Government Reform,Political Ideology,and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration

This article examines how ideological differences between political officials and agencies may have affected the implementation of an ostensibly nonpartisan, government‐wide administrative initiative: the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review of federal programs. The analysis reveals that managers in agencies associated with liberal programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management resources. Further analysis reveals that differences in reported agency effort can be explained partly by objective differences in the demands that PART placed on agencies—liberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement plans relative to their organizational capacity—and partly by the ideological beliefs of employees—on average, liberal managers reported more agency effort, even after accounting for objective measures of administrative burden.     

Second‐Order Devolution or Local Activism? Local Air Agencies Revisited

In response to calls from previous scholarship for further bottom‐up examination of local government roles in environmental policy, the authors revisit local air agencies to examine two separate phenomena occurring in environmental federalism: one from the top down (second‐order devolution) and one from the bottom up (local activism). Using survey data from local air agencies on devolved authorities to set air quality standards and to enforce federal and/or state standards, the authors identify three different types of local agencies: state administrative subunits (only enforcement authority), fully devolved agencies (authority to both set and enforce standards), and activist agencies (neither authority). Further findings indicate that state administrative subunits and fully devolved agencies are likely functions of second‐order devolution, while activist agencies are likely functions of local activism. Conclusions suggest that both top‐down and bottom‐up approaches to environmental federalism are shaping local government roles in environmental management.     

The Challenge of Strengthening Nonprofits and Civil Society

The Winter Commission Report was centrally concerned with improving the performance of state and local governments. Since the issuance of the commission’s report in 1993, the delivery of services by state and local government has been substantially changed by the growing role of nonprofit organizations in providing public services and representing citizen interests. As a result, state and local governments and nonprofit agencies are faced with complex governance challenges. The central argument of this paper is that despite the dramatic changes in the relationship between government and nonprofit organizations in recent years, the key tenets of the Winter Commission report—the need for improved training and education, greater transparency and accountability, more emphasis on performance, and improved citizen engagement—remain deeply relevant in improving the governance of the public services in an increasingly complex policy process and service delivery system at the state and local levels.     

In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) under Indonesia's new decentralisation policy: old problems,new challenges

This study explores a possible governance model for Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) under Indonesia's new Decentralisation Policy. At present the management of JMA development is coordinated by Badan Koordinasi Pembangunan Jabodetabekjur (BKSP) —Coordinating Board for JMA Development, but this agency is ineffective and powerless to perform its tasks because of lack of authority and power. The establishment of JMA governance model should take into account the existence of the BKSP which has been politically accepted by all provincial and local governments in the region. Involvement of central government in JMA governance is very important. A mixed model of urban governance is most suitable for the JMA. Thereunder the central government should have authority to plan and develop major physical infrastructure for the whole JMA, while the provincial and local governments retain their respective general administrative functions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Encouraging Local Compliance with Federal Civil Rights Laws: Field Experiments with the National Voter Registration Act

Can state officials increase local officials’ compliance with an important federal civil rights law with subtle interventions? The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires voter registration services at certain government agencies, but many counties fail to comply with the act. Working with officials in two states, the authors conducted field experiments to determine whether two methods commonly used by state officials increase compliance with the NVRA. Findings show that although the effects of the methods on output were sizable relative to recent performance, agency performance remained poor overall, with many offices continuing their history of registering no voters. The authors also discovered that gains in performance were largest for the offices that had performed best in the past. These findings suggest that while subtle interventions by state officials can produce increased compliance, stronger tactics may be needed to secure implementation of this federal law by local government agents.     

