Civilian power and ‘history‐making’ decisions: German agenda‐setting on Europe

This article examines ‘history‐making’ decisions on Europe by the German government, drawing on the concept of civilian power, which has been refined by international relations theorists, subjecting it to a political science critique. Three case studies ‐ of economic and monetary union (EMU), dual enlargement and European defence and security policy ‐ are discussed and compared with the aim of assessing the value of civilian power for the analysis and explanation of key German decisions. The focus is on agenda‐setting in relation to key ‘history‐making’ decisions. It is argued that German European policy behaviour is better explained by civilian power than realism or neo‐liberal institutionalism. However, civilian power does not adequately capture the complex attitudes and values at work in Germany, the interests brought to bear in a fragmented, sectoralised policy process, the resource limitations on pursuing this approach, and the external conditions for sustaining such a role.     

Collective memory in Germany and the great foreign policy debate: the case of the European refugee crisis

Abstract

Embedded within the wider normalization–continuity debate about the nature of Germany’s actorness, this article assesses the impact of collective memory on German foreign policy during the European refugee crisis. The Federal Republic’s open-door policy in autumn 2015 bewildered many observers who saw it as a self-harming act of charity. Based on a three-stage empirical framework, the article argues that Germany’s initial behaviour cannot be understood without accounting for the influence that collective memory still exerts in Germany today. The open-door policy was irreconcilable with Germany’s immediate material interests, but instead shaped by collective memory-inspired humanitarian and European principles. This conclusion challenges the growing consensus among students of German foreign policy that Germany is becoming a normal actor which has freed itself from the constraints of the past and behaves in congruence with its material interests. This article seeks to make a timely contribution to the knowledge about collective memory in international relations, Germany’s foreign policy in the specific as well as wider context, and the dynamics of the European refugee crisis.     

The “sleep-walking giant” awakes: resetting German foreign and security policy

A quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the role of the Bundesrepublik in Europe is once again the focus of international scrutiny and academic debate. Having long been seen as a “reflexive multilateralist” and “tamed power”, with a “leadership avoidance reflex” and a “civilian power” strategic culture, the Eurozone crisis has pushed the Berlin Republic into the role of “reluctant hegemon”. At the same time, however, Germany has been widely criticized by its EU and NATO partners for its half-hearted commitment to the Afghan war and its failure to support its allies in the Libyan intervention. Prompted by a call by Federal President Joachim Gauck in 2013 for Germany to live up to its international responsibilities, new themes in foreign and security policy have recently emerged. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2014, a more active and engaged approach was outlined by both the Foreign and Defence Ministers. This paper will examine recent shifts in the discourse of German foreign and security policy, and considers the extent to which these have been accompanied by significant shifts in policy outcome and implementation – particularly in the light of the Ukrainian crisis.     

“价值观外交”:德国新政府的外交基轴?

德国新政府提出的“价值观外交”是对默克尔政府开启的“价值观外交”的延续和继承,是作为后现代和后民族国家的德国成功转化身份的必然结果。德国国内政治生态、国际秩序变革和默克尔时期“价值观外交”实践的正向激励,都会促进德国新政府加速推进德式“价值观外交”。但德国的“价值观外交”不完全等同于“意识形态外交”,它给中德关系发展带来的既有机遇也有挑战。未来针对德国新政府对华政策中的“价值观外交”,中国应在坚持“红线”的基础上,注重从积极面入手,明确双方在多边主义规则和制度方面的共同点,争取相互合作以塑造更具包容性的国际秩序。     

Identity,Insecurity, and Great Power Politics:The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War

Why did Germany pursue naval expansion at the turn of the twentieth century? This question has long puzzled scholars of international security, who consider German naval ambition to be an instance of suboptimal arming—a decision that decreased Germany's overall security and risked the survival of the German state. This article argues that the social desire to be recognized as a world power guided Germany's decision to challenge British naval hegemony. From the beginning of its naval planning, Germany had one clear aim: a powerful fleet of battleships stationed in the North Sea would alter the political relationship with Britain in such a way that it could no longer ignore Germany's claim to world power status. Reconceptualizing Germany's naval ambition as a struggle for recognition elucidates the contradictions at the center of German naval strategy, explaining how the doomed policy could proceed despite its certain failure. The article concludes that the power-maximizing practices of great powers should be seen as an important component of identity construction and an understudied dimension of contemporary security practice.     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

Unity in the face of threat? Exploring the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and public support for a common European army in Germany

ABSTRACT

Perceptions of threat from Russia’s military activities in Ukraine and President Trump’s critical attitude towards NATO have put the idea of a common European army on the agenda of European politics. Do these strategic threat perceptions also influence public support for the creation of a common European army? Previous research has largely overlooked strategic threat perceptions as individual-level determinants of public support for a common European army. This article explores the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and support for a common European army at the individual level of analysis with representative German survey data from 2018. The multivariate analysis shows that perceiving Russia’s military activities in Ukraine as a threat to Germany’s security, and U.S. foreign and security policy as a threat to the cohesion of NATO significantly increases support for the creation of a common European army, even when the influence of numerous other determinants is controlled for. The findings highlight the importance of considering strategic threat perceptions in future analyses of public opinion on European defence cooperation and integration.     

