Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS); TRICARE program; nonavailability statement requirements--DoD. Final rule

This final rule revises certain requirements and procedures for the TRICARE Program, the purpose of which is to implement a comprehensive managed health care delivery system composed of military medical treatment facilities and CHAMPUS. Issues addressed in this rule include priority for access to care in military treatment facilities and requirements for payment of enrollment fees. This rule also includes provisions revising the requirement that certain beneficiaries obtain a non-availability statement from a military treatment facility commander prior to receiving certain health care services from civilian providers.     

Retail medical clinics: increasing access to low cost medical care amongst a developing legal environment

Retail medical clinics are an innovation in health care with the potential to increase access to low-cost basic health care services while changing the delivery model for routine, non-urgent medical care. However, the few states that attempted to directly regulate retail medical clinics have been met with criticism by the FTC due to the proposed legislations' anticompetitive undertones. The relationship between retail medical clinics and the host stores or pharmacies that house them has the potential to spark fraud and abuse concerns. Retail medical clinics must abide by state-specific regulation on scope of practice of the various mid-level practitioners who work for the clinics, particularly to minimize exposure to litigation and keep within the clinics' intended purpose of a supplement to primary care physician offices. The author concludes that the consumer benefits of cost and convenience, combined with the potential for growth and expanded consumer base from a retailers' perspective, make the legal challenge inherent in running a retail medical clinic well worth the effort.     

Contract health care services; reimbursement and Medicare allowable rates--Bureau of Prisons, Dept. of Justice. Notice

The Bureau of Prisons is issuing this Statement of Policy to inform the public that when it becomes necessary to supplement the direct delivery system of health care the Bureau provides to persons committed to its custody, the Bureau ordinarily will contract to purchase health services only with those hospitals, physicians and other health care providers which agree to accept, as payment in full, reimbursement at rates no higher than the prevailing Medicare allowable rates (including deductibles and co-payments). This encompasses those rates established by the Health Care Financing Administration as "sole community providers" or "regional referral centers". The Bureau will phase this policy into the administration of its contract health services program.     

Differences in health care spending across countries: statistical evidence

The empirical evidence available for OECD countries suggests that economic factors play a major role and that demographic factors play a minor role in explaining differences in health care spending across countries. When countries are grouped on the basis of their health care systems, some significant cross-country differences result: countries with higher transfer rates (a larger share of collective financing) are not generally characterized by higher health care expenditures, and conversely, countries with a larger share of private financing (including higher coinsurance rates) do not have lower expenditures. Rather, the opposite holds true. Similar conclusions apply to the share of public versus private production of health goods. Furthermore, the results do not support the claims of those critics of universal public insurance systems who consider the expansion of the coverage to be a major source of expenditure growth. These findings cast serious doubt on the claim that cost containment can be achieved via market reforms that rely heavily on direct consumer payments and cost sharing as instruments of financing. A comparative analysis of the historic record of the United States, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany generally supports these conclusions; it also suggests that a greater degree of public penetration offers a better chance for control of health spending, particularly in periods of austerity. There is a strong presumption that health care systems relying on some overall control of spending generally are more cost-effective than those relying more on decentralized mechanisms of control. Services are more equitably distributed in relation to health and payment for health services is far more progressive in the former type of system.     

The fox and the grapes: is real reform beyond reach in the United States?

As the challenges of maintaining (or, in the US case, attaining) affordable universal coverage multiply, the debate about what constitutes "real" reform intensifies in Western health care systems. The reality of reform, however, lies in the eyes of myriad beholders who variously enshrine consumer responsibility, changes in payment systems, reorganization, and other strategies -- or some encompassing combination of all of the above -- as the essential ingredient(s). This debate, increasingly informed by the agendas of health services researchers and health policy analysts, arguably serves as much or more to becloud as to clarify the practical options policy makers face and remains severely imbalanced with respect to the institutional sectors on which it concentrates, the fields of knowledge on which it draws, and the roles it envisions for markets and the state.     

How MFN clauses used in the health care industry unreasonably restrain trade under the Sherman Act

When used in the health care industry, an MFN clause is a contractual agreement that guarantees a health insurer the same best price as their market competitors. MFN clauses have the effect of unnecessarily raising consumer costs, reducing choice among providers, constraining access to care and preventing the development of alternative health care delivery models. The purpose of this paper is four-fold. First, to design a four-quadrant matrix to evaluate the pro-competitive and anticompetitive purposes and effects of MFN clauses under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Second, to defeat the jurisprudential presumption that MFN clauses are pro-competitive in the health care industry and to recommend that this presumption be abolished. Third, to examine the U.S. Department of Justice's paradigmatic shift over the last decade toward prosecuting large insurers who employ MFN clauses resulting in U.S. Consent Decrees. Fourth, to outline the indicia of a meritorious claim against an insurer who employs an MFN clause.     