The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania

Since 1999, Tanzania has been actively pursuing reforms of the way in which the central government finances local government activities. This article looks at the potential problems with the mechanism that the central government currently uses to distribute budget resources among the 114 local government authorities and sets out to reveal the incidence of central government allocations to local authorities in Tanzania. Two strands of economics literature—the public choice literature and the political economy literature—consider the distribution of central government resources across local governments. Using regression analysis, this study specifies an incidence model that reveals the determinants of variations in local government allocations in Tanzania. The empirical analysis only finds weak evidence supporting the presumed pro‐poor allocation of some local government resources by the central government in Tanzania. Instead, the study finds more convincing support for substantial pro‐wealthy and pro‐urban tendencies in the way in which central government officials divide public resources across local government units. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Local Officials’ Support for PILOTs/SILOTs: Nonprofit Engagement,Economic Stress,and Politics

Nonprofit property tax exemption has become a major policy issue as the collapse of the housing market, the Great Recession, and property tax caps have threatened local tax collections. Consequently, many local governments have sought to obtain payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) from charities that are formally exempt from property taxes. Using a 2010 survey of local government officials in Indiana, this article examines whether support for PILOT policies is related to officials’ personal involvement with nonprofits, their views on government–nonprofit relationships, the type of position they hold, the level of economic distress in the county, local political conditions, and local nonprofit wealth. The findings support most of these hypotheses but also show that attitudes toward PILOTs appear to be shaped by somewhat different concerns than attitudes toward services in lieu of taxes (SILOTs).     

Equity in Federal Contracting: Examining the Link between Minority Representation and Federal Procurement Decisions

The federal government increasingly relies on nongovernmental organizations for procuring goods and services. This long‐term trend presents a significant challenge for administrators because it risks the egalitarian values of democracy by further distancing administrative action from direct, participative, democratic oversight. The authors put forward a theory of representative bureaucracy as a way to reconcile democracy with the reality of the contemporary policy process in which unelected officials are the principal decision makers. The theory is tested in the domain of federal procurement, specifically within the contract award decisions of 60 federal agencies over three years. The authors argue that increased minority representation in leadership positions results in an increased proportion of federal contracts awarded to small minority‐owned firms.     

Rural development management in Nepal,Part II: Implementation in the Karnali—Bheri Integrated Rural Development Programme

This paper looks at the implementation of rural development management in Nepal, especially how the implementation of the Karnali—Bheri Integrated Rural Development Programme is managed. The empirical data are provided by the officials themselves, and touch on organizational competence and responsibilities, the role of district line agencies. management mechanisms, inter-organizational cooperation, local leadership and local support of organizations and people. It is concluded that several reorganizations of power relationships, resource allocation and administrative mandates are needed to improve the feasibility of effectively managed implementation in the Karnali—Bheri programme. In a wider context, rural development management in Nepal will only be possible if the development administration reforms itself for greater management and implementation potential.     

States, Counties, and the Questions of Trust and Capacity

This study indicates that there is a high level of confidenceamong county representatives that state officials will be responsiveto local needs, but less confidence in state willingness toprovide fiscal support for programs. The preference for continuedfederal funding of programs is strongly evident. County representativesfeel that their policymaking and administrative responsibilitiesare increasing but that their fiscal (taxing and borrowing)capacities are not being expanded as quickly. The highest levelsof trust in state officials were found among those county representativeswho perceived the greatest increases in local government capacitiesto respond to local problems.     

Homogeneous National Management Policies or Autonomous Choices by Administrative Units? Inter- and Intra-Country Management Tools Use Variations in European Central Government Administrations

ABSTRACT

This article presents an original research on the use of management tools in central government departments and agencies in 16 European countries. It is based on a survey conducted among senior managers (n?=?5,998). The analysis shows that the use of management tools results from a combination of top-down implementation of a list of management tools at the national level, combined with a bottom-up independent selection of tools by administrative units. The variation in management tool use depends on the type of tool. While the uses of a HRM tool, such as performance-related pay, or a financial tool, such as risk management, are heavily influenced by national public management policies, service quality-type tools, such as user surveys or quality management systems, tend to be chosen in a more autonomous manner by different administrative units, especially agencies.     

