What Affects China's National Image? A cross-national study of public opinion

This paper investigates macro-level sources of variations across countries regrading China's national image, as measured by the proportion of the public in each of 35 countries that expressed a favorable view of China in the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey. It turns out that several expected factors have no significant measurable impact on China's image: not the extent of strategic ties between China and a given country; not the political system of that country; not the extent of Chinese investment in the country; and not the number of Confucius institutes and classrooms in that country. The only macro-level factor we find to affect China's image in a country is that country's level of economic and social development, as measured by the UN Human Development Index. Controlling for the other factors, publics in poor or developing countries are much more likely to have a favorable image of China than publics in economically advanced countries. Some implications of our findings are discussed.     

Chinese Nationalism and its Political and Social Origins

Using the 2008 China Survey, this paper examines Chinese respondents' feelings toward their country and how such feelings are related to their democratic values. First, it compares Chinese nationalism with that of 35 countries and regions in the 2003 National Identity Survey. Second, it looks at the origins of Chinese nationalism as embedded in the social and political characteristics of individuals. Third, it further examines the impact of nationalism on people's political attitudes. The findings show that nationalism in contemporary China is better predicted by the political and economic characteristics of an individual rather than cultural attributes, and that nationalism serves as a powerful instrument in impeding public demand for democratic change.     

Hong Kong joins the National People's Congress: A first test for one country with two political systems

Before its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997, Hong Kong was preoccupied with safeguarding its autonomy while China insisted on keeping separate the two political systems of Hong Kong and the mainland. Toward these ends, everyone focused on Hong Kong's own governing councils and ignored its future status within China's congress system. Not until the December 1997 deadline approached for naming Hong Kong's delegation to the March 1998 meeting of China's new Ninth National People's Congress, did the full implications of this oversight become apparent. Hence, the institutional channels whereby the two systems must interact are actually rooted in the reforming structure of China's congress system. Delegate selection in Hong Kong revealed a new ‘bridging’ function whereby the two legislative systems are linked through the old organization tactic of concurrent membership. The bridging function also illuminates previously unheralded features of Hong Kong's new post‐1997 government, as a replica and appendage of China's people's congress network.     

The Television Play,Melodramatic Imagination and Envisioning the ‘Harmonious Society’ in Post-1989 China

The television play has been recognized by scholars as the most influential genre in the flourishing television industry in China's new media landscape; yet little critical attention has been given to inquiry of why and how it functions as a dynamic cultural agent in the Chinese people's reconfiguration of their past and imagining of their everyday life. This paper investigates the intriguing socio-historical environment from which the genre emerged and its unique modes of operation by focusing on the television play of sentiment. It demonstrates that the television play embodies the many complex aspects of social forces and relationships contested in China's reform, suggesting, all at once, commercialization in Chinese society, the popular imaginary of morality and the state's conceptualization of a ‘harmonious society’, a strategic policy aiming at maintaining social balance while bypassing some of the thorny political questions in the post-revolution era.     

China's Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang

China's counterinsurgency strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang relies heavily on hard power and imposition. Well-functioning vertical coordination in the security sector of China's political system and assimilationist nationality dynamics combine to favour the use of force against ethnic groups that do not accept the political legitimacy of China's Communist Party. Transnational links contribute to China's difficulties with implementing counterinsurgency in Tibet and help China implement its strategy in Xinjiang. Development strategies aimed at improving living standards are crowded out due to a lack of horizontal coordination between civilian and security agencies and a bias towards unitary nation-building in Chinese nationalism.     

The Rise of China: media perception and implications for international politics

In recent years, the rise of China as an emerging great power has been widely perceived across the world. How has the rise of China been represented over time in the Western news media? Has the image of China as a rising power had any impact on the country's soft power? These questions remain unanswered but answering them is of great significance in helping us understand the impact of the news media on the transformation of international politics in the information age. This paper conducts a longitudinal study to examine the nature of Chinese coverage and explores how the image of a rising China—economically, politically, regionally and globally—has been represented in three transnational newspapers in Europe. It further argues that the Western media coverage of China's rise is as a soft power, which, to some extent, has an impact upon China's foreign relations.     

