Victim or injurer, small car or SUV: Tort liability rules under role-type uncertainty

In this paper we modify the standard tort model by introducing role-type uncertainty. That is, we assume that neither party knows in advance whether she will be the victim or the injurer when an accident occurs. When the standards of care of the two parties are set at the socially optimal levels, only pure comparative negligence and the equal division rule guarantee efficiency, while the rules of simple negligence, contributory negligence, and comparative negligence with fixed division (other than a 50:50 split) may produce inefficient equilibria. Since pure comparative negligence splits liability between negligent parties according to each party's degree of fault, it makes the accident loss division independent of one's role-type. This produces its efficiency advantage.We extend the model to the choice of vehicle size, as a factor determining who will be the injurer and who the victim in motor vehicle collisions. In the extension we analyze various standard negligence-based liability rules, and tax rules, as instruments to mitigate inefficiency resulting from the vehicle size “arms race.” We also examine two strict liability rules, one of which incorporates a comparative negligence feature; this rule prevents inefficiency from both role-type uncertainty and from the “arms race.”     

Scope of liability: the vanishing distinction between negligence and strict liability

The duty-of-care requirement cannot be used anymore as the touchstone to differentiate negligence from strict liability because it can be found in many forms of the latter. Duty of care is smuggled into strict liability hidden under the scope of liability requirement (traditionally called “proximate causation”). As far as the scope of liability requirement is common to negligence and to many forms of strict liability, there is a fairly large common ground to both liability rules, and consequently the marginal Hand formula is applied to both rules. Indeed, under a negligence rule, the marginal Hand formula is applied twice: first to assess whether or not the defendant did breach his or her duty of care, and, second, to delimit whether or not the defendant’s behavior was a proximate cause of the harm suffered by the victim. However, under a strict liability rule, the Hand formula is applied only once when the proximate causation question is raised. Traditional law and economics analysis has almost always taken the normative question raised by the causation requirement as given, which is a potential major problem due to the importance of scope of liability or proximate causation in legal practice. Defining the scope of liability, that is to say, the boundaries of the pool of potential defendants, is the basic legal policy decision for each and every liability rule. In the normative model presented in this paper, the government first chooses efficient scope of liability, and given the scope of liability, the government then decides the liability rule and damages that guarantee efficient precaution. In the article, most known scope of liability rationales developed by both common law and civil law systems are discussed in order to show the substantial common ground between negligence and strict liability.     

过失相抵与无过错责任简

过失相抵是损害赔偿法中的一项基本规则,适用于所有的损害赔偿之债。在适用无过错责任的侵权行为中,除非法律另有规定,可以适用过失相抵,这是法律之公平精神与自己责任原则的要求。在可以适用过失相抵规则的无过错责任中,对该规则的适用也应有一定的限制。首先,只有当受害人对损害的发生或扩大有重大过失时,才能适用过失相抵,减轻侵权人的赔偿责任。其次,如果受害人是不完全民事行为能力人,无论是受害人本人还是其监护人对于损害的发生或扩大有过错,对侵权人赔偿责任的减轻都不得低于全部损失的一定比例。     

The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence

This article questions, and in some contexts disproves, thevalidity of the efficiency justifications for the comparativenegligence rule. One argument in the literature suggests thatcomparative negligence is the superior rule in the presenceof court errors. The analysis here shows the analytical flawin this claim and conducts numerical simulations — a formof synthetic "empirical" tests — that prove the potentialsuperiority of other rules. The second argument in the literaturein favor of the comparative negligence rule is based on itsalleged superior ability to deal with private information. Thisarticle develops a general approach to liability rules as mechanismsthat induce self-selection among actors. It then shows thatself-selection can occur, not only under comparative negligence,but also under every other negligence rule. These conclusionsweaken the efficiency explanation for the growing appeal ofthe "division-of-liability" principle within tort law and beyond.     

The comparative law and economics of pure economic loss

Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal economic loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss. Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although not formally adopting the economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light of efficiency considerations. The comparative analysis reveals that the substantive applications of the economic loss rule in European jurisdictions are consistent with the predicates of economic analysis.     

