Civil service and democracy: Questions in reforming the civil service in eastern and central Europe

The debate over public service reform is taking place at a time of flux when old models are being challenged everywhere. This article discusses issues of institutional transfer, as between western and east and central Europe, relative to civil service reform and democratisation. It presents several models to describe the place of the civil service in the democratic state and the implications of each for civil service organisation. It argues for a better balance between a legal approach, which tends to dominate advice coming from some continental European countries, and one which emphasises ‘good’ rather than just ‘correct’ relations between administration and citizens. This distinction is fundamental in so far as, under the UK Citizens Charter for example, the citizen is seen as a ‘customer’ rather than a mere ‘user’ of services he has no influence over. The article concludes that, given the differences in culture, political climate and economic situation of ‘recipient’ countries in east and central Europe, each must search for its own reforms, looking for questions rather than answers.     

Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia,the Philippines and Thailand

Abstract

This article analyses the Kim Dae-jung government's industrial realignment (‘Big Deals’) policy in post-crisis Korea, which offers a valuable insight into the state's role in managing the transition from a developmental state to a free-market economy and into the changing nature of government–business relations. Although Kim was committed to creating a free-market economy in Korea, as the ‘Big Deals’ got under way critics accused him of violating market principles and employing tactics of intervention and coercion used by previous authoritarian regimes. The ‘Big Deals’ experience suggests a further stage in the evolution of the Korean developmental state; the dismantling of state powers and the implementation of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s had led to the emergence of a ‘transformative state’ in which the state acted as ‘senior partner’ rather than ‘commander-in-chief’. The transitional state charged with the task of rebuilding the economy after 1997 regained some of its lost powers and used some familiar methods of achieving its ends. However, it also demonstrated by the nature and scope of its interventions that it was gradually evolving and adapting to meet the changing economic environment. Although Kim's actions prompted allegations from the chaebol and their conservative allies of a return to autocratic economic management by the government, it was clear that the developmental state had not been resurrected. Rather, these criticisms serve to highlight the continuing antagonism in the state–business relationship; neither side had developed new strategies for dealing with each other and their relations were still characterized by mutual mistrust and staunch chaebol resistance to key reforms demanded by the government. Although suspicions of a permanent return to extensive state intervention were unfounded, they nevertheless diminished the prospects for the creation of a cooperative relationship between the state and big business that would be a crucial factor in revitalizing the Korean economy.     

The Rise of the Far Right in Debtor and Creditor European Countries: The Case of European Parliament Elections

While the 2014 European Parliament elections were marked by the rise of parties on the far right‐wing, the different patterns of support that we observe across Europe and across time are not directly related to the economic crisis. Indeed, economic hardship seems neither sufficient nor necessary for the rise of such parties to occur. Using the cross‐national results for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 EP elections in order to capture time and country variations, we posit that the economy affects the rise of far right‐wing parties in more complex ways. Specifically, we compare the experience of high‐debt countries (the ‘debtors’) and the others (the ‘creditors’) and explore the relationship between far right‐wing party success on the one hand, and unemployment, inequality, immigration, globalisation and the welfare state on the other. Our discussion suggests there might be a trade‐off between budgetary stability and far right‐wing party support, but the choice between Charybdis and Scylla may be avoided if policy‐makers carefully choose which policies should bear the brunt of the fiscal adjustment.     

Economic change and labour market policy: Corporatist and dualist tendencies in britain and Sweden

This article explicates John Goldthorpe's recent analytical distinction between ‘corporatist’ and ‘dualist’ tendencies in Western political economies. By linking these categories to macro‐economic strategies, the role of trade unions and the circumstances under which state policy is initiated, this dichotomy can be of value in the analysis of these polities. The article examines the major characteristics of British and Swedish labour market policy in the areas of wage policy, trade unions and training and education as they relate to the respective macro‐economic policies adopted by British and Swedish governments. These provide examples of the presence and development of corporatist and dualist tendencies in these two countries.     

The changing character of national borders

At the end of the twentieth century, the pace of change in the international system is increasing. New actors and even new categories of actors are emerging. Some have a strong impact on international relations, thus competing with the traditional type of international actor, the sovereign nation‐state. One salient feature of the nation‐state is its power to control its borders. In the process of globalization, this power is being disintegrated.

