Saving the league: V.K. Wellington Koo,the league of nations and Sino‐Japanese conflict, 1931–39

In 1919, VK. Wellington Koo, the most famous Chinese diplomat of the early twentieth century, participated in the creation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference. Little over a decade later, as Japanese forces expanded into Manchuria and North China, Koo struggled to save the League he had helped found. He argued that inability or refusal to brand Japan as an aggressor would sound the League's death knell. In vain, Koo tried to convince European statesmen that the Far Eastern Crisis was a litmus test of the League's viability as a collective security organization. From 1936 on, League inaction in the face of Japanese, German and Italian expansion left Koo thoroughly disillusioned. The lessons of the League were not forgotten during World War II, when Koo argued that a more effective collective security organization, in the form of the United Nations, be created on a basis similar to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept.     

'Real securities against new wars': Official British thinking and the origins of the league of nations, 1914-19

The historiography of the origins of the League of Nations has usually placed collective security at the centre of the debate during the First World War. This is anachronistic and misleading. The British government considered a guarantee of peace to be essential for any league. This was not contentious. The new proposals of 1917-18, associated especially with Philip Kerr and The Round Table, were intended not as alternatives to a guarantee, but as establishing the preconditions for it to become effective. Only after December 1918 did some persons of influence begin to argue against commitment to a guarantee system. The historiography should now move on to consider the economic questions which were more contentious at the time.     

Brazil and the league council crisis of 1926

In 1926, the League of Nations faced a serious crisis over the proposed entry of Germany. On this decision appeared to depend the success of the Locarno treaties and the future peace of Europe. To everyone's surprise German entry was blocked, not by a vengeful European power, but by Brazil. Although it was assumed that Brazil was being manipulated, in fact it had been following its own agenda at Geneva for years, and its veto was more of an unfortunate coincidence than deliberate malice. This article unravels the crisis, and looks more deeply at the failure of statesmen to make the League a truly international organization.     

“No More War?” Belgian Reception of the League of Nations and Arbitration After the First World War

After the horrors of the First World War, different initiatives were taken to introduce and institutionalise principles of international organisation such as collective security and arbitration in international relations. The League of Nations was founded, and different bilateral and multilateral arbitration treaties were concluded. This article studies the reception of these internationalist principles by Belgian policymakers and diplomats. I will argue that this reception initially ranged from cautiousness to clear scepticism. Although an evolution towards increased trust in collective security and arbitration can be observed between 1919 and 1929, Belgian policymakers' and diplomats' views during this period remained predominantly based on realist premises and beliefs.     

Austen Chamberlain and the continental balance of power: strategy, stability, and the league of nations, 1924-29

As foreign secretary from November 1924 to June 1929, Austen Chamberlain dominated British foreign policy. Central to his diplomatic strategy was the maintenance of the European balance of power and, in this circumstance, pursuit of a leadership role for Britain within the League of Nations. The foundation upon which Chamberlain based his European strategy lay with his determination to have Britain play the vital role of stabilizing relations between France and Germany, whose mutual antipathy after the Great War, compounded by the severity of the Treaty of Versailles, threatened continental security. By October 1925, his work bore fruit with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements. For the remainder of his tenure at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain used Locarno - and Germany's membership in the League that was part of that settlement - as the diplomatic mechanism to underwrite his strategic conception of the balance of power. This article addresses the neglected issue of the strategic base of Chamberlain's European policy and addresses three criticisms of his record as foreign secretary.     

“No More War?” Belgian Reception of the League of Nations and Arbitration After the First World War

After the horrors of the First World War, different initiatives were taken to introduce and institutionalise principles of international organisation such as collective security and arbitration in international relations. The League of Nations was founded, and different bilateral and multilateral arbitration treaties were concluded. This article studies the reception of these internationalist principles by Belgian policymakers and diplomats. I will argue that this reception initially ranged from cautiousness to clear scepticism. Although an evolution towards increased trust in collective security and arbitration can be observed between 1919 and 1929, Belgian policymakers' and diplomats' views during this period remained predominantly based on realist premises and beliefs.     