Waiting for Godot: wishes and worries in managed care

Managed care has done a better job at reducing expenditure growth than it has in improving quality. Although reduced expenditure growth is not appreciated by many, it has real benefits. For the majority of Americans who are privately insured, it results in greater disposable income for goods and services other than health care (although the illusion of employer-paid health insurance obscures this reality for many). For Medicaid programs, slower growth of expenditures facilitates efforts at expanding coverage. For low-income workers, slower expenditure growth results in larger numbers of people retaining insurance coverage than would have been the case if premiums rose more quickly. While there are some victories to which managed care organizations can point, we cannot credibly argue that overall levels of quality and health outcomes are improving as the health care system is massively disrupted by changes in health care finance and delivery. The disruptions create real hardships for some physicians and other health care workers, and worries for many consumers. These worries fuel the managed care backlash. The danger is that politicians will respond to these worries with policies that inhibit the development of high-quality delivery systems. The opportunity is for relatively modest public policy changes--external review organizations, better public-sector purchasing capabilities, public investment in producing and publicizing information on health plan and medical group performance, and establishment of a public ombudsperson--to respond to consumer worries and lead to improvements in health care quality and outcomes. Finally, I would be remiss without a reminder that the single most effective action politicians could take to improve health care quality and outcomes would be to change the rules of health care financing to assure that all Americans are covered by managed care. Even with all of its inadequacies, managed care is much superior to the patchwork care available to the 43 million Americans who are uninsured. The managed care backlash is concerned with protecting patients who are insured (and their providers). Far more valuable would be to protect those without insurance. Sadly, no politician has yet figured out how to do this. Still waiting.     

Medicare program; rural health clinics: amendments to participation requirements and payment provisions; and establishment of a quality assessment and performance improvement program. Final rule

This final rule amends Medicare certification and payment requirements for rural health clinics (RHCs) as required by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). It changes the definition of a qualifying rural shortage area in which a Medicare RHC must be located; establishes criteria for identifying RHCs essential to delivery of primary care services that we can continue to approve as Medicare RHCs in areas no longer designated as medically underserved; and limits waivers of certain nonphysician practitioner staffing requirements. This final rule imposes payment limits on provider-based RHCs and prohibits "commingling" (the use of the space, professional staff, equipment, and other resources) of an RHC with another entity. The rule also requires RHCs to establish a quality assessment and performance improvement program that goes beyond current regulations. Finally, this final rule addresses public comments received on the February 28, 2002 proposed rule and makes other revisions for clarity and uniformity and to improve program administration.     

Medicare program; home health prospective payment system refinement and rate update for calendar year 2008. Final rule with comment period

This final rule with comment period sets forth an update to the 60-day national episode rates and the national per-visit amounts under the Medicare prospective payment system for home health services, effective on January 1, 2008. As part of this final rule with comment period, we are also rebasing and revising the home health market basket to ensure it continues to adequately reflect the price changes of efficiently providing home health services. This final rule with comment period also sets forth the refinements to the payment system. In addition, this final rule with comment period establishes new quality of care data collection requirements. Finally, this final rule with comment period allows for further public comment on the 2.71 percent reduction to the home health prospective payment system payment rates that are scheduled to occur in 2011, to account for changes in coding that were not related to an underlying change in patient health status (section III.B.6).     

The changing locus of decision making in the health care sector

In the 1970s, the health policy debate focused on whether government or the medical profession should control the health care system. This article asserts that that struggle between two forms of centralized control was both less promising and less consequential than the devolution of decision-making authority upon consumers and their agents that is occurring today and that seems likely to continue as competitive forces become stronger and opportunities for meaningful consumer choice increases. What we are witnessing is the simultaneous deprofessionalization and depoliticization of important decisions affecting health care, a decentralization and diversification of the system that is opening new possibilities for translating diverse consumer desires into provider performance. Although covering much familiar ground, this article links a variety of seemingly discrete issues under the sterility of the competition-versus-regulation debate and to show the historical and ethical significance of the major changes that are under way in the health care sector today.     

Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS); TRICARE Program; reimbursement--DoD. Final rule

This final rule revises certain requirements and procedures for reimbursement under the CHAMPUS program, the purpose of which is to implement a comprehensive managed health care delivery system composed of military medical treatment facilities and CHAMPUS. Issues addressed in this rule include: implementation of changes made to the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) upon which the CHAMPUS DRG-based payment system is modeled and required by law to follow wherever practicable, along with changes to make our DRG-based payment system operate better; clarification of payment reduction for noncompliance with required utilization of publication of list of ambulatory surgery procedures; limitation on ambulatory surgery group payment rates; extension of the balance billing limitations currently in place for individual and professional providers to non-institutional, non-professional providers; adjustment of the CHAMPUS maximum allowable charge (CMAC) rate in the small number of cases where the CMAC rate is less than the Medicare rate; implementation of the government-wide debarment rule where any provider excluded or suspended from CHAMPUS shall be excluded from all other programs and activities involving Federal financial assistance, such as Medicare or Medicaid; elimination of the requirement for non-participating providers to file claims; and revision of the ambulatory surgery cost-share information to enable the cost-share to be assessed against the facility claim instead of the primary surgeon's claim.     

Payment method for health care services under the Supplemental Health Care Program for Active Duty Members of the Uniformed Services; adoption of CHAMPUS procedures--DoD. Final rule

This final rule partially implements 10 U.S.C. 1074(c), as amended by section 729 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Public Law 101-189. The recent amendment authorizes the Department of Defense to establish for the active duty supplemental care program payment rules similar to those used under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). The supplemental care program is the program which provides for the payment to civilian (non federal-governmental) health care providers for care provided to active duty members of the uniformed services. This final rule would adopt CHAMPUS payment amounts for the supplemental care program.     

Physicians' conflicts of interest in Japan and the United States: lessons for the United States

Japanese health policy shows that even with physician ownership and the absence of for-profit, investor-owned health care, physicians' conflicts of interest thrive. Physician dispensing of drugs and ownership of hospitals and clinics were justified in Japan as ways to avoid commercialization of medicine. Instead, they create physicians' conflicts and fuel patient overuse of services. Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) has responded by introducing per-diem payment, thereby creating incentives to decrease services in ways similar to those of American managed care organizations, but with none of their benefits, such as coordination of care, oversight of physicians practices, and quality assurance. Although the United States and Japanese health care systems are organized and financed differently there is convergence in the source of their physicians' conflicts and the way they are addressed. The United States is starting to integrate institutional and physician payment and align their incentives, in a traditional Japanese way. In so doing, the United States creates new physicians' conflicts and reduces the role of countervailing incentives and power, an advantage of previous policy. Japan, in turn, has combined incentives to increase and decrease services, thus moving closer to the U.S. policy.     

Payment for inpatient and outpatient health care professional services at non-departmental facilities and other medical charges associated with non-VA outpatient care. Final rule

This document affirms as final, with changes, a proposed rule that updates the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical regulations concerning the payment methodology used to calculate VA payments for inpatient and outpatient health care professional services and other medical services associated with non-VA outpatient care. The rule has been designed to ensure that it will not have adverse effects on access to care.     

Prospective payment based on case mix: will it work in nursing homes?

This article evaluates the potential efficacy of implementing a prospective payment system based on case mix in the nursing home industry. The analysis of structural differences between the nursing home and hospital industries suggests that the mechanism of compensating long-term care facilities should be based on functional health status rather than on diagnosis and that incentives to improve quality and access should be strengthened. The article assesses several systems of classifying patients that have been proposed as the basis for implementing a prospective payment system in the nursing home industry. The article concludes with a discussion of policy issues related to the appropriate unit of payment and the scope of regulatory authority.     

Child health policy in the U.S.: the paradox of consensus

The U.S. spends more of its total GNP on health services than any other nation, yet it has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the industrialized world. Young American children are immunized at rates that are one-half those of Western Europe, Canada, and Israel. In the mid-1980s, a consensus among policymakers on the need for federal action to improve child health services resulted in the expansion of Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women and young children and the separation of Medicaid eligibility from eligibility for AFDC. The current phase of child health policymaking includes discussion of much broader proposals for changes in health care financing and innovation in health care delivery. This examination of child health policy begins by reviewing the politics of maternal and child health services from the early twentieth century to the Reagan administration, including the role of feminist movements, the development of pediatrics, and the expansion of federal involvement during the 1960s. Next, the politics of Medicaid expansion as a strategy for addressing child health issues are discussed. Current critiques of child health services in the U.S. are examined, along with proposals to restructure health care financing and delivery. Central to the politics of child health policy during the 1980s and into the 1990s is the way in which child health has been defined. Infant mortality and childhood illness are presented as preventable problems. Investment in young children is discussed as a prudent as well as a compassionate policy, one which will reduce future health care costs and enhance our position in the international economy. Unlike other "disadvantaged groups," children are universally viewed as innocent and deserving of societal support. Framing child health issues in these terms helped to produce consensus on the expansion of Medicaid eligibility. Yet the issues beyond the expansion of Medicaid eligibility involve the restructuring of health care financing and delivery, and, on these issues, conflict is far more likely than consensus.     

