Backloading to extinction: Coping with values conflict in the administration of Australia's federal biodiversity offset policy

Policy-makers are frequently required to consider and manage conflicting public values. An example of this in the environmental domain is biodiversity offset policy, which governments worldwide have adopted as a mechanism to balance environmental protection with socio-economic development. However, little work has examined administrative practices underpinning biodiversity offset policy implementation, and how the adoption of coping strategies to manage value conflicts may influence resulting policy outcomes. This study fills this research gap using a case study of Australia's federal biodiversity offset policy under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act 1999. Using data from 13 interviews of federal policy administrators, I show that the introduction of a new policy in 2012 enabled a shift from the use of precedent to a technical approach for setting offset requirements under the EPBC Act. Yet, multiple sources of policy ambiguity remain, and administrators have adopted post-approval condition-setting, or ‘backloading’—a form of cycling, facilitated by structural separation—to defer detailed assessments of offset requirements until after biodiversity losses are approved. Backloading thus undermines the effectiveness of environmental policy and will persist as coping strategy unless policy ambiguity is reduced via legislative amendments and adequate resourcing of biodiversity conservation.

Points for practitioners

• Biodiversity offset policy requires administrators to manage conflicting environmental and socioeconomic values.
• Technical decision tools reduce reliance on case-by-case decision-making, but multiple ambiguities persist.
• Backloading (post-approval condition-setting) defers values conflict, but reduces transparency, accountability, and policy effectiveness.
• Policy ambiguity must be reduced at the political level to facilitate effective biodiversity conservation.

     

The five capabilities of socially responsible companies

This paper develops and tests a model that integrates processes of public affairs management with stakeholder engagement and dialogue, business ethics and social reporting to explain social responsibility capabilities in organisations. The model, called Corporate Social Responsibility Management Capacity, describes social responsiveness as arising from a firm's social responsibility orientation and its public relations orientation. The paper shows how the model can be used by managers to measure, manage and improve their company's ability to be socially responsible. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Serving many masters: Public accountability in private policy implementation

In recent decades, the introduction of market principles has transformed public service delivery into a hybrid. However, little is known about how these changes are reflected in the attitudes of private implementing agents: The hybridization literature neglects individuals, and street‐level bureaucracy research has disregarded hybridization. This article extends Hupe and Hill's ( 2007 ) accountability regimes framework to introduce the market as an additional accountability regime alongside state, profession, and society. Using a configurational approach, the article explores how public and private food safety inspectors in Switzerland perceive the multiple norms for behavior stemming from their environment. Results suggest that the plural accountabilities of for‐profit street‐level bureaucrats can increase the dilemmas involved in their work. Under certain circumstances, for‐profit street‐level bureaucrats have particular difficulties reconciling rule pressure with market incentives and client demands. The extended accountability regimes framework fruitfully captures such dilemmas and helps identify suitable governance responses.     

Accountability issues of the resolution trust corporation

Abstract

No other governmental organization ever created can rival the complex patterns of accountability created to manage the bailout of the savings and loan industry. This complexity has, in turn, led to criticism that the bailout structure is too unwieldy to be managerially effective or politically accountable. While the structure does indeed immensely complicate these problems, it is an inevitable product of the political realities that shaped the bailout strategy. The real issues in maintaining accountability to the public for the bailout are: reporting clearly on how the money is being used; improving Congress's ability to track the complex management of the bailout; and using government officials, not contractors, to supervise the government's goals. Indeed, the biggest potential problem of accountability in the savings and loan rescue is not the convoluted political structure at the top but the heavy reliance on private contractors at the bottom.     

