China–Africa Cooperation: promises,practice and prospects

Chinese engagement in African states has increased tremendously over the last decade, much in line with Chinese globalisation strategies and supported by state encouragement and financial support. The size and potential of China as a world power leads to the level of expectations the country faces from the developing world. However, some elements of these expectations are also created through political discourses which emphasise differences with Western countries. The types of promises that the Chinese leadership makes to create such enthusiastic welcome amongst African political leaders are linked closely to the discourse on South–South cooperation. Albeit different from Western development assistance promises and parallel attempts to produce moderate expectations, the current discourse is thus partly sowing the seeds for future disappointment. This article takes a closer look at the discussions around South–South cooperation in China–Africa relations and at key rhetorical features (‘mutual benefit’; ‘non-interference’) and at the practice of this cooperation. It concludes that the Chinese discourse is creating large public expectations in African countries and while China delivers on many projects, its impact on development is less certain. The overall development success of this strategy builds on longer-term success and is implicitly linked to the occurrence of more reforms in Africa. Chinese policy thus ‘bets on the future’ in their foreign relations with Africa; the success of this strategy is dependent on political circumstances among the partners that are largely beyond Chinese control. In a number of cases, it can thus be expected that currently up-beat political rhetoric is going to meet obstacles that will require adjustments in a discourse that, in its current form, might undermine Chinese credibility if not the core elements of South–South cooperation altogether.     

Bashing ‘the Chinese’: contextualizing Zambia's Collum Coal Mine shooting

The 2010 shooting of 13 miners at Zambia's small, privately-owned ‘Chinese’ Collum Coal Mine (CCM) has been represented by Western and Zambian politicians and media as exemplifying the ‘neo-colonial’ and ‘amoral’ practices of ‘China’ and ‘the Chinese’ in Africa. CCM has been used to provide a sharp contrast to the supposed ways of the Western firms that own most of Zambia's mines. Embedded in racial hierarchy and notions of strategic competition between the West and China, the discourse of the CCM shootings further shapes conceptions of global China and Chinese overseas. While examining all the oppressive conditions that have given rise to protest at the mine, we contextualize the shooting and subsequent conflicts. In analyzing CCM's marginal and troubled development, we discuss aspects of the 2010 shooting incident known to miners and union leaders, but ignored by politicians and media. We look at the shooting's political fallout, focus also on the epilogue that was the 2012 CCM riot—in which one Chinese person was murdered and several others seriously injured—and trace the sometimes violent discontent manifested at other foreign-owned mines in Zambia since their privatization in the late 1990s. The empirical data for this detailed study derive from hundreds of documentary sources and interviews with union leaders, workers, officials and others in Zambia from 2011 to 2013.     

China's Responses to External Pressures on its WMD-related Exports after 2004: reactive and proactive

China, although a member of most of the international non-proliferation and multilateral export control regimes and having a law-based comprehensive export control system, has not fully complied with its non-proliferation obligations, which is evidenced by not only the US's sanctions on some Chinese entities for their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related exports but also some external disclosures in this regard. Faced with these external pressures, China's responses have been both reactive and proactive. The rationale for China's mixed responses can be attributed to its security interest in preventing nuclear terrorism, geopolitical interests in South Asia, economic interests in procuring oil supplies, high-tech imports and missile export markets, in addition to its status interest in building a ‘responsible great power’ identity in the international community.     

How East Asians View the Rise of China

Its newly acquired status as the world's second largest economy has entitled China to a more prominent role in global affairs, and increasingly, its behavior has drawn scrutiny from the world in ways that the country is ill-prepared for. The attention to China's rise, however, focuses not only on its economy but also on other aspects, including its military, diplomatic moves, domestic politics and its ‘soft power’, namely, its own image or self-projection and the world's perception or attitudes toward China. And yet, there has been no systematic investigation to evaluate how the world views a rising China. In this article, the authors applied the latest dataset from the Asian Barometer Survey to investigate whether East Asians recognize and welcome the rise of China. The findings suggest that geographical and cultural proximity have a great impact on people's perception of China. Countries which are territorially adjacent or culturally close to China tend to regard China as the most influential country in Asia. With the exception of Japan and Mongolia, most Asian countries hold positive views about the impact of China on the region. However, such benign evaluations are weaker in countries which have potential security conflicts with China, such as Taiwan and South Korea, when only the bilateral impact is considered. The overall picture shows that the rise of China has been largely recognized and welcomed by East Asians, despite some apprehension about China's strategic intentions to its neighboring countries.     