German policy in a strategic triangle: Berlin,Paris, Washington … and what about London?

The article presents the German view on the current stand and future perspectives of the transatlantic relationship. It points to the caesuras that have defined the US–German relationship since the end of the Cold War. It also details the German role in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and highlights the German discussion on its involvement in those wars. The historical strategic triangle of the US, Germany and France might develop into a Euro‐American ellipse to confront current global challenges, but, as of today, many hurdles remain, particularly the lack of a common vision and policy regarding the future political order of Europe. The article finally calls on the German government to continue its policy as a ‘civilian power’ and to repair its relations with the US after the Iraq war. International cooperation in multilateral institutions remains the main pillar of German foreign policy.     

German Military Reform 1998–2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint over International Opportunity

Abstract

The article analyses the processes and outcomes of military reforms during the two Schröder governments (1998–2005). These reforms are the litmus test for Germany's willingness and ability to play an important role in crisis-management tasks as part of NATO, CESDP and the UN. The study argues that, despite its strengths, the concept of strategic culture provides only a partial explanation of military reform in Germany. The article illustrates the strongly self-referential nature of Bundeswehr reform, despite adaptational pressures from the EU and NATO and the role of ‘international structure’. The domestic politics of base closures, ramifications for social policy, economic and financial restrictions consequent upon German unification and commitment to EMU's Stability and Growth Pact were critical in determining the outcomes of the reform processes undertaken by Defence Ministers Rudolf Scharping and Peter Struck. The study also draws out the important role of policy leaders in the political manipulation of reform as entrepreneurs, brokers or veto-players and in controlling the extent of adaptational pressure from NATO and the EU. In doing so, the article shifts the focus of leadership studies in Germany away from the Chancellor to an examination of the role of ministerial and administrative leadership within the core executive.     

Not quite the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’: Japan's security,the US–Japan alliance and the ‘war on terror’ in East Asia

Japan, in responding to US expectations for support in the ‘war on terror’, has displayed a degree of strategic convergence on global security objectives, thus prompting policy-makers and observers to dub it the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’. This article argues, however, that Japan is far from assuming this role. For Japan, the ‘war on terror’ serves more as a political pretext for legitimating long-planned changes in military security policy that are often only marginally related to the US's anti-terrorism agenda. Instead, Japan has focused much more on using the terror threat rationale as a means to push forward its response to the regional and traditional security challenges of North Korea and China, even if at times it attempts to depict both as ‘new security challenges’ or as involving elements of counterterrorism. The final conclusion is that US military hegemony may be weakened by Japan's and the Asia-Pacific's potential divergence from the US global security agenda.     

National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand Strategy and Appeasement, 1930–1939

British grand strategy in the 1930s had two cardinal elements: security of the home islands and Imperial Defence. This article questions the view that Britain did not have a strategic commitment to the continent of Europe till late in the 1930s. It also provides an over-arching analysis of the two distinct but intertwined periods in the evolution of national strategy and Imperial defence in that decade: before 1930 till late 1937 built around the strategy of the balance of power; and from late-1937 till early 1939 built around the strategy of appeasement. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the high level debate within the British government over strategic issues without putting the domestic political situation into the context of the impact of the First World War on Britain's society and economy. Similarly, the development of the new international order created at the Paris Peace Conference – and its demise in the ‘hinge years’ of the early 1930s – also needs to be better understood in terms of how British grand strategy emerged in this period. A rational and realistic policy, appeasement was a tactical diplomatic manoeuvre; it had no place serving as the strategic basis of British external policy.     

Identity and anxiety: Germany’s struggle to lead

At a time when calls for German leadership abound, we need to ask what kind of leadership Berlin is likely to offer. This paper builds on scholarship that presumes identity as an essential precondition for orderly social life. My focus is on how identity is secured through ontological security-seeking. Ontological security theory reveals how Germany is responding to rising calls for leadership in Europe and beyond and traces these responses to an increasingly stressed identity narrative. It explains both Germany’s reluctance to lead and, being pressed to lead, how leadership is legitimated through discursive adaptation. Whether “leading from the center” or exercising “servant leadership”, ontological security theory exposes the specific interactions between a national self-narrative and a rapidly changing environment. I show how these interactions challenge Germany’s identity and its ability to adapt; how they cause ontological anxiety, and how the scope and direction of adaptation to structural change account for the kind of leadership Germany is able to offer. What we observe is a determined effort to position the country between a traditional culture of restraint that can no longer meet Germany’s responsibilities and a position of hegemony that speaks of self-serving behaviour and dominance.     

