Sex crime legislation: Proactive and anti-therapeutic effects

Therapeutic jurisprudence may have its major role within law practice, but analysis of the law from a therapeutic perspective is a task that should not be neglected; how a piece of legislation is designed and formulated certainly influences the therapeutic outcome of a legal process. This article uses sex legislation as an example to demonstrate how the old rape law based on coercion has anti-therapeutic effects on rape victims. If the law requires resistance, it implies that a woman is sexually available until she resists physically, resulting in an attitude that a woman reporting rape without injuries should be mistrusted. This mistrust of the victim and the victim's attendant feelings of self-blame aggravate the victim's trauma. On the other hand, a modern rape law based on lack of consent gives the signal that a woman is not available until she has given her consent, resulting in a different starting position for the investigation. Since the will of the victim must be respected, the victim herself must be respected in the legal process. Furthermore, being able to tell one's story in a respectful atmosphere can be more important for the well-being of the victim than the outcome of the reported case.     

自杀的认定及其相关行为的刑法评价

刑法中认定自杀有主客观两方面要求。在主观方面,被害人不仅应当认识到并且意欲死亡结果发生,而且必须自愿地、也即自主决定地选择了死亡。对于自愿性的判断应当以有效承诺的主观要件为标准。重大的动机错误同样导致不能成立自杀。此外,被害人还必须客观上事实性地支配着直接导致死亡的行为,在将不可逆转地造成死亡结果的最后关键时刻自己控制着事态的发展。自杀本身并非刑事不法行为,教唆或帮助自杀、对自杀者不予救助或者过失导致他人自杀等自杀相关行为也不应受到刑事处罚。     

How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About Rape

From the American Law Institute to college campuses, there is a renewed interest in the law of rape. Law school faculty, however, may be reluctant to teach this deeply debated topic. This article begins from the premise that controversial and contested questions can be best resolved when participants understand the conceptual architecture that surrounds and delineates the normative questions. This allows participants to talk to one another instead of past each other. Accordingly, in this article, we begin by diffusing two non-debates: the apparent conflict created when speakers use “consent” to mean two different things and the question of whether rape law ought to be formulated in terms of consent or force. From here, we turn to the conceptual apparatuses that surround the normative questions of freedom from force, knowledge, and capacity. Here, we suggest how better understanding these concepts can frame the underlying discussions as to what sorts of coercion undermine consent, what kinds of deception invalidate consent, and when the victim is too incapacitated to consent. Finally, we turn to different formulations of consent, demonstrating that one conception better captures the harm of rape but that other formulations may better protect victims. We show how clarifying these questions allows discussants to see why different formulations are valuable and to debate the best all-things-considered formulation. Although this article is framed as a question of how (to teach students) to think like lawyers about rape, its ambition is to set forth a framework that is useful to reformers as well.     

Observer reactions to emotional victims of serious crimes: stereotypes and expectancy violations

Negative observer reactions towards victims may be related to people’s expectations of the characteristics and demeanor of an ideal victim. We examined how expressed emotion, victim sex, and type of victimization influence observers’ perceptions of victim credibility, victim character, and harm. Our hypothesis was that angry victims, male victims, and victims of sexual violence are perceived less positively than sad victims, female victims, and victims of physical violence. Additionally, we anticipated that expectancy violations following expressed agentic/high status, or passive/low-status emotions of the victim would lead to negative reactions. Participants (N?=?335) read a written victim impact statement, by a male or female victim of a sexual or physical assault, in which anger or sadness was expressed. The results show that observers generally respond more negatively to male victims than to female victims, and to victims expressing anger rather than sadness. However, a two-way interaction between expressed emotion and type of crime revealed that expressed emotion only significantly influences character derogation and victim credibility in cases of physical violence. Finally, emotion expectancy violations based on ex-ante expectations lead to derogation and diminished credibility. The discussion focuses on how emotion expectancy violations seem intimately tied to stereotype-ridden features of victimization.     

Restoring the Victim: Emotional Reactions, Justice Beliefs, and Support for Reparation and Punishment

Psychological responses to criminal wrongdoing have primarily focused on the offender, particularly on how (and why) offender punishment satisfies people’s need for justice. However, the restoration of the victim presents another way in which the “psychological itch” that injustice creates can be addressed. In the present article, I discuss two lay theories of how crime victims can be restored: a belief that the harm caused to crime victims should be directly repaired (a restorative justice approach) versus a belief that victim harm should be addressed via the punishment of the offender (a retributive justice approach). These two lay theories are discussed with regard to their emotional and ideological determinants, as well as situational and chronic factors that can affect whether people adopt a reparative or punitive “justice mindset” in dealing with victim concerns (and crime in general).     