论合同法中的可预见规则

可预见规则作为限制违约损害赔偿范围的最重要的标准之一 ,在世界各国民法或合同法中得到了普遍的承认。本文分析了可预见规则的法理基础 ,认为可预见规则的理论依据在于诚实信用原则。可预见规则与因果关系在功能、判断标准、所确定的赔偿范围、保护的重点等方面存在不同。判断是否可预见的因素主要是合同当事人的身份和合同的主要内容。作者主张我国合同法应将故意和重大过失的违约行为排除在可预见规则之外 ,以保护非违约方的利益和平衡双方当事人的利益     

论法律政策在侵权法因果关系判断中的作用——以英美侵权法之最近原因的分析为中心

法律政策在侵权法上因果关系判断中起到怎样的作用?在英美法系对因果关系考察的二分法下,最近原因考察与法律政策考量密切相关.最近原因的判断标准中渗透着政策考量的因素,具体而言,行政管理、价值层级、环境、责任保险等政策因素影响着最近原因的判断,尤其体现在与有过错、救助等特殊类型案件中.法律政策在因果关系判断中的作用,深层次上反映了对侵权法上因果关系本质的不同看法.     

重塑比例过失原则：《最高人民法院关于审理船舶碰撞纠纷案件若干问题的规定》评述

就《最高人民法院关于审理船舶碰撞纠纷案件若干问题的规定》所涉及的一些问题进行评述,包括船舶碰撞纠纷案件适用的准据法、比例过失原则、责任主体等,指出该规定重塑了比例过失原则,发展了中国船舶碰撞法,澄清了审判实践中的一些长期未决的问题。     

Factual causation in medical negligence

The conventional approach to causation in negligence is the "but for" test, decided on the balance of probabilities. Even when supplemented by the "material contribution" principle, satisfying the onus of proof of causation can be an insuperable obstacle for plaintiffs, particularly in medical cases. Yet, having found a breach of duty, a court's sympathies may gravitate toward the plaintiff at this point in the case. Accordingly, courts have sometimes accepted a relaxation of strict causation principles. The judicial devices are described: a special principle of causation in particular duties of care; a shifting burden of proof; "bridging the evidentiary gap" by drawing a robust inference of causation; treating a material increase in risk as sufficient proof of causation; and permitting causation to be established on the basis of the loss of a material chance of achieving a better outcome and discounting damages. In Accident Compensation Corp v Ambros [2007] NZCA 304 the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognised the need for a legal device to ameliorate the injustice sometimes caused by the strict rules of causation, and preferred the "inferential reasoning" approach favoured by the Canadian common law for use in the context of the accident compensation scheme. It is hoped that the New Zealand Supreme Court approves Ambros if the opportunity arises.     

论医疗过失损害赔偿责任的适当限制规则

医疗过失损害赔偿责任与一般的人身损害赔偿责任不同,具有一定的特殊性,因此,应当确立医疗损害赔偿适当限制规则。具体的限制方法,应当限制精神损害抚慰金的赔偿数额、应当对医疗过失引起的财产损害赔偿运用原因力规则合理确定、应当特别强调定期金赔偿在医疗过失损害赔偿中的适用和应当借鉴排除间接来源规则在医疗过失损害赔偿中实行损益相抵规则。     

Australian tort law reform: statutory principles of causation and the common law

By mid-2004, Parliaments in each Australian jurisdiction will either complete or will be in the process of partial codification of the law of torts. The reforms, including those to the law of negligence, are extensive. This article focuses on codification of the law of causation as an element of the cause of action in negligence. It examines the background to "tort reform", as the process has been labelled, and discusses the common law paradigm of negligence and various approaches to causation. It then analyses and compares the causation provisions in each jurisdiction.     

The Relationship of Alternative Negligence Rules to Litigation Behavior and Tort Claim Disposition

Recently most states have abandoned the traditional tort defense of contributory negligence and substituted a form of comparative negligence. Using an extensive data set of auto accident injury claims, we provide evidence on the relationship between negligence rules and claimants' litigation decisions to retain attorneys, file lawsuits and litigate versus settle out of court. Litigation choices appear to be rational responses to the varying incentives created by alternative tort standards. We find that in contrast to comparative negligence, claims arising under comparative negligence are associated with greater probabilities of attorney involvement, higher average award levels, and longer delays in securing payment. Only 37% of claims involving attorneys in contributory negligence states result in a lawsuit being filed compared to 49% and 47% under the pure and modified forms of comparative negligence, respectively. The study provides the first statistical evidence on the litigation costs of the new forms of comparative negligence.     

可预见性之判断标准的具体化——《合同法》第113条第1款但书之解释路径

可预见性规则在契约法中担当着法律上因果关系的角色,规则于解释论上的妥适展开,取决于价值基础的厘清及技术工具的合理选择.可预见规则背后具有复杂的价值构成,其中分量最重的两项是私的自治的尊重和给付均衡的维持.技术上可采理性人标准来判断损失是否可以预见,标准的具体化系在价值指引下结合个案情境确定理性人能力和知识状况,可预见程度在标准适用中可扮演着重要的角色.     