The Hong Kong Policy of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1997

China's policy toward Hong Kong in the period 1949-1997 was primarily driven by utilitarian calculations of national interests and the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. The Hong Kong policy of China, as an integral part of its foreign policy, was distinctive in that ideological fervor and nationalist passions had limited influence. The goals to be achieved by the Hong Kong policy remained unchanged throughout the period; the strategies adopted, however, changed in accordance with the changing international situation and the national interests as defined by the Chinese leaders. The primary goals of the Hong Kong policy were to secure a less threatening external political environment for China and to make calculated use of Hong Kong for China's economic development. By tolerating Hong Kong as a British colony, China also depended on Britain to control the potentially threatening anti-Communist Chinese population there. The 'over-dependence' on the British to control the Chinese people in Hong Kong on the eve of Hong Kong's reversion to China, however, alienated the Hong Kong people as well as impeded the formation of local political leaders in the territory. As a result, the acquisition of Hong Kong by China in 1997 has not been accompanied by political rapport between the Chinese government and the Hong Kong people, thus sowing seeds for lingering friction between them.     

Domestic Openness in post-WTO China: central and local perspectives

This article seeks answers to three basic questions about the WTO's impact on domestic openness in China: is China a more open society as a result of its WTO membership; in what way has the WTO affected reform and openness; and, is WTO membership leading to political liberalization or translating into a demand for democracy as democracy advocates predicted? To this end, it identifies and analyzes the WTO-related reforms at central and local levels which have had the strongest impact thus far on openness to Chinese citizens. The analysis focuses on the reduction of the Party-state's control of economic activity as manifested in decreasing state monopoly and bureaucratic intervention in the sphere of economic activity, improved legal regulation, and increasing transparency of trade-related rules and rule-making. It argues that the varied depth and scope of the WTO's impact are attributable to differences in the congruence between the WTO principles and China's domestic political logic and the varying levels of effectiveness of external and internal pressure for change.     

An Emerging China and Diasporic Chinese: historicity,state, and international relations

The past decade has seen a growing body of literature on the (re)emergence of China and its implications for the new international order, and this scholarship is accompanied by the attempts from both within and outside of China to establish Chinese schools of international relations (IR). These admirable efforts, however, have been largely state-centric and concerned mainly with the balance of power, with little attention being directed to the diaspora's role in the evolution of China's international relationship and their potential contribution to bridging China studies and international relations theorization. Drawing upon theoretical insights from both IR and diaspora studies and employing a wide range of primary data including archives and personal interviews, this essay examines the diaspora's role (or the lack of it) in China's diplomacy since 1949 and attempts to conceptualize the Chinese experience in an historical and comparative perspective. I argue that historicity and state have played a significant part in shaping the interactions between the diaspora and diplomacy. The Chinese state's resilient capacity in domesticating (potential) diplomatic problems with respect to the diaspora and transforming them into new policy initiatives through facilitating diasporic participation in China's socio-economic and political processes has opened up new venues for the Chinese overseas to be involved in China's diplomacy. This article concludes by considering three different routes in engaging the diaspora with diplomacy at a time of China rising and by calling for strategic integration of diaspora into the emerging discourses on ‘IR theories with Chinese characteristics’.     

The ‘China Threat’ through the Lens of US Print Media: 1992–2006

China scholars have examined the ‘China threat’ theory from various theoretical perspectives, offered a range of explanations for the theory's emergence and forecast the potential implications for US–China relations. However, few scholars have empirically studied the ‘China threat’ theory through the lens of the US media. This is a critical oversight, because the media plays a pivotal role in shaping US public opinion and US foreign policy, and the media is a key channel for ‘China threat’ dissemination and popularization. This study seeks to redress this oversight by empirically examining ‘China threat’ coverage in the US print media over a 15-year period from 1992 to 2006. We use content-analysis methodology to systematically collect, code and analyze ‘China threat’ data from five major US newspapers and to track the frequency and content of this coverage over time.