In some respects, national borders have completely lost their relevance, owing to certain adverse ecological developments like the degradation of the ozone layer and other virtually global threats. They are equally of limited use in influencing the speed and content of some trade operations concerning goods or currencies or the free flow of media information.

They however continue to function in a rather efficient way for people. Immigration laws and certain other procedures of the ‘rich’ countries tend to distinguish between wanted and unwanted immigrants. Due to various catastrophies and disasters, wide‐spread violence and the anticipation of a bleak economic future, the number of migrants continues to grow rapidly, as does the pressure from migrants from the ‘poor’ and densely populated countries of the world on the borders of the ‘rich’ countries. This is a multi‐dimensional development with political, economic, but also moral aspects.     

Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations

Intelligence liaison increased exponentially during the so-called ‘War on Terror’. Today it continues as the most significant dimension of intelligence, including impacting on accountability and oversight considerations. Nevertheless, the intelligence liaison phenomenon remains largely under-studied and substantially under-theorized. In this article, preliminary suggestions are offered concerning how this dearth of theory can be addressed. Firstly, the relevance of international relations theory and other bodies of theory, together with significant approaches concerning how international relations – extending to how intelligence and intelligence-related phenomena (such as, in this article, intelligence co-operation) – can be studied, are explored. These theories, and equally, approaches, are arguably most appropriate when deployed in an arrangement of ‘complex co-existence plurality’ across the different interrelated levels of experience and analysis, and they offer more effective explanations when intelligence liaison is disaggregated into at least eight systemic attributes or variables. More broadly, the suggestion that international relations theory, and indeed theory generally, is ‘irrelevant’ to intelligence studies is simultaneously challenged.     

Tristees tropes: post-modern anthropologists encounter the other and discover themselves

Modernists have represented the world and its history as divided into ‘medieval’ (or traditional) and ‘modern’, ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, and claimed that they will bring about humanity's ‘emancipation’ from the medieval. I argue that the world which modernists wish to bring into existence, far from entailing the erasure of the medieval, as claimed, involves the complex rearticulation of the medieval. Vital to the modern is not just the secularization of a previously sacred realm, upon which scholars have concentrated, but the sacralization of the mundane, pointed to by Foucault. The agent of modernist emancipation is a hypostatized sovereign Agent. The medievals engaged in certain practices which were supposed to embody a transcendent God in the human world and lead them to a celestial paradise. the moderns, silently transposing that god intoa foundational reason, assert that its manifesation in enlightened institutios will take them to a utopia which is none other than the surreptitious imporatation of the medieval paradise on earth. Imperial progresses and religious processions were, I argue, the foremost paractices by which medieval polities embodied the transcendent and attained to heaven. Modern polities, While treating them as mere ‘rituals’, have sublimated those very practices into an abstract material progress emanating from the economic practices of the entire nation represented as a vehicle on the move. Developed countries represented themselves, after recovering from World War II, as already moving at a fast clip and as living in a productionist and consumerist utopia. Underdeveloped countries like India, considered medieval, were represented as only beginning to move. They were to transfrom themselves into modern utopias through central planning andmassive projects such as dam building.     

Asymmetrical rivalry between China and Japan in Africa: to what extent has Sino-Japan rivalry become a global phenomenon?

Abstract

To what extent is China–Japan rivalry a global phenomenon, and what is the nature of the rivalry they engage in outside their own region? Literature on Sino-Japanese rivalry abounds, but it pays scant attention to the relevance of the rivalry outside East Asia. This article argues that Sino-Japanese rivalry has indeed become a global phenomenon, that various forms of the rivalry are evident in Africa, and that they are mostly of an asymmetrical nature. Quantitatively, China’s contribution to Africa is far greater than that of Japan, with the exception of foreign direct investment (FDI). Qualitatively, though, Japan has a stronger sense of the rivalry than China has, revealing a psychological aspect to the asymmetry as well. Contextually, the types of activity that Chinese and Japanese actors carry out in Africa are not necessarily the same, which makes the rivalry all the more asymmetrical. The rivalry has become more apparent recently, not only because of the rise of China but also because of a change in the meaning of ‘Africa’ – from a region of ‘poverty’ and ‘hunger’ to a region of ‘economic opportunities’. That said, Africa – to a greater or lesser degree in each of its countries – still suffers from conflict and instability. As a result, the ability of Japan and China to exert power and influence throughout Africa is somewhat restricted.     