Medicare program; prospective payment system for long-term care hospitals RY 2009: annual payment rate updates, policy changes, and clarifications; and electronic submission of cost reports: revision to effective date of cost reporting period. Final rule

This final rule updates the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs). We are also consolidating the annual July 1 update for payment rates and the October 1 update for Medicare severity long-term care diagnosis-related group (MS-LTC-DRG) weights to a single rulemaking cycle that coincides with the Federal fiscal year (FFY). In addition, we are clarifying various policy issues. This final rule also finalizes the provisions from the Electronic Submission of Cost Reports: Revision to Effective Date of Cost Reporting Period interim final rule with comment period that was published in the May 27, 2005 Federal Register which revises the existing effective date by which all organ procurement organizations (OPOs), rural health clinics (RHCs), Federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), and community mental health centers (CMHCs) are required to submit their Medicare cost reports in a standardized electronic format from cost reporting periods ending on or after December 31, 2004 to cost reporting periods ending on or after March 31, 2005. This final rule does not affect the current cost reporting requirement for hospices and end-stage renal disease (ESRD) facilities. Hospices and ESRD facilities are required to continue to submit cost reports under the Medicare regulations in a standardized electronic format for cost reporting periods ending on or after December 31, 2004.     

Health care cost-containment regulation: prospects and an alternative.

Regulation of the health care system to achieve appropriate containment of overall costs is characterized by Professor Havighurst as requiring public officials to engage, directly or indirectly, in the rationing of medical services. This rationing function is seen by the author as peculiarly difficult for political institutions to perform, given the public's expectations and the symbolic importance of health care. An effort on the part of regulators to shift the rationing burden to providers is detected, as is a trend toward increasingly arbitrary regulation, designed to minimize regulators' confrontations with sensitive issues. Irrationality and ignorance are found to plague regulatory decision making on health-related issues, even though it is the consumer who is usually thought to suffer most from these disabilities. The author argues that consumer choice under some cost constraints is a preferable mechanism for allocating resources because it better reflects individuals' subjective preferences, has a greater capacity for facing trade-offs realistically, and can better contend with professional dominance of the resource allocation process. In view of the unlikelihood of regulation that is both sensitive and effective in containing costs, the author proposes that we rely primarily on consumer incentives to reform the system. A simple change in the tax treatment of health insurance or other health plan premiums, to strengthen consumers' interest in cost containment while also subsidizing needy consumers, is advocated. Steps to improve opportunities for innovation in cost containment by health insurers, HMOs, and other actors are outlined briefly.     

Methods for developing relative need criteria to accompany a health care capital expenditure limit

In recent years capital spending in the health care industry has escalated tremendously, and most forecasters agree that needs will increase at an even faster rate throughout the 1990s. As a result of this trend, there is a dire need to develop effective and equitable controls on capital spending in health care. One of the capital payment options under consideration is the establishment of a lid on capital expenditures and the concomitant allocation of capital to health care providers whose applications are the most meritorious. The purpose of this article is to present some ideas and methods for the development of a relative need system to accompany a capital expenditure limit and to supplement and expand the absolute need determinations of the typical CON process.     

Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS); TRICARE program; reimbursement--DoD. Proposed rule

This rule proposes to revise certain requirements and procedures for reimbursement under the TRICARE program, the purpose of which is to implement a comprehensive managed health care delivery system composed of military medical treatment facilities and CHAMPUS. Issues addressed in this proposed rule include: implementation of changes made to the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) upon which the CHAMPUS DRG-based payment system is modeled and required by law to follow wherever practicable, along with changes to make our DRG-based payment system operate better; extension of the balance billing limitations currently in place for individual and professional providers to non-institutional, non-professional providers; adjusting the CHAMPUS maximum allowable charge (CMAC) rate in the small number of cases where the CMAC rate is less than the Medicare rate; and implementing the government-wide debarment rule where any provider excluded or suspended from CHAMPUS shall be excluded from all other programs and activities involving Federal financial assistance, such as Medicare or Medicaid, and adding violations of our balance billing or claims filing requirements to the list of provider actions considered violations of the TRICARE/CHAMPUS program.