Conflict and Collaboration in Wildfire Management: The Role of Mission Alignment

Responding to large wildfires requires actors from multiple jurisdictions and multiple levels of government to work collaboratively. The missions and objectives of federal agencies often differ from those of state land management agencies as well as local wildfire response agencies regarding land use and wildfire management. As wildfire size and intensity increase over time and associated annual suppression costs range between $2 billion and $3 billion, learning more about the existence and management of perceived agency differences becomes imperative within the academic and practitioner communities. This article examines the extent to which perceived mission misalignment exists among federal, state, and local actors and how well those differences are managed. Findings provide quantitative evidence that mission misalignment is greater within intergovernmental relationships than within intragovernmental relationships. Additionally, findings speak to the larger conversation around intergovernmental relationships within the federal structure and perceptions of the presence and management of potential interagency conflict.

Practitioner Points

• Potential conflict between the missions of federal and state land agencies presents a challenge for disaster management, and differing governmental levels and land‐use mandates may highlight relationships where tensions are likely greater.
• Wildfire managers may need to more proactively address relationships among federal agencies and state and local partners rather than relationships among multiple federal agencies.
• Wildfire management may benefit from increased awareness of—and discussion around—partner agencies’ stated land management philosophies and legal mandates, as structural frameworks, such as the Incident Command Structure, may not alone lead to conflict‐free collaboration.

     

Questioning Kaufman: How Cross‐Level Political Coalitions Interact with Organizational Structure

Herbert Kaufman's The Forest Ranger is considered a landmark study of how organizations can be structured to elicit compliance from field officials, yet there have been few attempts to validate Kaufman's claims. The author argues that the outcomes observed by Kaufman resulted from interplay between organizational structure and political context—a variable that Kaufman ignored. This argument is supported by case studies of two agencies with structures similar to Kaufman's U.S. Forest Service but poorer outcomes: the same agency today and India's forest departments. Both differences in organizational structure and poorer outcomes are found to be the result of political context. Specifically, coalitions assembled around agencies use the implementation process to shape outcomes in ways that could not be accomplished solely through changing laws or formal administrative structure. This points to the importance of building supportive field‐level coalitions to complement administrative reforms.     

Competition among officials and the abuse of power

Traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption. However, empirical evidence does not yet support this view. In this paper, I show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself. While competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government, corruption at the higher level of government is increased. To avoid widespread theft from the central authority, competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist. Hence, even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus, it may reduce welfare.     

Learning how to be efficient property owners and accountable governments: the case of Kyrgyzstan's cities

As a result of government decentralization and property devolution from central to local governments, many city governments in transition countries became the largest real property owners in urban areas. For transitional countries lacking sufficient democratic traditions, efficient asset management represents a dramatic and multifaceted challenge. Kyrgyzstan happened to be among the first transitional countries where cities obtained systematic technical assistance in adapting the most advanced methodology of municipal asset management, which was recently developed under the auspices of the World Bank. Based on experience of work within five pilot cities, the article summarizes factors and methods that help develop a sense of strong ownership and internalization of new asset management vision and approaches among local officials and elected members of city councils. The article presents the experience of how the government of Uzgen, a city of about 40,000 people in South Kyrgyzstan, has changed its attitudes and approach regarding management of municipal property. The article demonstrates how two key processes—improving professional aspects of municipal asset management and developing local democracy though public involvement—have been reinforced by each other. One of the main lessons from Uzgen's experience is that municipal property asset management—because it deals with tangible issues—is a perfect focal point for developing local democracy and communication between a local population and its government. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The American West’s longest large mammal migration: clarifying and securing the common interest