Age‐based self‐interest,intergenerational solidarity and the welfare state: A comparative analysis of older people's attitudes towards public childcare in 12 OECD countries

When faced with the necessity of reforming welfare states in ageing societies, politicians tend to demand more solidarity between generations because they assume that reforms require sacrifices from older people. Political economy models, however, do not investigate such a mechanism of intergenerational solidarity, suggesting that only age‐based self‐interest motivates welfare preferences. Against this backdrop, this article asks: Does the experience of intergenerational solidarity within the family matter for older people's attitudes towards public childcare – a policy area of no personal interest to them? The statistical analysis of a sample with individuals aged 55+ from twelve OECD countries indicates that: intergenerational solidarity matters; its effect on policy preferences is context‐dependent; and influential contexts must – according to the evidence from twelve countries – be sought in all societal spheres, including the political (family spending by the state), the economic (female labour market integration) and the cultural (public opinion towards working mothers). Overall, the findings imply that policy makers need to deal with a far more complex picture of preference formation toward the welfare state than popular stereotypes of ‘greedy geezers’ suggest.     

The prospects of egalitarian capitalism in the global South: Turkish social neoliberalism in comparative perspective

Abstract

This paper studies the transformation of economic and social policy in Turkey during the 2000s. The policy mix that has emerged can be usefully conceptualized as social neoliberalism, combining relatively orthodox neoliberal economic policies and retrenchment of the protective welfare state (e.g. labour market institutions) with a significant expansion, both in terms of public spending and population coverage, of the productive welfare state (e.g. public health care). Therefore, social neoliberalism as a development model is distinct both from social democracy and orthodox neoliberalism. Its rise in Turkey during the 2000s is arguably best understood with reference to the interests of the AKP's support coalition, the salience of inequalities in access to public services, and the disconnect of social policy-making from civil society mobilization. Turkey's experience with social neoliberalism provides an important reference point for theorizing the ‘social turn’ that since the 2000s has occurred in many late-developing countries with now maturing welfare states, including Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and Chile.     

Government employment and pay: the global and regional evidence

Against the background of paucity of complete and reliable data as the basis for sound policy, this article reports on the results of a major international survey of government employment and wages in about 100 countries. Key findings are that: in developing countries as a whole, relative government employment is now less than half the level of OECD countries; the reduction in the role of the state in the ‘decade of adjustment’ is striking, and so is the erosion in real government wages in the poorest countries—particularly in anglophone Africa; decentralization in Latin America is visible in the substantial shift of employment from central to subnational government levels; and the lean and well-paid civil service of East Asia is one possible reason why rapid economic growth could coexist for so long with the governance weaknesses that have surfaced in the form of the Asian crisis. The article then undertakes an aggregate cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of government employment. In Africa and Latin America, relative government employment is positively associated with per capita income and the fiscal deficit, and negatively associated with relative wages and population. Clearly, the tendency for government to expand as the economy grows—the so-called ‘Wagner law’—is still operative in developing countries. However, it seems no longer at work in OECD countries, suggesting that Wagner's law ceases to operate beyond certain per capita income level. The article concludes, nevertheless, with a reminder of the limits of cross-sectional analysis: even ‘good facts’ prove little by themselves—good analysis and policy must rest on country-specific quantitative and qualitative evidence. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporatism and the Microeconomic Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy: The Swedish Model Revisited*