China’s Future Security Environment

A U.S.military strategy report published in 2009 provides an assessment of China's overall national security environment and regional issues over the next 25 years.China's future international strategi...     

Into the Great Wide Open: The Transformation of the German Armed Forces After 1990

The German military has gone through fundamental changes since Reunification in 1990. Not only did its obvious enemy disappear, but the basis for what had been a partnership of convenience between German society and the Bundeswehr eroded. Since then, successive German governments have tried to find ways to transform strategic concepts, military structures, and international commitments to fit the new international relations and security challenges at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These transformation efforts have been affected both by cultural restraints and by economic ones. Instead of just following one new and simple strategic concept, the transformation of the Bundeswehr had to be oriented towards military structures that were politically and financially feasible. Despite the progress achieved on the operational level, Germany is still lacking a clear strategic concept for the use of force and the engagement of the Bundeswehr.     

国家安全视角下南极法律规制的发展与应对

2015年《中华人民共和国国家安全法》从法律层面界定了中国国家安全的内涵和外延,其中包括维护在南极等新型领域的国家安全。由于中国南极事业的开展须遵循一系列的南极法律规制,因此南极法律规制的发展对中国在南极的国家安全利益具有重要意义。南极法律规制的主要内容包括和平利用与非军事化、搁置和冻结主权要求、科学研究自由、海洋生物资源养护、海事安全以及全面保护环境等。近年来,随着人类南极活动的扩展,南极法律规制出现了一些前沿性的问题,如南极主权要求国仍然强化权利主张,南极旅游和非政府活动、航空活动、特别区域保护等规则酝酿发展以及南极环境损害责任制度面临重新谈判等。这些趋势将对中国在南极的国家安全利益产生深远影响,中国可通过国内立法、发布政策文件、积极行使享有的国际法权利等途径来维护国家的南极利益。     

Continuity in the Face of Upheaval—British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government

This chapter will consider how the elements of continuity and change in British foreign policy that emerged under the current Labor government will be managed in the short to medium term and ask what their fuller implications for the UK and European security may be in the longer run. The article will examine how the change that transpired after 1997 which saw a new pro-European stance on security can be reconciled with the prevailing continuities in British strategic culture, namely Britain’s special relationship with the US, its global role, and, as demonstrated in the case of Iraq, the UK’s negation of Franco-German security initiatives. The article will also emphasise the central importance of the UK’s commitment to the EU’s security policy ambitions, given that the UK armed forces are the most capable in Europe and as confirmed in Iraq, an ESDP without a UK contribution would have no credibility. Despite Blair’s policy overtures towards developing greater European military capabilities, the continued reliance on the US has meant that British strategic culture has displayed remarkable continuity rather than fundamental transformation.     

De-Europeanization by Default? Germany's EU Policy in Defense and Asylum

Since the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union (EU) has undergone significant changes. Once a model "Europeanist," Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Neither an instance of a planned strategic change nor a result of an inevitable adaptation to structural shifts at the systemic level, these changes in German foreign policy, incremental yet significant as they are, evade both deterministic and voluntaristic accounts of foreign policy change. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory, the article develops an innovative framework for analysis that is applied to Germany's European asylum and refugee policy as well as its security and defense policy. The origins of both policy fields at the European level can be traced back to initiatives that were supported by or even originated in Germany. However, as the 1990s progressed Germany increasingly obstructed further institutionalization. While in the field of asylum and refugee policy the Amsterdam summit marks a clear turning point in Germany's position, the transformation of German policies on European security and defense proceeded rather as an incremental decrease in material support, aggravating substantive progress in the policy field more broadly. An unanticipated consequence of earlier initiatives, in both cases Germany has found it increasingly difficult to live up to the expectations it has helped to raise.     

俄罗斯新版国家安全战略评析

2021年7月2日,俄出台新版《俄罗斯联邦国家安全战略》,其中有许多新变化值得关注.俄认为,当前国际形势动荡不安,地缘政治紧张局势日益加剧,武力仍是解决国家间冲突矛盾的重要手段.俄当前国家安全面临的主要威胁是美西方针对其进行的"混合战争",具体包括军事威胁、经济制裁和政治施压.为此,新战略提出的基本战略目标是维护国内、...     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.