because of the high degree of external/transborder incongruence in comparison with all other regions. The combination of nationalist revisionism and state incoherence has made the Middle East more prone to violence than most other regions.     

Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon with threatening great powers than to balance against them. In this article, we suggest that state- and individual-level variables can play a greater role in explaining the foreign policy behavior of small states and that small states sometimes choose to balance rather than bandwagon, especially when elite ideology is deeply embedded in formulating foreign policy. We develop this claim in terms of elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the state and examine its plausibility using primary sources and exclusive interviews with the security and foreign policy elite in Georgia. We find that this approach offers a more plausible explanation for Georgia's otherwise puzzling foreign policy behavior than frameworks that focus on the international or regional system. Although Georgia may be the exception that proves the rule, it can advance an understanding of the conditions under which standard explanations of small-state foreign policy behavior may miss their predictive mark and when incorporating the role of elite ideas can provide additional explanatory leverage.     

Outside the box: Explaining sanctions in pursuit of foreign economic goals*

Despite a marked increase in research on economic sanctions, empirical work has been constrained to a set of cases where sanctions are used for political or security issues, i.e., “high politics.” Since most theories of sanctions are generalizable to cases of political economy, i.e., “low politics,” this ad hoc empirical restriction is puzzling. This paper examines how well the existing theories of economic coercion can explain sanctions used to extract concessions on trade or regulatory issues. These theories are tested on a data set of 86 observations of the United States using or threatening section 301 action against a variety of target states. The results indicate that a conflict expectations approach is able to explain these cases as well as cases of high politics sanctions. Approaches stressing domestic politics or the use of sanctions as signals are of little use.     

巴勒斯坦自杀式袭击的精神支柱

发生在巴以冲突中的自杀式袭击导致了大量人员伤亡,而且似乎有愈演愈烈之势。由于方式之惨烈、震憾力和破坏力之巨大,自杀式袭击成为全球关注的焦点。分析研究表明,自愿成为自杀式人体炸弹者主要受以下几大因素的影响。