MANDATED CUSTODY EVALUATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER

Kelly and Ramsey are clearly correct that a shift from a “how to” approach to custody evaluations to one that asks the more fundamental question “why” is long overdue. However, in addition to assessing the efficacy of custody evaluations (which Kelly and Ramsey propose), the legal system must also clarify the justification for imposing this extensive—and often expensive—intrusion into the privacy of parents. Three possible justifications for these intrusions are examined in this article: privilege, harm, and voluntariness. Is divorce a privilege, rather than a right, and can qualifications (including intrusive and expensive ones) be attached to requesting that privilege? Are custody evaluations instead justified as a means of avoiding harm to children? If a harm justification is asserted, exactly what harm do evaluations prevent, and how do they accomplish this harm avoidance? Finally, given the high value placed on parental cooperation by the family courts, is it simply too perilous for a parent to oppose a custody evaluation if one is suggested, either by the other parent or by the court? If so, are consents to custody evaluations truly voluntary?     

Of Rights and Rhetoric: Discourses of Degradation and Exploitation in the Context of Sex Trafficking

International condemnations of people trafficking (particularly of women and girls for prostitution) as a human rights violation have proliferated in recent times. The deployment of human rights in this context has been supported by those who seek to challenge narrow victim hierarchies, but these accounts fail to clearly articulate which particular aspects of the activity violate which particular rights, and how. This article examines the applicability of protections against slavery and inhuman/degrading treatment, arguing that, in the context of the diversity and complexity of contemporary people trafficking, their limitations become apparent. The final part considers the concept of exploitation as an alternative basis for grounding a human rights claim. It cautions that invoking this concept without further elaboration (particularly in relation to the relevance of harm and consent) may be counter-productive, both in terms of theoretical clarity and practical implementation.     

故意伤害罪新论

由于我国刑法只规定一个伤害故意,因此,当行为人出于轻伤的故意导致他人重伤结果,应当怎样处罚,不仅在刑法理论中没有一个统一的基准,在司法实践中也是见仁见智。实施暴力行为,导致被害人重伤或死亡的,应当属于故意伤害罪的结果加重形态。在故意伤害的情况下,即便有被害者的承诺,由于作为伤害的社会意义并没有变更,因此,不能阻却构成要件的符合性。但是,基于被害者承诺的违法性的阻却,在某种情况下可以成立。阻却违法性的判断,应当根据被害者处分自己身体的安全这一法益,是否具有社会相当性而进行。针对同时伤害的情况,不应认定为共同伤害。     

受害人同意之效力基础的探讨

侵权行为法和刑事犯罪研究要求对受害人同意的效力基础做出回答。系统探讨了受害人同意的法律判断,并对其本质进行了考研。在对国内外关于受害人同意阻却违法性的学说进行深入分析探讨的基础上,提出"利益扬弃"之新观点作为受害人同意的效力基础,并对该观点进行相关论证和说明。     

Is victim identity in genocide a question of science or law? The scientific perspective,with special reference to Darfur

In genocide, victims must represent an ethnic, racial, religious or national group. But is victim identity a question of science or law? Must victims be a socially recognized group or can group identity exist solely in the mind of the perpetrator? This question is relevant to the on-going crisis in Darfur. The “Arab-on-African” violence depicted in the media encompasses identities not shared by Darfurians. This study details an evaluation of victim identity in Darfur, based on field research and literature review. Darfurians are defined by subsistence strategy and economic groups are not protected under genocide law. Whether Darfur is genocide depends on whether victims must conform to scientific group classifications or need only be defined by their relationship to the perpetrators.     