Over the last 10 years, conflict has grown over a 170-mile pronghorn antelope (Antilocapra americana) migration between Grand Teton National Park and the Upper Green River Basin in western Wyoming. Resolving conflict in the common interest is proving difficult. This movement is the longest mammal migration in the lower 48 states, spanning the jurisdiction of three federal agencies, three Wyoming counties, and over 40 private landowners. In addition, there are over ten non-governmental conservation organizations, two major state agencies, Wyoming’s executive office, and many citizens involved in the issue. There are three major problem definitions serving the beliefs of participants: the ecological-scientific (conservation biologists, environmentalists), local rights (local control, property rights), and cultural value (historic, western heritage) definitions. These definitions challenge the social and decision making processes of regional communities and government agencies. Underlying the problem of securing the common interest is the highly fragmented patterns of authority and control, misorganized arena(s), and parochial perspectives of many participants. Options promoted by participants can be loosely classified as top-down (government, expert driven) versus bottom-up (local, practice-based) approaches and reflect preferences for the distribution and uses of power and other values. Given the social and decision making context of this case, the bottom-up, practiced-based approach would likely best secure a common interest outcome.     

Reorganization for local administration in Zambia: An analysis of the local administration act, 1980

Analysing the Zambian administrative reforms of 1968 (Chikulo, 1981) we noted the increasing centralism, moves to strengthen party control over government administration and the closer control over local party officials by party appointees from the centre. These trends have been reinforced by the introduction of the Local Administration Act 1980 which came into force on 1 January 1981. The objective of the 1980 Act was to restructure the pattern of local administration in Zambia into an integrated system of administration. As a result, a single politico-administrative structure has been created in each district to which has been assigned the totality of government and party activity. As a consequence, the structure of local administration will not only bring the decision-making process to the district level, but also ensure close party control over the mechanism of field administration.     

Imitating the West? Evidence on Administrative Reform from the Upper Echelons of Chinese Provincial Government

This article explores the attitudes of officials in the upper echelons in Chinese provincial and local government toward the origins of administrative reform. The authors examine the somewhat dichotomous argument that reform imitates the West or is indigenous and contend that both influences are present. Data drawn from a survey of party cadres and government officials show that cultural factors (time in government, overall knowledge of administrative reforms, together with familiarity with the move from a planned system of government to a market economy) and structural variables (upper echelon and familiarity with business management techniques) are correlated with learning from the West. Cadres and officials who spend more time managing outward and those who are familiar with performance assessment do not learn from the West. The theoretical and research implications of these findings—that learning from the West is an important influence on the adoption of administrative reforms in China—are discussed.     

What Do Bureaucrats Like Doing? Bureaucratic Preferences in Response to Institutional Reform

How do bureaucrats respond to administrative reform in relation to their overall administrative goals? The authors test the bureau‐shaping thesis, which holds that bureaucrats’ preferences for certain kinds of roles and tasks motivate their support for bureau reform. Drawing on attitudinal and behavioral data from a survey of English local government officials, the findings underscore how bureaucrats with different interests and motivations sort themselves into job types. Their preferences drive support for reform, which, in turn, strengthens the executive structure of English local government. Drawing on the literature on bureaucratic responses to institutional reform, the authors offer a more nuanced portrayal of bureaucratic preferences in line with the bureau‐shaping model. A key conclusion: political principals need improved empirical awareness of bureaucratic preferences when undertaking public institutional reforms.     

Fifteen Years After Decentralization by Devolution: Political‐administrative Relations in Tanzanian Local Government

One of the professed goals of the 1998 Tanzanian Local Government Reform Program, entailing substantial decentralization, was to provide for a democratic administrative set up in local government. Elected local councils were invested with responsibilities for a wide range of policy sectors and services; the local administrative staff, formerly recruited and instructed by central government, would be appointed by and accountable to the local councils. A well‐functioning local politico‐administrative system was considered paramount to improve service delivery and ensure control of decision making by the local community. This article reports on research into the relations between councilors and administrators in two Tanzanian municipalities. Overall, these relations were found to be tense and full of discordance, caused by clashing role perceptions and mutual distrust. The research suggests that the main factor underlying the behavior and attitudes of councilors and administrators is the very system of public administration, which — despite the ambitions expressed in the Local Government Reform Program — remains very centralistic in character. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.