Our analysis reveals many interesting patterns in ‘China threat’ media coverage. First, the initial emergence of ‘China threat’ arguments in the US print media corresponded with the sharp upward turn in China's economic growth rates in the early 1990s. However, since the early 1990s, ‘China threat’ coverage has not mirrored China's steady growth. Rather, the media coverage was cyclic, featuring three key peaks (1996, 2000 and 2005) followed by subsequent declining interest. Second, our analysis reveals that the focus of these stories also varied over time. Perceptions of China as a political/ideological threat dominated media coverage in the earlier years (1992–1994) but steadily declined after 1995 and totally disappeared from the US print media after 2001. Perceptions of China as a military/strategic threat replaced political/ideological concerns in 1995, and the military focus has dominated media coverage ever since. Perceptions of China as an economic/trade threat persisted steadily throughout the 15-year time period with a clear uptick in recent years. We conclude this analysis by turning to the literature on realism, agenda setting and information processing to offer possible explanations for these empirical trends.     

Nationalism and Democratization in Contemporary China

The crippled economic and political reform in China has come with two schools of thought: the new-left and nationalism. The new-left focuses on domestic issues, while nationalism tackles more international relationships. This paper explores the effects of radical nationalism on China's democratization process. It argues that if nationalism takes the dominant position in China's political process, Chinese reform will go astray.     

Political Liberalization without Democratization: Pan Wei's proposal for political reform

This paper is a response to Pan Wei's rule of law regime reform proposal. It agrees with Pan that the direction of political reform taken and discussed inside China is indeed different from the democratization that has been pushed by outside pro-democracy activists, including Chinese dissidents. While some Chinese scholars and think-tank analysts talk about political reform, they are not proposing to democratize the polity but to make the single party rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) more efficient or to provide it with a more solid legal base. They have looked upon political liberalization without democratization as an alternative solution to many of China's problems related to the extant authoritarian system. Pan Wei's proposal for building a rule-of-law regime is a representative work of this group of Chinese intellectuals.     

China Goes to Africa: a strategic move?

Entering the twenty-first century, particularly under the reign of Hu Jintao, China began to pursue an increasingly pro-active diplomacy in Africa. Most analysis on China's offensive diplomacy in Africa focuses on Beijing's thirst for energy and raw materials, and for economic profits and benefits. That is why it is often called ‘energy diplomacy’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ as if China, just like Japan in the 1980s, became another ‘economic animal’. But if one looks at the history of the PRC's foreign policy, Beijing has seldom pursued its diplomacy from purely economic considerations. Is this time any different? This article exams China's diplomacy in Africa from a strategic and political perspective such as its geo-strategic calculations, political and security ties with African countries, peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts in the region, support for African regionalism, etc. It argues that China's diplomatic expansion in Africa, while partially driven by its need for economic growth, cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration its strategic impulse accompanying its accelerating emergence as a global power. Africa is one of China's diplomatic ‘new frontiers’ as exemplified by new Chinese leader Xi Jinping's maiden foreign trip to Africa in 2013.     

One Rising China,Multiple Interpretations: China's 60th anniversary celebration through the lens of the world's printed media

What does a rising China mean to the world? While some countries take China as a salient threat, others regard China as their role model for development and governance. However, limited research has offered a systematic comparative analysis in this regard. China's spectacular celebration of its 60th anniversary uniquely showcased its increasing military might, mounting economic wealth and carefully-maintained mass support. Taking advantage of simultaneous worldwide news coverage of this all-in-one event, we scrutinize how different societies responded to a rising China. We find significant variance in the news coverage from 42 top printed media in 21 sampled societies. Moreover, these societies' political features affect their newspapers' reporting styles the most. This analysis significantly enriches our understanding of the rise of China.     

Patterns of Authority and Governance in Rural China: who's in charge? Why?

A ‘dual-power structure’ governs the Chinese countryside. Branch committees of the Chinese Communist Party, traditionally the centers of power in the villages, increasingly share their authority with elected villagers' committees. Seeking to illuminate the factors contributing to the division of authority between these ‘two committees’, we view Party branch secretaries and the chairs of villagers' committees as the agents of two distinct principals. Party branch secretaries tend to derive their authority from township authorities, while villagers' committee chairs derive theirs from their village electorates. We predict that the division of authority between the two committees varies with (a) the relative levels of activism exhibited by the principals; and (b) the perceived legitimacy of the agents, as determined by their method of s/election. Through analysis of a unique dataset, we test four hypotheses derived from this framework. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the ‘exercise of power’ in rural China and shed light on the dynamics of China's political evolution.     