Rethinking The Ends of Harm

In The Ends of Harm, Victor Tadros claims that the general justifying aim of the criminal law should be general deterrence. He also takes seriously that we cannot use people as a means, and thus he argues that we may only punish people in the name of general deterrence who have a ‘duty’ to suffer. Tadros claims that this duty arises as follows: An offender initially has a duty not to harm the victim. If the offender violates that duty, the offender still has a duty to stop the harm from occurring (so that, for example, an offender would have to jump in front of his own bullet). And if the harm does occur, then the offender has a duty to rectify that harm. This duty to rectify, argues Tadros, requires the defendant not only to compensate the victim but also to protect the victim to the extent that he would have been able to have been harmed to prevent the threat from occurring. Tadros further advances intricate arguments for why the state may therefore punish the offender to protect other potential victims to the extent of the offender’s duty to rectify. This symposium contribution seeks to explore three problems with Tadros’ analysis, ultimately arguing that Tadros’ theory fails on its own terms. First, attempts present a substantial problem for Tadros’ regime because attempts do not give rise to duties to prevent harm because there is no harm to be prevented. Tadros’ attempt to account for attempts, as completed offenses of diversions of security resources, ultimately leads to punishments that bear little resemblance to the crime attempted. Such a wildly counterintuitive result creates problems for a regime premised on general deterrence, which must be understood and respected. Second, Tadros’ regime will often exempt the rich from suffering criminal punishment. Tadros claims that duties to prevent harms from occurring (by jumping in front of bullets) are only enforceable when compensation will be inadequate. However, affluent offenders may be able to fully compensate. Moreover, since the scope of the duty to suffer will be determined by what remains of the duty after the victim is compensated, affluent offenders will be able to compensate more and thereby suffer less. Again, the actual sentences will thereby bear little resemblance to the rationale for criminalization, thus threatening the deterrent message of the law. Moreover, a system that exacerbates distributive inequalities will not achieve public respect. Third, Tadros cannot justify taking the duty that the defendant owes to the victim and forcing the victim to transfer this asset to the state. In his quest to articulate a theory that does not impermissibly use defendants, he ultimately endorses a theory that impermissibly uses their victims. He thus fails to achieve the very goal he sets for himself, which is to achieve general deterrence without impermissibly using anyone.     

Mock jurors’ expectations regarding the psychological harm experienced by rape victims as a function of rape prototypicality

We examined mock jurors’ judgments in a rape case that was either prototypical (late-night assault by a stranger in a public place) or non-prototypical (daytime assault by an acquaintance in a private home). We also varied the psychological harm experienced by the victim as a result of the rape (mild anxiety or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)). We hypothesized that participants’ expectations regarding the level of harm the victim is likely to experience would mediate the effect of harm level on ratings of the victim’s credibility, and this indirect effect would be contingent on the prototypicality of the case. In a pilot experiment we demonstrated that people expect prototypical rape cases to be more traumatic for victims than non-prototypical cases. In the main experiment, and as predicted, participants in the Prototypical condition expected the victim to develop PTSD more than mild anxiety, but Non-Prototypical condition participants expected the opposite. In addition, a level of harm that was consistent rather than inconsistent with their expectations led participants to rate the victim as more credible; they also rated her as less responsible for what happened, and they thought the defendant was more likely guilty and that he should be incarcerated for a longer period of time.     

论患者隐私权保护——兼论侵害“告知后同意”之请求权基础

隐私权已从传统消极防御面向发展到兼具积极支配面向,主要包括四项权能:隐私隐瞒权、隐私利用权、隐私维护权和隐私支配权.《侵权责任法》第62条、第61条、第55条和第56条对应以上四种权能并共同构筑了患者隐私权范畴.患者隐私支配权需要借助于对患者的“告知后同意”实现,告知的内容应当包括医师同时兼具的研究者身份与潜在利益冲突.“告知后同意”虽然可以作为一种法益或者注意义务之违反得到救济,但作为某种权利得到保护系必然趋势,这种权利应是隐私权而非自主权.侵害患者“告知后同意”之隐私权的请求权基础应为第6条第1款,涉及赔偿责任时应适用特别规定第55条第2款,所涉损害主要系精神损害.     

被害人辨认错误及其防范

被害人辨认错误是导致刑事错案发生的主要原因之一。被害人“身临其境”和“身受其害”的当事人身份，决定了被害人体验案件事实和辨认犯罪嫌疑人存在局限性，容易出现某些“诚实”的错误。分析被害人辨认错误的成因，进一步完善辨认规则，健全辨认程序，有助于提高被害人辨认的准确性和可信性，防范错误辨认，保护被害人权利。     

拐卖妇女儿童罪的几个问题

拐卖妇女、儿童罪是一种严重的危害社会的犯罪,其保护客体是被拐取人的人身自由和本来的生活场所的安全。构成本罪,被害妇女的同意可以阻却违法,但儿童的同意则不能阻却违法。构成本罪也不要求有场所的转移。本罪是典型的目的犯,构成犯罪既遂时,并不要求实现特定目的。本罪是继续犯,在犯罪行为的继续中,有成立共犯的余地。从犯罪本质上讲,绑架罪、拐骗儿童罪与本罪的罪质都是一样的,三者构成了对人身自由和本来的生活场所安全法益的完整的保护体系。     