Differences between traditional Chinese and Western military thinking and their philosophical roots

Recent years have witnessed a heated debate in the Chinese military academia about traditional strategic culture and its impact on modern military thinking. This article tries to analyze and explain the differences between Chinese and Western military traditions from a philosophical perspective. The authors generalize disparities in Chinese and Western military traditions in the following paradigms: ‘justice’ vs ‘interests’, ‘human factors’ vs ‘weapon factors’, and ‘stratagem’ vs ‘strength’, and make an effort to trace them to their ancient philosophical roots. In their view, the Chinese military tradition focuses on ‘man’ by stressing ethical and moral dimensions in war, valuing ‘human factor’ more than ‘weapon factor’ and preferring victory won by wisdom to victory won by brutal force. The western strategic culture, on the other hand, shows its emphasis on ‘material’ by centering on interests, weapon factor and strength in military calculations. As culture legacies, these distinctive preferences still exert influences on modern strategic thinking and military decision making.     

The China challenge: Theoretical perspectives and policy implications

Over the past few years there has been a heated debate in the West over the potential challenge of an increasingly strong and assertive China to the Asia‐Pacific region and to the world in general. This article offers a systematic analysis of the debate on China's emerging role in the international system and its security implications from the theoretical perspectives of realism and liberalism. While both international relations theories have provided valuable insights, neither of them alone is able to unravel the puzzle of whether a prosperous and powerful China will be a major force of stability or a threat to international peace. Drawing on the theory of trade expectations, this article shows the conditions under which high interdependence between China and its trading partners will lead to pacific or belligerent Chinese behavior. If Chinese decision‐makers’ expectations for future trade are high, they will be less likely to use force to deal with unresolved disputes with neighboring countries. If, however, they have a negative view of their future trading environment, they will be likely to take measures, including military actions, to remove any obstacles that might forestall the pursuit of great‐power status. For the moment, China's expectations of future trade are by and large optimistic, but there is evidence of growing Chinese suspicion of a Western ‘conspiracy’ to contain China which may alter Beijing's future perceptions. To ensure that the rise of China will not cause regional and global instability, the outside world should seek to integrate China into the international community by pursuing policies that will have a positive influence on China's expected value of trade. In the meantime, some elements of the balance of power strategy need to be introduced in order to curtail China's expected value of war.     

An Emerging Consensus on the US Threat: the United States according to PLA officers

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping.     

River Politics: China's policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in comparative perspective

China manages its transboundary rivers as a subset of its broader relations with other riparian states. This results in discernible differences in the way China approaches its international river systems. Although there is a limit to the extent of Chinese cooperation, in relative terms China is more cooperative in the Mekong than in the Brahmaputra. To China, Southeast Asian states are part of a hierarchical system where it stands at the apex. While problems exist, there are deep linkages between them, which help foster collaboration in the Mekong. India, which has greater power parity with China, is not part of China's hierarchical worldview. The territorial disputes and security dilemmas that characterize South Asian geopolitics further impede cooperation. Domestic considerations also impact on China's river policies. There is greater consensus among Chinese policymakers in managing the Mekong than the Brahmaputra, which explains the higher degree of clarity in Chinese policies towards the former compared to the latter.     

China's Economic Diplomacy towards the Arab Countries: challenges ahead?

Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, China has adhered to its ‘business-first’ economic diplomacy towards the Arab countries, a policy driven by China's ongoing geoeconomic interests. The ten-year-old China–Arab States Cooperation Forum serves as the nucleus for China's economic diplomacy in the region. The Chinese authorities have also initiated interagency coordination and central–local governments' power sharing in order to pursue this diplomacy successfully. However, while its economic diplomacy may be evolving, China, unlike what it has achieved in Black Africa, seems to have failed to develop strategic, political and cultural exchanges with its Arab counterparts. The intertwined geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that have emerged since the Arab revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the longer run.     

China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises: ‘interest’ and ‘identity’ in foreign behavior

China reacted very differently to the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis: engaging in passive and ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy in the first and choosing more proactive and ‘stage-managing’ diplomacy in the second. This article has sought to explain this striking contrast in China's foreign behavior. Though most studies tend to rely on Chinese strategic and security interests in explaining China's proactive diplomacy as demonstrated in the six-party talks, those strategic and security interests do not explain directly the contrasting foreign behavior of China. China faced basically equal strategic and security concerns and equally dangerous potential military conflict between the US and North Korea through the first and the second nuclear crises. This article, then, argues that ‘same interests, but different behaviors’ should be explained not by China's external interest calculus but by internal changes within China itself. By the turn of the new millennium, China had undergone an evolutionary change of state identity from a cautious accommodator to an active constructor, or from a state of ‘taoguang yanghui’ to a state of ‘fuzeren daguo’. The contrasting foreign behaviors in the first and second nuclear crises are profoundly reflective of this identity shift of China.     

