Presumptions,Burdens, and Best Interests in Relocation Law

The pure “best interests” approach to relocation law is a failure. It is unpredictable and expensive, increasing conflict and discouraging settlement. The “fundamental questions” proposed by Parkinson and Cashmore in their article will not reform the law. Real reform will require the use of presumptions or burdens to guide best interests. “Presumptions” are not “rules,” but only starting points. No simple presumption “for” or “against” all relocations can be justified, but there are large categories of cases that do warrant presumptions: interim moves, unilateral relocations, shared care, and predominant primary caregivers. The first three involve presumptions against relocation, while the last—the largest category—warrants a presumption that relocation is in the best interests of the child, unless the contrary is proved. There will remain a small minority of in‐between cases where none of these presumptions will operate, recognizing the limits of our general knowledge. It is time to move the relocation reform debate beyond pure “best interests,” to the next stage, to a serious discussion of which cases warrant presumptions, and of what strength.

Key Points for the Family Court Community
• Pure best interests approach to relocation law is a failure
• Presumptions or burdens needed to reform the law, but not just “for” or “against”
• Presumptions are identified for four categories of relocation cases: interim moves, unilateral relocations, shared care, and predominant primary caregivers

     

累积犯视域下网络账号恶意注册行为的规制

作为各类网络“黑灰产业”的源头,网络账号恶意注册行为具有行为原子化、推定的“恶意”、原因力的间接性、侵犯法益的广泛性等特征,亟需刑法规制。累积犯理论依据“真实的累积效应”,将轻微不法行为纳入抽象危险犯的规制范围,与网络账号恶意注册行为相契合且为规制后者提供了理论支持。立足于网络社会特点及语用学的发展,通过对刑法解释进行“去中心化”的网络改造,可使帮助信息网络犯罪活动罪的适用更加灵活。对“明知”与“犯罪”的阐释应跳出传统语义的窠臼,扩张至“推定明知”与“不法行为”,进而在恪守罪刑法定原则的基础上实现刑法立法的效用最大化。     

Was Ellen Wronged?

Imagine a citizen (call her Ellen) engages in conduct the state says is a crime, for example, money laundering. Imagine too that the state of which Ellen is a citizen has decided to make money laundering a crime. Does the state wrong Ellen when it punishes her for money laundering? It depends on what you think about the authority of the criminal law. Most criminal law scholars would probably say that the criminal law as such has no authority. Whatever authority is has depends on how well it adheres to the demands of morality inasmuch as morality is the only authority we have. Thus if morality says that money laundering should not be a crime then the state wrongs Ellen when it punishes her. But if the criminal law as such does have authority, and if in the exercise of its authority the state has decided to make money laundering a crime, then the state does Ellen no wrong when it punishes her.     

Gustav Radbruch vs. Hans Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law*

Abstract. Can the label “law” apply to rules as amoral as the enactments of the Nazis? This question confronted the courts in Germany after 1945. In dealing with it, the judges had to take sides in the philosophical debate over the concept of law. In this context, the prominent voices of the legal philosophers Gustav Radbruch and Hans Kelsen could not go unheard. This paper draws on what could have been the “Radbruch‐Kelsen debate on Nazi Law.” In examining the debate, it will argue for a substantive account of the morality of the law, as expressed in Radbruch's Formula.     

Should Law Improve Morality?

Lawyers and philosophers have long debated whether law should enforce social morality. This paper explores whether law should improve social morality. It explains how this might be possible, and what sort of obstacles, factual and moral, there are to doing so. It concludes with an example: our law should attempt to improve our social morality of sexual conduct.     

刑法框架下见危不助犯罪化的具体考量

基于刑事一体化的要求,刑事立法也应从"一体化"的要求出发,在研制出法律文本的同时顾及司法与守法的可能。通过对见危不助犯罪化的刑事立法本身及其在法律实践中的实际效果进行分析与研究表明,将见危不助行为犯罪化的做法,无法在法益判断上寻求到立法的根据,司法实践中也会遭遇无法解决的困难。将道德纳入刑法体系,未必见得公民便能确立对法律的忠诚,刑法并不是我们在规制见危不助行为方面所能达致的普遍共识。     

以罪名为讨论平台的反思与纠正

我国刑法学界存在以罪名作为问题讨论平台的现象,但是,由最高司法机关确定的罪名与刑法规定的犯罪构成之间大多并非一一对应的关系,“多罪一名”是我国罪名体系的显著特征,以罪名作为问题讨论平台会带来诸多理论上难以妥善处理的问题。在刑法学研究中,应当严格区分罪名和犯罪这两个概念。刑法学的研究对象是犯罪,讨论刑法问题的基本平台只能是犯罪构成而不是罪名,分析刑法问题的基本单元是“一个犯罪构成”而不是“一个罪名”。罪数中的“罪”是指犯罪构成而不是罪名,具体的事实认识错误是指“同一犯罪构成”内的事实认识错误而非“同一罪名”内的事实认识错误,罪过是犯罪构成的罪过而非罪名的罪过。     