Finding the Balance: Intoxication and Consent

Sexual offences in England and Wales have had a dramatic reimagining in the last 15 years, with the Sexual Offences Act 2003 establishing not only the boundaries of the most heinous of offences such as rape, but also defining one of the most important elements; consent. This article seeks to explore the problems that surround establishing if legally valid consent has been given, with particular regard for cases where voluntary intoxication takes centre stage. The problem that often arises is the question on whether or not an intoxicated victim had the capacity to consent, or establishing if she did consent when memory of the event is hazy, possibly from both parties. Using comparative analysis with other jurisdictions and their take on the offence of rape, the author seeks to discover if the current rules are sufficient to fit within twenty-first century western culture. The victim will be referred to as ‘she’, although the law here and all situations discussed are equally applicable to male rape.

     

盗窃罪中的被害人同意

盗窃罪的客观构成要件是违反占有人意愿而转移财物的占有;相反,得到占有人同意而取走财物,就可以排除盗窃罪的客观构成要件。将被害人同意的一般原理与盗窃罪构成要件的具体特征相结合,能够强化刑法总论与各论之间的整合与协调,促进刑法教义学的纵深发展。运用"预设的同意"理论,可以有效回应ATM机等自助型机器类案件中的疑难问题:使用"伪币"从机器处取得财物的,构成盗窃罪;使用真币从机器处取得财物后又抽出真币的,构成针对真币的盗窃罪;非法使用他人的信用卡在ATM机上取款的,不构成盗窃罪;使用信用卡利用ATM机故障恶意取款的,构成盗窃罪。在盗窃陷阱的场合,应根据是否存在同意而区分既遂和未遂。按照"客观权限+审核义务"的标准来区分盗窃罪间接正犯与三角诈骗,体现了对被害人意愿的尊重。     

Reconciling Autonomy and Beneficence in Treatment Decision-Making for Companion Animal Patients

This article explores how the concept of consent to medical treatment applies in the veterinary context, and aims to evaluate normative justifications for owner consent to treatment of animal patients. We trace the evolution of the test for valid consent in human health decision-making, against a backdrop of increased recognition of the importance of patient rights and a gradual judicial espousal of a doctrine of informed consent grounded in a particular understanding of autonomy. We argue that, notwithstanding the adoption of a similar discourse of informed consent in professional veterinary codes, notions of autonomy and informed consent are not easily transferrable to the veterinary medicine context, given inter alia the tripartite relationship between veterinary professional, owner and animal patient. We suggest that a more appropriate, albeit inexact, analogy may be drawn with paediatric practice which is premised on a similarly tripartite relationship and where decisions must be reached in the best interests of the child. However, acknowledging the legal status of animals as property and how consent to veterinary treatment is predicated on the animal owner’s willingness and ability to pay, we propose that the appropriate response is for veterinary professionals generally to accept the client’s choice, provided this is informed. Yet such client autonomy must be limited where animal welfare concerns exist, so that beneficence continues to play an important role in the veterinary context. We suggest that this ‘middle road’ should be reflected in professional veterinary guidance.     

The Significance of Transferred Intent

The doctrine of transferred intent (or transferred “malice” in England) generally provides that if A attempts to harm B but, because of bad aim, misses and accidentally causes the same harm to befall C, A’s harmful intent vis-à-vis B is transferred to C, thus rendering A guilty of intentionally harming C. Commentators acknowledge the doctrine to be a legal fiction, but they differ regarding whether the fiction produces just results, some believing it does, others believing that A is guilty at most of attempting to harm B rather than intentionally harming C. Commentators who agree that the fiction produces just results nevertheless differ regarding whether the fiction should be retained or whether A’s intent to harm “a” person, in this case, B, is the only intent that signifies for crimes of intentional harm, regardless of whom A eventually harms. Doug Husak sought to achieve reflective equilibrium between intuition and theory regarding bad-aim cases by proposing in 1996 that A be punished for attempting to harm B (rather than for harming C) but sentenced as if he had harmed B. I once believed that Husak was correct. But I now have doubts, in part because Husak, along with others, cannot explain why the strength of people’s intuitions regarding A’s responsibility in bad-aim cases depends upon (1) C’s being a reasonably foreseeable victim, and (2) C’s being harmed by the same threat of force that A initially unleashed against B. I argue that one cannot achieve reflective equilibrium in bad-aim cases without inquiring into why resulting harm matters in criminal law, and that when one does, one discovers that just as people’s intuitions regarding whether intentional harms are proximate depend upon how resulting harms occur, so, too, people’s intuitions regarding whether an actor is guilty of intentional harm depend upon how resulting harm comes about.