The aim of this paper is to advance the research into the workings of ‘corporatist’ societies by adding a microeconomic dimension and outlining how such a revised model is applicable to recent Swedish experience. Sweden is often regarded as a corporatist society., that is, one in which policy is the outcome of a ‘social partnership’ between encompassing groups coordinated by government. This corporatist approach, resting on the existence of a macro-economic social contract between peak organizations, is complemented here by an analysis of the micro-level incentives and mechanisms conducive to operating within the corporatist cooperative framework. These characteristics are seen as together constituting what I term the solidaristic market economy, a system of economic relations different in fundamental respects from the two with which we are familiar. While Swedish reality docs not correspond exactly to the economic model set out, the case is made that it is as reasonable to extrapolate from Swedish experience to the solidaristic market economy (and vice versa) as to learn from U.S. experience about the competitive market economy and from the Soviet Union about the command economy. Complemented by these micro-characteristics, corporatist analysis of economic relations under social-democratic regimes is thus seen as explaining the resilience of the ‘Swedish model’. Rather than in constant peril as critics suggest, the encompassing interest organizations and the patterns of relations among them are characterized by continued solidity in keeping with the operating principles of the solidaristic market economy.     

Social reproduction and the limits of a neoliberal approach: the case of Singapore

Should citizenship status confer social rights independent of an individual's economic contribution? This study approaches this question through looking at social settings in which answers are contested. Specifically, it documents and analyzes qualitative semi-structured interviews and focus group interviews with 221 Singaporean citizens. As such, it complements existing critical policy studies on shifting conceptualizations of social citizenship and the rise of neoliberal governance. Data analysis illustrates interviewees' perceptions and lived experience of neoliberal, or ‘market citizenship’, bias in state population policy. Interviewees, moreover, find existing pronatalist incentives helpful but insufficient, largely because they see a decision to have more children as a long-term commitment requiring continual investment. They call for more generous, sustained, and universal state provisions for education and health, as well as homemaker allowances, which would be closer to feminist and classical formulations of citizenship-as-social rights.     

Acting one way and talking another: China's coercive economic diplomacy in East Asia and beyond

Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond.     

Administration in a small capitalist state: The Hong Kong experience

This article is primarily concerned with the functions of bureaucracy in a minimal state and with how those functions might change in response to economic growth. It is predicated on the assumption that bureaucracy is necessary for economic growth even in those countries which seek to achieve such growth through the relatively free operation of the economy within the rubric of a capitalist state. Hong Kong is a case in point. Although it has often been taken as the epitome of the benefits which can be derived from keeping government out of the economy, the bureaucracy has in fact played a critical role in support of economic development. Aside from the functions which must be performed by any state, such as the maintenance of law and order, the administration of justice, and the provision of public works, three features of Hong Kong bureaucratic practice appear to have been important in the definition of the bureaucracy's tasks in the economic growth process. These are ‘value for money’ and the constant need to justify government expenditure; effective line implementation; and the ability to manage crises. If these constitute minimal essential requirements for such governments, they may provide useful criteria which small or micro-states, following capital growth models but not yet experiencing rapid economic development, can apply in assessing the capabilities of their own bureaucracies.     

Financing growth in the 1990s: New challenges for OECS countries

This article argues that the world as we know it is becoming increasingly integrated and that the traditional providers of foreign assistance for infrastructure and other purposes, are about to increase the demand that poorer nations like the OECS countries must do more for themselves during the process of social development. The article admits that poorer countries like the OECS have developed revenue raising structures that facilitate indigenous development but the post-Cold War reality intensifies the need for countries like the OECS to do more for themselves than ever before. The reasons for this occurrence have been stated largely as being attributed to financial, economic, attitudinal changes in major industrial countries, particularly in North America. These changes suggest difficult limes for industrial countries in the future and are likely to have serious impacts on countries like the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The article offers a specific approach to dealing with this anticipated demand from donor countries to do more for themselves. The author advocates the following: (1) expand the existing revenue structure of the OECS countries to include specific revenue instruments to finance new growth and development in these countries; (2) broaden the concept and practice of ‘pay-as-you-go’ to ‘pay-as-you-grow;’ (3) require new growth to pay its own way or at a minimum, to shoulder a large proportion of the cost; (4) let those who primarily benefit from new growth pay for it. ‘Impact’ or ‘development’ fees have been suggested to be a new method of financing growth, particularly in countries that are experiencing new levels of growth. The author argues that this method will not be unusual to developers-foreign investors from North America, or OECS nationals who may be returning temporarily or otherwise to their home country. This discussion on pay-as-you-grow, it is hoped, will contribute to the growing literature on Caribbean public finance.     