Why Be Accountable? Exploring Voluntary Accountability of Australian Private Ancillary Funds

The aim of this paper is to consider why Private Ancillary Funds (PAFs), endowed philanthropic foundations with no public reporting requirements, engage in accountability in its various forms. This exploratory, qualitative study reports on perspectives on accountability from 10 semi‐structured interviews with PAF managers and/or trustees from three Australian states. Through the lens of March and Olsen's (2011) logics of action and Karsten's (2015) typology of motivational forms for voluntary accountability, findings show that although logics of appropriateness and consequentiality explain many reasons why PAFs engage in voluntary accountability, some reasons do not fit comfortably within either logic. The findings challenge conceptions embedded in much non‐profit accountability literature that motivations for and purposes of accountability are linked with sustainability and survival. By examining this subset of non‐profit organisations subject to limited regulatory accountability, a clearer understanding of motivations for voluntary accountability is achieved.     

FIGHTING CORRUPTION WITH SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS' POTENTIAL TO REDUCE CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Given the poor track record of traditional anti‐corruption initiatives, donors and governments are increasingly looking at how civil society can fight corruption in public administration. Social accountability mechanisms intend to perform this role by holding officials directly accountable through citizen engagement. However, this article argues that social accountability mechanisms are only capable of reducing corruption systemically if they activate horizontal accountability and sustain it through the sanctioning mechanisms of electoral accountability. A comparative case study analysis using the cases of the Ugandan Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and the Bangalore Citizen Report Card is applied to test this hypothesis. The Tanzanian Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and an example of citizen engagement in Mumbai are employed as shadow cases to provide additional evidence for the hypothesis. The results indicate that social accountability mechanisms must be inclusive, broad, with public effect and embedded in other accountability relationships to fight corruption effectively. Electoral accountability is key, and support to social accountability mechanisms should therefore always be well placed within a broader agenda aimed at strengthening democratic governance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Gauging the Effects of Social Accountability on Services,Governance, and Citizen Empowerment

Engaging citizens in holding public officials and service providers accountable, referred to as social accountability, is a popular remedy for public sector performance weaknesses, figuring prominently in many international donor‐funded projects and leading to widespread replication. However, the contextual factors that influence the successful transfer of social accountability are debated. Demand‐side factors (civil society and citizens) are overemphasized in much of the literature. Yet supply‐side factors (state structures and processes) and the nature of state–society relations are also important. This article examines four projects in developing countries to explore how these contextual factors influenced social accountability aims and outcomes. The salience of supply factors in enabling social accountability for service delivery and government performance stands out, particularly the degree of decentralization and the availability of space for citizen engagement. The capacity and motivation of citizens to occupy the available space, aggregate and voice their concerns, and participate with state actors in assessing service delivery performance and problems are critical.     

Why do “teeth” need “voice”? The case of anti‐corruption agencies in three Australian states

Interactions between horizontal accountability agencies (e.g., anti‐corruption agencies [ACAs]) and social accountability actors (e.g., journalists, civil society activists, and complainants/whistleblowers) are recognized as important to horizontal agencies’ performance, but the reason(s) is not clear. This study therefore explores why horizontal accountability agencies need social accountability actors in performing their functions. The study analyses data from 30 key stakeholders in Australia, including ACAs staff members, social accountability actors, and other observers to report on the specific support roles social actors play to ACAs’ activities and operations. Through the conceptual lens of social accountability, evidence show that social actors play four key types of support roles to ACAs’ activities and operations: activate ACAs’ investigations; “amplify” ACAs’ operations; guard ACAs’ activities and operations; and defend ACAs’ independence and powers. These findings support the need for interactions and, also, affirm the potential for research into how these support roles can better be provided for effective anti‐corruption outcomes. The research is of value to public accountability agencies in Australia, and internationally.     

Public accountability: Effectiveness, equity, ethics

This article tests a wide range of government activities against requirements for public accountability. The article explores the incentives for ethical behaviour by public officials; the need for more outcome focused performance indicators, tensions between parliamentary and managerial accountability; the standards of accountability applied to public providers of services can be applied to private providers; the utility of spelling out service requirements in advance; the impacts on accountability of the convergence of the public and private sectors; the need, where responsibility for programs is collaborative, for a clear governance framework, tensions between representative and participative democracy, and trends towards more participative and collaborative leadership.     