America in the Eyes of America Watchers: survey research in Beijing in 2012

Based on an original survey conducted in the summer of 2012 in Beijing, we examine how China's America watchers—IR scholars who work on US-China relations—have viewed China's power status in the international system, US-China relations and some specific US policies in Asia. Our survey shows that almost half of the survey participants thought that America would remain the global hegemon in the next ten years. Meanwhile, a large majority was also optimistic that China is a rising great power, especially in the economic sense, in the world. More than half of the respondents saw Asian military issues, such as the South China Sea issue, as the most difficult problem between China and the US.     

Identity,Sovereignty, and Economic Penetration: Beijing's responses to offshore Chinese democracies

Investigating how the PRC responds to democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, this paper argues that the Chinese Communist leadership has mainly developed three strategies in managing the complicated crises, including Beijing's own legitimacy crisis and the integration crisis of the Chinese nation, caused by the rise of offshore Chinese democracies. These strategies are: identity politics, sovereignty politics, and economic penetration. With ‘identity politics’, Beijing identifies ‘identification with the Communist leadership’ as the sole Chinese national identification, and utilizes the nationalistic passions of mainland and even overseas Chinese people against democrats in Taiwan and Hong Kong, by labeling the latter as ‘separatists’ or ‘national traitors’. Further, Beijing defines ‘sovereignty’ in a way in which the ‘central’ government monopolizes all possessions of the nation, and excludes ‘people's sovereignty’ from the politics of national reunification or the ‘one country, two systems’ model actualization. While appealing to both ‘soft power’ based in ‘patriotic nationalism’ and ‘hard power’ embedded in national sovereignty, however, the Chinese regime also mobilizes business resources and opportunities provided by China's growing economic power and China's dominance in Greater Chian economic integration for its political purposes of curbing offshore Chinese democracies.     

China Goes to Africa: a strategic move?

Entering the twenty-first century, particularly under the reign of Hu Jintao, China began to pursue an increasingly pro-active diplomacy in Africa. Most analysis on China's offensive diplomacy in Africa focuses on Beijing's thirst for energy and raw materials, and for economic profits and benefits. That is why it is often called ‘energy diplomacy’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ as if China, just like Japan in the 1980s, became another ‘economic animal’. But if one looks at the history of the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing has seldom pursued its diplomacy from purely economic considerations. Is this time any different? This article exams China's diplomacy in Africa from a strategic and political perspective such as its geo-strategic calculations, political and security ties with African countries, peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts in the region, support for African regionalism, etc. It argues that China's diplomatic expansion in Africa, while partially driven by its need for economic growth, cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration its strategic impulse accompanying its accelerating emergence as a global power. Africa is one of China's diplomatic ‘new frontiers’ as exemplified by new Chinese leader Xi Jinping's maiden foreign trip to Africa in 2013.     

The ‘China Threat’ through the Lens of US Print Media: 1992–2006

China scholars have examined the ‘China threat’ theory from various theoretical perspectives, offered a range of explanations for the theory's emergence and forecast the potential implications for US–China relations. However, few scholars have empirically studied the ‘China threat’ theory through the lens of the US media. This is a critical oversight, because the media plays a pivotal role in shaping US public opinion and US foreign policy, and the media is a key channel for ‘China threat’ dissemination and popularization. This study seeks to redress this oversight by empirically examining ‘China threat’ coverage in the US print media over a 15-year period from 1992 to 2006. We use content-analysis methodology to systematically collect, code and analyze ‘China threat’ data from five major US newspapers and to track the frequency and content of this coverage over time.

Our analysis reveals many interesting patterns in ‘China threat’ media coverage. First, the initial emergence of ‘China threat’ arguments in the US print media corresponded with the sharp upward turn in China's economic growth rates in the early 1990s. However, since the early 1990s, ‘China threat’ coverage has not mirrored China's steady growth. Rather, the media coverage was cyclic, featuring three key peaks (1996, 2000 and 2005) followed by subsequent declining interest. Second, our analysis reveals that the focus of these stories also varied over time. Perceptions of China as a political/ideological threat dominated media coverage in the earlier years (1992–1994) but steadily declined after 1995 and totally disappeared from the US print media after 2001. Perceptions of China as a military/strategic threat replaced political/ideological concerns in 1995, and the military focus has dominated media coverage ever since. Perceptions of China as an economic/trade threat persisted steadily throughout the 15-year time period with a clear uptick in recent years. We conclude this analysis by turning to the literature on realism, agenda setting and information processing to offer possible explanations for these empirical trends.     