“The Worst of all Worlds:” Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–1936

Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 caused a crisis for the League of Nations. League members imposed limited sanctions against Italy and debated at length the imposition of an embargo on oil shipments to Italy, which came to stand as a symbol of the League's determination to punish the Italian aggressor. The British government conducted a detailed investigation to determine whether or not an oil sanction could compel Italy to abandon its invasion. Although Italy imported the vast majority of its oil, British and League experts concluded that an oil embargo would not succeed. Even if the League instituted a comprehensive embargo amongst its members, Italy could still have secured sufficient supplies from non-members, particularly the United States, which could not legally prevent American companies from trading with Italy. Italy could also have secured additional supplies through third-party transshipments. An additional ban preventing Italy from using League tankers to carry its purchases would not have succeeded either, although the various sanctions together would have increased Italy's costs to import oil and the amount of pressure on its gold reserves. In spite of the technical difficulties involved in implementing an embargo, the British Cabinet continued to support the idea for domestic political reasons; it needed to placate the British public that considered it vitally important to put into practice the League's collective security rhetoric. The League's unwillingness to impose an oil sanction and its evident failure to prevent Italy's conquest of Abyssinia discredited the League and its collective security provisions.     

Saving NATO: Renunciation of the Article 5 Guarantee

The purpose of this article is to offer a radical proposal: NATO should unleash its potential as the world's premier cooperative and collective security organization by stepping down from being a European collective defense alliance. In other words, I argue that without renouncing territorial security guarantees in Europe, NATO will sacrifice its effectiveness in the new security environment.     

Realism, Rationalism, Race: On the Early International Relations Discipline in Australia

The received view of the development of the international relations discipline in Australia discounts its early history, maintaining that it only came into existence in the 1960s. It was then confined, according to this account, within a realist-rationalist discourse. This article shows that if realism-rationalism is the identifying feature of the discipline in Australia, then many exemplars can be found in the earlier period from the 1920s to the Pacific War. Problems regarding empire, obligations towards the League of Nations, and Australia's position in the Pacific region were major concerns. Arguments in support of the League, or for an emerging Pacific order, were often couched in rationalist terms; with the increasing international uncertainty of the 1930s, realist arguments became more prominent. There are also some examples of revolutionist theory. However, a major preoccupation across the spectrum of international thinkers was the issue of race and the exclusionary White Australia immigration policy. It is argued that this theme cannot be readily assimilated to realism-rationalism.     

Reading “Threats to International Peace and Security,” 1946-2005

In the United Nations Charter the notion of the “threat to international peace and security” is designed to play a key enabling role in framing its collective security functions. Taking a 60-year period from the UN's founding, this article examines how the UN Security Council has developed the notion of the “threat to international peace and security” through its resolutions, and what this evolution might mean for the notion of collective security and the Council's role in it.     

Naturalist Law and Japan's Legitimization of Empire in Manchuria: Thomas Baty and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Thomas Baty (1869–1954), a prolific, British international law scholar, achieved prominence in diplomatic affairs by serving as Japan's Foreign Legal Adviser in the years spanning two world wars. Baty's advice to the Japanese government was rooted in the non-mainstream natural law philosophy of international legal theory. Baty's law became the defence of the Japanese government before the League of Nations with Japan's occupation of Manchuria in the early 1930s. Baty contended that China's objections to Japanese actions had no basis in the natural fabric of the nation-state system since China was a non-state.     

拉美国家现代化与美洲国际秩序民主化——对美拉关系发展中三大标志性“峰会”的考察及思考

由美国主导的、已有120年历史的泛美联盟组织,由于其内存逻辑的矛盾而造成的美洲国际秩序民主化功能的缺失,未能为拉美国家现代化创造良好的外部条件,导致泛美联盟危机屡屡出现。2010年2月,墨西哥坎昆团结峰会决定组建无美的拉美和加勒比国家共同体,以推进拉美地区一体化,进而加速拉美国家现代化,这是一种明智的战略性选择。本文从拉美历史嬗变的视角,阐明经济全球化背景下的国家现代化不完全是单纯的国家工程,它需要有良好的国际环境和条件,要求与改革旧的游戏规则、推进国际秩序民主化相衔接。尽管这一过程可能十分复杂、曲折,但这一历史趋势不可避免,其前景是看好的。     

