美国、德国隐私权宪法保护比较研究

美国和德国是世界上隐私权宪法保护比较成熟的国家,但是由于历史文化和法律传统的不同,两国隐私权的宪法保护在基本理念、具体含义、宪法保护方式和保护效力方面存在着很大的不同,比较研究两国隐私权的宪法保护对于我国隐私权的宪法保护的完善有借鉴意义。     

浅议宪法对隐私权的保障及完善

随着科学技术的发展,人们进入信息时代,个人隐私受到侵犯的事件频频发生,对隐私权的保护也越来越引起人们的重视。当今世界有许多国家不仅在侵权法或普通法中对隐私权进行了保护,还在判例或成文法中确认了隐私权的宪法权利属性,从宪法高度保护个人隐私权,而相比之下我国法律对隐私权的保护仍不够完善,宪法中没有对隐私权的明确规定,只是间接对其进行了不完全保护。本文从宪法对隐私权进行保护的必要性及现状进行了分析,并从宪法法规、宪法效力及相关配套制度几方面提出了完善隐私权保障的措施。     

论隐私权的宪法保护——以自媒体时代为分析背景

自媒体在彰显言论自由之对,也打开了一扇偷窥公民隐私之窗.在宪法视野下,隐私权已经超越部门法的疆域上升为一项基本人权.在自媒体时代,侵犯公民隐私权的特征表现为隐蔽性、侵财性、便捷性和严重性,隐私权的传统法律保护模式遭遇了新的挑战.宪法对公民隐私权加以保护有其合理性与必要性.隐私权的宪法保护路径在于明确隐私权是一项列举的人权,强化违宪审查制度的贯彻执行,并通过部门法落实和实施该项权利,建立一个由宪法统领的、由部门法具体实施的、多层级和全方位的立体保护架构.     

浅议宪法隐私权的确认

隐私权随着一些网络事件的热议,引起了社会各界广泛关注。确切的说,隐私权并未被我国宪法明示为一项公民权利,但是现行宪法中诸多条款都为隐私权的宪法保护提供了依据,完全可以通过对这些条款的解释,确认宪法隐私权。本文通过对现行宪法相关条款的解读,来确立作为公民基本权利一种的隐私权。     

搜查与隐私权保护——加拿大宪法与美国宪法第4修正案之比较

<加拿大权利与自由宪章>第8条赋予了公民反对不合理的搜查和扣押的权利.与美国宪法第4修正案的发展历程类似,经由加拿大最高法院的判例解释,<宪章>第8条确立了隐私权的宪法保护.基于对美国宪法判例的批判和借鉴,<宪章>第8条下的隐私权在判断标准、保护范围方面体现了本国特色.第8条下隐私权具备的丰富内涵,不仅得益于加拿大最高法院确立的隐私权旨在促进的诸项基本价值,也与加拿大较为宽泛的非法证据排除规则有关.     

隐私权:历史进路与现实挑战

隐私权的观念发源于美国,并很快影响了大陆法系国家。在美国,隐私权曾遭遇言论自由的阻碍,后来以个人信息隐私为主要法益。而在德国,民法隐私权的发展以宪法隐私权的出现为主要推力。我国自上世纪90年代以来,隐私权有了很大发展,但仍存在不足,为应对网络时代隐私权受到的冲击,我国还须加强对隐私权的保护。     

论隐私权的宪法保护

我国宪法对隐私权的保护在目前还比较薄弱，我国宪法理论应该将隐私杈普遍化处理。同时，在原则上应将隐私权优先于与之相冲突的权利进行保护，对于与隐私权相冲突的权利，可以在个案中利用价值平衡进行保护。     

隐私权:刑事程序基本权

隐私权是宪法权利,亦是刑事程序基本权.隐私权作为刑事程序调整的重要范围,保护着个人对刑法执行至关重要的有罪或者无罪信息的私有,以及对不让政府插手的个人信息的享有.加强刑事领域的隐私权保护,意味着要在政府的规范需要和个人隐私权益上达成大量开放式的司法平衡,对政府操纵背景条件的能力进行有限限制.漠视隐私权的刑事程序比我们想象的更具有事实性的恶果,其对事实结果的影响可能导致一些不良趋势.为此,应关注作为宪法权利的隐私权在刑事诉讼中的属性、价值及作用,加大对我国刑事程序中隐私权的保护.     

对我国刑事诉讼中隐私权保护的几点思考

隐私权入宪,确立隐私权的地位是根本 从当今国际的趋势来看,隐私权正在被逐步确立为一项独立的人格权,将隐私权作为一宪法权利加以保护不仅是有关国际公约的要求,也是很多国家的一致做法.而我国宪法并未确立隐私权的独立权利地位,只是在第38条、第39条、第40条原则性地规定了公民人格尊严不受侵犯;公民住宅不受非法侵犯;公民的通信自由和通信秘密受法律保护的内容.这只是规定了与隐私权有关的相当少的一部分内容,并没有明确规定隐私权,因此在宪法中明确规定隐私权显得相当必要.只有这样刑事诉讼法保护隐私权才能切实做到.     