Identity and recognition: remembering and forgetting the post-war in Sino-Japanese relations

Abstract

In the 1990s, Japanese views of China were relatively positive. In the 2000s, however, views of China have deteriorated markedly and China has increasingly come to be seen as ‘anti-Japanese’. How can these developments, which took place despite increased economic interdependence, be understood? One seemingly obvious explanation is the occurrence of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents in China since the mid-2000s. I suggest that these incidents per se do not fully explain the puzzle. Protests against other countries occasionally occur and may influence public opinion. Nonetheless, the interpretation of such events arguably determines their significance. Demonstrations may be seen as legitimate or spontaneous. If understood as denying recognition of an actor's self-identity, the causes of such incidents are likely to have considerably deeper and more severe consequences than what would otherwise be the case. Through an analysis of Japanese parliamentary debates and newspaper editorials, the paper demonstrates that the Chinese government has come to be seen as denying Japan's self-identity as a peaceful state that has provided China with substantial amounts of official development aid (ODA) during the post-war era. This is mainly because China teaches patriotic education, which is viewed as the root cause of ‘anti-Japanese’ incidents. China, then, is not regarded as ‘anti-Japanese’ merely because of protests against Japan and attacks on Japanese material interests but for denying a key component of Japan's self-image. Moreover, the analysis shows that explicit Chinese statements recognising Japan's self-identity have been highly praised in Japan. The article concludes that if China recognises Japan's self-understanding of its identity as peaceful, Japan is more likely to stick to this identity and act accordingly whereas Chinese denials of it might empower Japanese actors who seek to move away from this identity and ‘normalise’ Japan, for example, by revising the pacifist Article Nine of the Japanese constitution.     

The politics of currency crises in Sweden: Policy choice in a globalised economy

In the two‐pronged debate on ‘globalising markets’ the ‘society‐centered’ perspective claims nation‐states are losing economic control whereas the ‘state‐centred’ perspective holds that ‘business as usual’ is possible. Both views are oversimplified. Looking at Sweden's 1992 currency crisis, we suggest that studies over time provide insights about the significance of political craftsmanship. We argue that market influence on domestic policy making should be regarded as a variable contingent on a fortuitous (from the point of view of market actors) confluence of political and economic circumstances. Our analysis suggests that this confluence, to some extent, can be controlled or manipulated by the state.     

Situating technologies: Radio activity and the nuclear question

Theory‐dependence or ‘the principle of simulation which governs all information’ underpins Baudrillard's critique of ethics. Modern moral theory is just another ‘map that precedes the territory'—a ‘hypermoral simulation’ that makes an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’. That ‘production’ of moral knowledge is doomed to uncertainty by theory‐dependence, argues Baudrillard. Instead, he offers the ‘seduction’ of a pre‐modern ontology of Good and Evil. The ‘fatal strategy’ of seduction evokes a ‘state of grace’ which invites us to encounter Good and Evil as a ‘totality’ and be ‘re‐enchanted’ by the mystery of the world.     

China and the middle-income trap: toward a Post Washington,Post Beijing Consensus

Abstract

Over the last 30 years, China has experienced tremendous growth, with many commentators attributing the rapid development to the ‘China Model’ (CM) or the ‘Beijing Consensus’ (BC). However, in recent years growth has slowed and an ever-increasing number of bears are predicting a financial crisis, economic collapse, and a very hard landing, perhaps even a lost decade a la Japan. All of this has led to heated debate about whether the CM is now exhausted, whether China is caught in ‘the middle-income trap’ (MIT) and whether a new model is needed for the next phase of development where China attempts the difficult transition from middle-income country to high-income country status. This article addresses the following five sets of issues. First, is there a CM or BC? If so, what does it entail, and does it differ from the model followed by other successful countries in East Asia? Second, is there a MIT? Is China stuck in the MIT or perhaps multiple MITs? Third, what adjustments to the economic model are required for China to continue its long march toward becoming a high-income country? Fourth, are political, legal and social reforms also required? If so, will all reforms proceed simultaneously or are reforms likely to be sequenced, with adjustments to the economy preceding reforms in other areas? Fifth, is there now a global convergence on a new model of development for developing countries – a Post-Washington, Post-Beijing Consensus?