The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?*

Jurisprudential debate about the grounds of law often focuses on the status of morality. Given the undoubted fact of judicial engagement with morality in legal reasoning, the key question is whether morality legitimately counts as a ground of law. This article seeks to challenge the special status accorded to morality in debates about the grounds of law. The claim I seek to advance is that very often judicial engagement with morality is not different in kind to judicial engagement with other diverse objects of legal reasoning. What the comparison tends to show is that instances of “moral reasoning” in law do not obviously challenge our account of the grounds of law. Rather these instances can be viewed as central case examples of legal reasoning. Conventional grounds of law are left untouched.     

略论我国第一个《刑法修正案》

笔者认为,《刑法修正案》不属于单行刑法,用“修正案”的形式补充修改刑法具有灵活性、便于适用性,能保持刑法统一等优点,但是我国第一个《刑法修正案》在立法技巧上仍不当地沿用了以往单行刑法的模式。     

论主要罪过

在结果加重犯、结合犯,以及行为人对于结果发生难以预测的特殊犯罪中,要认定行为人究竟具备故意还是过失的罪过,可能比较困难。对此,刑法学界先后提出了复合罪过说、客观的超过要素概念等解决方法。但是,这些理论是否合理,还值得推敲。本文提出的新方法是:先从“事实上”确定这些特殊犯罪中的行为人究竟有多少个罪过;然后从“规范”意义上确定在这些罪过中,哪一个是次要罪过,哪一个是主要罪过,最终确定的这个主要罪过就是这些特殊犯罪的罪过形式。“主要罪过说”的提出,有助于解决刑法学上一直存在的罪过难题。     

法律介入科研违规行为的障碍因素分析

由于严重的科研违规行为同样会带来严重的社会危害性,从而为法律介入科研违规行为提供了可能性。但法律介入科研违规行为的时间毕竟不长,目前还存在着许多障碍因素。这些障碍主要有:我国传统社会的“德主法辅”的观念仍在产生消极影响;科研活动的特点会导致立法的复杂性;我国刑法理论中的犯罪概念含混不清,给具体科研违规行为的定性带来了困难。     

犯罪着手的教义学重述:学说对决、命题重证与具体解答

形式客观说并未丢弃实质,故其本为形式与实质相结合说。是否立足于构成要件行为是法益侵害紧迫危险性的刑法定型,决定了形式客观说和实质客观说各自是否为犯罪着手认定提供了明确标准,且是否导致犯罪着手认定的过于提前或推迟,进而决定了是否背离罪刑法定原则。犯罪着手的认定标准,应抛弃脱离形式限制的实质客观说而仍坚持形式客观说,但其“开始命题”应通过“基于大数法则的类型化危险形成说”而将犯罪着手的认定标准予以实质性落实。通过“基于大数法则的类型化危险形成说”,形式客观说对结合犯、隔离犯、徐行犯和原因自由行为型犯罪的着手能够做出妥当解答。     

刑法概念的法哲学问题

刑法的概念既重要又危险,而如何使其科学化却是被忽视了的法哲学问题。从刑法与道德和政治的关系出发,能够为重新理解刑法的概念开辟新路径。任何时代的刑法都是自己时代的公共道德与政治权力相互结合的产物,只不过由于政治权力的性质不同,这种结合方式亦会不同。现代刑法应具有对公共道德与公共政治进行双向控制的功能,而刑法生活是刑法道德基因所存在、表现的基本场域,回到刑法生活才是尊重和确证刑法之道德基因的基本途径。     

犯罪概念形式与实质的理论建构

犯罪概念的形式与实质,是刑法理论犯罪界说的焦点,并且由此涉及到对于罪刑法定原则的贯彻。在刑法规范的框架内,犯罪的形式界定与实质界定并不是冲突的;大陆法系、英美法系犯罪成立条件的形式也贯穿着实质的判断。犯罪实质与形式的划分,既是立法实际的复写,也是理论分析的必要。行为的犯罪评价可以通过肯定判断与否定判断来具体实现。基于犯罪的“形式与实质双面统一”的理念,犯罪概念与罪刑法定原则具有形式与内容的统一。     