乌兹别克斯坦再次退出集体安全条约组织的原因及影响

2012年12月19日,集体安全条约组织批准了乌兹别克斯坦关于退出该组织的申请。这是乌2006年8月重返集安组织以来的再次退出。此举的深层次原因是乌对外政策目标与俄罗斯主导的欧亚空间一体化进程矛盾的积累。退出之后,乌将继续在美国和俄罗斯之间寻求一种更加谨慎的平衡关系。乌的退出,对集安组织的负面影响有限,将促使俄罗斯加强该组织内部一体化。     

Collective Security and Human Rights: How the United Nations' Institutional Design Corrupted Complementary Purposes

That human rights should be viewed as a complementary aim to the international pursuit of collective security was an intention of the drafters of the Charter and the subsequent Universal Declaration and they were correct to stress that functional relationship which exists between the domestic observation of human rights and the achievement of lasting peace and security internationally. Yet, in spite of the United Nations' assertion of the complementary nature of the purposes of collective security and human rights, this essay argues that if we survey the inception of the United Nations Organisation then it will become clear that the organisation was from the onset institutionally impaired in regard to effective human rights proliferation and enforcement. Indeed, the organisation's particular approach to collective security was designed intentionally so as to render any hopes for the effective observation and enforcement of human rights nugatory.     

Naturalist Law and Japan's Legitimization of Empire in Manchuria: Thomas Baty and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Thomas Baty (1869-1954), a prolific, British international law scholar, achieved prominence in diplomatic affairs by serving as Japan's Foreign Legal Adviser in the years spanning two world wars. Baty's advice to the Japanese government was rooted in the non-mainstream natural law philosophy of international legal theory. Baty's law became the defence of the Japanese government before the League of Nations with Japan's occupation of Manchuria in the early 1930s. Baty contended that China's objections to Japanese actions had no basis in the natural fabric of the nation-state system since China was a non-state.     

日本退出国际联盟的“法理”思辨

1933年日本退出国际联盟,原因概在于西方列强于伪满洲国的承认问题上投了反对票。日本的这一举动,无疑是对国际组织的强有力冲击。简言之,在日本侵略野心急剧膨胀的时段,国际联盟约束力的缺失与公法强制力的丧失,使得日本巧妙利用公法为一己之私服务,给今天的学界留下了耐人寻味的思考。     

论预防性自卫与反国际恐怖主义

《联合国宪章》生效以前传统的国际习惯法理论承认在符合严格限制条件的前提下的预防性自卫。但是,《联合国宪章》生效后,对于《联合国宪章》第五十一条是否绝对地禁止预防性自卫,国际社会尚未达成一致。国际恐怖主义组织发动的恐怖袭击,如果达到可以被视为针对受害国的"武力攻击"的程度,则受害国可以行使自卫的权利。但是,如果受害国决定对国际恐怖组织的支持国实施预防性的武力自卫,则必须纳入到安理会的运作机制之下。     

“A Genuine and Energetic League of Nations Policy”: Lord Curzon and the New Diplomacy, 1918–1925

At the end of April 1922, S.P. Waterlow of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, which dealt with Franco–German relations and European security, put up a memorandum. This claimed: “Except on paper and as an expedient for minor purposes or an escape for some dilemma, we have not taken the League [of Nations] seriously.” It contrasted London's indifference with the active use which Paris was making of the League, asserted that “the objects of British policy and those of the League are broadly speaking identical,” and urged: “let us institute a genuine and energetic League of Nations policy.” This recommendation was strongly endorsed by the Assistant Under-Secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, who believed that such a policy would secure almost universal popular support for co-operation with France, and he proposed making a joint declaration that for the purpose of maintaining the frontiers created by the Treaty of Versailles: “the two countries would place at the disposal of the League all their resources for the enforcement of its decisions.” ¹ 1. Waterlow memorandum, 28 April, Tyrrell minute, 29 April 1922, both FO 371/7567/6200/6200/18 [Foreign Office Archives, The National Archives, Kew, England}.      

Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia

International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behavior of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have given added impetus to the Eurasian inter-state cooperation in confronting non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors. Bearing in mind the theory of collective security, this article analyzes threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations at achieving stated objectives depends upon their capacity to adopt new criteria of effectiveness.     

Sir Eric Phipps,the British Government,and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933–1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.