浅谈言论自由与隐私权的冲突——从宪法权利新分类的视角出发

言论自由与隐私权是两项非常重要的宪法权利。但随着社会的发展,尤其是网络时代的到来,使言论自由与隐私权的冲突日益凸显。本文通过分析二者在权利类别中的归属,从宪法权利新分类的角度,明确了言论自由与隐私权冲突的实质。希望使言论自由和隐私权得到充分保护的同时,减少冲突和侵害。     

The Supreme Court's spring term: abortion, the right to die, and the decline of privacy rights

Wing analyzes the constitutional significance and the important long-term implications for health policy of three 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Hodgson v. Minnesota, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. Hodgson and Ohio upheld state statutes requiring parental notification of a minor's impending abortion. Cruzan upheld a state court decision refusing to allow the family of a patient in a persistent vegetative state to discontinue life-sustaining treatment. Wing argues that these decisions reach far beyond "the abortion issue" or "the right to die." Not only have they narrowed the constitutional protection of individual privacy, but they allow states to regulate activities like abortion in a manner that indicates that the Court is prepared to repeal the notion that individual privacy is entitled to enhanced judicial protection.     

Information Privacy Protection in the New Chinese Civil Code: Priority or Replacement?

The right to privacy has been developed through judicial practice and has evolved from “the protection of the right to reputation” to “privacy interest” then to “privacy right.” The Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China (2020) clarifies the right to information privacy and the right to personal information as two independent personality rights and establishes a privacy priority protection mechanism for private information in civil law. The comparative efficiency of the right to personal information may mean that the protection of the right to information privacy is weakened or even replaced by the right to personal information. The uncertainty and fragmentation of private information also creates a wide gray space for judicial decisions. The development from traditional privacy right to information privacy right and personal information right is generally positive and shows the active legal response to the protection of private information in multiple ways. However, clarifications and systematization are required to increase the effectiveness of such protections.     

Judges as Readers,Authors and Dialecticians: Legal Interpretation in the EC<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis>HR Cases on Mental Disability

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.     

Student privacy rights involving strip searches

The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution provides protection of all citizens against unreasonable search and seizure. The US Supreme Court has affirmed that the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against unreasonable intrusive searches by governmental officials. Since students possess constitutional rights and public school officials are considered governmental officials for Fourth Amendment purposes, privacy protection is afforded students in public schools within reasonable limits. A reasonable search is one that clearly does not violate the constitutional rights of students. What is reasonable, however, depends on the context within which a search occurs. Strip searches involving students in public schools are the most intrusive form of all searches. Extreme caution should be exercised by school officials regarding these types of searches.     

当事人隐私权保护视野中的司法透明之度

我国现有的公开审判制度及其运作远没有达到现代法治对司法机关的要求,司法透明度无疑是不够的。之所以强调透明应有必要的限度,是因为人民法院在全面落实公开审判制度过程中,保守国家秘密、审判秘密,保障当事人隐私权等合法权益与公众知情权、监督权的冲突不仅存在,而且日趋多样化。有鉴于此,立足公开审判,以当事人隐私权的保护为视角,对知情权等权利与隐私权之间的特殊关系进行理性思考和法理分析,探求在二者之间作出更为合理的制度安排,从而促进公开审判制度在我国得到更为全面的落实和更为规范的运行,真正实现“司法透明,公开有度”。     

基因隐私权的民法保护

以传统隐私权保护为基点的现行立法与司法,无法完成现代隐私权,特别是个人信息隐私权所强调和要求的保护架构.在权利配置上,无法实现对传统隐私权按照个人信息处理程序的不同阶段进行权利增设与重置.在保护机制上,无法通过司法能动主义建立个人信息隐私权,特别是基因隐私权所要求的公共监督框架.因此,在后基因组时代,应当坚持以个人信息法作为个人信息(包括基因信息)保护的基本制度框架,在个人信息法的范围内,对作为高度敏感个人信息的基因信息予以特别处理.     

Conundrums with penumbras: the right to privacy encompasses non-gamete providers who create preembryos with the intent to become parents

To date, five state high courts have resolved disputes over frozen preembryos. These disputes arose during divorce proceedings between couples who had previously used assisted reproduction and cryopreserved excess preembryos. In each case, one spouse wished to have the preembryos destroyed, while the other wanted to be able to use or donate them in the future. The parties in these cases invoked the constitutional right to privacy to argue for dispositional control over the preembryos; two of the five cases were resolved by relying on this right. The constitutional right to privacy protects intimate decisions involving procreation, marriage, and family life. However, when couples use donated sperm or ova to create preembryos, a unique circumstance arises: one spouse--the gamete provider--is genetically related to the preembryos and the other is not. If courts resolve frozen preembryo disputes that involve non-gamete providers based on the constitutional right to privacy, they should find that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the interests of both gamete and non-gamete providers. Individuals who create preembryos with the intent to become a parent have made an intimate decision involving procreation, marriage, and family life that falls squarely within the the right to privacy. In such cases, the couple together made the decision to create a family through the use of assisted reproduction, and the preembryos would not exist but for that joint decision. Therefore, gamete and non-gamete providers should be afforded equal constitutional protection in disputes over frozen preembryos.