构成要件和犯罪体系

日本的阶层犯罪体系理论取道德国,其经历了从贝尔纳体系向李斯特体系的转变。相应地,日本的构成要件论也经历了特别构成要件和一般构成要件的分歧。同时,日本的刑事立法中也存在与其理论体系相龃龉的现象。这也是导致理论以及实务中问题产生的原因。鉴于此,有必要从以下两方面明确探讨犯罪论体系的实际意义:第一,区分刑法上的“构成要件”和刑事诉讼法上的“构成犯罪的事实”;第二,在刑事政策上,具有采纳阶层体系的必要性。如果刑法不采纳政策上的“保安处分”,只注重刑罚这一法效果的话,只要坚持“责任主义”,“要件体系”也是行得通的。     

Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge Informer: A Reconsideration

Hart's defense of the separation of law and morality is partly based on his refusal to accept Radbruch's solution of the well‐known grudge informer case, in his famous article “Statutory Injustice and Suprastatutory Law.” In this paper, I present a detailed reconstruction of the “debate” between Radbruch and Hart on this case. I reach the conclusion that Hart fails to address the issue that was Radbruch's primary concern, namely the legal position of the judiciary when dealing with criminal statutes. I suggest that Hart's separation thesis cannot be upheld in the face of this concern. In my argument, Hart's mistaken understanding of the verdict of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg that he refers to plays a crucial role.     

“不知法不免责”准则的历史考察

刑法中事实错误与法律错误分类的现代意义与罗马法无关。对“不知法不免责”准则的发展历史的考察表明,无论在大陆法的语境中,还是在普通法的语境中,现代的“不知法不免责”准则都建立在知法的推定的基础之上。知法的推定与近代以来国家权威的扩张与治理方式的理性化存在紧密联系。借助知法的推定,“不知法不免责”准则与责任主义在古典的刑法理论体系中得以自洽共存。在知法的推定动摇之后,为维护“不知法不免责”的传统立场,人们提出诸种新的理论根据,但这些根据无法使传统立场正当化。     

Grandparent contact: another presumption?

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the debate about the enhancement of grandparents’ legal status in relation to their grandchildren. In particular, it observes that calls for a legal presumption in favour of grandparent contact with their grandchildren when family relationships break down were emboldened by the enactment in s1(2A) of the Children Act 1989 of a presumption that involvement of both parents in their children’s lives furthers children’s welfare. Proponents of grandparent rights argued that there should be a similar statutory presumption in favour of grandparent involvement. It is also argued that courts should strictly enforce child arrangement orders that give grandparents time with grandchildren. The article examines the welfare case for such involvement and concludes that there is no unequivocal evidence to support it. It also considers the effect of the presumption in s1(2A). The article concludes that to enact a similar presumption in favour of grandparents, to apply a de facto presumption, to enforce orders strictly and even to remove the leave requirement that currently exists, could prejudice the interests of mothers as well as children.     

“卡迪”模式与刑事公正司法的实现

从“有法必依”到“公正司法”喻示着一种刑事司法观的应然转变:放松了司法者对法律文本本身严格服从的要求,更加强调文本之外的个案公正、合情理等实质合理性依据。这对破解当下具有普遍性的法条主义裁判思维,无疑是一种很好的政策支持和启发。按照罪刑法定原则本意进行合乎逻辑的推演,绝不能推导出“法有明文规定即可定罪处罚”的结论。韦伯关于中国古代司法系“卡迪”模式(即“非理性”)的论断具有一定的事实依据及合理性,这种卡迪模式对实质公正的追求具有目的正当性,不宜将此简单视为“恣意司法”的代名词,其中体现的能动性判断具有司法出罪维度的意义。在目前刑法体系下,法的公正价值与法的安定性并不存在冲突,出罪的理论依据与规范依据完全可以得到恰当融合,但在法适用中需要缓和法的命令性要求。恰当的说理论证是嫁接法的安定性与个案公正的纽带,该过程实际上是将合情理、合目的等价值考量揉入刑法文本的理解、适用及说理论证过程当中。     

Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence

When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence. After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive regime, I ask what Ashworth’s challenge consists in. It seems that there is broad disagreement over the meaning and requirements of the presumption of innocence. I thus survey the myriad possibilities and extract two claims that have potential bearing on preventive regimes. One claim is that of substantive priority—the criminal law comes first when assessing blame. This is the claim at the root of objections to pretrial detention based on consideration of the crime charged. The second strand of argument is one of procedural symmetry. This is the concern that with respect to citizen/state relations, certain procedures are required, including, for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offense or defense. Having extracted these claims, I then assess their applicability with respect to the preventive regime defended. I first conclude that the criminal law must share blame and censure with other fora, and thus, the criminal law only has substantive priority when criminal proceedings have been instituted. I then survey whether procedural symmetry is required, specifically assessing whether the preventive regime I defend requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My tentative conclusion is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is warranted.