Comparative Vigilance

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juriesare inclined toward division of liability between two strictlynon-negligent or "vigilant" parties. In this paper, we explorethe economic efficiency of liability rules based on comparativevigilance. We devise rules that are efficient and that rewardvigilance. Commonly used liability rules have discontinuousliability shares. We develop a liability rule, which we callthe "super-symmetric rule," that is both efficient and continuous,that is based on comparative negligence when both parties arenegligent and on comparative vigilance when both parties arevigilant, and that is always responsive to increased care.     

论民法上的注意义务

无论在英美法系还是在大陆法系,注意义务都是过失判定的基准。民法上的注意义务是义务主体谨慎地为自己一切行为(包括作为和不作为)的法律义务,其核心内容包括行为致害后果预见义务和行为致害后果避免义务。注意义务的产生依据包括制定法、技术规范、习惯和常理、合同或委托、在先行为。在注意义务的体系中,特别要重视以内容为标准的体系构成,还要理清作为注意义务与不作为注意义务,更要突出高度注意义务的地位。在注意义务存在冲突的情况下,其解决规则为依据注意义务的优先性。注意义务有着程度的差异,应当构建“注意程度标准人”以替代“合理人”。我国侵权行为立法应当明确规定注意义务。     

注意规范保护目的与交通过失犯的成立

交通过失犯的本质应是结果回避义务,判断该义务之有无应以预见因果关系为内容的结果预见可能性为前提;注意规范保护目的是判断此种因果关系成立与否的理论,只有当行为人违反了注意规范保护目的而致损害法益结果发生时才能成立交通过失犯。注意规范保护目的是以作为刑法规范下位规则的交通法规为基础的可普遍适用于交通过失犯的判断标准,它属于交通过失犯中的违法要素,使用它无须通过客观归责理论。注意规范保护目的理论能合理限定交通过失犯的成立范围,有效克服我国司法实践中普遍存在的以交通事故责任书直接作为刑法上交通过失犯成立依据的不妥做法。     

侵权法上的原因力理论研究

在数人的分别加害行为不构成一个整体原因但致受害人同一损害后果之情形,需要解决多数加害人的责任分配问题。在受害人有过错而减轻或免除行为人责任之情形以及共同侵权责任人在承担连带责任后内部分割责任份额之情形,也需要相应的规则来分配责任。过去的理论比较侧重于从过错中寻找答案,而作者认为对这些情形的责任分配之基本规则主要应当是原因力,即主要依据各当事人的分别行为对同一损害后果之发生所起作用之大小确定其责任,但是这并不否认比较过错规则在一些案件中的作用。     

医疗侵权损害赔偿的限制规则

因医疗侵权行为引起的损害赔偿问题,司法解释采取了以是否构成医疗事故为依据适用不同法律法规的制度,引起较大争议。作为一种侵权行为,医疗侵权造成患者损害的,应以全部赔偿为原则,辅之以过失相抵规则和衡平原则。对患者因医疗行为带来的损害,医疗机构原则上应全部予以赔偿;由于患者本身的原因与医疗过错共同作用造成损失的发生和扩大的,应适用过失相抵规则,适当减轻甚至免除医疗机构的赔偿责任;在精神损害赔偿方面,还应当考虑医疗机构的过错程度和偿付能力等因素,适用衡平原则。     

The development of care technology under liability law

It is well known that strict liability and negligence induce pareto optimal care in a most restrictive model of unilateral accidents. The paper at hand extends this traditional theorem from its static context to an intertemporal setting where tort law induces progress in care technology. This model provides a methodological framework for a general analysis of the dynamic incentives generated by alternative liability rules. One of the many possible extensions of the basic model is to allow for incomplete information. Particularly, we drop the assumption that the authority setting the due care standard under negligence is able to assess technical progress ex ante. It is shown that the dynamic incentives of the negligence rule are distorted compared to strict liability in this modified framework.     

美国侵权法中的纯粹经济损失解读

纯粹经济损失问题是美国侵权法领域的热点问题之一,它的解决主要依据一般过失侵权规则和经济损失规则两种方法。作为占主导地位的规则,经济损失规则源于法院对缺陷产品引起纯粹经济损失案件的判决,现在已经广泛适用于一般过失侵权领域。经济损失规则的理论依据主要包括维持侵权法与合同法的界限、合同优先理论、＂诉讼洪闸＂理论和社会成本理论。经济损失规则在服务合同、过失误述等特殊情况下的适用例外,在不同的州得到不同程度的承认。总体而言,美国侵权法在纯粹经济损失问题上达成了尚不稳定的一致,相关的判例及学说仍在不断发展之中。