The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan

In recent years the concept of ‘soft power’, popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power.     

How Do Americans Evaluate China's International Responsibility? An Empirical Assessment

China in recent years has been asked by other major powers to take a greater share in international responsibility in response to the rise in China's national capability. Negative perceptions about how China is dodging its international responsibility exist not only among policy makers around the world, but have spread to worldwide mass publics, especially across the American people. In this article, we apply the dataset from the ‘Americans’ Attitudes toward China Survey' (AACS) to investigate what the American public think of China's international responsibility and which factors explain the varying evaluations from different theoretical perspectives. The results indicate that Americans' negative evaluations of China's international responsibility are associated with poor ratings regarding China's fulfillment of its domestic obligations and apprehension regarding China's potential threat, but has little to do with China's international behavior. To reduce these negative evaluations, China needs to improve its human rights conditions, give people more political rights, and convince the American public of the benevolence of its ascending power. In addition, persistent efforts toward soft-power construction are also very important since Americans who are interested in Chinese culture or knowledge tend not to think that China is dodging its international responsibility.     

Trading with the Dragon: Chinese trade,investment and development assistance in the Pacific Islands

Chinese development assistance, raw material exploitation, investment and trade increases in their region are causing Pacific Islanders to ask: ‘Why are the Chinese interested in Pacific Island states?’ and ‘Why has there been an upsurge of the Chinese influence in the Pacific?’. This article seeks to add to the debate on that issue by examining the nature and the evolving purpose of Chinese engagement with the small island states of the Pacific. Only a small proportion of China's outbound investment goes to the Pacific Islands, but it has a considerable effect on the region's economically dependent states. Pacific Island nations have a pressing need for overseas investment and are highly dependent on development assistance. They are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to external players.     

Establishing Confucius Institutes: a tool for promoting China’s soft power?

Soft power has become China’s new diplomatic tool to spread its influence in today’s changing international landscape. The establishment of Confucius Institutes (CIs) since 2004 to promote the understanding of Chinese language and culture is a striking example of how the government promotes soft power through cultural means. Through the macro- and micro-level analysis of CIs, this study shows that CIs fail to increase the soft power of China because many countries regard CIs as a propaganda tool and a threat to academic freedom and the local community. It shows that China’s soft power is not so attractive in the eyes of receivers. In fact, China’s aggressive cultural initiatives through the establishment of CIs have triggered another version of the ‘China threat’.     

Patterns of Authority and Governance in Rural China: who's in charge? Why?

A ‘dual-power structure’ governs the Chinese countryside. Branch committees of the Chinese Communist Party, traditionally the centers of power in the villages, increasingly share their authority with elected villagers' committees. Seeking to illuminate the factors contributing to the division of authority between these ‘two committees’, we view Party branch secretaries and the chairs of villagers' committees as the agents of two distinct principals. Party branch secretaries tend to derive their authority from township authorities, while villagers' committee chairs derive theirs from their village electorates. We predict that the division of authority between the two committees varies with (a) the relative levels of activism exhibited by the principals; and (b) the perceived legitimacy of the agents, as determined by their method of s/election. Through analysis of a unique dataset, we test four hypotheses derived from this framework. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the ‘exercise of power’ in rural China and shed light on the dynamics of China's political evolution.     

China and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia: recent developments and future prospects

Future international relations in East Asia are likely to be largely shaped by the maritime strategies and policies of various actors. This paper examines China's policy and behavior in maritime cooperation in the East Asian region in recent years, a topic that has been insufficiently understood. I suggest that while it is necessary and useful to take into account China's naval power, more attention to Chinese intentions and policy on East Asian maritime issues is warranted to arrive at a more balanced, and arguably more accurate, understanding of China's role in East Asian maritime affairs. This paper takes stock of China's changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in maritime cooperation in the region. I describe China's new policy moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea. I also address some of the major Chinese concerns for further maritime cooperation in East Asia. I conclude that while a grand cooperative maritime regime is still not possible from a Chinese perspective, China is likely to agree to more extensive and substantive maritime cooperation in many functional areas, most notably in the non-traditional security arena.