Governance in Central Government: Reconciling Accountability and Capability

Governance structures in central government departments are poorly articulated. Departmental boards were imported from the private sector; in central government their remit and accountability are obscure, as is their role in relation to Permanent Secretaries and Ministers—whose leadership roles are also muddled. This brings costs for Ministers, departments and the public. Improvements have proved elusive, in part because an underlying confusion has been neglected—about how bodies subject to the almost unlimited democratic accountability of Ministers are to be governed. The confusion can be cleared up, principles of governance formulated, and concrete improvements proposed. These include: better articulation of Permanent Secretaries' presumptive leadership role; strengthened lines of external accountability; and more coherent provisions for the role and accountabilities of boards, and their relationship with Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, and the centre of government. Such changes should improve accountability, leadership, capability and delivery.     

WHAT SHAPES CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF THEIR PUBLIC OFFICIALS' ACCOUNTABILITY? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL ETHIOPIA

In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens' views of the local accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local accountability reflect not only citizens' poltical attitudes and beliefs but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large‐N citizen survey (N = 10 651) with contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens' evaluations of local public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to information on political decision making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens' stakes in local planning processes, it positively affects citizens' evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen–government relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of accountability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Measuring Accountability for Results in Interagency Collaboratives

This article examines the intersection of two types of innovations that are increasingly common in public administration—accountability for results and interagency collaboration. Recent scholarship suggests four approaches that collaborators can use to increase their accountability for results. The article proposes measures of these four approaches to assess a collaborative's capacity for accountability, and uses them to compare the accountability of human services collaboratives in 10 states. The findings indicate that collaboratives tend to use the four approaches together with one another. In combination, the various approaches may help collaborators manage their stake holders' expectations about their actions and accomplishments. Further research is needed to determine whether a collaborative's capacity for accountability for results actually correlates with improvements in outcomes.     

Complex Contracting: Management Challenges and Solutions

Governments at all levels buy mission‐critical goods and services whose attributes and performance requirements are hard to define and produce. Many governments—and the public managers who lead them—lack experience and knowledge about how to contract for complex products. The contract management counsel provided to public managers is thin. Missing is a conceptual managerial framework to guide purchasing the complex products that are often so critical to public organizations' core missions. Drawing on perspectives from across the social sciences, the framework presented in this article provides guidance on how managers can harness the upsides of complex contracting while avoiding its pitfalls. The framework helps identify conditions that increase the likelihood of positive outcomes for the purchasing government and the vendor—the win‐win. To illustrate the framework, the article provides examples of successful and failed acquisitions for complex products such as transportation projects, social service systems, and information technology systems.     

Comparing Accountability in the Public and Private Sectors

Analysis of public accountability tends to concentrate on public sector institutions. However, increasing use of the private sector in the provision of public services suggests the need to compare accountability in the two sectors. While private sector (for-profit) companies are more accountable in terms of their 'bottom line', accountability requirements in the public sector are generally more stringent, particularly with regard to process and general policy.     

Technocracy,the market and the governance of England's National Health Service

England's National Health Service, the fifth largest employer in the world, has become heavily influenced by expert authority and the market economy, which has had implications for accountability and the receptiveness of health decisions to stakeholder needs. One response has been the introduction of a range of regulatory provisions designed to facilitate effective governance and stakeholder engagement. These provisions are scrutinized using three conceptual devices: core accountability, social reporting and social learning. These devices have significant implications, as they enable technical experts to form closed communities, communicate among themselves mainly about economic and financial matters, and make decisions that aid the market without meaningful recourse to citizens. While technical experts are necessary to help manage complex areas, current arrangements reinforce an existing gap between economic and democratic values through hardened technocratic approaches to health care governance.     