China's Economic Diplomacy towards the Arab Countries: challenges ahead?

Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, China has adhered to its ‘business-first’ economic diplomacy towards the Arab countries, a policy driven by China's ongoing geoeconomic interests. The ten-year-old China–Arab States Cooperation Forum serves as the nucleus for China's economic diplomacy in the region. The Chinese authorities have also initiated interagency coordination and central–local governments' power sharing in order to pursue this diplomacy successfully. However, while its economic diplomacy may be evolving, China, unlike what it has achieved in Black Africa, seems to have failed to develop strategic, political and cultural exchanges with its Arab counterparts. The intertwined geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that have emerged since the Arab revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the longer run.     

China's Prolonged Stability and Political Future: Same political system,different policies and methods

Contrary to the earlier political upheavals which culminated in the 1989 Prodemocracy Movement, China has achieved an extended stability in the 1990s. This paper argues that the prolonged stability resulted from a set of changes in China's state‐society relations, and much of it was related to the 1989 movement. After the 1989 movement, the CCP veterans selected younger leaders who were both reform-minded and had a Machiavellian sense of politics. This new leadership skillfully managed the economy and contained dissident activities from public attention. Reform and the booming economy also provided many opportunities for intellectuals and students and turned them from the earlier economic 'losers' into the current 'winners'. As market forces penetrated into China more deeply and the state no longer took charge of everything as it used to, the Chinese became less interested in national politics, and political conflicts localized. This paper also argues that although China's state‐society relations underwent great changes, the state still bases its legitimacy on performance and is thus intrinsically unstable. A political reform that aims at changing the basis of state legitimation becomes crucial.     

Peasant challenge in post‐communist China

Peasants constitute about 73% of China's population. To a large extent, the success of China's modernization program and transition depends on where peasants are heading. Peasants have posed new challenges for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1990s after 17‐year economic reform. This article argues that these challenges derive from the empowerment of the peasants since the mid‐1980s. How well the CCP could deal with these challenges directly concerns China's political stability and reform. Through the examination of the evolution of the peasant‐CCP relations and of the implications of the challenges for China in the 1990s and beyond, this article raises an open question for China scholars to address.     

Discussion of 'Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior'

Chinese foreign policy behavior is constrained by different sets of contradictions, but at the same time these contradictions serve to inspire and focus Chinese foreign policy, both in negative and positive ways. As China transitions to a developed country that is fully integrated into regional and global economic, political and security regimes, these contradictions may become less salient, however. With the growth of China's comprehensive national power, the Chinese will come to view their country less as a poor nation and more as a great power and thus this dual-identity syndrome should diminish in importance as a factor constraining China's foreign policy behavior over time. The contradictory impetus behind Chinese foreign policy that derives from the desire to benefit from pursuit of 'open-door' policies and the compulsion to protect state sovereignty will similarly likely become less important as China's power grows, but only if there is mutually acceptable settlement to the Taiwan problem and Beijing's confidence in its ability to secure its territorial integrity is enhanced. A stronger, more confident China will also likely become more actively involved in regional and global issues on a pragmatic, rather than principled basis. Finally, while bilateral ties will remain important to Beijing, its participation in multilateral fora will no doubt increase, including in the security sphere, as it becomes more experienced and self-assured in multilateral interaction. Ultimately, bilateral and multilateralism may take on the role of parallel tracks in Chinese diplomacy with little tension between them.     

Choosing China: public perceptions of ‘China as a model’

This article examines East Asians and Chinese nationals who select ‘China as a model’ of development. The analysis looks at both macro and micro explanations to show that China's standing as a development model is not in sync with its status as a rising global and regional power. At the macro level, the focus is on country-level patterns, while the micro analysis is drawn from the third wave surveys of the Asia Barometer Survey data conducted from 2011 to 2013 in 13 different countries. The findings suggest that political values, history, geography and socio-economic conditions correspond to different views of China as a model and that those outside of China who select the country as a model are quite different from those in China itself.