Decentralization in Kerala: Panchayat government discretion and accountability

Kerala is regarded as one of the most decentralized states in India. Through a ‘big bang’ approach, Kerala implemented a significant fiscal decentralization program and then built the capacity of its local governments. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyze its local government discretion and accountability in political, administrative and fiscal domains. We find that Kerala's local governments have a very high degree of discretionary power accompanied by a high degree of accountability towards citizens. But the areas of administrative accountability and financial management need to be strengthened. Also there may have been excessive focus and investment on social accountability mechanisms at the cost of local government discretion and formal public sector accountability mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation

Accountability is said to be about the management of expectations. Empirical studies reveal considerable variation in organizational interest, intensity, and investment in accountability relationships. Less is known, however, about what explains these observed variations. Drawing on accountability and reputation‐concerned literatures, this article argues that a reputation‐based perspective on accountability offers an underlying logic that explains how account‐giving actors and account‐holding forums actually manage these expectations and how organizations make sense of and prioritize among accountability responsibilities. Reputational considerations act as a filtering mechanism of external demands and help account for variations in degrees of interest in, and intensity of, accountability. The resulting accountability outcomes are coproduced by the reputational investment of both account‐giver and account‐holder, resulting in distinct accountability constellations and outcomes.     

Impact of compulsory competitive tendering on the structure and performance of local government systems in the State of Victoria*

Around the world, the public sector is introducing private sector management practices. Abandoning the binary model of public and private sectors the State Government of Victoria introduced the compulsory competitive tendering system under which local government bodies are required to tender out their services to private sector service providers. The aim was to encourage local government bodies to operate in contestable situations so that they can increase efficiency, decrease operating costs, develop clear programme goals and objectives, become responsive to client goals, and improve the quality of goods and services. The article describes how the practice of the compulsory competitive tendering system has introduced major changes to organizational cultures, attitudes of employees, power and authority structures, sytems of decision making, delegation of financial and managerial authority, and the nature of control and accountability. In addition, the article explains the degree of competitiveness and efficiency that local government bodies have achieved and describes how the corporatized structure has helped to achieve the financial objectives. The article also discusses how the role of the elected councils is diminishing under this new management structure and argues that in the absence of a genuine monitoring system and accountability mechanism the local government bodies find it difficult to assert their role as quality service deliverers. This has forced the councils to comply with the requirements of the competition laws which have reduced direct accountability of government to the public. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The consolidation of adjustment: Implications for public administration

The governments of most developing countries have been subject to pressures, especially through structural adjustment programmes, to reduce the direct role of the state in the supply of services. New forms of service supply are emerging, in which government has only an indirect role as enabler and regulator of other actors; but there has been little practical guidance on how these ‘new’ roles are to be performed in the specific context of developing countries. The danger is then of the adoption of inappropriate practices from more advanced countries. The argument of this article is that governments face several difficulties in managing the ‘post-adjusted state’: the inheritance of social and political strains, and of reforms made abruptly under pressure; the complexity of identifying the appropriate role of the state for particular services under particular circumstances; the technical difficulty of managing new administrative roles; and the contradiction, particularly in respect of systems of accountability, between the new and the old requirements on public administration.     

Principles for Public Management Practice: From Dichotomies to Interdependence

In this essay we explore the relationship between management practices and a basic governance dilemma: how to manage flexibly and accountably. The challenge is both practical and theoretical. Managers must respond flexibly to the changing demands and expectations of the public and the ever-changing nature of public problems, yet they must do so in a manner that provides accountability to the public and political overseers. A dichotomous approach to the study of leadership as management action and the governance structures within which managers operate has inhibited the search for a public management theory that reconciles the dilemma. Emphasis upon managers as leaders typically focuses on the flexible actions managers might take to overcome structural "barriers," while emphasis upon governance structures typically focuses on the essential role of structure in ensuring accountability and restraining or motivating particular management efforts. The practicing manager, however, cannot deal with these aspects of the work separately. Managers must attend to demands for both flexible leadership action and structures that promise accountability. Anecdotal evidence provides illustrations of some of the ways that managers can integrate these demands. We suggest that these efforts point to an alternative theoretical framework that understands action and structure as mutually constitutive, creating a dynamic tension in which attention to one requires attention to the other.